NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S24A0692. SUMMERVILLE v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Michael Earl Summerville was convicted of felony murder in
connection with the death of Martha West.1 On appeal, Summerville
contends that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to object to a comment in the State’s closing
argument and that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting
the defense’s cross-examination of a witness. For the reasons that
The crimes occurred on December 10, 2017. In November 2020, a
1
Wilkes County grand jury indicted Summerville for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault, family
violence. At a jury trial, Summerville was found not guilty of malice murder
but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Summerville to
serve life in prison for felony murder, and the aggravated assault, family
violence count merged for sentencing purposes.
Summerville filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended
through new counsel. Following a December 2023 hearing, the trial court
denied the motion as amended on January 9, 2024. Summerville then filed a
timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2024
term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the
day of the crimes, Summerville and West—who were romantic
partners—visited the home of their neighbor Johnny Clark, arriving
around 6:45 p.m. Though Summerville drank tequila with Clark,
West declined any alcoholic beverages and threatened to call the
police when Summerville refused to take her home. The couple
eventually left but continued arguing outside.
Between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m., Summerville returned in his
truck to Clark’s home and reported that West had fallen in the field
that separated their home from Clark’s. Summerville proceeded to
“guzzle” some of Clark’s tequila from the bottle, after which he drove
Clark to the field where they found West deceased.
Summerville then retrieved his nephew from another mobile
home nearby. Summerville told his nephew that West had a heart
attack and that he had performed CPR. After learning that
Summerville had not called for emergency services, Summerville’s
nephew called 911 and reported that West had a heart attack.
2
However, when Summerville’s nephew arrived at the scene, he
noticed West “had stuff coming out the side of her mouth” and was
lying between tire tracks.
When responding personnel arrived at the scene, they found
West deceased, with her glasses and shoes several feet away from
her body and tire tracks on each side of West. Summerville’s truck
was towed from the field to a GBI office and, pursuant to a search
warrant, the following signs of a collision were found on the vehicle:
a piece of black plastic, resembling a protector shield for the truck’s
undercarriage, was found in Summerville’s toolbox; a spot on the
otherwise dirty undercarriage of the truck appeared as if it had been
wiped down; and a handprint, positioned with the fingers facing up,
was observed low to the ground outside the truck’s door.
Investigators also lifted fibers from the underside of the truck,
and testing showed those fibers were consistent with fibers from the
leggings West was wearing when she died. West’s autopsy revealed
71 injuries, including extensive abrasions, rib fractures, and a
dislocation of the skull from the spine, which a Georgia Bureau of
3
Investigation (“GBI”) medical examiner determined were consistent
with her being struck by a motor vehicle at a high speed.
2. In his first enumeration of error, Summerville contends that
his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. To
prevail on this claim, Summerville bears the burden of showing both
that counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he
was prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052,
80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To satisfy the deficiency prong, Summerville “must
demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively
unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of
prevailing professional norms.” Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (4)
(872 SE2d 722) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). And to
show prejudice, Summerville must “establish a reasonable
probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance,
the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. If an appellant
is unable to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test, “it is not
4
incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Grant v.
State, 305 Ga. 170, 175 (5) (824 SE2d 255) (2019) (citation and
punctuation omitted); see also Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (2)
(897 SE2d 428) (2024) (“The failure to demonstrate either deficient
performance or resulting prejudice is fatal to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and obviates the need even to consider the
other.”).
Summerville argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object during the State’s closing argument. Specifically,
the analyst who examined the fibers collected from the underside of
Summerville’s truck testified that the fibers “were consistent with”
the leggings West wore at the time of her death. During closing
arguments, the prosecutor highlighted evidence that Summerville’s
truck was involved in a collision and noted in passing that “the hair
fibers from Martha’s clothing” were found on the vehicle’s underside.
Pointing to the prosecutor’s characterization of “the hair fibers from
[West’s] clothing,” which was not the same as how the analyst
described the fibers, Summerville argues that trial counsel should
5
have objected to the prosecutor’s argument as improperly conveying
the prosecutor’s own opinions about the evidence. We do not agree
that counsel’s performance was deficient.
It is well settled that “a prosecutor is granted wide latitude in
the conduct of closing argument, and within that wide latitude, he
may comment upon and draw deductions from the evidence
presented to the jury.” Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 240 (4) (c) (862
SE2d 285) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And here, the
prosecutor’s comment clearly was not a statement of personal
opinion but rather a permissible reasonable inference drawn from
the trial evidence. As recounted above, the State presented
substantial evidence that West died as a result of being struck by
Summerville’s truck. West’s body was found in an open field
surrounded by tire tracks; an autopsy showed that her numerous
injuries were consistent with being struck by a motor vehicle; and
Summerville’s truck showed signs of being in a recent collision.
Summerville is correct that the analyst could not testify, as a
matter of scientific certainty, that the fibers came from West’s
6
leggings and, thus, was limited to opining that the fibers were
“consistent with” West’s leggings. But it would be reasonable to
infer, in light of the other evidence at trial, that the fibers recovered
from the underside of Summerville’s truck came from West’s
clothing. As such, the prosecutor’s argument fell “within the bounds
of permissible argument” and, thus, was not improper. Blocker v.
State, 316 Ga. 568, 579 (4) (a) (889 SE2d 824) (2023); see also Gaston
v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 640 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 808) (2020). Cf. Jackson
v. State, 301 Ga. 774, 775-776 (3) (804 SE2d 73) (2017) (“While it is
improper for counsel to state to the jury counsel’s personal belief as
to the veracity of a witness[,] it is not improper for counsel to urge
the jury to draw such a conclusion from the evidence.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). And because the prosecutor’s argument was
not improper, any objection would have been meritless, and “trial
counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection to the State’s closing
argument is not evidence of ineffective assistance.” Gaston, 307 Ga.
at 640 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). This claim of
ineffective assistance therefore fails.
7
3. In his second enumeration of error, Summerville contends
that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the
State’s objection and restricted his questioning of the GBI medical
examiner who conducted West’s autopsy. Specifically, during
recross-examination of the medical examiner, Summerville elicited
testimony that the medical examiner had been suspended from the
GBI Crime Lab for two years and had “entered into an agreement
with [the crime lab] to not have any further inappropriate action.”
When Summerville attempted to probe the issue further, the State
objected. Outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor characterized
the line of questioning as “character assassination.” Summerville
countered that the questioning went to the medical examiner’s
potential bias. Upon further questioning from the trial court,
defense counsel elaborated:
The witness entered into an agreement whereby,
according to what I’ve read, that another inappropriate
action would result in termination. That’s what was
widely reported, and if this witness were to do something
for one side or the other that were to shade things and
somebody thought it was inappropriate, she could lose her
job. And so the entering of a medical examiner’s report is
8
indeterminate and then shading it towards the State
makes it seems that perhaps she is biased towards the
State.
Defense counsel further argued that the medical examiner’s
agreement with GBI made the witness biased toward the State
because “[t]he GBI, while it claims to be independent, works at the
behest of prosecutors . . . .” Defense counsel did not proffer any
evidence in support of these assertions, nor did defense counsel seek
to question the medical examiner further, outside the jury’s
presence, to show the trial court what the medical examiner would
have testified to regarding her prior disciplinary action. The trial
court sustained the State’s objection and curtailed Summerville’s
questioning about the medical examiner’s suspension and
subsequent disciplinary action, “unless it goes to [the medical
examiner’s] ability to perform autopsies and her medical
experience.” The trial court also struck from the record
Summerville’s question about the medical examiner’s prior
disciplinary action, as well as the medical examiner’s response, and
instructed the jury to disregard it. On appeal, Summerville contends
9
that the trial court denied his right to a thorough and sifting crossexamination of the medical examiner regarding partiality and bias.
We disagree.
“The permissible scope of cross-examination is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review a limitation of
the scope of cross-examination only for abuse of discretion.” Nicely
v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 796 (4) (733 SE2d 715) (2012) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “That discretion is circumscribed, of course,
by our Evidence Code, which provides that the accused is entitled to
a ‘thorough and sifting cross-examination’ of witnesses for the
prosecution. OCGA § 24-6-611 (b).” Lucas v. State, 303 Ga. 134, 137
(2) (810 SE2d 490) (2018). It is further circumscribed by the
Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Georgia
Constitutions, 2 “which secure, among other things, the right of the
accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him.” Id.
Though “this right of cross-examination includes a right to
inquire into the partiality and bias of witnesses,” that right is not
2 See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV.
10
without its limits. Id. Rather, an accused is entitled to a “reasonable
cross-examination on the relevant issue of whether a witness
entertained any belief of personal benefit from testifying favorably
for the prosecution.” Id. (emphasis in original; citation and
punctuation omitted); see also Howard v. State, 286 Ga. 222, 225 (2)
(686 SE2d 764) (2009) (“[T]he right of cross-examination integral to
the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not an absolute right
that mandates unlimited questioning by the defense.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). And trial courts “retain wide latitude to
impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns
about, among other things[,] interrogation that is only marginally
relevant.” Nicely, 291 Ga. at 796 (4) (citation and punctuation
omitted). On the record in this case, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion by restricting Summerville’s crossexamination of the medical examiner. Here, evidence that the
medical examiner was disciplined for telling an inappropriate joke
and had agreed not to engage in “any further inappropriate action”
was, at best, marginally relevant to the issue of the medical
11
examiner’s potential bias in favor of the State. But Summerville
failed to make the requisite showing that such evidence was
meaningfully probative of the issue of potential bias. See Olds v.
State, 299 Ga. 65, 75 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (“Relevance and
probative value are related, but distinct, concepts. Relevance is a
binary concept—evidence is relevant or it is not—but probative
value is relative. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to
prove or disprove a fact, whereas the probative value of evidence
derives in large part from the extent to which the evidence tends to
make the existence of a fact more or less probable. . . . [T]he extent
to which evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more or less
probable depends significantly on the quality of the evidence and the
strength of its logical connection to the fact for which it is offered.”
(emphasis in original)).
In arguing before the trial court that he should be able to crossexamine the medical examiner about the prior disciplinary action
for the purpose of showing bias, Summerville did not seek to proffer
evidence from which the trial court could find a connection between
12
the disciplinary action and any motivation on the part of the medical
examiner to testify favorably to the State. Instead, Summerville
offered only argument in support of this line of questioning. To that
end, trial counsel vaguely referenced “what [she had] read” and
“what was widely reported” about the disciplinary action and
speculated that the medical examiner, by virtue of her employment
with the GBI, was biased toward both the GBI and the State. These
arguments, unsupported by a proffer of evidence, were insufficient
to establish that testimony about the medical examiner’s
disciplinary action was related to and thus probative of the issue of
her potential bias for the State. See Smith v. State, 310 Ga. 790, 793
(2) (854 SE2d 721) (2021) (no abuse of discretion in restricting crossexamination of State’s witnesses about their potential involvement
in other crimes as a motive to testify favorably for the State where
appellant offered no evidence to support basis for alleged bias);
Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 653, 655-656 (2) (827 SE2d 254) (2019)
(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting
cross-examination of witness about potential bias for the State
13
arising from prior first-offender plea where appellant “made no
proffer explaining a relationship between [the witness’s plea] and
her testimony in his case”).
By contrast, evidence of the prior disciplinary action, as the
State emphasized to the trial court, could have impugned the
medical examiner’s character, and it certainly carried the potential
to prejudice jurors against her. See Lucas, 303 Ga. at 138-139 (2);
Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 685 (5) (89 SE2d 914) (2023) (“[A]
defendant does not have carte blanche to question a witness on
issues of marginal relevance that are intended primarily to impugn
the witness’s character or motives.”). See also OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”);
OCGA § 24-6-611 (a) (3) (“The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to . . . [p]rotect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.”). In sum, on the record before us, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting cross14
examination about the medical examiner’s prior disciplinary action,
and this claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
15