NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 13, 2025
S25A0075. WESTON v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Jaquan Dontae Weston was convicted of malice murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his father,
Leroy Weston (“Leroy”).1 On appeal, Weston argues that the
1 The crimes occurred between March 5-6, 2018. In June 2018, a Terrell
County grand jury indicted Weston for malice murder (Count 1), possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 2), and cruelty to children
in the third degree (Count 3). At an October 2019 jury trial, Weston was found
guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Weston to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole on Count 1, five years consecutive on Count 2,
and twelve months concurrent on Count 3.
Weston filed a timely motion for new trial on October 22, 2019, which
was amended with new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion, as amended, on June 12, 2023. Weston then filed
a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed in this Court as Case
No. S24A0278. However, after Weston’s appellate counsel failed to file a
principal brief, the appeal was stricken from the docket and remanded with
instruction that the trial court determine whether counsel had abandoned
Weston. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that appellate counsel
had abandoned Weston, and new counsel was appointed to represent Weston
for purposes of his direct appeal. Thereafter, the trial court clerk transmitted
related additional records to this Court, and Weston’s appeal was re-docketed
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for malice murder
and asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in a number of
ways. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial showed the following. Sometime on or around
March 5, 2018, Weston’s three-year-old child, J. J., disclosed that
Leroy, her grandfather, had hurt her vaginal area. Weston became
emotional at this disclosure and stated that he was “going to get”
Leroy and shoot him.
After drinking alcohol with the husband of J. J.’s maternal
grandmother, Weston went out at approximately 11:00 p.m.,
indicating that he was going to visit a friend. At 11:49 p.m., Weston
called J. J.’s maternal grandmother and inquired about a burn
barrel at her house. Weston did not return for some time, and
Shontrell Jackson, J. J.’s mother, was unable to locate Weston.
Eventually, Weston showed up at the home of J. J.’s maternal
to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
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grandmother.
A short time later, around 1:00 a.m., Jackson accompanied
Weston, at his request, to Leroy’s house. Upon entering the
residence, Jackson and Weston discovered Leroy’s body in the
hallway with several gunshot wounds. According to Jackson,
Weston became distraught upon seeing the body. Weston and
Jackson reported their discovery to the police. When police arrived
at Leroy’s home, they found, among other things, a significant
amount of blood on Leroy’s bed, numerous blood stains throughout
the house, and a shoeprint that was later determined to be similar
to the shoes Weston wore on the night of the crimes.
Later that day, while Jackson was driving Weston to the police
station to answer questions, Weston jumped out of the vehicle with
a knife, confessed that he killed Leroy, and indicated that he was
going to hurt himself. Officers found Weston with a knife and
multiple injuries to his neck, wrists, and lower abdomen. In an
interview, which was played for the jury, Weston’s four-year-old son,
who was staying with Leroy on the night of the crimes, reported that
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Weston “beat” Leroy and that Leroy fell to the ground and did not
get up. Weston’s son also told Jackson’s sister that Weston shot
Leroy.
2. On appeal, Weston first challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction for malice murder. In Weston’s
view, the evidence supported, at most, a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter because he became emotional, threatened to shoot,
and actually did shoot Leroy only after his daughter’s outcry against
Leroy. As such, Weston says, the evidence at trial showed that he
killed Leroy as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion that was reasonable under the circumstances. See OCGA §
16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter
when he causes the death of another human being under
circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely
as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting
from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a
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reasonable person.”).2 We disagree.
“The proper standard of review for sufficiency of [the] evidence
as a matter of constitutional due process is whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Turner v. State, 315 Ga. 274, 278 (2) (882 SE2d
241) (2022) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B)
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). We view the evidence in the
“light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s
assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Hayes v.
State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (citation and
punctuation omitted). And the question of “whether or not a
provocation, if any, is such a serious provocation as would be
sufficient to excite a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a
reasonable person, reducing the offense from murder to
manslaughter, is generally for the jury.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted).
2 Weston requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which
was given.
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A person commits malice murder “when he unlawfully and
with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the
death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).
For a malice murder conviction, the requisite criminal
intent is that of malice, which incorporates the intent to
kill. The malice necessary to establish malice murder may
be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the time
of killing. Whether a killing was intentional and
malicious is for the jury to determine.
Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 836 (1) (a) (896 SE2d 476) (2023)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
In this case, the evidence at trial authorized the jury to find
that Weston formed the intent and malice necessary to return a
guilty verdict for malice murder. Specifically, the evidence showed
that, following J. J.’s outcry, Weston became emotional and
threatened to shoot Leroy. And after some time had passed, a
portion of which Weston had spent drinking alcohol, Weston
admittedly did just that. The evidence also showed that, around the
time of the crimes, Weston called Jackson’s mother to inquire about
a burn barrel, from which the reasonable inference could be drawn
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that Weston sought to dispose of evidence of his crimes. Based on
this evidence, the jury was entitled to find Weston guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of malice murder. See Wigfall v. State, 274 Ga.
672, 672-673 (558 SE2d 389) (2002) (concluding that jury was
authorized to find appellant guilty of malice murder rather than
voluntary manslaughter where victim made unwanted sexual
advances toward appellant’s mother, refused to leave after being
asked, and cursed at and hit appellant with a metal chair, and
appellant then retrieved a gun from her purse, went outside, and
shot and killed the victim as he was walking away).
Moreover, the evidence also supported a finding that there was
“an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for
the voice of reason and humanity to be heard” — specifically, the
long interlude between J. J.’s outcry and Leroy’s death — in which
case the voluntary manslaughter statute instructs that “the killing
shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as
murder.” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). See also Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706,
708 (2) (777 SE2d 435) (2015) (“[T]hat [appellant] discussed the
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matter with his cellmate, procured the shank, and then later went
in search of [the victim], was evidence that [appellant] acted in a
rational and calculating fashion rather than solely as a result of a
sudden, violent, and irresistible passion.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). For this additional reason, Weston’s claim fails.
3. Weston next argues that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in a number of ways. We
conclude that Weston failed to preserve two claims of ineffectiveness
and has not met his burden regarding the other.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must prove both that his counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80
LE2d 674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, [a defendant]
must show that trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively
unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light
of prevailing professional norms.” Waters v. State, 317 Ga. 822, 829
(3) (b) (896 SE2d 507) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
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“To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Allen v.
State, 317 Ga. 1, 9 (4) (890 SE2d 700) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “We need not address both components of the
inquiry if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Grier
v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 246 (4) (869 SE2d 423) (2022).
(a) Weston first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to “fully investigate” Weston’s competency to stand trial and
to request a competency hearing, and by failing to object to a
witness’s interview on the grounds that it constituted improper
bolstering. “To preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of
previous counsel, new counsel must raise the issue at the earliest
practicable opportunity of post-conviction review or the issue is
waived.” McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 531, 536 (3) (863 SE2d 166)
(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And here, Weston did not
raise these claims in his motion for new trial, and the court did not
rule on them. Accordingly, these claims are not preserved for
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appellate review. See id. See also Prince v. State, 295 Ga. 788, 793
(2) (b) (764 SE2d 362) (2014) (claim of ineffective assistance not
preserved where defendant failed to raise the issue in his amended
motion for new trial, failed to raise the claim at the hearing on that
motion, and failed to obtain a ruling on it from the trial court).3
(b) In his sole claim of ineffective assistance preserved for
appellate review, Weston argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to obtain an expert evaluation as to his sanity at the time
of the crimes and to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
on Weston’s behalf. Weston acknowledges that he was twice
3 Based on the trial court’s finding that Weston’s prior appellate counsel
had abandoned him, Weston has filed a motion to remand for the trial court to
hold another hearing so that his current appellate counsel could offer more
evidence in support of his ineffectiveness claims regarding competency and
sanity. But the court found that prior appellate counsel had abandoned him
after moving for a new trial and filing an appeal to this Court. The court did
not make any findings regarding prior counsel’s performance before the appeal
was docketed in this Court, and Weston does not raise a claim of ineffectiveness
of prior post-conviction counsel as error in his appeal. Accordingly, the trial
court’s finding regarding prior counsel’s abandonment does not support
remand. To the extent Weston wishes to pursue a claim that post-conviction
counsel was ineffective by failing to raise and adduce evidence at the hearing
on the motion for new trial in support of his claims regarding competency and
sanity, “he must do so through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” King v.
State, 304 Ga. 349, 351 (2) (818 SE2d 612) (2018); Moore v. State, 311 Ga. 506,
513 (6) (858 SE2d 676) (2021). Weston’s motion for remand in this case is
therefore denied.
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evaluated for his competency to stand trial and in fact was found
competent to stand trial. Weston asserts, however, that trial counsel
also should have sought an expert evaluation to determine whether
Weston had “the mental capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong” at the time of the crimes. See OCGA § 16-3-2 (“A person shall
not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or
negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such
act, omission, or negligence.”). It is true that “a defendant may have
mental capacity to be placed on trial, and yet be insane within the
contemplation of the law as to responsibility for a criminal act.”
Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 856 (2) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019)
(citation and punctuation omitted). But here, the record indicates
that counsel did, in fact, move for an evaluation of Weston’s sanity
and that an order to evaluate the same was entered. Accordingly,
counsel was not deficient for failing to file a motion that she did
actually file.
Moreover, while the results of that assessment do not appear
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in the record, the trial court found that there was no evidence that
Weston was insane at the time of the murder. And Weston failed to
present at the motion for new trial stage any expert testimony or
other evidence indicating that he has in fact suffered from mental
illness at any point, let alone at the time of the crime such that he
would be able to avoid criminal responsibility or at the time of trial
to such an extent that he would be incompetent to stand trial. See
Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 10 (4) (a) (890 SE2d 700) (2023). Therefore,
Weston “has failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability
that the result of his trial would have been different had his trial
counsel requested an evaluation” and attempted to enter a plea
based on such an assessment. Id. Because he cannot establish the
requisite prejudice, his claim of ineffectiveness therefore fails on this
ground, as well.
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
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