In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 21, 2021
S21A0739. TIDWELL v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Following a jury trial, Tonya Tidwell was convicted of malice
murder and aggravated battery in connection with the death of
David Eric Guice. 1 On appeal, Tidwell claims that the trial court
erred by failing to charge the jury on mutual combat and by failing
to suppress evidence obtained during the post-incident search of the
1 On August 14, 2017, a Forsyth County grand jury indicted Tidwell, along with Ryan Spark and Jimmy Winkles, for the malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated battery of Guice. Tidwell was tried alone from November 5 through13, 2018; the jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. The trial court sentenced Tidwell to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and 20 years concurrent for aggravated battery; the trial court vacated the felony murder charge by operation of law.
Tidwell timely filed a motion for new trial on November 16, 2018, which she amended through new counsel on May 8, 2020. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as amended on January 14, 2021. Tidwell timely filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was docketed to the April 2021 term of this Court, and oral argument was heard on May 20, 2021.
crime scene. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that, on the evening of
December 30, 2016, Forsyth County officers arrested Ryan Spark,
Tidwell, and Michael Smith2 for possession of methamphetamine
after conducting a routine traffic stop. In addition to finding
methamphetamine in the vehicle, officers located several knives,
paracord (also known as parachute cord), and a machete; officers
confiscated only the methamphetamine, however, as they had no
reason or cause to seize the other items at that time.
Approximately one week later, on January 5, 2017, Forsyth
County 911 received an anonymous call. The caller told the
dispatcher that he had seen a body at an abandoned mobile home
about two hours prior, that the body was located by the back door of
the residence, and that it was wrapped in blankets. Responding
officers entered the residence and found Guice’s dead body under a
2 Smith was not charged in Guice’s murder as, by all accounts, he was merely present when the defendants showed up at the mobile home and murdered Guice.
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pile of blankets by the back door. Officers exited the mobile home,
notified dispatch of their discovery, and obtained a search warrant.3
During a subsequent search of the mobile home, the crime
scene investigator noted that Guice had rope tied around his neck
and his left hand. Similar rope was found wrapped around the
handle of the mobile home’s back door. There was blood throughout
the mobile home along with bloody drag marks, indicating that
Guice had been dragged to different locations while bleeding.
Drywall had been removed in sections of the mobile home, a section
of the carpet had been cut out, and a pile of bloody towels was located
in the closet behind the door of the master bedroom. Officers found
a pair of Nike shoes on the floor of the master bedroom, an orange
pipe,4 a blood-stained gray hoodie, a white glove in a trash bag, and
a broom that had blood on the handle.
The coroner noted multiple injuries to the back of Guice’s head,
numerous injuries to his face, and cut marks to his hands. After
3 Officers obtained search warrants for all subsequent searches of the home and for seizures of evidence.
4 This was also described at trial as an orange pole.
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conducting an autopsy, the medical examiner opined that Guice had
suffered several stab wounds as well as blunt force trauma all over
his body. The medical examiner concluded that Guice died as a
result of stab wounds to the neck and torso and multiple blunt force
injuries.
Officers learned the identity of the January 5 tipster (Cameron
McCallum) and interviewed him as a potential suspect. McCallum
implicated Tidwell, Spark, and Jimmy Winkles in Guice’s death.
Spark and Winkles were arrested at their respective residences.
Officers searched Spark’s home and located a bloody towel behind a
bedroom door. Spark’s white Dodge Ram, which was parked outside
the residence, was seized and transported to the sheriff’s office.
During a search of the vehicle, officers found an empty water jug and
a fixed-blade knife. Winkles and Spark were interviewed by officers;
they confessed their involvement in Guice’s murder and implicated
Tidwell. Michael Smith was also interviewed, and he, too,
implicated Winkles, Spark, and Tidwell in Guice’s murder. Tidwell,
who had not made bond from the drug arrest, was interviewed at
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the jail; she admitted to participating in Guice’s killing. Also, while
incarcerated, Tidwell admitted to fellow inmate, Christine Dutton,
that she had beaten, robbed, and murdered a man because he had
“ripped her off.” Tidwell told Dutton she was going to claim at trial
that she had been raped in order to avoid conviction.
After their interviews, officers took the defendants’ clothing
and collected buccal swabs. Blood was found on all of the
defendants’ shoes and was later matched to Guice’s DNA. A
swabbing from the orange pipe found at the scene also contained
Guice’s DNA. Officers returned to the crime scene to search for
additional evidence based upon the new information they obtained
during the defendants’ interviews. Inside the mobile home, officers
collected a milk jug, some paracord, a hammer, and a door that did
not belong to the residence.
Spark and Winkles pled guilty prior to trial and testified as
witnesses for the State.5 Specifically, Spark and Winkles told the
5 Smith was also called as a witness and testified about what he saw take place inside the mobile home, which largely tracked Spark’s and Winkles’ testimony.
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jury that, on the day of the crimes, they were with Tidwell and had
been using drugs when the group realized they were all mad at
Guice for various reasons.6 The group decided to confront Guice over
their respective grievances, so they drove to his mobile home and,
when they entered the residence, they found Smith and Guice
asleep. Although Smith woke up, Guice remained passed out in his
bed. The group smoked some meth and decided that they needed to
beat up Guice and “make him pay” for what he had done. Tidwell
went into the bedroom where Guice was still sleeping, picked up a
hatchet, and hit Guice in the head with the blunt side of the hatchet
three or four times. Guice jumped up, and the group began beating
him with heavy objects, such as a barbell and the orange pipe. Guice
tried to defend himself and swung at his attackers, but he could not
ward off the three by himself. Eventually, Guice fell to the ground,
but he was able to grab a nearby door that was not hinged to the
frame and pulled it over himself as a shield. Winkles pulled the door
6 The record shows that Spark and Winkles believed Guice had stolen from them, and Tidwell was angry at Guice from a prior physical altercation.
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away; Guice tried to hit back, but Winkles punched Guice
unconscious.
After a period of time, Guice regained consciousness, got up off
the ground, and started swinging at Tidwell, who still had the
hatchet in her hands. Tidwell, Spark, and Winkles resumed beating
Guice with heavy objects (the hatchet, barbell, and a piece of
lumber). Guice once again grabbed the door and used it as a shield
while swinging it at his attackers, but the group was able to knock
the door away and continue beating Guice. He fell unconscious
again. After approximately fifteen minutes, Guice regained
consciousness, and the group once again beat him with heavy
objects. They eventually backed him into the kitchen corner and
yelled at him for the wrongs he had allegedly committed. Guice
apologized and offered to pay them back, but Tidwell exclaimed that
she wanted to kill him. She ran into the bedroom, returned with a
knife, and started punching, stabbing, and kicking Guice. She then
grabbed some paracord, bound Guice’s hands behind his back, and
stabbed him again before cutting the paracord.
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Guice did not regain consciousness again. Spark testified that
he could hear Guice’s shallow breathing, and it sounded as if he had
“a bunch of fluid in his lungs.” Tidwell removed Guice’s jeans and
told Spark to look through the pockets. During this time, Tidwell
took a nearby broom and put it up Guice’s rectum. Spark walked
outside for a moment, and Winkles went into the bedroom where
Smith was sitting. Tidwell closed the door to the bedroom, stating,
“Y’all probably don’t want to hear this.” Winkles then heard a loud
bang and something rattling on the floor. Smith heard gurgling
coming from the kitchen, and Spark announced that Guice was
“cold.”
Tidwell, Winkles, and Spark cleaned the crime scene, cut out
the blood-stained dry wall, cut out a piece of bloody carpet, and
started a fire in the backyard so they could destroy the evidence.
Tidwell had jugs of water in the house and used them to clean the
scene, including her shoes, clothes, the hatchet, barbell, and orange
pipe. At this point, Winkles decided he no longer wanted to be a part
of the crimes and left the mobile home. Spark and Tidwell covered
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Guice’s body in blankets. Tidwell changed out of her blood-covered
Nike sneakers and her gray hoodie. She left the mobile home with
Spark and Smith, and the three were on their way to take Smith
home when they were pulled over by police. Spark testified that,
after they were arrested on the drug charges, Tidwell told Spark to
go back to the scene and “clean up the mess.”7
1. Tidwell argues that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on mutual combat. Assuming without deciding
that this claim was preserved for ordinary appellate review, it fails
because Tidwell cannot show that the trial court erred by ruling that
there was no evidence to support a charge on mutual combat. “To
authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight
evidence to support the theory of the charge, and the necessary
evidence may be presented by the State, the defendant, or both.”
(Punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (2) (842
SE2d 275) (2020). “Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to
7 Spark was released on bond a day later, but he did not return to the crime scene.
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authorize the giving of a charge is a question of law.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 863 (1) (834
SE2d 96) (2019).
Tidwell argues that she has met this standard because Spark
testified that Guice charged toward Tidwell and her co-defendants
each time he regained consciousness. However, “[t]he essential
ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat,
must be a willingness, a readiness, and an intention upon the part
of both parties to fight.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Berrian
v. State, 297 Ga. 740, 743 (2) (778 SE2d 165) (2015). “Reluctance, or
fighting to repel an unprovoked attack, is self-defense, and is
authorized by the law, and should not be confused with mutual
combat.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Here, there is no
evidence of an agreement, willingness, or readiness to fight between
Guice and any of his attackers. Instead, the evidence, including
Spark’s testimony, showed that Guice was ambushed by Tidwell,
Spark, and Winkles while he slept; that he was brutally beaten by
his attackers; and that, despite his numerous attempts to protect
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himself from the blunt force objects hitting him, Guice was
eventually bound and stabbed to death. Based on the foregoing, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Tidwell’s
requested charge of mutual combat.
2. Tidwell also argues that the trial court erred by denying
her pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained at the crime scene
after officers’ initial warrantless entry into the mobile home,
arguing that there were no exigent circumstances that would have
excused officers from obtaining a search warrant. 8 “On reviewing a
trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, evidence is construed
most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment and the trial
court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility must be accepted
unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Scandrett v. State, 293 Ga. 602, 603 (2) (748 SE2d 861) (2013).
The record shows that the trial court held a hearing on
Tidwell’s motion to suppress wherein the State called the three
8 We assume without deciding that Tidwell had standing to challenge the search of the mobile home.
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officers that responded to the initial 911 call. One of the officers
testified that he got information from dispatch concerning an
anonymous call “that there’s possibly a body at an abandoned
[mobile home] somewhere off of Pea Ridge Road” in Forsyth County.
The caller did not give an address but did provide a description of
the property. Based upon the officers’ prior dealings with the area,
they determined that the tipster was referring to Guice’s mobile
home. The mobile home was familiar to officers because they had
responded to previous calls at that residence for “verbal disputes”
including “a lot of yelling and arguing.” Another officer testified
that, “with the information we have, we are there to render aid if
someone is in there and still alive. So our main priority is to render
aid if we can.”
When officers arrived, they knocked on the door and announced
who they were but received no answer. At that time, officers noticed
that the front door was unsecure and that there were pry marks
around the door handle. They opened the front door and announced
themselves again but received no response. Officers checked the
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residence and observed a large pile of blankets in the corner of the
kitchen. When they moved one of the blankets, officers saw a human
leg with obvious signs of lividity. At this point, the responding
officers stopped what they were doing, exited the residence, and
notified dispatch. Thereafter, officers obtained search warrants for
all subsequent entries and searches of the home.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied Tidwell’s
motion, ruling, in pertinent part, “that the initial warrantless entry
was justified in light of the objectively reasonable basis that
someone inside may be in need of immediate aid.” Tidwell argues
that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because the State failed
to show that the warrantless search fell within the “emergency aid”
exception to the warrant requirement. We disagree.
“The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches
and seizures, and searches conducted without prior judicial approval
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Teal v.
State, 282 Ga. 319, 322-323 (2) (647 SE2d 15) (2007). One such
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exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, is “that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless
entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S.
385, 392 (I) (98 SCt 2408, 57 LE2d 290) (1978). This is so because
“[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency
or emergency.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
“Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a
warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U. S. 398, 403 (II) (126 SCt 1943, 164 LE2d 650) (2006). 9
The crux of Tidwell’s argument is that, because the initial 911
caller only notified officers of a “body” inside a mobile home, officers
9 We note that the State did not seek to invoke the distinct “community care” exception addressed in the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Caniglia v. Strom, ___ U. S. ___ (141 SCt 1596, 209 LE2d 604) (2021).
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did not have enough information that the person inside was in need
of immediate aid. However, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of
a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid
exception.” (Punctuation omitted.) Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45,
49 (130 SCt 546, 175 LE2d 410) (2009). The test, as explained by
the Supreme Court, “is not what [officers subjectively] believed, but
whether there was ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that
medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” Id.
(quoting Brigham City, supra, 547 U. S. at 406 and Mincey, supra,
437 U. S. at 392). Here, the record shows that officers received a tip
about a possible dead body inside a mobile home; had responded to
the residence on prior occasions for verbal disputes; and that, after
knocking on the front door and receiving no response, officers
noticed that the front door was unsecure and that there were pry
marks near the door handle. Based on the foregoing, we agree with
the trial court that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to
believe that a person inside the mobile home was “seriously injured
or imminently threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, supra,
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547 U. S. at 400. See also Teal, supra, 282 Ga. at 322-323
(emergency aid exception applied to initial entry into motel room by
officers responding to a call reporting a “bound, motionless body”
visible through the room’s window). Consequently, the trial court
did not err in denying Tidwell’s pretrial motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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