NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 16, 2023
S23A0090, S23A0091. THE STATE v. HARRIS.
BETHEL, Justice.
Lorenzo Harris was indicted for malice murder and other
offenses arising from the shooting of Larry Jones. Pursuant to
OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the State appeals the trial court’s pretrial rulings,
which were not reduced to writing, granting Harris’s motion in
limine to exclude evidence of two prior incidents and his motion to
suppress identification evidence. In the absence of a written order
from the trial court regarding the appealed rulings, we directed the
parties to brief the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction. Upon review,
we conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals, vacate the
trial court’s rulings, and remand for further proceedings.
1. According to the affidavit supporting the warrant for
Harris’s arrest, Jones was shot on March 26, 2019, in the parking
lot of an apartment building at 20 Vanira Avenue in Atlanta. 1
Surveillance video recordings 2 of the parking lot captured around
the time of the incident show a man leaving the apartment of Shirley
Ndetti and entering a red truck. The man then shot Jones in the
back and drove away. Jones died as a result of his injuries. Three
.40-caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene of the shooting.
During their investigation, police interviewed Ndetti and
showed her a single photograph of Harris. She confirmed that the
person depicted in the photograph, whom she knew as “Low,” visited
her apartment the night of the shooting and left shortly before
Ndetti heard gunshots. The State indicated at pretrial hearings that
1 The background facts set forth in this opinion concerning the crime and
the evidence that was excluded under Rule 403 were drawn from the affidavit
supporting the warrant for Harris’s arrest, a police report, and discussions
between the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor during the pretrial
hearings. However, the facts concerning the identification were supported by
a recording of the interview and a witness who was called at the hearing on
the motion to suppress. The trial court did not issue written orders containing
any findings of fact. Our recitation is solely for the purpose of establishing
context and nothing in this opinion should be understood as establishing or
resolving any disputed fact.
2 The video recordings were not tendered as exhibits to the motion to
suppress or the motion in limine and are not part of the record before this
Court.
2
it intends to introduce evidence at trial showing that Harris owns a
red truck, as well as Harris’s phone records, which place him in the
area around the time of the shooting.
Before trial, the State sought an order confirming the
admissibility of evidence related to prior shootings, which allegedly
linked Harris to Jones’s shooting, as intrinsic evidence. At pretrial
hearings, counsel for both Harris and the State proffered the
following account of the two prior shootings. The first incident 3 (the
“Almond Incident”) occurred in September 2019; the victim, Mario
Almond, was robbed at gunpoint by three men while conducting a
jewelry sale with Harris, and Almond alleged that Harris
orchestrated the robbery. The second incident (the “Hank Aaron
Incident”) occurred on March 7, 2019, and arose from a shooting
incident involving damage to property at 942 Hank Aaron Drive, one
block from where Jones was shot. Police recovered 13 .40-caliber
3 We use “first” and “second” to denote the order of the argument.
Chronologically, the Almond Incident occurred five to six months after Jones
was shot. Meanwhile, the Hank Aaron Incident appears to have taken place
just under three weeks before Jones was shot.
3
cartridge casings at that location, which were forensically
determined to have been fired by the same gun that was used
nineteen days later during the Jones shooting. 4
Among other pretrial filings, Harris filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of the prior shootings as “inadmissible, prejudicial,
inflammatory and not relevant.” He also filed a motion to suppress
Ndetti’s identification of Harris, arguing that the use of a singlephotograph lineup was improper. The trial court held hearings on
these motions, excluded evidence of two prior shootings, relying on
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), and suppressed Ndetti’s
identification. It is from these rulings that the State appeals.
2. Before reaching the merits of the State’s appeal, we must
consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal in the
4 The State represented at pretrial hearings that it expects the evidence
at trial to show that Harris is linked to the shell casings recovered from the
Hank Aaron Incident through an August 2018 shooting of Daniel Troutman
(the “Troutman Incident”). The shell casings recovered from the Troutman
Incident were a forensic match to both the casings recovered from the Hank
Aaron Incident and the Jones shooting. Troutman initially identified Harris as
the shooter, but he later testified under oath at an evidentiary hearing in
another case that Harris was not the shooter. The Troutman Incident is not at
issue on appeal because the trial court declined to make a ruling as to the
admissibility of its evidence at the pretrial hearings.
4
absence of a written order from the trial court with respect to the
rulings at issue in this case. See Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 28 (608
SE2d 631) (2005) (“It is incumbent upon the Court to question its
jurisdiction in all cases in which jurisdiction may be in doubt.”). We
conclude that this appeal is properly before us.
Substantively, three oral rulings made at separate hearings
are at issue here. At the first hearing on May 4, 2022, the trial court
orally granted Harris’s motion in limine with respect to the Almond
Incident, and the State orally requested that the trial court enter a
written order memorializing its ruling. At that time, the trial court
indicated that it would not prepare and enter its own order, instead
informing counsel that it would file a written order only when a
party prepared a draft order and submitted it for the court’s
consideration. At the second hearing on May 27, 2022, the trial court
excluded the evidence of the Hank Aaron Incident. Before doing so,
the trial court asked if counsel for either Harris or the State could,
either collaboratively or independently, submit a proposed order
reflecting its prior rulings. Neither the State nor Harris’s counsel
5
submitted a proposed order. At the final hearing on June 9, 2022,
the trial court orally granted Harris’s motion to suppress Ndetti’s
identification, but the State did not request a written order for the
ruling on the motion to suppress at that hearing.
The next day, on Friday, June 10, 2022, the State filed a “notice
of need for written orders on pretrial motions,” which specifically
requested that the trial court enter written orders memorializing its
oral rulings on Harris’s motion in limine and motion to suppress “so
that the State may exercise its statutory rights of appeal on those
orders.” In a written order entered that afternoon, the trial court
acknowledged the State’s request for written orders, but rather than
memorializing its oral rulings, it indicated that the State’s filing
failed to state the statutory basis for an appeal and noted that the
State would be permitted to provide an amended filing specifying
the statutory basis for appeal. With the case scheduled for trial only
three days later, on Monday, June 13, 2022, the State did not
respond to the trial court’s order and instead filed its notice of appeal
after the close of business that day (the last business day before the
6
jury was scheduled to be selected), appealing the trial court’s rulings
on the motion in limine excluding evidence of the prior shootings and
the motion to suppress Ndetti’s identification of Harris under OCGA
§ 5-7-1.
As an initial matter, we address whether the State waived its
right to appeal by failing to comply with the trial court’s requests for
a proposed order. A trial court may – and routinely does – request,
or even mandate, that a party submit a proposed order
memorializing the court’s oral rulings. But such requests will not
absolve the trial court of its duty to issue written orders; the
ultimate responsibility for entering a written order rests with the
trial court. See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 462 (591 SE2d
774) (2003) (recognizing the trial court’s “clear legal duty to enter a
written order”); State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 153 (3) (635 SE2d 716)
(2006) (same). Thus, the fact that the trial court in this case
requested that the parties submit a proposed order and that the
7
State failed to do so does not preclude the State’s appeal.5
OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) authorizes the State to appeal a trial court’s
order, decision, or judgment under certain circumstances in a
criminal case. Ordinarily, “an order is not appealable [under OCGA
§ 5-7-1 (a)] unless it is in writing.” Morrell, 281 Ga. at 152 (2). But
an exception to this general rule arises where “the transcript
affirmatively shows that the State requested the trial court to put
the oral order in written form and that the trial court refused to do
so.” Id. See also State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 99 (686 SE2d 244) (2009)
(authorizing the State’s appeal of an oral ruling suppressing
evidence where, in response to the State’s request for a written
order, “the trial court stated that ‘the record speaks for itself’ and
never entered a written order”). This exception is grounded in the
State’s statutory right to appeal and serves to prevent the State’s
statutory right to appeal from being frustrated. See OCGA § 5-7-1
(a). Absent such an exception, the State’s ability to exercise its right
5Of course, where the trial court directs counsel to prepare a draft order
and counsel fails to do so, the trial court is not without remedy, including the
contempt power, to require its orders be fulfilled.
8
to appeal in any given case would depend on whether the trial court
timely carried out its duty to file a written order, effectively leaving
the State’s right to appeal to the trial court’s discretion. But the
statute allows the trial court no such role in approving the State’s
appeal; the Morrell exception simply recognizes as much. Here, the
focus is on the application of that exception at the intersection of the
absence of a requested written order and the expiration of the right
under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), (5), when jeopardy attaches.
Here, the transcripts of the pretrial hearings, reflecting the
interaction between the trial court and the State, provide some
context for the trial court’s failure to enter written orders. But,
standing alone, the transcripts are insufficient to establish the trial
court’s refusal to enter written orders. The record, 6 however,
affirmatively shows that the trial court refused the State’s request
6 Morrell stated that the exception applies when the “transcript
affirmatively shows” that the trial court refused the State’s request for a
written order. (Emphasis supplied.) 281 Ga. at 152 (2). Yet today we apply this
exception where the record affirmatively shows that the trial court refused the
State’s request for a written order. We do not read the language in Morrell to
limit the exception only to refusals shown in the transcript. Rather, refusals
otherwise reflected in the record will suffice.
9
for a written order. See Lynch, 286 Ga. at 99. Specifically, the trial
court’s June 10 order, which pointed to the State’s failure to allege
its statutory basis for appeal, affirmatively effectuates such refusal.
Although the trial court’s June 10 order does not articulate an
unequivocal refusal to enter written orders, the substance of the
order combined with the circumstances under which the order was
entered operated as a refusal. Critically, in addition to having
requested a written order for the trial court’s ruling on the
admissibility of the Almond Incident at the hearing on May 4, the
State filed its motion for written orders – which made explicit the
State’s intent to appeal all three of the trial court’s rulings and,
therefore, its immediate need for written orders – on Friday, June
10, the last business day before the trial’s scheduled start date of
Monday, June 13. Given the impending trial, any further delay in
entering written orders would have rendered nugatory the State’s
right of appeal. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (requiring that the order
decision or judgment be “ruled on prior to the impaneling of a jury
or the defendant being put in jeopardy”). But despite its awareness
10
of the imminent trial, the trial court failed to fulfill its duty to
memorialize in writing its oral rulings and instead, only hours
before the close of business, entered a non-responsive order to the
State’s time-sensitive request. Here, we conclude that the denial of
a motion for a written order, when entered on the Friday afternoon
before a trial scheduled for the next Monday, operates as a refusal
for purposes of the exception articulated in Morrell. As a result,
under the particular facts presented here, the Morrell exception is
satisfied.
Given our determination that an appeal is proper under
Morrell, we must also determine whether it was timely. OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (A), which applies only to the trial court’s rulings on
motions to exclude evidence to be used by the State at trial, requires
the State’s notice of appeal to be “filed within two days of such order,
decision, or judgment[.]” The trial court’s May 4 and May 27 oral
rulings on Harris’s motion in limine occurred more than two days
before the State’s June 10 notice of appeal was filed. The trial court’s
refusal to issue written orders, however, occurred on June 10, the
11
same day that the State filed its notice of appeal. This case thus
highlights an open question about when the two-day filing period
commences under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (A) in the absence of a
written order. In other words, does the clock start when the trial
court issues the oral ruling or when the trial court refuses the State’s
request for a written order?
Morrell generally mandates a written order, and it follows that
the two-day filing period should commence at the time of the order’s
entry. But in the absence of a written order, as here, the two-day
filing period must commence with the trial court’s refusal of the
State’s request to provide a written order. In determining the precise
time of the refusal, the appellate court must engage in a case-specific
factual inquiry, asking at what point, as affirmatively shown by the
record, the trial court refused the State’s request. Here, the clock
started on June 10 when the trial court declined to issue written
orders in response to the State’s request earlier that day. Therefore,
the State’s June 10 notice of appeal was timely.
Case No. S23A0090
12
3. We now turn to the State’s contention that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence of two prior shootings.
Because the record reflects that the trial court’s analysis under Rule
403 employed an erroneous legal standard, we agree.
The State sought to admit evidence of the Almond and Hank
Aaron Incidents as intrinsic evidence. 7 The trial court relied on Rule
403 to grant Harris’s motion in limine and exclude the evidence of
both incidents. In excluding the evidence of the Almond Incident,
the trial court explained that the State was “not charging [Harris]
with a crime spree.” When asked to elaborate on the “legal basis” of
its decision, the trial court stated that the evidence was “highly
prejudicial” and “not probative.” When excluding the evidence of the
Hank Aaron Incident, the trial court reasoned that the evidence “is
more prejudicial than probative,” the evidence “goes to bad
character,” and the facts are not “intrinsically intertwined to the
charges that are related to this case.”
7 The State also sought to admit this evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), and the trial court denied its motion. The State does not challenge that
ruling on appeal, and we do not address it.
13
On appeal, the State maintains that the evidence from the two
prior shootings is admissible as intrinsic evidence and that the trial
court’s exclusion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. We
review a trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence
as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion. See Harris v. State, 310 Ga.
372, 378 (2) (b) (850 SE2d 77) (2020). But a trial court does not have
discretion to apply an incorrect legal standard. See Welbon v. State,
301 Ga. 106, 109-110 (2) (799 SE2d 793) (2017) (“Where the trial
court has used a wrong standard in reaching its conclusion, a
remand may be appropriate[.]”). See also State v. Jackson, 351 Ga.
App. 675, 677 (832 SE2d 654) (2019) (“[W]hile the abuse-ofdiscretion standard presupposes a range of possible conclusions that
can be reached by a trial court with regard to a particular
evidentiary issue, it does not permit a clear error of judgment or the
application of the wrong legal standard.”).
Evidence may be admitted “as intrinsic evidence, rather than
extrinsic evidence subject to Rule 404 (b), when it is (1) an
uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of
14
transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the
story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence
regarding the charged offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Harris, 310 Ga. at 377 (2) (b). “Intrinsic evidence must also satisfy
Rule 403.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d
350) (2017). Whether the trial court concluded that the evidence at
issue was intrinsic evidence or assumed as much and simply moved
to analyze whether the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403
is unclear. But we need not review whether the trial court found the
evidence to be intrinsic because the trial court erred by applying an
incorrect standard in its application of Rule 403.8
Under Rule 403,
[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
8 We note that, as to the Hank Aaron incident, the trial court commented
that the evidence “basically is bad character evidence.” That conclusion,
standing alone, is not grounds to deem intrinsic evidence inadmissible because,
as this Court has explained, “intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it
incidentally places the defendant’s character at issue.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Harris, 310 Ga. at 378 (2) (b). If, on remand, the trial
court determines that this evidence is not admissible as intrinsic evidence, we
note further that the trial court already considered and determined that the
evidence was not admissible as extrinsic evidence under Rule 404 (b).
15
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The trial court never recited the correct standard under Rule
403. Rather, in both rulings, the trial court applied a different,
incorrect standard in determining whether to exclude the evidence
under Rule 403. First, the trial court stated that the evidence of the
Almond Incident was “highly prejudicial” and “not probative.” But it
is not enough that the trial court considered the evidence to be
“highly prejudicial”; rather, the court must assess the danger of
unfair prejudice. See OCGA § 24-4-403; Middlebrooks v. State, 310
Ga. 748, 751 (2) (b) (854 SE2d 503) (2021) (“[A]ll inculpatory
evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits
exclusion.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
original)). See also Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 263 (3) (a) (875 SE2d
659) (2022) (“Rule 403’s term ‘unfair prejudice’ speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder
into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof
16
specific to the offense charged.”).
Second, the trial court stated that the evidence of the Hank
Aaron Incident is “more prejudicial than probative.” But the proper
standard requires the trial court to determine whether “the
probative value [of the evidence] is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 24-4-403. See, e.g., Jackson, 351 Ga. App. at 677 (remanding because the
trial court erred in applying the wrong standard under Rule 403
when it determined that the probative value was not outweighed –
rather than not substantially outweighed – by the danger of unfair
prejudice).
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it incorrectly applied
Rule 403 to exclude the evidence of the Almond Incident and the
Hank Aaron Incident. The trial court’s order must therefore be
vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to reconsider the
motion under the correct legal standard and consistent with the
directions of the Court. See State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413, 423 (2) (c)
(819 SE2d 28) (2018).
17
Case No. S23A0091
4. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Harris’s motion to suppress Ndetti’s out-of-court
identification of Harris because her identification was merely
“confirmatory.” Because we cannot determine whether the trial
court applied the correct legal standard, we vacate its grant of the
motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Police investigators interviewed Ndetti with her husband,
Sammie Glenn, on two occasions. The trial court was informed
through the representations of defense counsel that during the first
interview, the investigators were “impermissibly suggestive,
aggressive, [and] intimidating” toward Ndetti and Glenn. 9 The
second interview began with a different investigator, Detective
Danny Agan, asking if Ndetti or Glenn were familiar with the
9The audio recording of this first interview is not contained in the record.
Instead, the interaction was only described by Harris’s counsel during the
pretrial hearings.
18
shooting. 10 Ndetti said yes and explained that on the day Jones was
shot, a person named “Low”11 came to her apartment to give money
to Glenn. Shortly after “Low” left the apartment, Ndetti heard
gunshots. She described “Low” as a “big man” and explained that
over the past year, he had periodically brought money to Glenn. Just
before the interview concluded, Detective Agan showed Glenn and
Ndetti a single photograph depicting Harris and asked “Who is that
right there?” Ndetti responded “That’s him” and Detective Agan
confirmed that she was referring to the man she knew as “Low.”
In a pretrial motion, Harris moved to suppress the out-of-court
identification. The trial court granted Harris’s motion, finding that
the “identification was highly suggestive” and that it “also meets the
second prong.” The court further noted that it “got the impression
that [the witnesses] were being steered toward a certain outcome,”
it was sure the witnesses knew “more than one big guy,” “no other
10 Unlike the first interview, the trial court heard testimony from
Detective Agan about the second interview and an audio recording of the
interview.
11 Ndetti referred to the shooter as “Low” and “Felipe,” Harris’s
reportedly recognized nicknames.
19
photos were presented,” and “the answers were fed, or suggested, to
them by the detective.”
On appeal, the State argues that this ruling was erroneous
because although the investigator only used one photograph, Ndetti
was merely confirming a known acquaintance. We review a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress identification evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Newton v. State, 308 Ga. 863, 866 (2) (843
SE2d 857) (2020).
“Evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due process
and is inadmissible at trial if the identification procedure is so
impermissibly suggestive that it could result in a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Id. at 865 (2). “An identification procedure is unduly suggestive
when it leads the witness to the virtually inevitable identification of
the defendant as the perpetrator, and is equivalent to the
authorities telling the witness, ‘This is our suspect.’” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
20
Detective Agan’s use of a single photograph was impermissibly
suggestive. See Leeks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 724, 727 (2) (710 SE2d
908) (2011) (“[D]isplaying a single photograph to a witness is
impermissibly suggestive.”). But even where the identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the identification may be
excluded only if a substantial likelihood of misidentification exists.
Newton, 308 Ga. at 867 (2).
In determining whether there is a substantial likelihood of
misidentification, a trial court must look to the “totality of the
circumstances[.]” State v. Hattney, 279 Ga. 88, 89 (610 SE2d 44)
(2005). Several factors are considered when determining the
likelihood of misidentification, including:
(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the accused at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention; (3)
the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of accused;
(4) the witness’ level of certainty at the confrontation;[12]
12We note an apparent discrepancy between the factor concerning “the
witness’ level of certainty at the confrontation” and our holding in Brodes v.
State, 279 Ga. 435 (614 SE2d 766) (2005). In Brodes, we instructed that trial
courts should “refrain from informing jurors [that] they may consider a
witness’s level of certainty when instructing them on the factors that may be
considered in deciding the reliability of that identification.” Id. at 442. While it
21
and (5) the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.
Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 670 (6) (b) (878 SE2d 467) (2022).
“Moreover, whether the witness knows the defendant is a critical
factor in determining the reliability of an identification.” Id.
If the witness was acquainted or otherwise personally familiar
with the suspect before making an out-of-court identification, then
there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification regardless
of an impermissibly suggestive procedure. See Hattney, 279 Ga. at
90 (“If the trial court determines that [the witness] had known [the
suspects] for a sufficient period of time so that his out-of-court
identification of them pursuant to the single photograph show-ups
seems incompatible that a trial judge should consider the witness’s level of
certainty when determining the likelihood of misidentification but the jury
may not be instructed to consider the witness’s level of certainty when
determining the reliability of the identification, no one has asked us to
reconsider our decision in Brodes, and the trial court’s consideration of this
factor is expressly sanctioned under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 199 (III) (93 SCt 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972). See Pearson
v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 n.5 (2) (855 SE2d 606) (2021) (noting that despite our
holding in Brodes, “Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on
matters of federal constitutional law, to follow the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Neil”). Additionally, because no one has asked us to consider
this issue as a matter of due process under the Georgia Constitution, we decline
to do so today.
22
was reliable and not subject to a substantial risk of
misidentification, then evidence of the out-of-court identification
would be admissible.”). See, e.g., Newton, 308 Ga. at 867 (concluding
that the defendant failed to show a substantial likelihood of
misidentification where the witness told investigators that he knew
the defendant for two years prior to the shooting and that he saw
him near the scene of the crime that night); Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga.
745, 751-752 (15) (514 SE2d 639) (1999) (concluding that there was
no substantial likelihood of misidentification regardless of whether
the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive because the
witness testified that she recognized the defendant as a regular
customer at her store and that she remembered seeing him at the
store on the night of the murder). Rather, the use of photographs
under such circumstances functionally serves the purpose of
confirming the suspect’s identity. See Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377,
378-379 (2) (659 SE2d 372) (2008) (“[S]howing [the witness] a single
photograph of defendant merely confirmed her previous
identification of him.”). See also Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 693
23
(3) (763 SE2d 704) (2014) (concluding that presenting a single
photograph to a witness to confirm the defendant’s identity “created
no substantial likelihood of misidentification” because the witness
testified that she knew the defendant for 11 years, spent a lot of time
with his family, and saw the defendant on the day of the shooting);
Lewis, 314 Ga. at 670-671 (6) (b) (concluding that the investigator’s
use of a single photograph “did not create a substantial likelihood of
misidentification” where the witness told the investigator that he
knew the defendant, placed the defendant at the scene of the crime
that night, provided a description of the defendant, and rejected
three prior photos of other men); Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 828, 829
(2) (537 SE2d 39) (2000) (“Given [the witness’s] testimony that she
had seen appellant in the neighborhood on several prior occasions,
knew him by his nickname, knew where his family lived, and had
clearly seen his face during the commission of the crime, we find that
the in-court identification was independent of the pretrial
photographic identification thereby indicating its reliability.”).
But, here, it is not clear to what extent the trial court
24
considered the “critical factor” of substantial likelihood of
misidentification despite significant evidence of Ndetti’s familiarity
with Harris, including her statement that he periodically visited her
home and left her apartment moments before the shooting. Indeed,
the trial court simply mentioned that the “second prong” was met
and that the trial court was “sure [the witnesses] know more than
one big guy,” with no apparent consideration of Ndetti’s familiarity
with Harris. We decline to consider in the first instance whether
Ndetti’s familiarity required the trial court to determine, as a matter
of law, that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification.
Rather, we vacate the trial court’s grant of Harris’s motion to
suppress Ndetti’s identification and remand for the trial court to
reconsider the motion under the standards set forth above.13
Judgments vacated and case remanded with direction in Case
Nos. S23A0090 and S23A0091. All the Justices concur.
13 After the trial court granted Harris’s motion to suppress, it discussed
and left open the possibility of an in-court identification by Ndetti or Glenn.
We note that if, upon remand, the trial court again grants Harris’s motion to
suppress Ndetti’s out-of-court identification, it cannot, despite its suggestion
to the contrary, allow an in-court identification by Ndetti. See Hattney, 279 Ga.
at 90.
25