NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 19, 2023
S22Y0631, S23Y0279. IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT MALLORY
CRAWFORD (two cases).
PER CURIAM.
These disciplinary matters are before the Court seeking the
disbarment of former Superior Court Judge Robert Mallory “Mack”
Crawford (State Bar No. 194192), who has been a member of the Bar
since 1987. Both of these matters arise from an incident in which
Crawford obtained funds from the registry of the court on which he
served as a judge, under circumstances that, according to the Bar,
demonstrate that he was not entitled to the funds. In Case No.
S22Y0631, Crawford is charged with a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) of
the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), based on his
first-offender Alford1 plea to a misdemeanor count of theft for his
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1969).
conduct in obtaining the registry funds. In Case No. S23Y0279,
Crawford is charged with having violated the following provisions of
the GRPC for his mishandling of client funds and dishonest conduct:
Rules 1.5, 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), 1.15 (II) (c),
and 8.4 (a) (4). As explained more below, we impose a three-year
suspension on the basis of Crawford’s violation of numerous GRPC in
Case No. S23Y0279 and decline to consider the merits of Case No.
S22Y0631.
I. Procedural History
Crawford was previously the subject of a judicial discipline
proceeding, and the allegations in that proceeding regarding
Crawford’s underlying conduct were largely the same as those at issue
here – namely, that Crawford “‘impermissibly convert[ed] money from
the registry of the Superior Court of Pike County . . . when he ordered
the Pike County Clerk via handwritten note to disburse $15,675.62 in
funds from the court registry to him via check’ and ‘then cashed and
used a portion of the check for his personal benefit and deposited the
remainder of this money in his personal checking account.’” Inquiry
2
Concerning Judge Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 404 (851 SE2d 572) (2020).
In that matter, we ultimately declined to answer the question of
whether clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that
Crawford violated the Code of Judicial Conduct because Crawford
voluntarily resigned his office.
Following his appointment to oversee the two instant matters,
Special Master Adam M. Hames entered an order, with the agreement
of the parties, consolidating the two proceedings and setting an
evidentiary hearing. The hearing was held and the parties filed
motions and briefs, after which the special master issued a report and
recommendation. The special master’s report addressed and rejected
several general legal objections raised by Crawford and provided
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each of these disciplinary
matters, ultimately determining that the evidence established that
Crawford had committed each of the charged violations of the GRPC
except Rule 1.5. The special master then conducted an extensive
analysis of the appropriate discipline and recommended that Crawford
be disbarred.
3
In the matter underlying Case No. S23Y0279, Crawford filed
exceptions to the special master’s report, seeking review from the Bar’s
Review Board. After the Bar filed a response, the Review Board issued
its report and recommendation, in which it agreed with the special
master’s analysis and conclusions, except the Review Board ultimately
concluded that the appropriate discipline was a three-year suspension.
Having now undertaken our own review of the record for Case No.
S23Y0279, we also conclude that a three-year suspension is the
appropriate discipline for that matter. Given that both of these
matters arise from the same single course of misconduct, we see no
reason to levy additional discipline based on the alleged violation of
Rule 8.4 (a) (3) in Case No. S22Y0631 and therefore decline to consider
the issues raised by Crawford concerning that matter. See generally
In the Matter of Morris, 302 Ga. 862, 864 n.3 (809 SE2d 799) (2018)
(declining to reach question of whether attorney violated Rule 8.4 (a)
(3) because attorney clearly violated a number of other Rules for which
disbarment was an appropriate sanction). As a result, the discussion
4
that follows is confined solely to the issues relevant to Case No.
S23Y0279.
II. Special Master’s Recitation of the Underlying Facts
In his report, the special master laid out the underlying facts as
follows. In August 2002, Crawford was hired by D.C. and B.W. to
answer a summons in a foreclosure action seeking a writ of possession,
which concerned a property that was titled to another individual, A.T.
Crawford filed a complaint for redemption of a tax deed in the Pike
County Superior Court on September 12, 2002. The next day, the court
entered an order staying the writ of possession until a hearing could
be held on the redemption complaint, but apparently, no hearing was
ever held. In connection with the filing of the redemption action,
Crawford deposited into the court’s registry $15,675.62 on behalf of
D.C. and B.W. The $15,675.62 was composed of a $9,675.62 overage
collected by the tax commissioner at the tax sale and cash provided by
D.C. Although Crawford acknowledged at the hearing before the
special master that there was an unresolved issue regarding whether
the overage funds belonged to A.T. or D.C., Crawford signed the
5
receipt for the overage funds as A.T.’s “attorney-in-fact,” apparently
because D.C. presented Crawford with a power of attorney from A.T.,
although Crawford did not represent A.T.
Crawford did not have a written fee agreement with D.C. or B.W.,
but he maintained that he had an oral agreement with D.C. to the
effect that, if Crawford kept D.C. from being removed from the
property during D.C.’s life, Crawford could keep the money in the
court’s registry as his fee. Crawford rarely had fee agreements with
clients and would not get paid until after his work had been completed,
if he got paid at all; if, after completion of his work, Crawford and a
client could not agree on a fee, Crawford would simply move on and
forget about being paid for his work. Crawford was not paid anything
for his work for D.C. and in fact paid D.C.’s filing fees. Crawford
believed that, had the property been redeemed during D.C.’s life, they
would have worked out a fee.
D.C. died in April 2004, and Crawford reached out to D.C.’s
brother about the funds in the registry, but D.C.’s brother apparently
did not want anything to do with matters concerning D.C. In
6
September 2005, Crawford filed a motion seeking the appointment of
a special master in the redemption action and listing B.W. as the
executrix of D.C.’s estate. Crawford did not assert an interest in the
registry funds as a fee at that time.
In November 2009, a judge of the superior court entered an order
dismissing the redemption complaint for want of prosecution and
directing the clerk of court to pay the registry funds to the redemption
plaintiffs upon their submission to the clerk of the certificate required
by then-Rule 19 (now Rule 23) of the Uniform Superior Court Rules
(“USCR”).2 Crawford consented to the dismissal order without
2 This Rule provided that “[u]pon any order being presented to a judge
requiring the court clerk to pay out funds from the registry of the court, except in garnishment proceedings, counsel for the parties presenting the order shall at
the same time submit to the court” a certificate formatted as follows:
I hereby certify that the order presented in case no. ____ on this the
______ day of ____________, 20__, to draw down funds from the
registry of court, is done with written consent of all parties, or their
counsel, who have filed claims of record in this case, and whose
interest has not previously been foreclosed by judicial decree. In
condemnation matters only, I further certify that provision is made
in this order for the payment of all local, state and federal
government taxes, or assessments of record.
7
speaking with B.W. and, again, did not assert at that time that he was
owed any of the registry funds as a fee.
The clerk of the superior court, Linda Williams, initially
attempted to send the registry funds to B.W. or to someone on D.C.’s
behalf, as she believed that the funds belonged to them, but she was
apparently unable to find them. In 2017, Williams spoke to Crawford,
who was by then a judge on the superior court, about what to do with
the registry funds. The special master recounted that Williams
initially testified that, although she was not sure, she thought it had
been her idea to give the funds to Crawford. However, when Williams
was presented with testimony that she had given in connection with
the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) proceeding to the
effect that it had been Crawford’s idea to give him the money, she
acknowledged that her prior statement had been truthful but stated
I understand that the truth of the statements contained in this
certificate is a condition precedent to the issuance of a valid order to
pay the funds from the registry of the court.
Date __________________________________
Signed ________________________________
Attorney for ___________________________
8
that she simply did not remember at the time of these proceedings the
particular details of her testimony in connection with the JQC matter.3
In any event, Williams stated that Crawford had not ordered her to
give him the funds. Williams considered sending the registry funds to
the Department of Revenue as unclaimed, and Crawford asked her, if
she were to do so, to list him as a claimant. Williams stated that this
was the first time that she could recall Crawford telling her that he
was entitled to any of the registry funds.
On December 11, 2017, Williams issued to Crawford a check for
the full amount of the registry funds. Of those funds, $10,000 was
deposited into Crawford’s personal bank account, which was, at that
time, overdrawn by $2,232.21. Crawford took the remaining $5,675.62,
and he admitted at the hearing before the special master that he used
that money for personal purposes. Thereafter, Crawford was contacted
3 The special master stated that he did not find Williams’s testimony to be
“particularly helpful,” as it appeared clear to him that she did not wish to harm
Crawford, with whom she had apparently been friends for more than 30 years.
The special master “did not get the impression that Ms. Williams was attempting
to be deceitful,” instead stating that “a passage of time, personal tragedy, and a desire not to hurt a friend created gaps and shade in her memory.”
9
about the matter by the JQC, and, as a result of that conversation, he
raised and returned the money in February 2018. The special master
noted that Crawford acknowledged at the hearing that, in having the
funds removed from the registry, he had not complied with the judge’s
2009 order to file a certificate in compliance with the USCR, but he
claimed that he had taken money out of the registry without a
certificate before, presumably in other cases.4
On the same day Crawford received a check for the registry
funds, Crawford gave Williams unsigned, handwritten notes to
include in the file but not to be stamped in on the docket. Crawford
acknowledged at the hearing that he wrote these notes and stated that
they were put into the file on the day he received the registry funds for
the purpose of establishing a “roadmap” of what had happened to the
funds. The notes included a brief procedural history of the redemption
case, a recitation of Williams’s actions in attempting to contact the
case plaintiffs, an acknowledgement of D.C.’s death, and an assertion
4 Crawford also asserted at the hearing that, in his experience, the clerk
had a legal right to pay whomever she chose to pay, even in contradiction of a
court order, and that this was done “all the time.”
10
that Williams would have paid the funds in 2009. The last two items
in the notes stated that: (1) “[t]he funds are being returned to Robert
M. Crawford,” followed by two words that were crossed out but
appeared to the special master to have been “to make”; and (2) “[t]hese
notes cannot be filed in the case since the case has been closed for 8
years, they are to be placed in the file but not recorded.” The special
master pointed out that the notes were not signed, did not include any
mention of the funds representing an earned attorney fee for
Crawford, and did not otherwise comply with the certification
requirement for the withdrawal of funds under what is now USCR 23.
III. Crawford’s General Legal Objections
In the proceedings before the special master, Crawford raised a
number of legal objections that did not concern the specific allegations
of his violations of the GRPC, but instead concerned issues regarding
the general propriety of the disciplinary proceedings. The first of these
issues concerned Crawford’s request for a jury trial of this matter. In
rejecting this argument, the special master correctly recognized that
he was bound to follow the precedent set by this Court in cases such
11
as In the Matter of Jefferson, 307 Ga. 50 (834 SE2d 73) (2019), which
rejected a similar request for a jury trial. In his exceptions to the
special master’s report, Crawford argued this issue at length and
urged that this Court should reconsider its case law on this point. We
decline the invitation to do so.
The next two issues were raised by Crawford in the alternative:
(1) whether the Bar, the special master, and this Court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over this matter because Crawford was a sitting
judge at the time of the alleged misconduct and the JQC, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of judges, had already
prosecuted the matter; and (2) whether this matter was barred by res
judicata because of the prior JQC proceeding brought against him. As
to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, after reviewing the
pertinent law, the respective scope of the jurisdictions of the JQC and
the Bar, and the authority of this Court to govern the practice of law
in Georgia, the special master determined that there was no subjectmatter jurisdiction problem, as the record showed that Crawford
claimed that he did not overtly use his position as a judge to commit
12
the acts constituting the alleged misconduct; that he was, at the time
of his misconduct, a member of the Bar as well as a sitting superior
court judge; and that he believed that he was acting in his capacity as
an attorney in committing the acts at issue. We agree that, even to the
extent that the Bar lacks the authority to discipline a judge who is also
an attorney for conduct that was clearly committed in his judicial
capacity, under the particular facts here, where Crawford’s alleged
misconduct occurred in his capacity as a private attorney, and not as
a judge, there is no basis for concluding that there was a subjectmatter jurisdiction problem as to the Bar’s attorney disciplinary
proceedings here.
With regard to res judicata, the special master recounted that
Crawford argued that res judicata applied to preclude the Bar’s ability
to bring this matter because both the JQC matter and this matter
concern the same underlying acts and omissions; the JQC investigated
the matter and made a recommendation to this Court; and this Court
ruled on that recommendation. After reciting law concerning the
13
application of res judicata,5 the special master recounted that the JQC
complaint alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically, of Rule 1.1, which requires that judges respect and comply
with the law, and Rule 1.3, which requires that judges not use the
prestige of their office to advance their private interests or those of
others. The special master then concluded that Crawford had failed to
establish that there was an identity of the causes of action between
this matter and the JQC matter, given that this matter concerns
alleged violations of the GRPC, which were not and could not have
been before the JQC, and that this matter would require the Bar to
offer facts proving numerous allegations that were not at issue in the
JQC proceeding, such as that Crawford mishandled client funds as
proscribed by the GRPC.
5 As we have previously explained, “the doctrine of res judicata prevents
the re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical
causes of action,” and “three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata
applies – (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Rockdale County v. U.S. Enterprises, Inc., 312 Ga. 752, 758 (865
SE2d 135) (2021) (cleaned up).
14
We have not previously addressed the res judicata effect of a prior
JQC proceeding on a subsequent attorney discipline proceeding such
as this. But we can assume (without deciding) that res judicata
applies to a disciplinary proceeding like this one, because we agree
that, under these circumstances, res judicata does not bar this
disciplinary proceeding. “‘Cause of action’” is “‘the entire set of facts
which give rise to an enforceable claim’ . . . with special attention given
to the ‘wrong’ alleged.” Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105, 112
(816 SE2d 670) (2018) (citation omitted). The special master correctly
concluded that there was not an identity of the causes of actions
between this matter and the JQC matter because (1) the violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct charged in the JQC matter involved
alleged wrongs – specifically, that Crawford failed to respect and
comply with the law and that he used the prestige of his office to
advance his private interests – that were different from those alleged
in this matter; and (2) there were many facts that the Bar was
required to prove in this matter that were not required to be proved in
the JQC matter. Thus, regardless of whether the Bar and the JQC are
15
privies and whether the resolution of the prior JQC matter constituted
an adjudication on the merits, the Bar was not prevented by res
judicata from seeking to discipline Crawford.
The special master also addressed Crawford’s assertion that this
matter was time-barred under Bar Rule 4-222 (b). With regard to that
claim, the special master reviewed the record and concluded that this
matter complied with Bar Rule 4-222 (b) and thus denied Crawford’s
motion to dismiss on that basis. Crawford’s final objection was styled
as an equal protection argument, which the special master determined
was a species of a selective prosecution claim. The special master
rejected that argument because Crawford failed to develop a factual
record in support of such a claim. Crawford did not renew his
argument as to either of these final two issues in any of his filings
following the issuance of the special master’s report, such that they
appear to have been abandoned. In any event, we agree with the
special master’s resolution of these issues.
IV. Disciplinary Analysis by Special Master and Review Board
16
The special master began by addressing whether the Bar had
adequately demonstrated that Crawford’s conduct violated Rule 1.5.6
In making this determination, the special master first considered the
plausibility of Crawford’s story that he was entitled to the funds as an
earned fee for his work on behalf of D.C. The special master
acknowledged Crawford’s testimony that he was generally not paid a
fee until work was completed for a client, that written fee agreements
were uncommon in his practice, and that he would not collect any fee
if he and a client could not reach an agreement on a fee. Nevertheless,
the special master concluded that no reasonable attorney who believes
that he has earned a $15,000 fee would allow that fee to sit in the
registry of the court for nearly 14 years without claiming those funds
or at least attempting to assert an interest in them.
The special master reasoned that if Crawford had an agreement
with D.C. that, if Crawford were able to keep D.C. on the property
until D.C. died, the registry funds would be Crawford’s as a fee (as
6 Rule 1.5 makes it a violation for a lawyer to “make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”
17
Crawford asserted during the hearing before the special master), then
the time to claim that fee was upon D.C.’s death. The special master
noted, however, that Crawford did not attempt to claim or assert any
interest in the funds in 2004 when D.C. died, in 2005 when Crawford
filed a motion seeking the appointment of a special master in the
redemption action, or in 2009 when a judge of the superior court
entered an order dismissing the redemption complaint for want of
prosecution and directing the clerk of court to pay the registry funds
to the redemption plaintiffs. Instead, at the earliest, Crawford did not
assert an interest in the registry funds until 2017, when Williams
informed him that she planned to escheat the funds to the Department
of Revenue. Nevertheless, the special master concluded that, because
there was not sufficient evidence in the record to determine whether,
to the extent that the registry funds may have constituted a fee, such
a fee was unreasonable, the Bar had failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that Crawford had violated Rule 1.5.
18
As to the various alleged violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and (II),7 the
special master stated that they were premised on the facts that
Crawford took the funds from the registry, placing them in his
7 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall hold
funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own
funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts
maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1).” Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that “[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third
person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a
full accounting regarding such property.” Rule 1.15 (I) (d) provides that “[w]hen
in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance
of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is
resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or
property as to which the interests are not in dispute.” Rule 1.15 (II) (a) provides that “[e]very lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices
as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional
corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any
other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust
accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and
all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in
and administered from a trust account.” Rule 1.15 (II) (c) requires, in pertinent
part, that “[a]ll client’s funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interestbearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution.” The maximum sanction for
a single violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), and 1.15 (II) (a) is disbarment. The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand.
19
personal account and using them for his personal purposes. Although
the special master acknowledged that Crawford asserted that the
funds constituted an earned fee, he reiterated his conclusion that the
record did not support such an assertion, as the only evidence that
Crawford was entitled to the funds was Crawford’s own post hoc
statement, which was supported by no other evidence. The special
master further noted that, even to the extent that Crawford believed
that he had a fee agreement with D.C. that may have entitled him to
some of the registry funds, Crawford acknowledged that there was
uncertainty regarding whether a substantial portion of the funds had
even belonged to D.C. in the first place, but that Crawford failed to
seek a judicial determination to resolve that question.
The special master thus concluded that clear and convincing
evidence showed that Crawford violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by failing to
hold the funds of his client separate from his own funds in an approved
institution; violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing, upon receipt of the
funds from the registry, to notify and promptly deliver those funds to
the client; violated Rule 1.15 (I) (d) by keeping funds in which,
20
arguably, both he and his client had an interest and by failing to keep
those funds separate until there had been an accounting; violated Rule
1.15 (II) (a) by failing to hold the funds of his client in a trust account
and to administer those funds from that trust account; and violated
Rule 1.15 (II) (c) by failing to place his client’s funds in an interestbearing account at an approved institution.
Finally, the special master considered whether Crawford had
violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4).8 The Bar had alleged five bases for such a
violation: (1) that Crawford had falsely told Williams that he was
entitled to the funds; (2) that he had falsely stated that Williams had
urged him to take the funds; (3) that he had acquired the funds
without complying with the 2009 superior court order or with the
relevant provision of the USCR; (4) that he had used his judicial office
to acquire the funds; and (5) that he had acquired the funds without
notifying his client or delivering the funds to his client. The special
8 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The maximum
sanction for a single violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.
21
master concluded that the Bar failed to demonstrate that Crawford
used his judicial office to obtain the funds, noting that, although there
was a “stench around this transaction” and Crawford’s position likely
helped to enable the transaction, his actions were done as a private
attorney and he had not compelled Williams to turn over the funds.
However, the special master concluded that clear and convincing
evidence did support the Bar’s remaining allegations. The special
master found that Crawford used deceit and misrepresentation in
telling Williams that he was entitled to the registry funds, as Crawford
conceded at the hearing that it was not clear whether he would have
been entitled to the $9,675.62 overage from the tax sale, which was
made out to A.T., not D.C. The special master noted that Crawford was
experiencing financial difficulties at the time he obtained the registry
funds and expressly found his explanation denying such difficulties
not credible. As to Crawford’s representation that Williams had urged
him to take the funds, the special master found that Williams’s
seemingly favorable testimony on this point in these proceedings was
undercut by her previous conflicting testimony before the JQC, her
22
failure to give Crawford the funds in 2009 after the superior court’s
order was entered, and her attempts to find B.W. over the years. The
special master determined that Crawford’s inclusion in the file of the
handwritten notes that Crawford gave to Williams to place in the case
file, purportedly for the purpose of establishing a “roadmap” of what
had happened to the funds, did not demonstrate good faith on
Crawford’s part but instead demonstrated that Williams wanted to at
least have something in the file showing some attempt to comply with
the court’s order.
The special master then concluded that Crawford engaged in
deceit when he acquired the funds without complying with the
superior court’s 2009 order or the USCR. Crawford admitted that he
did not comply with the certification requirement, and the special
master was unmoved by his explanation that he had taken money from
the registry before without the required certificate, noting that this
was in clear violation of the USCR. The special master further noted
that Crawford could not have complied with the relevant rule and
removed the funds for himself, as he knew that other people had an
23
arguable claim to at least a substantial portion of the funds. As to the
final allegation, regarding Crawford’s failure to notify his client, the
special master acknowledged that D.C. had died in 2004 and that
Crawford maintained that he had been unable to contact B.W., but
nevertheless concluded that Crawford knew that others had at least
an arguable claim to the funds and that Crawford eschewed seeking a
judicial determination on the question of ownership of the funds,
which would have allowed for delivery to clients of any funds to which
they were entitled, and instead used deceit and misrepresentation to
claim the funds for himself.
The special master then undertook the analysis regarding the
appropriate level of discipline. The special master considered the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), see In the Matter of
Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), noting that the ABA
Standards require consideration of the ethical duty violated; the
lawyer’s mental state; the actual or potential injury caused by the
lawyer’s conduct; and the existence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. See ABA Standard 3.0. The special master concluded
24
that Crawford violated a duty to his clients and the legal profession;
that he acted knowingly and showed no remorse; and that, although
he returned the funds to the registry, the potential injury could have
been severe. The special master noted that, under the ABA standards,
disbarment is generally appropriate “when a lawyer knowingly
converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a
client,” ABA Standard 4.11; “engages in any other intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice,” ABA
Standard 5.11 (b); or “knowingly violates a court order or rule with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer,” ABA Standard 6.21.
In aggravation of discipline, the special master found that the
record supported the conclusion that Crawford had a dishonest and
selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.22 (b); that he has refused to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard
9.22 (g); that the victims of his conduct – D.C., B.W., and A.T. – were
vulnerable, see ABA Standard 9.22 (h); that he has substantial
experience with the law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), a factor which the
25
special master found to weigh particularly heavily against Crawford,
especially given Crawford’s service as a judge, see In the Matter of
Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011) (noting that “a judge
occupies a unique and crucial position of power, trust and
responsibility in our society” and that Blitch’s conviction for felony
Honest Services Fraud Conspiracy “deal[t] a serious blow to the
public’s confidence in the legal system and, given his position as a
judicial officer, his admitted violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) warrant[ed] a
severe level of discipline”); and that he broke the law, see ABA
Standard 9.22 (k), another factor that the special master found
weighed heavily against him.
In mitigation, the special master noted that Crawford had no
prior disciplinary history, see ABA Standard 9.32 (a), and that he
made a timely, good faith effort to make restitution,9 see ABA
9 The Bar argued below that the special master improperly credited
Crawford’s restitution of the registry funds as mitigating evidence, contending
that the record showed that restitution was only made after the initiation of the
JQC proceedings and at the behest of the JQC. See In the Matter of Brantley, 311
Ga. 61, 65 (855 SE2d 625) (2021) (stating that “[t]he fact that [Brantley] has made restitution carries no mitigating weight given that she did so only after the
26
Standard 9.32 (d). The special master acknowledged that, at the time
of the alleged misconduct, Crawford was experiencing financial
difficulties, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c) (personal or emotional problems
are mitigating), but he concluded that this fact simply provided an
explanation for Crawford’s conduct but did not mitigate its
seriousness. The special master also stated that, in light of Crawford’s
extensive record of public service, his character or reputation should
have been mitigating, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g), but he noted that
there was no evidence of Crawford’s good character in the record, such
that there was no mitigation on that basis.10
The special master then considered and rejected three further
arguments raised by Crawford, by which Crawford sought to mitigate
initiation of disciplinary proceedings”); In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 641-642 (820 SE2d 716) (2018) (noting that restitution was not mitigating because it
had been ordered by a judge and citing ABA Standard 9.4 (a), which provides that
forced or compelled restitution is neither aggravating nor mitigating). Because
we conclude that a three-year suspension is the appropriate discipline in this
matter regardless of whether this mitigating factor was properly credited in
Crawford’s favor, we pretermit the question in this matter.
10 The special master further determined that any delay in the disciplinary
proceedings did not weigh in Crawford’s favor, see ABA Standard 9.32 (j), as any
such delay was at least partly attributable to Crawford.
27
his culpability. As to Crawford’s argument that he “has already
suffered enough,” ABA Standard 9.32 (k) (providing mitigation for the
imposition of other penalties or sanctions), the special master noted
that, in his criminal case, Crawford received a favorable plea deal,
according to which he did not have to report to probation, pay a fine,
or perform community service; he was treated as a first offender; and
he was able to keep his pension. See also In the Matter of Levin, 289
Ga. 170, 175 (709 SE2d 808) (2011) (noting that imposition of a
criminal penalty is not mitigating). Although the initiation of the prior
JQC proceeding led to Crawford’s resignation from the superior court
bench, the special master noted that, by resigning, Crawford was able
to avoid a final determination from this Court as to whether he
impermissibly converted funds and concluded that, in any event, such
a proceeding was not the type of sanction contemplated to be
mitigating by this standard. See In the Matter of Tucker, 295 Ga. 357,
358 (759 SE2d 854) (2014) (concluding that a suspension imposed by
a federal bankruptcy court as a result of the same conduct involved in
28
the disciplinary action does not qualify as a mitigating factor in
determining the appropriate discipline).
Next, the special master considered Crawford’s argument that,
in this Court’s prior opinion in the JQC matter, “the Supreme Court
has already ruled that there may not be clear and convincing evidence
in his actions.” We did not make any ruling on the merits in that
opinion, but Crawford based this argument on our statement that “[i]t
also seems clear that, while the evidence before the Hearing Panel
likely was sufficient to support a finding that Crawford violated [Code
of Judicial Conduct] Rule 1.1 by impermissibly converting the funds
he obtained from the court registry under a preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof, and perhaps even under the higher clear
and convincing evidence standard, that is a close question; we note
that the evidence on that issue certainly was not overwhelming.”
Crawford, 310 Ga. at 405. The special master rejected this argument,
noting that the full record of the JQC proceedings was not before him
and that he was making his decision based on the record established
at these proceedings.
29
Concerning Crawford’s argument that “other attorneys have
committed far more heinous crimes and not been disbarred” (as the
special master characterized it), the special master acknowledged that
Crawford had submitted a “databank” of supporting case authorities,
but the special master found those distinguishable, in that Crawford’s
actions directly concerned his fitness to practice law; only one of the
cases Crawford cited involved harm to a client or other party in a legal
proceeding, such as Crawford’s misappropriation of client funds; and,
in most of the cited cases, the attorney had expressed remorse for his
actions. Accordingly, the special master recommended that Crawford
be disbarred.
Crawford filed a request for review by the Review Board, and the
Bar filed its response. The Review Board then issued its report and
recommendation. The Review Board first considered the special
master’s findings of fact and determined that the findings were
supported by the record and that Crawford had failed to demonstrate
that the findings were clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. The
Review Board thus adopted the special master’s findings. With regard
30
to the special master’s conclusions of law as to the specific alleged
Rules’ violations, the Review Board stated, as to each alleged violation,
that based on the findings of fact, it agreed with the special master’s
conclusion that the Rules in question had been violated. In reviewing
the special master’s conclusion that Rule 1.15 (I) (c) had been violated,
the Review Board specifically noted that Crawford had argued that
some or all of the funds had been a fee for work for which he had
otherwise not been compensated, but the Review Board rejected that
argument, determining that, had that been the case, Crawford could
have sought declaratory or other relief in a proper court proceeding,
rather than simply directing that the funds be turned over to him. The
Review Board also agreed with and adopted the special master’s
analysis regarding the legal duties Crawford violated, Crawford’s
mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by his misconduct,
and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. However, the
Review Board agreed with Crawford that a lesser sanction was
appropriate, and it recommended that Crawford instead receive a
three-year suspension of his license to practice law.
31
V. Our Review of This Matter
The resolution of this matter ultimately turns on the answers to
two questions: was Crawford entitled to the funds that he obtained
from the court registry, based on a fee agreement with a long-deceased
client, and, if he was not, what is the proper discipline for his
misconduct? As to the first question: if our job were to review the
record de novo, some of us might have come to a different conclusion
than did the special master. But we have recently reiterated that
“because this Court recognizes that the special master is in the best
position to determine the witnesses’ credibility, it generally defers to
the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the special
master unless those findings or determinations are clearly erroneous.”
In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 416 (877 SE2d 248) (2022). See
also Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 13 (727 SE2d 112) (2012) (noting that,
“[i]n Georgia, it is well-settled that the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard for
reviewing findings of fact is equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any
32
evidence’ test”).11 Here, the special master unquestionably made a
finding that Crawford’s story regarding his alleged fee agreement with
D.C. “does not make sense and is not credible.” And we cannot say that
this credibility finding was clearly erroneous: it was based on some
evidence, most notably the facts that the funds were allowed to sit in
the registry of the court for nearly 14 years after D.C.’s death without
Crawford attempting to claim or otherwise assert an interest in the
funds; that Crawford reached out to D.C.’s brother about the funds in
the registry; that Crawford made no attempt to assert an interest in
the funds until told by Williams that she intended to escheat them to
the State; that his personal bank account was overdrawn at the time
Crawford was issued a check for the registry funds; and that the
handwritten notes that Crawford gave to Williams to place in the case
file did not mention an attorney fee.
11 As we recently explained, there are caveats to this general standard,
particularly when our review of the record indicates that the special master’s
“rendition of the facts was incomplete in significant ways,” omitting numerous
undisputed, relevant facts. In the Matter of Tuggle, Case Nos. S23Y0500 &
S23Y0501, slip op. at 8 (decided Sept. 6, 2023). Our review of the record here
shows no such defect in the special master’s findings, so we apply the general
standard.
33
Moreover, Crawford has not made a meaningful attempt to show
that the special master’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. Instead,
Crawford’s arguments have focused on faulting the Bar for failing to
introduce any evidence to rebut his story and faulting the special
master for refusing to credit his story. As to the former point, although
the Bar is required to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence,
see Bar Rule 4-221.2 (b), it is difficult to imagine what evidence the
Bar could have presented that could have rebutted Crawford’s story
that he had a purely oral fee agreement that was known only to him
and to his long-deceased client; in any event, once the special master
made a credibility finding on this point, our question on review in this
case became whether the special master’s finding was clearly
erroneous. With regard to the special master’s refusal to credit
Crawford’s fee-agreement story, the special master expressly
acknowledged and considered Crawford’s account of what had
transpired, and, in declining to credit Crawford’s story, made the sort
of credibility determination that was within his province as the finder
of fact. See generally Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 56 (440 SE2d 646)
34
(1994) (noting that “[t]he trier of fact is not obligated to believe a
witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or
reject any portion of the testimony”).
Having reviewed the record and concluded that the special
master did not clearly err in finding that Crawford did not have a fee
agreement with D.C., such that he was not entitled to the registry
funds, the next issue to be addressed in conducting this inquiry is to
determine which Bar Rules Crawford has violated. As noted, the
special master determined that the Bar had failed to sufficiently
establish that Crawford had committed the charged violation of Rule
1.5, and we cannot say under these circumstances that the special
master erred in reaching that conclusion. With regard to the alleged
violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), and
1.15 (II) (c), Crawford did not meaningfully challenge the special
master’s conclusion that he had violated these Rules, other than by
asserting that he was entitled to the registry funds as a result of the
purported fee agreement with D.C. We thus agree with the special
35
master’s conclusion that Crawford violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I)
(c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), and 1.15 (II) (c).
Concerning the alleged violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), as noted
above, the Bar alleged five separate bases on which this Rule was
supposedly violated. We question whether several of those bases are
adequately supported by the facts and whether they sufficiently
support a violation of this Rule, which, as we have previously held, is
aimed at policing “‘conduct that is intended or likely to mislead
another.’” In the Matter of Golub, 313 Ga. 686, 691 (872 SE2d 699)
(2022) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, we conclude that the record
supports the special master’s determination that Crawford violated
Rule 8.4 (a) (4) when he falsely told Williams that he was entitled to
the registry funds. However, we are still left with the question of the
appropriate discipline to be imposed in this matter. Crawford, the Bar,
the special master, and the Review Board have collectively cited a
legion of cases on this point, but all of those cases are distinguishable
on one basis or another. Nevertheless, even though we must assess
each case’s unique factors on a case-by-case basis, the sanctions
36
imposed in prior, similar cases can be useful in establishing a baseline
against which the facts of the instant matter can be compared. See In
the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 472 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (noting
favorably that a proposed suspension was “within the range of
punishments that have been imposed by this Court for similar
violations”).
In determining the appropriate level of discipline in this matter,
we view it to be of particular importance that Crawford has engaged
in only a single course of misconduct. We recently concluded in a
matter concerning a single course of misconduct involving the
misappropriation of client funds for personal use, violations of the
provisions of the GRPC governing the use of trust accounts, and a
violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), that a two-year suspension was the
appropriate discipline. See In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (814
SE2d 394) (2018). However, the matter in Morgan contained
additional mitigating factors not present here and, more importantly,
this matter contains additional aggravating factors not present in
Morgan, namely that Crawford has not acknowledged the wrongful
37
nature of his conduct and that the victims of his misconduct were
vulnerable.
Moreover, the special master found that the fact that Crawford
broke the law weighed heavily against him as a factor in aggravation
of discipline, and, although, as noted above, we have declined to reach
the question of whether the alleged violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) charged
in the matter underlying Case No. S22Y0631 provides an additional
basis for discipline, we agree that the unlawful nature of Crawford’s
conduct is aggravating. These facts suggest that a suspension longer
than the two years imposed in Morgan is appropriate here, and three
years is, generally, the longest suspension that we impose. See ABA
Standard 2.3; In the Matter of Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. 199, 207-208
(815 SE2d 59) (2018). See also In the Matter of Favors, 283 Ga. 588
(662 SE2d 119) (2008) (imposing a three-year suspension for a single
course of misconduct involving the misappropriation of client funds for
personal use and an attempt to dishonestly cover up the circumstances
of the misconduct). Thus, although the special master recommended
that Crawford be disbarred, we have reviewed the record as a whole
38
and conclude, as the Review Board also concluded, that—in light of
the fact that Crawford’s violations of the GRPC, while serious,
involved only a single course of misconduct—the next-most serious
discipline that we generally impose, a three-year suspension, is the
appropriate discipline here. Accordingly, we hereby order that
Crawford be suspended from the practice of law in this State for three
years. Because there are no conditions on Crawford’s reinstatement
other than the passage of time, there is no need for him to take any
action either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate
his return to the practice of law. Instead, the suspension arising from
this opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is issued and
will expire by its own terms three years later. Crawford is reminded
of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Three-year suspension. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,
not participating.
39