NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 16, 2024
S24Y0534. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER TYSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Christopher Tyson (State Bar
No. 142208) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b) (2). Tyson admits to conduct in violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a),
1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The
maximum penalty for a violation of these rules is disbarment. Tyson
requests a six-month suspension, and the State Bar, through its
response, supports Tyson’s request. However, for the reasons
explained below, we decline to accept Tyson’s petition.
Tyson admits that he represented a client in a personal injury
matter arising out of a vehicle accident in December 2018 and that he
settled the client’s case in November 2020 for $6,300. Upon receiving
the settlement check, Tyson deposited the check into his IOLTA
account. Tyson notified the client of the receipt of funds, but he did not
notify a chiropractor from whom the client sought treatment and who
had an interest in any settlement funds resulting from the case. Tyson
paid an ERISA lien for medical benefits on behalf of the client but did
not promptly disburse the settlement funds owed to the client or the
chiropractor, did not maintain sufficient funds in his IOLTA account,
and used those funds for personal expenses. Tyson, who was admitted
to practice law in 1996, claims in an affidavit that he eventually
stopped practicing in June 2021, at which time he relocated to
Louisiana. Since July 2022, Tyson has been administratively
suspended from the State Bar of Georgia for failing to pay his license
fees.
In his representation of the client, Tyson admits to violating Rule
1.15 (I) (a) by failing to safeguard the settlement funds owed to the
client and the chiropractor in his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by
disregarding the chiropractor’s interest in the funds from the
settlement; Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly notify the
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chiropractor of the receipt of the settlement and failing to promptly
disburse the funds owed to the client and the chiropractor; and Rule
1.15 (II) (b) by withdrawing from the IOLTA account unearned funds
for personal use.
Tyson submits the following factors in mitigation of discipline: he
has made restitution to the client and the chiropractor; he has fully
and completely cooperated in this disciplinary matter; he has
expressed remorse by submitting this petition and agreeing to be held
responsible for his wrongdoing; and, though he has a disciplinary
history, his prior discipline is remote and for unrelated conduct. See
ABA Standard 9.22 (d), (e), (l), & (m).
In support of his purported restitution, Tyson includes with his
petition a copy of two $2,100 checks made out to the client and the
chiropractor. See Pet. Exh. A. The checks are dated June 22, 2023 —
almost three years from the date on which Tyson received the
settlement. Neither the petition nor response explains how a 2023
payment of $4,200 constitutes restitution for Tyson improperly
managing $6,300 in 2020, and there is nothing in the record indicating
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whether the client and the chiropractor agree that these checks
constitute full restitution and whether they feel that they have been
made whole.
Tyson requests a six-month suspension from the practice of law.
The State Bar does not dispute Tyson’s admissions of fact, admissions
of rules violations, or the mitigating factors set forth in his petition.
The State Bar supports Tyson’s six-month suspension with the
condition that he follow the procedures in Bar Rule 1-501 (b) to lift his
administrative suspension before returning to the practice of law.
While the State Bar acknowledges that the maximum penalty for
violations of the trust account rules is disbarment, it notes that when
the totality of the circumstances supports less severe discipline, this
Court has imposed suspensions or even reprimands. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Coggins, 314 Ga. 813 (2022) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline requesting six-month suspension for lawyer who violated
Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (b) and 1.15 (II) (a), (b), and (c) by disregarding
third-party’s interest in funds, commingling client and personal funds,
and using client funds to support his other business interests); In the
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Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (2021) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline requesting public reprimand for lawyer who mismanaged
trust account resulting in insufficient balance). Further, the State Bar
maintains that the Court has previously imposed a six-month
suspension for similar rule violations both where similar mitigating
and aggravating circumstances are present and even where there are
no mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Coggins, supra; In the Matter
of Summers, 278 Ga. 57 (2004) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline requesting six-month suspension for attorney who held
client funds in IOLTA account for over four years, during which time
the account at times contained insufficient funds to cover the
obligation).
However, while we do have precedents accepting a petition for
voluntary discipline requesting a six-month suspension for
intentionally violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II), a six-month
suspension is generally not sufficient when the conduct involves
improperly converting client funds for personal use — even where the
attorney has provided restitution. A longer suspension would be more
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appropriate in those circumstances. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach,
310 Ga. 470 (2020) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
requesting 18-month suspension where attorney failed to properly
disburse funds and removed estate funds from his IOLTA account for
personal use); In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (2018) (accepting
petition for voluntary discipline requesting two-year suspension with
conditions where attorney withdrew funds from client’s estate and
deposited it for personal use); In the Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824
(2018) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting 12-month suspension where attorney converted client funds for her own
personal use). And in In the Matter of Hine, 314 Ga. 70 (2022), the
Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline requesting a sixmonth suspension where the attorney failed to properly communicate
with his client and converted estate funds for his personal use, even
where the attorney repaid his clients and had no prior disciplinary
history. See 314 Ga. at 76.1
1 However, in Hine, the attorney converted an amount substantially larger
than the settlement here and neglected to address in the petition the fact that he significantly overcharged the estate’s beneficiaries. See 314 Ga. at 75-76.
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Accordingly, for Tyson, we conclude that a six-month suspension
is insufficient — even if he made full restitution. But he has not even
shown that he has done that. Rather, Tyson has provided little detail
on restitution. There has been no affirmative showing of restitution
having been completely paid. Tyson merely attaches two checks from
2023 equaling an amount less than the $6,300 at issue, and neither he
nor the State Bar provides any detail or response from the client or
the chiropractor on whether these checks constitute full restitution for
Tyson’s 2020 conduct.
Further, the petition does not fully consider Tyson’s disciplinary
history. According to the State Bar, in 2013, Tyson received an
Investigative Panel Reprimand for his violations of Rules 1.1 (lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client) and 1.16 (d) (upon
termination of representation, lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect client’s interests). The State Bar
contends that the 2013 sanction was “remote” and “for unrelated
conduct,” but our precedents approving six-month suspensions
typically do not involve attorneys with such disciplinary history. See
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Coggins, supra (noting lawyer’s lack of disciplinary history when
accepting request for a six-month suspension).
We believe a longer suspension is more appropriate based on the
facts before us. Even if Tyson made full restitution, six months is
insufficient considering the nature of his conduct and his disciplinary
history. However, we are unable to determine the more appropriate
discipline here without further information on Tyson’s purported
restitution. And regardless, “it has been the Court’s practice to reject
a petition in such circumstances rather than to impose a more
stringent discipline than that requested by the petitioner.” Veach, 310
Ga. at 472. We therefore reject Tyson’s petition for voluntary
discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
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