NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 10, 2024
S24A1353. PETERSON v. VIE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
In this case, as in many others before this Court both recently
and over the decades, a party who wants the results of an election
thrown out has disregarded the clear, longstanding rule requiring
“parties seeking to undo an election to have done everything within
their power to have their claims decided before the election
occurred.” Catoosa County Republican Party v. Henry, 319 Ga. 794,
794 (906 SE2d 750) (2024). We therefore “dismiss the appeal without
reaching the merits (or lack thereof)” of the claim at issue in this
case. Id. at 795.
Christina Peterson, representing herself, appeals from the
dismissal of her challenge to the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a
candidate in this year’s election for the office of probate court judge
in Douglas County. 1 Before the primary election, Peterson
challenged Vie’s qualifications in the local Board of Elections and
filed a petition for review of the Board’s adverse decision in superior
court. After the primary election, Peterson filed a second petition in
superior court. Both petitions in superior court were based solely on
the same substantive ground that Vie had not been a resident of
Douglas County for the time required to run for probate court judge.2
The pre-primary petition was denied, and Peterson was
unsuccessful in seeking to appeal from that denial. The direct appeal
now before us is from the dismissal of Peterson’s separate post1 Peterson also was a candidate in that election. There were no other
candidates who qualified to run for probate court judge. Peterson had
previously been elected as the Douglas County Probate Court judge in 2020.
However, she was removed from the bench on June 25, 2024, resulting in her
ineligibility to be elected to any judicial office for seven years. See Inquiry
Concerning Judge Peterson, 319 Ga. 316, 347 (903 SE2d 645) (2024).
Nevertheless, a candidate’s qualifications can be challenged, not only by
another candidate, but also “by any aggrieved elector who was entitled to vote
for such person[.]” OCGA § 21-2-521. After Peterson’s removal from office, Vie
was appointed and sworn in to serve the remainder of Peterson’s term.
2 Subject to an exception that is not applicable here, “no individual shall
be eligible to offer for election to or hold the office of judge of the probate court unless,” among other things, she “[i]s a resident of the county in which the
individual seeks the office of judge of the probate court for at least two years
prior to qualifying for election to the office and remains a resident of such
county during the term of office[.]” OCGA § 15-9-2 (a) (1) (B).
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primary petition.
Vie qualified as a candidate for probate court judge on March
8, 2024, and Peterson submitted her pre-primary challenge to the
local Board of Elections on March 14. After a March 26 hearing, the
Board unanimously denied the challenge on March 28, with one
abstention. Peterson filed her petition for review in superior court
on April 8, and Vie responded on May 7. After a May 8 hearing, the
superior court denied her petition for review and affirmed the
Board’s decision on May 9. Twelve days later, on May 21, the
Democratic primary election was held, and Vie was the winner.
Peterson did not move to stay that primary election. On Monday,
June 10, almost three weeks after the primary, Peterson filed an
application for discretionary appeal in this Court from the denial of
her pre-primary petition for review. On June 25, we denied that
application in Case Number S24D1153.
In the meantime, Peterson filed her verified post-primary
petition in superior court on May 30, nine days after the primary.
See OCGA § 21-2-520 et seq. That post-primary petition did not seek
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review of any administrative decision but was a direct challenge to
the result of the primary election on the ground that Vie was
ineligible for the office of probate court judge. See OCGA § 21-2-522
(2). Peterson twice filed a motion for recusal of the trial judge and
requested that consideration of each motion be expedited, and both
motions to recuse were promptly denied, but Peterson did not ask
the superior court to expedite the case. On June 12, Vie filed a
motion to dismiss Peterson’s post-primary petition, asserting that
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata barred the
petition and, in reliance on Jordan v. Cook, 277 Ga. 155, 157 (587
SE2d 52) (2003), that the petition was moot due to Peterson’s failure
to move for a stay of the May 21 primary election. On June 21, the
superior court granted Vie’s motion to dismiss “for all the reasons
set forth in [Vie’s] motion and brief.” Peterson filed a notice of
appeal on the same day her post-primary petition was dismissed.
However, Peterson did not request expedited treatment of the
appeal or an expedited briefing schedule and instead filed her
appellate brief on August 12, 20 days after the case was docketed in
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this Court. Later on August 12, she moved to expedite the appeal
and stay the general election. We denied that motion on August 26.
When a party who brings an election contest fails to act with
dispatch to have the dispute resolved before the election in question,
this Court has long declined to grant the “drastic remedy” of
invalidating the election after it has happened. Miller v. Hodge, 319
Ga. 543, 549 (1) (905 SE2d 562) (2024). In Miller, we reaffirmed that,
although “the occurrence of a subsequent election does not affect this
Court’s authority to direct a trial court to declare an election result
invalid and to call for a new election,” we generally will not review
challenges to a candidate’s qualifications “once the succeeding
election at issue has occurred.” Id. at 545-546, 548 (1). Due to
prudential considerations grounded in the statutory framework for
elections, 3 “litigants in election contests have a duty to expedite
3 We have explained that those prudential considerations include
“preventing the unnecessary expense of holding more than one election,
assuring the finality of results, and respecting the sanctity of elections wherein the will of the people is the supreme law.” Henry, 319 Ga. at 798 (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Miller, 319 Ga. at 548-549 (1). Moreover, in
Georgia’s election statutes, “the General Assembly has demonstrated that
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resolution of the dispute before an election is held[,] and . . . the
failure to make every effort to dispose of election disputes with
dispatch before a subsequent election may result in the dismissal of
the case.” Miller, 319 Ga. at 549 (1) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Peterson argues that under Jordan (on which we relied in
Miller), these principles apply only when the general election has
already taken place. However, “the sort of policy considerations
behind our prudential rule . . . apply even more strongly in the
context of an impending primary election.” Henry, 319 Ga. at 799.
Peterson consistently failed to “utilize every available means
to protect [her] rights and to resolve” her challenges to Vie’s
qualifications prior to the primary election. Miller, 319 Ga. at 547
(1). The record shows that (until she filed her appellate brief in this
post-primary proceeding) Peterson never requested an expedited
final ruling, an expedited appeal, or a stay of the primary election.
See id. Instead, she effectively delayed the proceedings by using the
election contests are to be heard with the greatest of expedition.” Miller, 319
Ga. at 546 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Henry, 319 Ga. at
798.
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full time allotted instead of expediting her own filings. By waiting
until June 10 to file an application for a discretionary appeal from
the final order of the superior court in the pre-primary proceeding,
Peterson took the full 30 days allowed by statute. See OCGA §§ 5-6-35 (d); 21-2-6 (e). Accordingly, the delay in consideration and final
disposition of Peterson’s challenge to Vie’s qualifications “is
attributable to [Peterson’s] failure to avail [herself] of the applicable
procedures of the Election Code,” by not promptly seeking to
expedite the pre-primary proceeding or to stay the primary election.
Miller, 319 Ga. at 549 (1).4
4 We note that, even if Peterson had done everything in her power to
resolve her challenge to Vie’s qualifications before the primary election,
Peterson failed to utilize every available means to resolve that challenge after
the primary election and before the general election. In this post-primary
proceeding, until she filed her appellate brief, Peterson never requested an
expedited final ruling, an expedited appeal, or a stay of the general election.
Instead, she once again delayed resolution of her claim by using the full time
allotted instead of expediting her own filings, when she took the full 20 days
allowed from the date of docketing to file her brief in this appeal. See Supreme
Court Rule 10 (1) (a). Peterson’s requests to expedite her motions for recusal
were her only efforts to expedite any proceedings until she had filed her brief
in this appeal. Thus, she failed to avail herself of the applicable procedures of
the Election Code when she instituted new litigation without promptly seeking
to expedite the proceeding or to stay the general election. See Miller, 319 Ga.
at 549 (1).
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For these reasons, the superior court correctly dismissed
Peterson’s post-primary petition, and we dismiss the appeal without
addressing the merits of Peterson’s enumerations of error regarding
the superior court’s other rulings. See Henry, 319 Ga. at 795; Miller,
319 Ga. at 544, 549 (1), 550 (2). Cf. Williams v. Heard, 302 Ga. 114,
116-118 (2) (805 SE2d 1) (2017) (where the case had to be remanded
for the superior court to dismiss an elections case as moot and this
Court addressed a recusal issue only in part, so as to require that a
new judge be selected to preside over the case on remand).
Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,
disqualified.
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