NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 5, 2024
S25Y0009. IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY JACKSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Jeffrey Jackson (State Bar No. 779477)
prior to the filing of a Formal Complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In
his petition, Jackson asserts that an ongoing mental health crisis
forced him to close his private law practice—first temporarily and
then permanently—and that, in the process of doing so, he failed to
adequately communicate with and to properly withdraw from his
representation of some of his clients. Asserting that he has now
successfully navigated the crisis, he seeks to resolve eight client
grievances filed against him by admitting only that he violated
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) 1.41 and 1.16 (c)2
and (d)3, found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Noting that the maximum
sanction for a violation of either rule is a public reprimand, Jackson
requests that the Court impose a State Disciplinary Review Board
reprimand but agrees to accept up to a public reprimand. In
response, the Bar urges the Court to reject Jackson’s petition,
1 GRPC 1.4 (a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0
(l), is required by these rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client’s objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s
conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not
permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”
Meanwhile, GRPC 1.4 (b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.”
2GRPC 1.16 (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a lawyer
withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules.”
3 GRPC 1.16 (d) provides that “[u]pon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the
client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned.”
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contending that it ignores many allegations of fact and fails to fully
address the extent of Jackson’s ethical violations.
Unfortunately, Jackson’s petition leaves open some significant
questions about when and how he allegedly advised his clients of his
decision to terminate his practice; whether, and, if so, to what
extent, Jackson may have violated more serious rules in addition to
GRPC 1.4 and 1.16 (c) and (d); and whether a reprimand is
appropriate discipline given the allegations of misconduct. We are
hesitant to overlook the fact that Jackson’s conduct may have caused
fairly serious harm to one or more of his clients and may also have
negatively affected the public’s perception of the legal profession in
general, among other ramifications. For these reasons, this Court is
not inclined to impose a State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand
or public reprimand to resolve the eight client grievances alleging
abandonment without more factual development from additional
proceedings. See In the Matter of Matteson, 314 Ga. 576, 580-581
(878 SE2d 196) (2022) (rejecting a petition for voluntary discipline
filed before the issuance of a formal complaint where the attorney
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provided no proof of facts alleged in the petition, including mental
health issues and restitution, and no indication of what steps he had
taken to ensure no further rule violations upon return to the practice
of law); In the Matter of Braziel, 303 Ga. 154, 156 (810 SE2d 476)
(2018) (rejecting a petition for voluntary discipline filed before the
issuance of a formal complaint “[b]ecause of the uncertainty
regarding the underlying facts . . . and the possibility that a Rule 8.4
violation may have occurred”). Therefore, the petition for voluntary
discipline is rejected.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.
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