NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 16, 2023
S23Y0585. IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW MATTESON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the renewed
petition for voluntary discipline filed by Andrew Matteson (State
Bar No. 477140) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) before the issuance
of a formal complaint. In Matteson’s first petition for voluntary
discipline, he sought a suspension of his license to practice law for a
period of time ranging from three months to six months as a sanction
for his violations related to two disciplinary matters. Matteson
previously asserted several mitigating factors, including that he had
mental health conditions that contributed to his misconduct and
that he made restitution to his clients who were impacted by his
misconduct. The Court rejected Matteson’s first petition because he
failed to provide proof of his mental health conditions and proof that
he made his clients whole, and because he failed to assure the Court
that he had taken steps to ensure that he would not commit the
same type of violations upon his readmission to the practice of law.
See In the Matter of Matteson, 314 Ga. 576, 580-581 (878 SE2d 196)
(2022) (“Matteson I”). In this renewed petition, Matteson adds
nothing to the recitation of the facts, the admitted violations, or the
aggravating and mitigating factors supporting his requested
discipline. Instead, he addresses the concerns this Court
highlighted in Matteson I by submitting proof related to his mental
health conditions and the treatment thereof, submitting proof that
his clients have been made whole, and by proposing conditions on
his reinstatement. He also agrees to a six-month suspension but
requests that it be imposed nunc pro tunc. Because Matteson has
sufficiently addressed the deficiencies set forth in Matteson I, and
because we agree that a six-month nunc pro tunc suspension is
appropriate, we accept Matteson’s amended petition for voluntary
discipline.
2
The underlying facts of the two disciplinary matters are recited
at length in Matteson I. In summary, as to the first disciplinary
matter, Matteson admits that he had represented a client in various
legal matters over several years, and that at some point he stopped
apprising his client of his work and of the important developments
in the legal matters; that the client eventually sued Matteson, who
chose not to dispute the client’s claims; that a consent judgment was
eventually entered against Matteson in the amount of $86,520; and
that he quickly took steps to satisfy the judgment. Matteson I, 314
Ga. at 576-577. As to the second disciplinary matter, Matteson
admits that he agreed to represent a client and his company in a
lawsuit against them for damages related to a business dispute;
that, although he filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, he failed to
take any additional material action in the case, even after a motion
for default judgment was filed and granted and a significant
judgment was entered against his clients; that these clients pursued
a legal malpractice claim against Matteson and his former law firm;
and that the claim was arbitrated, resulting in the issuance of an
3
award of over $640,000 in the clients’ favor. Id. at 577-578.
Although, in his initial petition, Matteson failed to support his
assertion that his clients’ claims had been resolved in full, he has
now provided proof that he satisfied the judgments his clients
obtained against him.
The facts set out in Matteson I support Matteson’s admissions
in this renewed petition that
in connection with his representation of the client in [the
first matter] he violated Rules 1.2 (a),[1] 1.4 (a),[2] 1.15 (I)
(c),[3] and 1.16 (a) (2)[4] of the [Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found at Bar Rule 4-102
(d)]. And, with regard to his representation of the clients
1 “Rule 1.2 (a) requires a lawyer to consult with and abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the scope and objectives of the representation.” Matteson
I, 314 Ga. at 578 n.1.
2 “Rule 1.4 (a) provides that a lawyer shall “promptly inform the client of
any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed
consent . . . is required; shall consult with the client about the means by which
the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; shall keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; shall promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; and shall explain matters to the extent
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.” Id. at 578 n.2.
3 “Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that, upon receiving funds in which a client
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client and deliver that
portion of the funds which the client is entitled to receive.” Id. at 578 n.3.
4 “Rule 1.16 (a) (2) provides that a lawyer shall withdraw from
representation of a client if the lawyer’s physical or mental condition
materially impairs his ability to represent the client.” Id. at 578 n.4.
4
in [the second matter], Matteson admits that he violated
Rules 1.1,[5] 1.2 (a), 1.3,[6] 1.4, and 1.16 (a) (2) of the GRPC.
The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and
1.16 (a) is a public reprimand, while the maximum
sanction for a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.15 (I)
is disbarment.
Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 578-579.
Similar to his first petition, Matteson admits no aggravating
factors, but offers in mitigation “that he has no disciplinary record;
that he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive; . . . that he made a
timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of his misconduct; that he displayed a cooperative
attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings; and that he is
remorseful for his actions and inactions.” Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 579
(citing ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (d), (e), and (l)). In addition,
Matteson continues to offer as a mitigating factor that, at the time
of these violations, he was suffering from a mental disability or
emotional problems for which he was being treated by a doctor. See
5 “Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to his
client.” Id. at 578 n.5.
6 “Rule 1.3 provides that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” Id. at 578 n.6.
5
ABA Standard 9.32 (c) and (i). However, unlike in his first petition
for voluntary discipline, Matteson has now provided, under seal,
letters from several mental health professionals who have treated
or are continuing to treat Matteson. These letters support
Matteson’s claims that he began experiencing symptoms of
depression during the above-described representations; that he has
been treated for depression and anxiety since 2015; that he has been
relatively compliant with treatment and medication since that time;
and that his mental health does not present an impediment to his
practice of law. Additionally, Matteson has provided an affidavit
supporting his claim that his experience with depression ultimately
led him to close his law practice in 2019 and to step away from the
practice of law.
Matteson further states in his petition and affidavit that, in
early 2019, he began advising his clients in writing that he could no
longer act as their attorney and that, for a six-month period
beginning on April 1, 2019, he performed no legal work and had no
source of income. In support of these claims, Matteson provided a
6
copy of a letter he sent to a client, in which Matteson informs the
client that he is no longer able to serve as the client’s legal
representative because he will no longer be practicing law due to
personal issues, updates the client on the status of the client’s case,
and offers to assist the client in retaining new counsel. Additionally,
Matteson provided with his sworn affidavit, in which he states that
from April 2019 through October 2019 he did not work at all, his
2019 income tax returns as evidence that he was not fully employed
in 2019.
Based on these claims, Matteson now requests as discipline a
six-month suspension from the practice of law and that this
suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc, in consideration of the fact
that, beginning in April 2019, he voluntarily refrained from the
practice of law for at least six months and fulfilled his ethical
obligations to his clients. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156,
157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010) (“[W]hen an attorney requests entry of a
suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the
lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily stopped
7
practicing law, the date on which their law practice ended, and that
they complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in such a
decision, such as assisting clients in securing new counsel and
facilitating the transfer of client files and critical information about
ongoing cases to new counsel.”). Further, Matteson proposes as part
of his discipline that every three months in the first year following
his reinstatement he be required to provide the Office of General
Counsel (“OGC”) with an opinion from a mental health professional
certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to
his practice of law; that he participate in the State Bar of Georgia’s
Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service;
and that he implement any recommendations made by that service
during such consultation.7
7 Matteson has attached to his affidavit a letter from a mental health
professional certifying that, as of January 2023, his mental health does not
present an impediment to his practice of law. Further, Matteson states in his
sworn affidavit that he has already participated in the State Bar of Georgia’s
Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service, which
occurred in February 2023, and the Bar does not dispute Matteson’s
participation in this program.
8
The State Bar has filed a response, noting that Matteson has
now submitted proof of the mental health conditions that
contributed to his misconduct, provided evidence that his clients’
claims have been resolved, and has taken steps to ensure that his
ethical failures will not reoccur. The Bar does not dispute
Matteson’s asserted factors in mitigation and asserts that it does not
oppose the six-month suspension requested by Matteson and that
the discipline Matteson requests is sufficient to serve as “a penalty
to the offender, a deterrent to others, and [] an indication to laymen
that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.”8 In the
Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981). Moreover,
the Bar asserts that this Court has imposed similar discipline in
other cases involving violations of the Rules implicated here. See,
e.g., In the Matter of Kirby, 312 Ga. 341 (862 SE2d 550) (2021)
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six8 Notably, however, the Bar notes in aggravation, as it did before, that
Matteson’s behavior suggests a pattern of misconduct, that he committed
multiple offenses, and that he had substantial experience in the practice of law.
See ABA Standard 9.22 (c), (d), and (i).
9
month suspension for attorney who admitted violating Rules 1.2,
1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 in four separate matters where attorney addressed
his mental health and practice management problems); In the
Matter of Johnson, 303 Ga. 795 (815 SE2d 55) (2018) (accepting
petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six-month
suspension, with conditions, for attorney who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4,
1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) in six separate client matters where
attorney was suffering from personal and emotional problems at
time of misconduct and had taken intervening efforts to improve
himself and his law practice); In the Matter of Huggins, 291 Ga. 92
(727 SE2d 500) (2012) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
and imposing six-month suspension with conditions for
reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 1.16,
and 9.3 in five client matters, where attorney had no prior
disciplinary history and was receiving treatment for his personal
issues). Further, the State Bar does not oppose Matteson’s request
that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to April 1, 2019. The
10
Bar, therefore, recommends that the Court accept Matteson’s
renewed petition for voluntary discipline.
Having reviewed the record in this case, including the
documentation submitted under seal which includes Matteson’s
sworn affidavit, 2019 tax returns, and client letter, we agree that
the imposition of a six-month suspension is appropriate under these
circumstances and is consistent with the precedent cited above. We
also agree that Matteson has made the required showing under
Onipede to support the imposition of his six-month suspension nunc
pro tunc to April 1, 2019, and note that, because Matteson has
sufficiently shown that he voluntarily stopped practicing law from
April 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019, he has completed his
suspension. Accordingly, Matteson is hereby reinstated with the
conditions that, within 90 days of the date of this opinion, he provide
the OGC with an opinion from a mental health professional
certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to
his practice of law and provide such an opinion every three months
for the first year of his reinstatement, and that he implement any
11
recommendations made by the State Bar of Georgia’s Law Practice
Management Program’s General Consultation service.
For these reasons, Andrew Matteson is hereby suspended from
the practice of law nunc pro tunc as of April 1, 2019, and he is hereby
reinstated with the conditions set forth above.
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Six-month
suspension nunc pro tunc. Reinstated with conditions. All the
Justices concur.
12