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Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
RASHAD MOON v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(SC 21069)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that newly discovered evidence established that he was actually innocent of those crimes. At his habeas trial, the petitioner introduced evidence that, after he was convicted, M, his alleged coconspirator, was separately tried and found not guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, among other offenses, under the statute (§ 53a-13 (a)) governing the affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. The petitioner claimed that M’s acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) established that M necessarily lacked the requisite intent to enter into a conspiracy with the petitioner and that M’s inability to form an intent to commit any crime at the time of the shooting established the petitioner’s actual innocence of each crime of which he was convicted. Relying on State v. Colon (257 Conn. 587), in which this court held that separately tried coconspirators are not entitled to consistent verdicts, the habeas court rejected the petitioner’s actual innocence claim, reasoning that M’s acquittal was, as a matter of law, irrelevant to whether the petitioner was actually innocent. Accordingly, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner’s habeas petition. The petitioner then appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court’s judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that the habeas court had misapplied Colon and failed to evaluate the aggregate evidence from the petitioner’s and M’s separate criminal trials. After conducting its own independent review of that evidence, the Appellate Court also concluded that M’s acquittal demonstrated that M was incapable of forming the necessary criminal intent to enter into the conspiracy, and M’s inability to form a criminal intent necessarily meant that the petitioner was actually innocent of conspiring with M to commit the robbery. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court determined that the evidence permitted a reasonable fact finder to find that a conspiracy to commit the robbery existed between the petitioner and a third individual, which served as the alternative basis for affirmance of the habeas court’s judgment. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:
Although the Appellate Court applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the petitioner’s actual innocence claim, it incorrectly concluded that M’s acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) demonstrated that M could not have possessed the specific intent required to form a conspiratorial agreement with the petitioner. This court agreed with the Appellate Court that this court’s holding in Colon permitting inconsistent verdicts between separately tried alleged coconspirators is not applicable in the context of a habeas petition asserting
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
an actual innocence claim, and that applying Colon to an actual innocence claim deprives a petitioner of the opportunity to prove his claim of innocence. In support of an actual innocence claim, a petitioner may rely on evidence from his alleged coconspirator’s separate criminal trial, including evidence that the alleged coconspirator lacked the requisite intent to enter into the conspiracy, if that evidence was not available to the petitioner at his own criminal trial, and the habeas court in the present case should have considered all of the evidence presented by the petitioner at his habeas trial to determine whether, in the aggregate, it established his actual innocence. Nevertheless, neither the judgment of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in M’s criminal case, nor the evidence from M’s criminal trial that was submitted at the petitioner’s habeas trial, supported the Appellate Court’s conclusion that M’s acquittal had demonstrated that M was incapable of forming the specific intent to conspire with the petitioner to commit the robbery. The trial court in M’s criminal case found that M had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law, but it was the petitioner’s burden in the present habeas proceeding to establish his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court’s finding in M’s criminal case, which was reached under the less burdensome standard of preponderance of the evidence, could not be treated as clear and convincing proof in the petitioner’s habeas proceeding that M lacked the specific intent necessary to conspire with the petitioner. Moreover, a finding of not guilty under § 53a-13 (a) means only that, at the time of an acquittee’s conduct, the acquittee lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law, and such a finding does not necessarily address whether the acquittee intended that conduct or necessarily equate with a finding that the acquittee lacked the specific intent to engage in the conduct. Whether a finding under § 53a-13 (a) that an acquittee lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct bears on the acquittee’s capacity to form a specific intent is a fact dependent inquiry that turns on the evidence of the nature and extent of the acquittee’s particular mental disease or defect, because, in some cases, the acquittee may fully intend the criminal conduct but, due to his mental disease or defect, lack the capacity to appreciate its wrongfulness, such that the mental impairment alters only the acquittee’s moral or evaluative understanding of his conduct but not his ability to form a specific criminal intent, whereas, in other cases, the acquittee’s mental impairment may so distort his perception of reality that it may negate the formulation of criminal intent.
During M’s criminal trial, the expert testimony established only that, as a result of his impairment, M lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, not that M was unable to form the specific intent to commit the charged offenses. Moreover, M’s symptoms, including hallucinations and paranoid and persecutory delusions, could indicate either an impairment that excuses an intentional act or one that may undermine the formation of intent.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
Accordingly, the evidence in the aggregate was insufficient for this court to determine whether M’s mental impairment altered only his moral or evaluative understanding of his conduct or whether it negated his ability to formulate specific criminal intent.
Because the newly discovered evidence of M’s acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) did not clearly and convincingly establish that M’s impairment negated the specific intent required for conspiracy to commit robbery, the petitioner’s actual innocence claim failed, and this court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment on that alternative ground.
Argued October 27, 2025—officially released February 17, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment denying
the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J., denied
the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, Elgo, Suarez and Keller,
Js., which affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, and the
petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
BRIGHT, J. In this certified appeal, we consider
whether the petitioner, Rashad Moon, established his
actual innocence of conspiracy to commit robbery in the
first degree based on newly discovered evidence arising from the separate trial of his alleged coconspirator,
Marvin Mathis, who was found not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect under General Statutes § 53a13 (a). The habeas court rejected the petitioner’s actual
innocence claim, reasoning that the verdict in Mathis’
case was, as a matter of law, irrelevant with respect to
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
whether the petitioner was actually innocent. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that Mathis’ acquittal demonstrated that he was incapable of forming the
necessary criminal intent to enter into the conspiracy
to commit the robbery. See Moon v. Commissioner of
Correction, 227 Conn. App. 838, 866–67, 322 A.3d 427
(2024). The Appellate Court reasoned that, because a
conspiracy requires that both alleged conspirators possess the intent to engage in criminal conduct, Mathis’ lack of
intent necessarily meant that the petitioner was actually
innocent of conspiring with Mathis to commit the robbery. See id. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court affirmed
the judgment of the habeas court on the ground that
the evidence permitted a reasonable fact finder to find a
conspiracy to commit the robbery between the petitioner
and a third person, Jahvon Thompson. See id., 873–75.
The petitioner then sought certification to appeal to this court, asking us to review the Appellate Court’s reliance
on the purported conspiracy with Thompson. According
to the petitioner, such reliance was improper because the
state’s theory of the case was and always has been that
the petitioner conspired solely with Mathis to commit
the robbery. We granted the petitioner’s petition for
certification to appeal, limited to the following question: “Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the
habeas court had properly determined that the petitioner
failed to meet his burden of proving that he was actually
innocent of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery in
the first degree?” Moon v. Commissioner of Correction,
350 Conn. 918, 325 A.3d 216 (2024).
We answer the certified question in the affirmative.
We do not, however, reach the question of whether the
Appellate Court properly rejected the petitioner’s actual
innocence claim based on the petitioner’s purported
conspiracy with Thompson because we agree with the
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, that the
judgment stemming from Mathis’ being found not guilty
by reason of mental disease or defect and the evidence
submitted in support thereof do not clearly and convincingly establish that he lacked the capacity to form
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
the requisite intent to conspire with the petitioner. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court,
albeit on a different ground.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant facts, as previously recounted by that court in the
petitioner’s criminal appeal. See State v. Moon, 192
Conn. App. 68, 217 A.3d 668 (2019), cert. denied, 334
Conn. 918, 222 A.3d 513 (2020). “In May, 2013, the victim, Felix DeJesus, and his fiancée posted two T-Mobile
Springboard tablets for sale on Craigslist. The Craigslist posting stated that the tablets were being sold for $300
each or $500 for both of them and included the victim’s
phone number. On May 8, 2013, at approximately 7 p.m.,
a prospective buyer of the tablets called the victim. The
prospective buyer said that he did not have a car and
asked the victim to meet him in Hartford so that he
could purchase the tablets. The victim agreed to travel
to Hartford and, shortly after 7 p.m., the victim left his home in Cromwell with the tablets.
“At approximately 7:45 p.m., a resident of the neighborhood where the crime occurred, Gloria Therrien,
observed the victim park his car in front of 16 Allendale
Road. From inside her home, Therrien saw two men
approach the car and stand at its driver’s side window.
One of the men spoke to the victim through the front
driver’s side window while the other man stood next to
him. Therrien heard a gunshot and saw the two men run
away from the car, using a cut through that connected
Allendale Road to Catherine Street. Therrien then went
outside and walked toward the victim’s car. She observed
that the car windows were open and that the victim was
in the driver’s seat of the car jerking . . . and gurgling. Therrien asked some children who were nearby to call
911 and report that someone had been shot.
“The police arrived at the scene at approximately 8 p.m.
When Jeffrey Moody, an officer with the Hartford Police
Department (department), arrived, he saw the victim’s
car and noticed that its engine was running and that the
victim was inside. Moody approached the car and found
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
the victim unresponsive. Thereafter, emergency services
took the victim to Hartford Hospital, where he died of
a single gunshot wound to the head at approximately
3:46 a.m.
“[Christopher] Reeder, a detective with the department, arrived at the scene at approximately 8:30 p.m.,
after the victim had been taken to Hartford Hospital.
Reeder searched the interior of the victim’s car and found a T-Mobile Springboard Tablet and a white Samsung cell
phone. The police took possession of both items.
“On May 9, 2013, the police extracted data from the
cell phone, which they determined had belonged to the
victim. The data extracted from the cell phone included
a series of text messages and phone calls between the
victim and a cell phone number that belonged to Marvin
Mathis, an individual who resided near the scene of the
crime. Around the time of the murder, there were text
messages between Mathis and the victim . . . which . . .
instructed the victim to meet him at 16 Allendale Road.
“That same day, Reeder went to speak with Mathis at
his home on Allendale Road. Mathis denied having any
knowledge of the shooting and stated that he was asleep
at home when the crime occurred. Mathis also stated that
he was with the [petitioner] from approximately 6 to 7:30
p.m. on the night of the shooting and that while they
were together, the [petitioner] borrowed his [cell] phone.
“Mathis allowed Reeder to view his cell phone and
the text messages on the device. The text messages on
Mathis’ cell phone matched the text messages that the
police had extracted from the victim’s cell phone. Mathis, however, denied sending the messages and stated that the
[petitioner] must have sent them. Reeder also observed
that the call log on Mathis’ cell phone revealed that, at
approximately the time of the shooting, there were calls
between Mathis and the [petitioner]. On May 8, 2013,
there were calls between the [petitioner] and Mathis at
6:02, 7:51, 7:52 and 9:53 p.m.
“On May 12, 2013, Reeder spoke with the [petitioner]
and the [petitioner’s] girlfriend, Brittany Hegwood.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
Hegwood informed the police that, on the night of the
shooting, she witnessed Mathis and the [petitioner] walk
down Catherine Street toward Hillside [Avenue] together
and that when the [petitioner] returned approximately
five minutes later he stated, [Mathis] just shot somebody.
“The [petitioner] also provided the police with a statement in which he admitted that he was with Mathis on
the night of the shooting and that he went with Mathis to
meet the victim. The [petitioner] stated that Mathis told
the [petitioner] that he was going to buy some stuff from
the victim. The [petitioner] further stated that he stood
approximately thirty feet away from the victim’s car
while Mathis spoke with the victim through the driver’s
side window. The [petitioner] stated that he looked away
from Mathis and heard a gunshot, at which point he and
Mathis ran away from the car to the [petitioner’s] house
on Catherine Street.
“As part of their investigation, the police obtained a
search warrant for the [petitioner’s] cell phone records.
The [petitioner’s] cell phone records revealed calls
between the [petitioner] and a phone number belonging
to . . . Thompson on May 10 and 14, 2013.
“On May 23, 2014, approximately one year after the
shooting, Thompson, who was under arrest at the time,
spoke with Reeder. Thompson informed Reeder that he
and the [petitioner] initially had planned to rob the victim because they were broke. Thompson further stated
that a day or two before the crime he, the [petitioner],
and Mathis were together and that the [petitioner] was
texting the victim on Mathis’ phone. Thompson stated
that he ultimately did not participate in the robbery
because something came up.
“Additionally, in May, 2014, an individual by the name
of Tyrell Hightower left three messages on a police tip
line, in which he indicated that he had information about
a homicide that had occurred on Allendale Road one year
earlier. On June 2, 2014, Reeder met with Hightower
at Hartford Correctional Center, where Hightower was
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
incarcerated. During the meeting, Hightower informed
Reeder that the [petitioner] had confessed to him that
he and Mathis were involved in the murder of the victim. Hightower further stated that the [petitioner] had
informed him that it was a robbery that went bad and
that Mathis had shot the victim.
“In late June, 2014, the police arrested the [petitioner]. After a jury trial, the [petitioner] was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to
commit robbery in the first degree. The court sentenced
the [petitioner] to a total effective sentence of forty-nine years of incarceration.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 71–74. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction; id., 71, 101; and this court denied
certification to appeal. State v. Moon, 334 Conn. 918,
222 A.3d 513 (2020).
In May, 2017, approximately six months after the
petitioner’s conviction, Mathis was tried separately for
his involvement in the murder. He was charged with
manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, robbery
in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in
the first degree. The case was tried to the court, Dewey,
J., over two days. At the close of the state’s case-inchief, and after allowing the parties to present closing
argument, the court expressly found that the state had
sustained its burden of proving each charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The court then acknowledged that Mathis had raised the affirmative defense
of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect and
proceeded to hear evidence and argument in support of
that defense. The court thereafter concluded that Mathis
had met his burden of proving his affirmative defense,
finding that he “lacked the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his behavior
to the requirements of the law.” Accordingly, the court
1
Defense counsel did not contest that the state had established the elements of the charged offenses and did not cross-examine the state’s only witness, Detective Reeder. The prosecutor likewise did not challenge Mathis’ evidence in support of his affirmative defense or provide any rebuttal.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
rendered a judgment of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect. Mathis then underwent a statutorily
mandated evaluation, which was followed by a commitment hearing. See General Statutes § 17a-582 (a),
(b) and (e) (1). After hearing testimony regarding the
results of that evaluation, the court committed Mathis
to maximum security at the Whiting Forensic Division
of the Connecticut Valley Hospital under the jurisdiction
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board for a period
of eighty years.
The petitioner commenced this habeas action in March,
2018, as a self-represented party. After counsel was
appointed to represent him, he filed the operative second
amended petition in November, 2022, alleging that his
criminal trial attorney had rendered ineffective assistance and that newly discovered evidence established
his actual innocence of felony murder, conspiracy to
commit robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the
first degree.
The habeas court, Newson, J., held a trial on November
7, 2022, at which the petitioner claimed that he was actually innocent of all three crimes because Mathis lacked
the mental capacity to form the necessary criminal intent
as to each. The petitioner argued that, in the absence
of such criminal intent, Mathis could not legally have
been a participant in the robbery or entered into a conspiracy with the petitioner, thereby negating essential
elements of first degree robbery and conspiracy to commit that offense, and, in turn, negating the predicate
felony required to sustain the felony murder conviction. In support of this claim, the petitioner introduced
the transcripts from his own criminal trial and Mathis’
separate criminal trial.
On November 25, 2022, the habeas court issued its
decision, denying both counts of the petition. The court
rejected the petitioner’s claim of actual innocence, concluding that the judgment in Mathis’ trial had no bearing on the petitioner’s guilt because factual findings
from a separate trial of one coconspirator cannot be
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
inserted into another trial, and, thus, Mathis’ acquittal
did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence
required to prove the petitioner’s actual innocence,
particularly when the acquittal undermined neither
the evidence placing the petitioner at the scene nor
the incriminating statements and messages linking
him to the crimes. Relying on State v. Colon, 257
Conn. 587, 602–603, 778 A.2d 875 (2001), the habeas
court explained that separately tried coconspirators
are not entitled to consistent verdicts because each
trial proceeds on its own evidentiary record; Mathis’
verdict, therefore, established only that a different
fact finder, considering different evidence, reached
a different result—it did not foreclose the reasonable possibility that the petitioner had committed
the crimes with which he was charged. Accordingly,
the habeas court concluded that the petitioner had
failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence.
The petitioner sought certification to appeal from the
denial of his habeas petition. The habeas court denied
the request, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate
Court, claiming that the habeas court had abused its
discretion in denying certification and further erred in
rejecting his actual innocence claim. See Moon v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. App. 847–48.
The petitioner maintained that the later judgment of not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in Mathis’
trial demonstrated that Mathis necessarily lacked the
requisite mens rea to enter into a conspiracy with the
petitioner, and that Mathis’ inability to form an intent
to commit any crime at the time proves the petitioner’s
actual innocence of each crime of which he was convicted.
Id., 848. He also argued that the habeas court misapplied
Colon in rejecting this theory. Id. The respondent countered that the petitioner’s actual innocence claim failed
because substantial evidence supported his convictions
and the petitioner did not produce affirmative proof that
he did not commit the crimes of conviction. Id.
The Appellate Court concluded that the habeas court
had abused its discretion in denying certification to
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
appeal, reasoning that the petitioner’s actual innocence
claim raised issues “debatable among jurists of reason”
and thus warranted appellate review. Id., 849–50. As
to the merits, the Appellate Court first determined that
the habeas court applied the incorrect legal standard in
evaluating the petitioner’s actual innocence claim by
relying on Colon and failing to evaluate the aggregate
evidence from both the petitioner’s and Mathis’ separate
criminal trials. Id., 860–61.
After conducting its own independent review of that
combined record; id., 864–66; the Appellate Court reasoned that the evidence from Mathis’ trial clearly and
convincingly established that Mathis lacked the mental
capacity to form any criminal intent and, therefore, that
no conspiracy between the petitioner and Mathis could
have existed. Id., 866–67. However, the Appellate Court
determined that the “aggregate evidence, if presented
in a new trial, would not prevent a reasonable jury from
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
was guilty of a conspiracy, despite the evidence of Mathis’ lack of mental capacity at the time of the homicide.” Id., 873. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence that the petitioner had conspired with a third person, Thompson, to commit the robbery. Id., 873–75. On
the basis of Reeder’s testimony and Thompson’s Whelan2
statement introduced at the petitioner’s criminal trial,
“the jury reasonably could have found that Thompson
was a willing coconspirator.” Id., 874. Therefore, “even
if evidence of Mathis’ incapacity had been presented at
the petitioner’s criminal trial, there was still sufficient evidence from which the jury could find the petitioner
guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery.” Id.
In this certified appeal, the petitioner argues that
the Appellate Court erred in relying on his purported
conspiracy with Thompson because neither the state
at the petitioner’s criminal trial nor the respondent in
this habeas case has ever claimed that the petitioner’s
2
State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
conspiracy conviction was based on an agreement with
Thompson. The petitioner argues that the state’s theory
of the case has always been that the alleged conspiracy
for which he was tried was between him and Mathis. He
concludes that, because the reasoning of the Appellate
Court was otherwise sound, we should reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case with
direction that the habeas court grant his second amended
habeas petition, vacate his conspiracy to commit first
degree robbery conviction, and order a new trial.
In response, the respondent argues that the Appellate
Court properly relied on the evidence of the conspiracy
between the petitioner and Thompson. Alternatively, the
respondent argues that the Appellate Court misapplied
Colon and that the proper application of our holding in
that case forecloses the petitioner’s claim. Finally, the
respondent argues that “Mathis’ inability to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or [to] control his conduct within the requirements of our criminal law is not
tantamount to an inability to enter into an agreement
or [to] form the requisite intent to rob the victim.” We
agree with the respondent’s last argument and affirm
the judgment of the Appellate Court on that basis.
I
A
A petitioner who seeks habeas corpus relief on the
basis of a freestanding claim of actual innocence bears
“a heavy burden . . . to establish that, notwithstanding
his conviction, he is entitled to a new trial.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gould v. Commissioner of
Correction, 301 Conn. 544, 567, 22 A.3d 1196 (2011).
In Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745,
700 A.2d 1108 (1997), we set forth a two part test that
the petitioner must satisfy to succeed on a claim of actual innocence. “First, the petitioner must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of
the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original
criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
corpus trial—he is actually innocent of the crime of
which he stands convicted. Second, the petitioner must
also establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom as the habeas court
did, no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner
guilty of the crime.” Id., 747.
Whether the petitioner has proven actual innocence
by clear and convincing evidence is a factual determination made by the habeas court that requires the reviewing court to undertake “an independent and scrupulous
examination of the entire record” to determine whether
the habeas court’s conclusion as to the petitioner’s actual innocence “is supported by substantial evidence.” Id.,
803. “[T]he clear and convincing evidence standard
should operate as a weighty caution [on] the minds of
all judges, and it [is not satisfied] whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 795. It requires evidence that
“induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the
probability that they are true or exist is substantially
greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794.
The second component of the Miller test presents a
different inquiry. “Determining whether no reasonable
fact finder, considering the entire body of evidence as
the habeas court did, would find the petitioner guilty
is either an application of law to the facts or a mixed
question of law and fact to which a plenary standard of
review applies.” Id., 805. As we explained in Miller, “[a] habeas court is no better equipped than we are to make
the probabilistic determination of whether, considering the evidence as the habeas court did, no reasonable
fact finder would find the petitioner guilty. That type
of determination does not depend on assessments of
credibility of witnesses or of the inferences that are the most appropriate to be drawn from a body of evidence—
assessments that are quintessentially [the] task for the
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
[fact finder] in a habeas proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Finally, we have recognized that actual innocence—
sometimes referred to as factual innocence—is distinct
from legal innocence. See, e.g., Gould v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 301 Conn. 560. “Actual innocence
is not demonstrated merely by showing that there was
insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id., 560–61. Instead, actual innocence requires
affirmative proof that might tend to establish that the
petitioner could not have committed the crime, that
a third party committed the crime, or that no crime
occurred. See id., 561–63. The petitioner must therefore
do more than expose deficiencies in the state’s proof. See id., 560–61.
B
The petitioner was convicted under General Statutes
§ 53a-48 (a), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting
a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons
to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct,
and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of
such conspiracy.” “Conspiracy is a specific intent crime,
with the intent divided into two elements: (a) the intent to agree or conspire and (b) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. . . . Thus, [p]roof of a conspiracy to commit a specific offense requires
proof that the conspirators intended to bring about the
elements of the conspired offense.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273
Conn. 138, 167, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).
We have explained that § 53a-48 is a bilateral conspiracy statute that requires a showing of a genuine criminal
agreement—a meeting of the minds—between at least
two actors possessing the requisite criminal intent. See
State v. Grullon, 212 Conn. 195, 201–203, 562 A.2d 481
(1989). Because the statute “requires a showing that two
or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
conduct that constitutes a crime,” we have determined
that “a defendant cannot be guilty of conspiracy if the
only other member of the alleged conspiracy lacks any
criminal intent.” Id., 199. For example, in Grullon, we
held that the defendant could not be found guilty of
conspiracy when the sole alleged coconspirator was a
police informant who lacked the requisite criminal intent. See id., 203–204. Thus, “[u]nless the state prove[s] that
some other person, with culpable intent, agreed with the
defendant to violate the law, the defendant [is] entitled
to acquittal” of the crime of conspiracy under § 53a-48.
Id., 203.
In the present case, the petitioner’s actual innocence
claim rests on his contention that he could not have
formed a criminal agreement with Mathis because the
trial court, in finding Mathis not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, determined that he “lacked the
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct . . . .” According to the petitioner, that finding necessarily means that Mathis was incapable of forming the specific
intent to conspire with the petitioner to rob the victim.
The habeas court rejected the petitioner’s claim on
the ground that, under State v. Colon, supra, 257 Conn.
602–603, inconsistent verdicts between separately tried
alleged coconspirators are legally permissible, and, therefore, the fact that Mathis was subsequently acquitted did
not establish that the petitioner was actually innocent
of conspiracy to commit robbery. The Appellate Court
concluded that the habeas court’s reliance on Colon was
misplaced because the rule permitting inconsistent verdicts in separate criminal trials is not applicable to a
habeas petition asserting actual innocence. See Moon
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. App.
858–60. The Appellate Court held that, in this procedural context, the habeas court must evaluate the entire
evidentiary record—including the newly discovered
transcripts and evidence from a codefendant’s separate
trial—as though it were a single body of evidence that
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
would be presented to a fact finder if a new trial were to be conducted. Id., 860–61; see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 242 Conn. 803.
We agree with the Appellate Court’s reading of Colon.
In Colon, we reasoned that, “[w]hen coconspirators are
tried separately, the acquittal of one on charges of conspiracy should not dictate the acquittal of the other
simply because the state in one case has failed to prove
an element necessary to a conspiracy charge. . . . An . .
. unsuccessful prosecution of an alleged coconspirator
in a separate trial means nothing more than that on a
given date the prosecution failed to meet its burden
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of all of the elements constituting conspiracy. It
certainly does not mean . . . that a conspiracy did not
occur. It has long been recognized that criminal juries
in the United States are free to [return] not guilty verdicts resulting from compromise, confusion, mistake,
leniency or other legally and logically irrelevant factors. . . . Consequently, an acquittal is not to be taken as the equivalent of a finding of the fact of innocence; nor does it necessarily even reflect a failure of proof on the part of the prosecution.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, supra, 257 Conn.
602–603. That reasoning has no application to a habeas
petitioner’s claim of actual innocence. When pursuing
such a claim, the petitioner may rely on evidence from his alleged coconspirator’s trial that was not available to the petitioner at his criminal trial,3 including evidence that the alleged coconspirator lacked the intent to enter into
the conspiracy. Ultimately, it is the petitioner’s burden to establish that such newly discovered evidence, together
3
Although the Appellate Court consistently has held that a claim of actual innocence must be based on newly discovered evidence, we have not opined on whether the evidence supporting an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered. See Gould v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 301 Conn. 551 n.8; see also Moon v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. App. 852–53. Because the respondent does not dispute that Mathis’ acquittal and the evidence presented at his criminal trial constitute newly discovered evidence, we have no reason to address this issue in the present case.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
with the evidence from his criminal trial, proves clearly
and convincingly that he is actually innocent and that
no reasonable jury could find him guilty. We agree with
the Appellate Court that applying Colon to an actual
innocence claim, as the habeas court did in the present
case, deprives a petitioner of an opportunity to prove his claim. Instead, the habeas court should have considered
all of the evidence presented by the petitioner at the
habeas trial to determine whether, in the aggregate, it
established the petitioner’s actual innocence.
II
The Appellate Court, recognizing its obligation to
conduct “an independent and scrupulous examination
of the entire record” and that the issue of whether no
reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty
is a matter of plenary review; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Moon v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
227 Conn. App. 851–52; undertook the aggregate review
the habeas court had not and concluded that “Mathis’
acquittal establishes, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he was unable to form any intent to conspire with
the petitioner to rob the victim.” Id., 867. The court
emphasized that, in Mathis’ trial, the state “did not
dispute the fact that Mathis, a seriously ill schizophrenic at the time of the incident, was incapable of forming any
intent to commit the crimes of which he was charged,
including conspiracy, and was, therefore, not guilty of
those crimes by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to § 53a-13.” Id., 864. Further, Mathis’ psychiatric
expert, Peter Morgan, testified that Mathis suffered
from “severe symptoms” of paranoid schizophrenia and
“lacked the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of
his actions and could not conform his behavior to the law
at the time of the incident.” Id., 865.
The Appellate Court concluded that “a properly
instructed jury could reasonably reach one conclusion,
namely, that the petitioner was actually innocent of
conspiring with Mathis to commit robbery in the first
degree.” Id., 867. In its view, “no crime of conspiracy
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
could have been committed because Mathis was incapable
of agreeing with the petitioner to commit robbery.” Id.
Thus, the Appellate Court held that “the evidence from
the Mathis trial, if introduced in the context of a single trial of the petitioner, would give rise to a finding of
actual innocence” because “[t]he undisputed fact that
Mathis suffered from a mental illness that rendered
him unable to form the intent to conspire mean[t] that
no crime of conspiracy involving solely Mathis as coconspirator actually could have occurred.” Id., 869.
Although we agree that the Appellate Court applied
the correct legal standard, for the reasons that follow,
we disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that
Mathis’ acquittal established by clear and convincing
evidence that he could not have possessed the specific
intent required to form a conspiratorial agreement with
the petitioner under § 53a-48.
A
Because the petitioner’s actual innocence claim rests
on Mathis’ subsequent acquittal, our analysis begins with
the statute governing the affirmative defense of lack
of capacity due to mental disease or defect, commonly
referred to as the insanity defense.
Section 53a-13 (a) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution
for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that
the defendant, at the time the defendant committed the
proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a
result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct
within the requirements of the law.” The defense includes
“both a cognitive and a volitional prong.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LeRoya M., 340 Conn. 590,
611, 264 A.3d 983 (2021). The cognitive prong addresses
the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; the volitional prong addresses the
defendant’s capacity to conform his conduct to the law.
See id., 611–12.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
We, like other courts, have long recognized that “there
is an analytic distinction between mental status as it
relates to the insanity defense and mental status as it
relates to intent to engage in criminal conduct.” State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 460–61, 625 A.2d 791 (1993); see
also, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705–706,
95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (“[a]lthough . . . evidence relevant to
insanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to
whether the required mens rea was present, the existence
or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required
mental elements of the crime” (citation omitted)); State
v. Griffin, 159 A.3d 1240, 1243 (Me. 2017) (“[t]he defense of insanity does not raise a reasonable doubt as to an
element of the crime, but instead excuses a defendant
from criminal responsibility even though the [s]tate can
prove each element of the crime”); State v. Niska, 514
N.W.2d 260, 264 n.4 (Minn. 1994) (“[the defense of]
insanity involve[s] establishing a mental state distinct
from the mens rea of the offense”); Commonwealth v.
Reilly, 519 Pa. 550, 566, 549 A.2d 503 (1988) (“[i]n
assessing sanity, a court is not concerned with whether
the defendant committed the act . . . or . . . formed the
prescribed mental state . . . [but with] whether [he] should be held criminally responsible for his act”); State v. Box, 109 Wn. 2d 320, 329, 745 P.2d 23 (1987) (“[I]nsanity
entitles a defendant to an acquittal not because . . . [the] state has failed to prove [the] element of criminal intent . . . but because the state declines to convict or punish
one shown to have committed the crime while mentally
impaired. . . . In other words, the mental state of insanity does not go to the elements of the crime but merely the
ultimate culpability of the accused.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). In Joyner, the defendant argued that
the burden placed on him pursuant to § 53a-13 to prove
that his conduct was the product of a mental disease
or defect violated the due process clauses of our state
constitution because, once the issue of the defendant’s
mental status is raised, the defendant’s sanity “then
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becomes one of the elements of the state’s case,” which
our state constitution requires the state to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id., 458; see id., 456–57. After noting that the United States Supreme Court had rejected
similar claims made pursuant to the federal due process
clauses; id., 458; we considered whether a different result was compelled by our state constitution. Id., 459–65.
We ultimately rejected the defendant’s claim, holding
that “sanity, like the absence of drug dependency . . . is an independent fact and not an element of any existing
criminal offense. As to such an independent fact, as with
regard to other affirmative defenses, the legislature has
the constitutional authority to allocate the burden of
proof to the defendant rather than to the state.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 464–65; see also State v. LeRoya
M., supra, 340 Conn. 611–12.
We held in Joyner that § 53a-13 (a) does not violate a
defendant’s due process rights because it “shifts to the
defendant the burden of establishing his or her mental
status only with respect to the affirmative defense of
insanity.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Joyner, supra,
225 Conn. 461. It “does not purport to relieve the state
of its continuing burden of proof with respect to mental
status when mental status is implicated in the state’s
proof of an element of the crime, such as the defendant’s
specific intent to commit the crime with which he or she
has been charged.” Id. In other words, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the
charged offense, whereas the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his conduct was the
product of a mental disease or defect.4 Thus, whether
4
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 165 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2006), in the context of the federal due process clauses, underscores this distinction. There, the court upheld a rule that permitted expert testimony about a defendant’s diminished capacity due to mental disease or defect to be considered only for purposes of the insanity defense and barred its use to negate the mens rea element of a crime. See id., 756–57, 779. Compare id., 748, 756 (upholding formulation of insanity defense that incorporates only moral incapacity standard, which required that
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
a defendant possesses the requisite intent to commit a
crime is a distinct inquiry from whether he can prevail
on an insanity defense under § 53a-13 (a). In fact, a fact finder has no reason to consider a defendant’s insanity
defense unless the state has proven all of the elements
of the charged crime, including the culpable intent,
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Connecticut Criminal
Jury Instructions 2.9-2, available at https://jud.ct.gov/
JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited February 6, 2026)
(if state has proved all elements of crime charged, jury
“must then go on to decide whether the defendant has
proved the affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to
mental disease or defect”).
Against this backdrop, we turn to the petitioner’s
contention that Mathis’ acquittal demonstrates that he
was incapable of forming the specific intent to conspire
with the petitioner to commit robbery. As we explain,
neither the judgment of acquittal itself nor the evidence
underlying it supports that conclusion.
First, the petitioner cannot rely on Mathis’ insanity
acquittal to prove his actual innocence because that judgment was reached under a lower burden of proof than the
one the petitioner must satisfy to prevail on his actual
innocence claim. In rendering its judgment, the trial
court found that Mathis had established his affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence—that is, he
proved that it was more likely than not that he satisfied
one of the prongs of § 53a-13 (a). See General Statutes
§ 53a-12 (b); see also State v. Weathers, 339 Conn. 187,
209, 216, 260 A.3d 440 (2021). By contrast, to prevail on
a claim of actual innocence, the petitioner must present
evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates his
actual innocence—“a very demanding standard . . . .”
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 242 Conn.
defendant demonstrate that “[he] did not know the criminal act was wrong” because of mental disease or defect (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 276–77, 279, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 206 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2020) (upholding formulation of insanity defense requiring defendant to show that mental illness prevented him from forming requisite mens rea).
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
795. The finding reached under a lower burden at Mathis’
criminal trial therefore cannot be treated as clear and
convincing proof in this habeas proceeding that Mathis
lacked the intent necessary to conspire with the petitioner.
The order in which the court made its findings in
Mathis’ bench trial reinforces why the resulting verdict cannot bear the evidentiary weight that the petitioner assigns to it. The court conducted the bench trial
in two phases. During the first phase, the court heard
uncontested evidence of Mathis’ involvement in the
crimes charged and expressly found that the state had
proven every element of those offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, including the specific intent to enter into a
conspiracy to commit robbery. Only after making those
findings did the court consider the affirmative defense
and conclude that Mathis had met his burden of proving
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the
finding that resulted in Mathis’ acquittal need satisfy
only the preponderance standard, without more, it cannot
serve as clear and convincing proof that Mathis lacked
the criminal intent the court already had found beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Second, as we previously noted, a finding of not guilty
by reason of mental disease or defect does not necessarily equate to a finding that the acquittee lacked the
specific intent to commit the charged offense. See State
v. Joyner, supra, 225 Conn. 460–61. A judgment of not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect means that, at the time of the acquittee’s conduct, he lacked substantial capacity “to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to control his conduct within the requirements of the
law.” General Statutes § 53a-13 (a). The finding itself
does not address whether the acquittee intended the act
he committed. Because the judgment in Mathis’ trial
does not resolve whether Mathis could have formed the
specific intent to conspire to commit the robbery with
the petitioner, we now turn to the evidence underlying
that issue to determine whether it clearly and convincingly demonstrates a lack of such an intent. We conclude
that it does not.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
At the outset, we note that, although the trial court
found that Mathis satisfied both prongs of the insanity
defense contemplated under § 53a-13 (a), only the cognitive prong is at issue in this case. Indeed, a finding under the cognitive prong can, in certain circumstances, bear
on a defendant’s capacity to form a specific intent.5 A
finding under the volitional prong, by contrast, tells us
nothing about what a defendant understood and intended
when he engaged in the criminal conduct.
Our decisions in State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 700
A.2d 633 (1997), and State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88, 755
A.2d 202 (2000), provide guidance as to when evidence
of a mental disease or defect might negate the intent element of the charged offense. In Wilson, the defendant,
who was charged with murder, raised a defense under the
cognitive prong of § 53a-13 (a) based on his schizophrenia, which he claimed caused elaborate delusions.6 See State
v. Wilson, supra, 606–609. Although the defendant
understood that killing the victim was illegal, he claimed that his delusions caused him to believe that the killing
was morally justified—that “he had to do [it] in order
to save other people” and that, in killing the victim, he
had “saved the world.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 626. The jury rejected the affirmative defense
and found the defendant guilty of murder. Id., 609. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the court’s charge to
the jury on his insanity defense was inadequate because it failed to instruct the jury that he “was entitled to prevail under § 53a-13 (a) if the evidence established that [he]
believed his conduct to be morally justified.” Id., 610.
We agreed that the cognitive prong of § 53a-13 (a)
encompasses a moral dimension of “wrongfulness.” Id.,
622–23. This includes “cases in which a defendant’s
delusional ideation causes him to harbor personal beliefs
5
See, e.g., State v. Madigosky, 291 Conn. 28, 41–42, 966 A.2d 730 (2009). Madigosky is discussed in part II C of this opinion.
6
The defendant in Wilson delusionally believed that the victim “was the mastermind of a large organization bent on controlling the minds of others” and had been drugging and brainwashing the defendant and others. State v. Wilson, supra, 242 Conn. 608.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
that so cloud his cognition as to render him incapable
of recognizing the broader moral implications of his
actions. . . . Those cases involving the so-called ‘deific command,’ in our view, fall into this category. . . . An
individual laboring under a delusion that causes him
to believe in the divine approbation of his conduct is an
individual who, in all practicality, is unlikely to be able fully to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct.”
Id., 619. We concluded that “a defendant does not truly
‘appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct’ as stated in
§ 53a-13 (a) if a mental disease or defect causes him both to harbor a distorted perception of reality and to believe that, under the circumstances as he honestly perceives
them, his actions do not offend societal morality, even
though he may also be aware that society, on the basis of
the criminal code, does not condone his actions. Thus, a
defendant would be entitled to prevail under § 53a-13 (a)
if, as a result of his mental disease or defect, he sincerely believes that society would approve of his conduct if it
shared his understanding of the circumstances underlying his actions.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 622–23. This
formulation of the insanity defense makes clear that a
defendant can both possess the specific intent to commit
the underlying offense and still prove the cognitive prong of the defense. As the facts in Wilson demonstrate, there
is no irreconcilable conflict between the two.
In State v. Cole, supra, 254 Conn. 88, we discussed the
intersection of the cognitive prong of § 53a-13 (a) and
criminal intent in a different context. There, the defendant, who was charged with the murder of his girlfriend,
raised an affirmative defense under the cognitive prong
of § 53a-13 (a) based on his chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which produced hallucinations and delusions. Id.,
89–91, 94–96. The defendant claimed that his mental
illness caused him to delusionally believe that “the victim was not his girlfriend, but, rather, an evil double who had been sent to replace her”; id., 96; and that she was going to kill him if he did not shoot her first. Id., 95. The jury rejected the affirmative defense and found him guilty
of murder. Id., 89, 97–98.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court’s
jury charge on the insanity defense was improper because
it did not include an instruction that “wrongfulness”
under § 53a-13 (a) includes a moral component that incorporates standards of societal morality, as articulated in
Wilson. Id., 100–103. We rejected that claim and held
that, under the facts of that case, such an instruction was unnecessary. Id., 104–106. We explained that, in “most
cases in which the insanity defense is raised. . . society’s moral judgment regarding the accused’s conduct will be
identical to the legal standard reflected in the applicable criminal statute”; id., 102; and, thus, it is “the unusual case in which the distinction between wrongfulness and
criminality [is] . . . determinative . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 103. Wilson was one such
unusual case because the defendant there “knew that
his conduct was illegal but nevertheless believed that his actions were justified under principles of societal morality . . . .” Id., 102. Cole, on the other hand, was not such a case. See id., 103. The defendant in Cole did not claim
that he believed his conduct was morally justified despite knowing that it was illegal; rather, he claimed that he
delusionally believed the victim posed an imminent threat
to his life and that he was acting in self-defense when he killed her. See id., 95–96, 104. Because “society recognizes that one who acts in self-defense is justified in doing so under both legal and moral standards,” the defendant’s
belief did not implicate the distinction between illegality and morality that was central in Wilson. Id., 104. Accordingly, “the trial court’s failure to define wrongfulness
as including a moral component for purposes of § 53a-13
(a) could not have possibly inured to the detriment of the defendant.” Id., 106.
As the foregoing case law demonstrates, there are two
distinct ways in which cognitive impairment caused by
a mental disease or defect may impact a defendant’s culpability. In some cases, as in Wilson, the defendant may
fully intend the criminal act but, due to mental disease or defect, lack the capacity to appreciate its wrongfulness.
In such cases, the mental impairment alters the defendant’s moral or evaluative understanding of his actions,
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
not his ability to form specific intent. In other cases, the defendant’s mental disease or defect may so distort his
perception of reality that it may negate criminal intent.
We focused on this latter type of impairment in State
v. Madigosky, 291 Conn. 28, 966 A.2d 730 (2009), noting that “[t]here may be a case in which a defendant’s
insanity defense evidence actually challenges the intent
element of the crime, one in which the defendant’s mental
state is such that he intends to engage in the conduct for which he is charged, but, because of a mental disease or
defect or his extreme emotional state, does not act with
the specific intent required for the charged offense. By
way of example, if an accused intentionally engaged in
conduct—the stabbing of a person—but, because of his
mental state, thought he was stabbing a piece of meat, the jury’s function to assess whether the state had proved the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt would
require it to consider his affirmative defense evidence in concert with its assessment of his intent. In other words, the affirmative defenses in that case would intersect with an essential element of the offense.” Id., 41–42.
These cases demonstrate that only in certain circumstances will a defendant’s cognitive delusions bear on
his capacity to form specific intent; whether they do so
is a fact dependent inquiry turning on the evidence of
the nature and extent of the particular mental disease
or defect.
B
Mindful of this distinction between those cognitive
impairments occurring as a result of mental disease or
defect that leave intent intact and those that may negate
intent, we consider whether the aggregate record before
the habeas court, including the transcripts from Mathis’
criminal trial, contains the clear and convincing evidence necessary to establish the petitioner’s actual innocence.7
The relevant facts from Mathis’ trial, which form part
of the aggregate record before us, are as follows. During
7
We note, as the Appellate Court did, that the record before the habeas court did not include the exhibits introduced at either the petitioner’s or Mathis’ criminal trial. See Moon v. Commissioner of Correction,
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
the state’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor called Reeder,
the lead investigator into the homicide of the victim, who testified about the circumstances of the homicide and
his interactions with Mathis during the investigation.
Reeder testified that he spoke with Mathis and Mathis’
mother at approximately 2:30 a.m. the morning after
the homicide. He testified that Mathis told him that,
the prior evening before the homicide, the petitioner had
come to Mathis’ house. The two men then walked back to
the petitioner’s house, where they smoked marijuana and
the petitioner borrowed Mathis’ cell phone. Mathis then
claimed that he walked back to his home and remained
there. Mathis showed Reeder his cell phone, from which
Reeder was able to obtain a series of text messages and
phone calls between Mathis’ phone and the victim’s
phone. Reeder also testified that he spoke with several
eyewitnesses who placed Mathis in the area around the
time of the homicide. The state also introduced the statements of Hightower and Thompson. Reeder testified that
Thompson told him that Thompson and the petitioner
had initially planned to commit the robbery together and
that the petitioner “had only gotten [Mathis involved]
because [Thompson] was not available to do the robbery
on the day that the [incident] happened.” Thompson
also claimed that he and the petitioner had discussed
the robbery with Mathis after it occurred. Reeder was
the state’s only witness, and Mathis’ counsel did not
cross-examine Reeder.
The following day, counsel delivered closing arguments as to the underlying offenses. The prosecutor
argued that, based on the facts and circumstances as
presented, each offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel did not deliver a closing
argument, instead “leav[ing] [it] to the court’s discretion and judgment.” After having heard and reviewed all of
the evidence, the trial court concluded that the state
supra, 227 Conn. App. 846 n.7. Thus, the only evidence the petitioner submitted in support of his actual innocence claim were the transcripts from both criminal trials, the petitioner’s judgment mittimus, and the information and disposition from Mathis’ criminal trial. See id.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
had carried its burden of proving each of the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, the
court found that the state had “proven beyond a reasonable doubt the conspiracy to commit robbery in the
first degree. The [conspiracy] is most evident from the
phone calls that were made in advance, phone calls from
[Mathis’] phone. That is how the [victim] was lured to
the Allendale [Road] area. . . . It wasn’t impulsive. There was a plan. And, certainly . . . the intent of the conduct was to [commit] robbery in the first degree.”
After concluding that the elements of all three offenses
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial
court heard evidence on Mathis’ affirmative defense.
Defense counsel introduced the testimony and report8
of Morgan, a psychiatrist who evaluated Mathis on
three occasions between 2015 and 2017. Morgan testified that he spent more than two hours interviewing
Mathis and had reviewed extensive collateral records,
including police materials, medical records, an evaluation of Mathis’ competency to testify authored by Howard
Zonana, a forensic psychiatrist, at the request of the
state, and an evaluation of Mathis’ competency to stand
trial. Morgan explained that Mathis’ medical records
documented a long-standing diagnosis of paranoid type
schizophrenia dating back to at least age seventeen,
with repeated inpatient hospitalizations and persistent
psychotic symptoms—including delusions and auditory
hallucinations—throughout the year surrounding the
homicide. Mathis had been discharged from the hospital
approximately six days prior to the homicide. Morgan
concurred with the prior diagnoses and with Zonana’s
conclusion that the symptoms of Mathis’ schizophrenia
impaired his perception of reality.
Based on his evaluation and the reviewed records,
Morgan opined that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, Mathis suffered from severe schizophrenia
and, at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, “did
8
Morgan’s report was not before the habeas court. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
not have the capacity to understand the wrongfulness
of his actions [or to] conform his behavior to the law.”
The prosecutor did not challenge Morgan’s conclusions
regarding Mathis’ mental condition, offer any expert to
opine on Mathis’ mental illness, or provide any rebuttal to Morgan’s testimony. In his closing argument concerning
the affirmative defense, the prosecutor did “not contest
[defense] counsel’s argument as made and supported by
the evidence presented by . . . Morgan in this matter.”
The trial court subsequently found that Mathis had
met his burden of proving that he “lacked the capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.”
Following a forensic psychiatric evaluation, Rina
Kapoor testified at Mathis’ commitment hearing that
Mathis had some significant symptoms of paranoia and
persecution, as well as problems with organization,
motivation, and execution of activities. She opined that
Mathis’ schizophrenia had interfered with his ability
to reason and that he was vulnerable to peer influence.
Kapoor explained that Mathis had consistently said that
he did not “do anything except for lend [his] friend [his] cell phone” and that Mathis did not seem to “[have] a
grasp on what went wrong or how [his] illness contributed
to [the] offense.” At that time, Kapoor recommended that
Mathis be committed to the Psychiatric Security Review
Board and remain in a maximum security hospital.
C
This record is not sufficient to permit us to determine
which of the two scenarios—intent preserved but wrongfulness not appreciated, or intent itself impaired—is
implicated by Mathis’ mental condition at the time of
the offense.
Although Morgan testified that Mathis had suffered
from severe paranoid type schizophrenia accompanied by
symptoms of psychosis, including delusions and auditory
hallucinations, nothing in Morgan’s testimony or in the
trial court’s findings identifies the functional impact
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
of those symptoms on Mathis’ capacity to form intent.
In particular, the presence of delusions or hallucinations does not inform us whether a defendant has acted
with specific intent. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, supra,
242 Conn. 608–609; State v. Madigosky, supra, 291
Conn. 33, 40. As we explained previously, in Wilson,
the defendant’s schizophrenia produced elaborate delusions that distorted his understanding of the morality of
his actions, yet there was no dispute that he acted with
the specific intent to kill. See State v. Wilson, supra,
626–27. By contrast, as the hypothetical illustration
in Madigosky demonstrates, a defendant’s misperception of reality may be so severe that it impairs his or
her ability to act with the requisite criminal intent. See State v. Madigosky, supra, 42. The record from Mathis’
trial does not demonstrate that Mathis’ impairment
affected his ability to act with the specific intent to agree to commit the robbery with the petitioner. Morgan’s
testimony established only that Mathis suffered from
schizophrenia and that he lacked substantial capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. Notably, however, Morgan
did not opine—and was not asked to opine—on whether
Mathis was able to form the specific intent to commit
the charged offenses. Nor did the trial court make any
affirmative finding to that effect. This record contains no evidence that anyone believed that Mathis did not intend
to conspire with the petitioner to rob the victim. To the
contrary, the court in Mathis’ criminal trial expressly
found that the state had proven all of the elements of
each offense, which included the specific intent to agree
to commit the robbery with the petitioner, and did not
alter that finding after hearing Morgan’s testimony.
Because the same symptoms—e.g., hallucinations,
paranoid and persecutory delusions, disorganized thinking—can evidence either an impairment that excuses an
intentional act, or an impairment that may undermine
the formation of intent, the newly discovered evidence
from Mathis’ trial does not clearly and convincingly
Moon v. Commissioner of Correction
establish that Mathis’ impairment negated the specific
intent required for conspiracy to commit robbery.
The petitioner’s failure to satisfy his burden in this
regard is dispositive of his actual innocence claim, which requires clear and convincing evidence that “unquestionably establish[es] [his] innocence”; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Miller v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 242 Conn. 795; such that “no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the crime.” Id., 747.
Indeed, “the clear and convincing evidence standard . .
. forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 795. Because the record contains no evidence reflective of a scenario in which the defendant’s mental illness negated the formation of specific intent; see, e.g., State v. Madigosky, supra, 291 Conn. 41–42; the petitioner
has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Mathis lacked the specific intent to enter into a
conspiracy with the petitioner to commit the robbery.9
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
9
Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to prove his actual innocence of conspiracy to commit first degree robbery with Mathis, we do not consider whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the petitioner had failed to prove his actual innocence in light of the purported conspiracy between the petitioner and Thompson.