NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 10, 2024
S24A1021. MILLS v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Following a reversal of his convictions on appeal and a retrial,
Appellant Roger Tashawn Mills was convicted of felony murder and
related crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Masuto
Garrett. 1 On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was
1 The shooting and connected crimes occurred on December 23, 2017. On
January 26, 2018, a Douglas County grand jury indicted Appellant and his codefendant, Mosas Bolar, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated
on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault by brandishing a handgun
(Count 3), and aggravated assault (Count 4). Appellant was jointly tried with
Bolar from October 22 to November 1, 2018. Appellant was found guilty on all
counts. The jury acquitted Bolar of malice murder, but found him guilty on the
remaining counts. After sentencing and the denial of his motion for new trial,
Appellant filed his first appeal to this Court.
On April 20, 2020, we reversed Appellant’s convictions on the ground
that the trial court abused its discretion in removing a holdout juror and that
such error was harmful. See Mills v. State, 308 Ga. 558, 562-563 (842 SE2d
284) (2020).
On June 11, 2021, Appellant and Bolar were re-indicted for street gang
activity in violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (Count
1), felony murder predicated on participation in criminal street gang activity
insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to
disprove his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt and
that it was plain error for the trial court to allow the State to present
other-acts evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed that in the early evening of
December 23, 2017, several people, including Appellant, Moses
Bolar, and Heather Sears—who had previously been romantically
involved with Garrett—were socializing at the home of Stanley
Yates, which was known as the “hangout spot” where “everybody in
(Count 2), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 3), felony
murder predicated on aggravated battery (Counts 4 and 5), aggravated assault
(Count 6), aggravated battery (Counts 7 and 8), and possession of a firearm
during commission of a felony (Counts 9 and 10). Appellant was retried
alongside Bolar—whose case is not part of this appeal—from October 4 through
October 14, 2021. The jury found Appellant guilty on Counts 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9,
and not guilty on the remaining counts. He was sentenced to life without parole
for felony murder (Count 3) and five years consecutive for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 9). All remaining counts were
either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes.
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial on November 22, 2021. After a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion on May 26, 2023. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024
term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
the neighborhood went.” Around 6:30 p.m., Sears sent a text
message to Garrett, asking him “to bring [her] something to eat
because [she] was hungry.” Upon arriving at Yates’s house after
receiving this text message, Garrett “walked in the house calling
everybody . . . [a] broke a** . . . saying they ain’t doing nothing with
the[ir] life.” Garrett then “grabbed the back of [Sears’s] shirt,”
“pulled [her] into [a] room,” and began “yelling” at Sears because he
was “really mad” that she was at Yates’s house with “all these
dudes.” After arguing with Sears for about five to ten minutes,
Garrett proceeded to the living room, walking by Appellant and
Bolar, who were sitting at a table, and “went directly to the front
door.” As Garrett was about to open the door to leave the house,
Bolar asked Garrett, “what did you say?” In response, Garrett
turned around to face Bolar and replied, “I didn’t say a
motherf**king word to you.” Garrett then began “walking towards
[Bolar]” and “pointing his finger” at him. Bolar stood up from the
table and “got his [gun] and pointed it directly at [Garrett].”
Appellant also drew a gun and “pointed [it] at [Garrett’s] face.”
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Garrett used his hand to “swipe” at Appellant’s gun. Appellant and
Bolar then began firing at Garrett, who was struck three times and
died from his injuries.
At trial, witnesses testified that Garrett did not have a gun or
weapon during the exchange, that Appellant and Bolar were the
only people involved in the dispute with Garrett, and that they did
not see anyone besides Appellant and Bolar with guns. The State’s
medical examiner testified that Garrett was struck once in the
shoulder and twice in the back, and that the gunshot wounds to
Garrett’s back were consistent with Garrett laying on the ground
and someone firing downward at him. Additionally, the State
introduced a video from a neighbor’s surveillance camera, which
captured several people—including Appellant and Bolar—fleeing
from Yates’s house after the shootings, and a cell phone video one of
the witnesses made during the altercation. Although the cell phone
video captured the sounds of four gunshots and a visual of Garrett
swiping at Appellant’s gun, it did not show the actual shootings.
However, a crime scene investigator testified that by combining the
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video from the neighbor’s surveillance system and the video from the
witness’s cell phone, investigators were able to determine that Bolar
fled from Yates’s house after the initial gunshot and that Appellant
did not flee from the house until the other three rounds of gunshots
were fired. Further, the investigator testified that based on the
videos and witness statements, he determined that the initial
gunshot was fired by Bolar and that this gunshot caused Garrett to
“stumble and fall to the ground” and that he would have been visibly
“bleeding on both the front and back shoulder of his hoodie,” when
Appellant shot him multiple times “at a downward angle.” The
State’s firearm expert testified that a total of four shell casings were
discovered at the crime scene, three of which were consistent with
being fired from the same Taurus 9-millimeter pistol and one of
which was consistent with being fired from a Smith and Wesson
pistol. Appellant later testified to shooting Garrett in the back with
a Taurus gun; Bolar testified to shooting Garrett in the shoulder
with a Smith and Wesson gun.
The State’s theory of the case was that the shooting was gang5
related and that Appellant and Bolar were motivated to retaliate
against Garrett after feeling that Garrett disrespected them. The
State introduced several videos and photographs featuring
Appellant and Bolar wearing certain clothing, making certain signs,
and using certain language, all of which the State’s expert in
criminal street gang activity testified as being associated with
“Cuz6locc,” a street gang affiliated with the Crips gang. Specifically,
the State’s expert noted that the video and photographs showed
Appellant and Bolar carrying blue bandannas on their left sides,
which is “a common identifier that has been adopted by Crip gangs.”
The State’s expert further testified that he believed Appellant and
Bolar were affiliated with Cuz6locc; that retaliation and “acts of
violence” due to a perception of disrespect is common among gang
members; and that if one gang member “starts a fight” “as a result .
. . [of] confrontation,” then there is an expectation that the “other
members jump in.”
The defense’s theory of the case was that Appellant was
justified in using deadly force against Garrett because Appellant
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reasonably feared for his own life and Bolar’s life. Appellant testified
that as Garrett walked towards the door to leave Yates’s house,
Appellant and Bolar were having a separate conversation when
Garrett turned around and said, “I didn’t say a motherf**king word
to you.” Garrett then started walking toward Bolar while “pulling
up his pants . . . [l]ike he [was] trying to . . . fight.” Appellant picked
up a loaded gun that was laying on the table with the intention
“[j]ust to scare [Garrett]” because Appellant had an “instinct” that
Garrett had “a gun in some type of way.” Garrett then “rushed”
towards Appellant, “grabb[ing] the hand that [Appellant] had the
gun in.” Appellant’s “back hit the table,” and Appellant and Garrett
both fell onto the floor. As Appellant fell, he “let go of the gun” and
a struggle between Appellant and Garrett over the gun ensued.
Appellant then remembered that he had a second gun in his
waistband and “jumped up” as Garrett was “going for the other gun.”
Appellant pulled out the gun from his hip and began firing at
Garrett “[t]o stop [Garrett] from getting the other gun” because it
was a “guarantee” that if Garrett got the gun, Garrett was going to
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shoot him. Appellant also testified that, prior to Garrett entering
Yates’s house before the shooting, he had never seen Garrett before,
had never communicated with him, and had never heard of him.
During cross-examination, the prosecution questioned
Appellant about the “G” and “C” tattooed on his hands and whether
it stood for “Gangster Crip.” Appellant responded that it stood for
“Gucci” and “Chanel,” and that he was not gang affiliated. Appellant
was also asked about a photograph in which he was shown
“thow[ing] up the C” and “carrying [a] blue bandanna.” Appellant
responded that “[a]nybody can throw up a C” and that he was
carrying the blue bandanna because he was “false flagging.” The
prosecution further asked whether Appellant saw Garrett with a
weapon or “going in his pockets” or “behind his waist” to grab a gun
before Appellant grabbed the gun from the table and “racked it.”
Appellant responded that he did not. The prosecution also asked
Appellant how many shots he had fired at Garrett and whether he
had shot Garrett in the back. Appellant responded that he did not
fire the first shot but that he had fired the other three shots with a
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Taurus gun and that he shot Garrett in the back. Further, when
Appellant was asked why he decided to become involved in an
altercation that did not involve him, Appellant responded, “[Bolar]
is my family.”
2. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to
disprove that he was justified in using deadly force against Garrett
to defend himself and Bolar. We disagree.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper
standard of review is whether “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (emphasis in original). A person generally
“is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death
. . . only if he . . . reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or . . . a third person.”
OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). “When a defendant presents evidence that he
9
was justified in using deadly force, the State bears the burden of
disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Birdow v. State,
305 Ga. 48, 50 (823 SE2d 736) (2019). “However, it is the role of the
jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is free to
reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept
the evidence that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Russell
v. State, 319 Ga. 556, 559 (905 SE2d 578) (2024) (cleaned up).
Here, the trial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to
conclude that Appellant did not reasonably believe that deadly force
was necessary to defend himself and Bolar during the encounter
with Garrett, and, thus, to reject Appellant’s justification defense.
Both the medical examiner who conducted Garrett’s autopsy and the
crime scene investigator testified that Garrett was likely already
injured and on the ground when Appellant shot him in the back
multiple times. Further, witnesses to the shooting testified that
Garrett did not have a weapon during the incident. Moreover,
although Appellant testified that he reasonably feared for his life,
he also admitted during cross-examination that he had shot Garrett
10
in the back and that he never saw Garrett with a weapon.
See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235 (862 SE2d 285) (2021) (“the
jury was entitled to disbelieve [the defendant’s] testimony,” in which
he claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense). See also Mims v.
State, 310 Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (“[T]he defendant’s
testimony, in which he claimed he was justified or provoked into
acting, may itself be considered substantive evidence of guilt when
disbelieved by the jury, as long as some corroborative evidence exists
for the charged offense.”). Accordingly, Appellant has not
established that the State failed to disprove his justification defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Appellant also argues that it was plain error for the trial
court to admit other-acts evidence that Appellant and others
allegedly assaulted another person following a verbal altercation.
This enumeration of error fails.
Prior to the start of Appellant’s first trial, the State filed a
notice of intent to introduce other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”). Specifically, the State sought to introduce
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evidence that approximately two weeks prior to Garrett’s murder,
Appellant, Bolar, and five or six other people “banded together as a
pack” and assaulted Erice Williams 2 after Williams confronted
Appellant for previously shooting him with a pellet gun. The State
contended that the evidence was relevant to an issue other than
propensity because it showed that Appellant and Bolar were
members of the same street gang and “as such have a duty to
support each other if they are involved in a dispute.”
Following a hearing, at which Appellant objected to the
admission of the incident involving Williams, the trial court ruled
that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404 (b), concluding
that the incident was relevant to show motive and that the probative
value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice.
Specifically, the trial court found that the evidence was relevant to
show motive because it explained “the relationship between
[Appellant and Bolar],” “why they would jointly participate in the
2 Williams was also present at Yates’s house during the shooting of
Garrett and testified to the events that transpired on that evening.
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[charged] crime,” and that they acted “as part of their gang
membership.”
Following this Court’s remand of the case after Appellant’s first
appeal, Appellant did not ask the trial court to reconsider its
evidentiary ruling regarding this incident.
At the second trial, Williams testified about the incident,
explaining that he was walking to a friend’s house when he saw “a
whole bunch of people” at the neighborhood park. Williams
approached the group and asked them whether Appellant was
nearby. Upon being asked why Williams was looking for Appellant,
Williams explained that he had previously been walking in the area
when he was shot with a pellet gun and that he believed Appellant
was the shooter. Appellant then exited a nearby car to approach
Williams, and Williams asked Appellant whether Appellant had
“heard what [he] said” about the pellet gun. Appellant responded by
telling Williams “don’t make me go to the house and get a real gun.”
Appellant then walked away from the park, but Williams stayed in
the area. Shortly after leaving, Appellant rejoined the group,
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holding in his hand “a pistol or something.” Williams just “stood
there,” and Bolar, who was among the group, told Williams that he
“need[ed] to get away from around here.” Williams responded to
Bolar that he would “whoop [his] a**” and the people “behind him.”
Williams was then “hit . . . in the back of the head with a . . . pistol”
and “got jumped by like six or seven people,” who all “just started
kicking [him] all over the place.” Upon being asked whether he saw
who had hit him in the head with the pistol, Williams responded
that he “ha[d] no idea.” However, when the prosecution asked
whether Williams recalled “saying that [Appellant] hit [him] with
the gun” at a “prior hearing,” Williams responded that he
“remember[ed] saying that” but that he no longer remembered the
incident. Williams also testified that, prior to being attacked, he was
aware that Bolar was affiliated with the Crips gang and that
“[Appellant had] started flagging and stuff like that” after Appellant
began “hanging with [Bolar].” When asked what Williams meant by
“flagging,” he explained “[l]ike rocking a blue bandanna.”
Appellant argues that it was plain error for the State to be
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allowed to present the evidence involving Williams pursuant to Rule
404 (b).3 To establish plain error, Appellant
must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived,
the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected his substantial
rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 547-548 (837 SE2d 261) (2019)
(cleaned up). Here, Appellant cannot establish plain error because
he has not shown a clear error in the admission of the evidence
pursuant to Rule 404 (b). See State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga.
259, 264 (818 SE2d 552) (2018) (“We need not analyze all of the
elements of this test when, as in this case, the defendant has failed
to establish one of them.”).
Rule 404 (b) provides that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith, but [that] such
3 Appellant does not address whether his objection to this evidence at the
first trial preserves the issue on appeal from the second trial, and we do not
consider this issue here.
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evidence is admissible for other purposes, including to prove . . .
motive.” Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 479 (819 SE2d 468) (2018)
(cleaned up). “The party offering evidence under [Rule 404 (b)] must
show three things: (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case
other than the defendant’s character; (2) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and
(3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant committed the other act.” Id.
(a) Here, the incident involving Williams was relevant to the
issue of motive. See OCGA § 24-4-401 (relevant evidence is
“evidence [that has] any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).
The State’s theory of the case was that the shooting of Garrett was
gang-related, and that Appellant was motivated to shoot Garrett as
a form of retaliation after he disrespected Bolar, a fellow member of
Cuz6locc. The incident at issue—which involved Appellant and
others retaliating against Williams after Williams allegedly
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disrespected Bolar—was relevant to help explain to the jury
Appellant’s motivation in shooting Garret. Thus, evidence that
Appellant and Bolar were fellow gang members and Appellant had
previously retaliated against someone following a verbal altercation
involving Bolar, “in combination with the expert testimony that
gangs consider standing up to them to be an act of disrespect,
provided evidence of [Appellant]’s motive” to shoot Garrett for
“standing up to a fellow gang member.” See Armstrong v. State, 310
Ga. 598, 602-603 (852 SE2d 824) (2020).
(b) The second part of the Rule 404 (b) analysis is governed by
OCGA § 24-4-403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Under Rule 403, “other acts
evidence should be excluded if it constitutes matter of scant or
cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of
its prejudicial effect.” Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 500-501 (847 SE2d
17
172) (2020) (cleaned up). A “trial court’s decision to exclude evidence
under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used
only sparingly.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 480. “Thus, in reviewing issues
under Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to
its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
undue prejudicial impact.” Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 419 (897 SE2d
856) (2024) (cleaned up).
Here, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that
the probative value of this evidence was not substantially
outweighed by its undue prejudice. The prosecutorial need for this
evidence was significant, given that the State had to disprove
Appellant’s justification defense, and it is otherwise unclear what
motive Appellant would have had to shoot Garrett—someone
Appellant claimed to have never seen or heard of—after merely
witnessing a brief verbal altercation between Garrett and Bolar. See
Armstrong, 310 Ga. at 603 (“[T]he prosecutorial need for the other
acts evidence showing gang membership was high because, without
it, it is unclear what motive [the defendant] would have to shoot [the
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victim] in a crowded park merely because [the victim] was in a
dispute with [an alleged fellow gang member].” (cleaned up)). Thus,
the incident involving Williams, along with the expert testimony on
street gangs and the evidence that both Appellant and Bolar were
members of Cuz6locc, helped the State explain its theory that
Appellant did not shoot Garrett in self-defense but, rather, shot
Garrett as a form of retaliation after Garrett disrespected a fellow
gang member. Moreover, given the significant probative value of the
evidence in rebutting Appellant’s justification defense, and
“reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission,”
id. (cleaned up), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence
was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. See id.
(“Although evidence of gang membership can be highly prejudicial,
all inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the
rule permits exclusion.” (cleaned up)).
(c) Finally, there was sufficient proof for a jury to find by a
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preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was involved in this
incident. Appellant argues that there was not sufficient proof
because Williams testified that he could not remember whether it
was Appellant who hit him in the head with the pistol. However,
Williams’s testimony established that he saw Appellant right before
the attack, and that he recalled previously testifying that Appellant
was the one who hit him in the back of the head with the pistol.
Thus, there was sufficient proof for the jury to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was involved in this
incident. See Coxwell v. Coxwell, 296 Ga. 311, 314 (765 SE2d 320)
(2014) (“Preponderance of evidence means that superior weight of
evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free
the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline
a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than
to the other.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that it
was plain error for this incident to be admitted into evidence
20
pursuant to Rule 404 (b) fails. 4
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
4 The State additionally argues, for the first time on appeal, that the
evidence involving Williams is also admissible under OCGA § 24-4-418 (a),
which provides that “[i]n a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused
of conducting or participating in criminal gang activity . . . evidence of the
accused’s commission of criminal gang activity . . . shall be admissible and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” However,
because at trial the State sought to introduce this evidence pursuant to Rule
404 (b) and we conclude that the trial court’s admission of this evidence under
Rule 404 (b) does not constitute plain error, we do not address this argument.
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