NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 21, 2023
S22G1035. IN THE INTEREST OF A. H., A CHILD.
COLVIN, Justice.
After adjudicating A. H. delinquent but finding that he was not
in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision, the juvenile
court in this case entered an order dismissing the delinquency
proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-600 (d) and sealing the record
under OCGA § 15-11-701. The State appealed the juvenile court’s
decision to seal the record, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal, concluding that neither subsection (a) (1) nor subsection
(a) (6) of OCGA § 5-7-1 authorized the State to appeal from the
juvenile court’s order. We granted certiorari to determine whether
“the Court of Appeals err[ed] in concluding that the State was not
permitted to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a).”
1. After carefully considering the full record and the briefs
of the parties, this Court has determined that the writ of certiorari
issued in Case No. S22G1035 was improvidently granted. The Court
of Appeals determined that the juvenile court’s order was not
appealable under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) because it was not a “void”
order. But this issue is a difficult one given the state of our case law
in this area, and the issue was neither fully litigated below nor
briefed by the parties in significant depth in this Court. Thus,
although this issue is properly before us in a narrow sense, it is not
presented in a form that would allow us to clarify the law or
otherwise provide meaningful guidance. Accordingly, the writ is
vacated, and the petition for certiorari in Case No. S22C1035 is
denied.
2. In connection with this case, we observe that this Court
has not fully explained the contours of what makes an erroneous
order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction “void” under state
law for purposes of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) (providing that the State
may appeal “in criminal cases and adjudication of delinquency cases
. . . [f]rom an order, decision, or judgment of a court where the court
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does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the
Constitution or laws of this state” (emphasis supplied)). We have
held that, even when a court has jurisdiction over a case, certain
types of errors can render the court’s order “void,” but we have not
explicitly identified what principle or principles of law distinguish
erroneous-but-valid orders from erroneous orders that are “void and
of no legal effect.” Triola v. Triola, 299 Ga. 220, 221 (1) (787 SE2d
206) (2016). Compare State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 212 (3) (b) (766
SE2d 66) (2014) (stating that “[a] judgment entered on mutually
exclusive verdicts is void” without explaining why such an error
renders the judgment void rather than merely erroneous), overruled
on other grounds as recognized by Booth v. State, 311 Ga. 374 (858
SE2d 39) (2021); State v. Sumlin, 281 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (637 SE2d 36)
(2006) (holding that an order granting a mistrial after the jury
returned its verdict was void because “the time for granting a
mistrial ha[d] passed,” but not explaining why this procedural error
caused the order to be void rather than merely erroneous); and
Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 610 (1) (409 SE2d 517) (1991)
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(noting our longstanding rule that criminal sentences and
judgments are “void if [a] court imposes punishment that the law
does not allow,” without explaining the basis for that rule); with
State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63, 65 (646 SE2d 77) (2007) (noting that not
just “any improper exercise of a trial court’s authority renders a
judgment void” and holding that a court’s decision to conduct a
bench trial over the State’s objection resulted only in “an ineffective
waiver of the right to trial by jury, not a void judgment,” without
explaining why an error of that type did not render the judgment
void (emphasis in original)); and State v. Glover, 281 Ga. 633, 633
(641 SE2d 543) (2007) (holding that an order dismissing the State’s
appeal pursuant to a statute authorizing orders of that type was not
void without fully explaining why the court’s procedural and factual
errors did not render its order void). Perhaps we will have an
opportunity to further explain the legal principles governing
voidness in a case where the issue is squarely presented and fully
briefed. But this is not that case.
Writ of certiorari vacated and petition for certiorari denied. All
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the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., who concurs in Division 1 and
in the judgment.
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