NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S24A1090. ESPINOSA v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
On August 11, 2021, Andy Espinosa pleaded guilty to the
malice murder of Zachary Mejia and to other related offenses.1 On
1 Zachary died on December 9, 2020. On January 26, 2021, a Chattooga
County grand jury indicted Espinosa for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated
on cruelty to children (Count 3), aggravated assault (family violence) (Count
4), cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 5), two counts of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Counts 6 and 7), and cruelty to
children in the third degree (Count 8). On August 11, 2021, Espinosa pleaded
guilty on all counts without a recommendation as to sentencing from the State.
The trial court sentenced Espinosa to serve life without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive sentence of five years to serve on Count 6, and a
concurrent 12-month sentence on Count 8. Counts 4 and 7 merged for
sentencing purposes. Though the trial court purported to merge the felony
murder counts, they were actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v.
State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-72 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). We also note that,
although the trial court merged Count 5 with Count 1, the crimes of malice
murder and cruelty to children in the first degree do not merge. See Vasquez
v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 234-35 (c) (4) (830 SE2d 143) (2019) (noting that “even if
the same conduct establishes the commission of both malice murder and
cruelty to children [in the first degree], the two crimes do not merge”).
However, the State has not cross-appealed on this issue, and we decline to
appeal, Espinosa claims that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because plea counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of an insanity defense.
For the following reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling and affirm.
1. In presenting its factual basis for the guilty plea, the State
proffered the following. Espinosa was living with his girlfriend,
Sarah Mejia, and her four children. Zachary was the eldest at 15
years old. On December 8, 2020, Espinosa and Zachary got into a
physical fight, and Zachary “got the better of” Espinosa. Espinosa
felt “humiliated and embarrassed” following the fight and continued
to feel that way when he went to work the next day. The next day,
Espinosa made a search on Quora – a question and answer blog
website – that read “What does it feel like to murder someone?”2
correct the error in this case. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-97 (4) (808
SE2d 696) (2017) (though appellate court has discretion to correct merger
error, when the error benefits the defendant and the State fails to raise it by
cross-appeal, this Court will only exercise its discretion to correct such error in exceptional circumstances).
2 Records were obtained from the Quora website and showed that the
search had been made several hours prior to the stabbing.
2
On that same day, Espinosa returned home from work, saw
Zachary’s lights on through his window, and thought Zachary “must
want something with [him] again.” Espinosa grabbed a knife from
his car and entered the home. He immediately opened the door to
Zachary’s room, saw Zachary, and rushed at him. Espinosa stabbed
Zachary repeatedly with the knife and then called 9-1-1. Sheriff’s
deputies arrived and arrested Espinosa. Espinosa later claimed that
he told officers at the scene that he had “snapped” and was taken
over by a “demon” during the stabbing. 3 An investigator who
responded to the 9-1-1 call noted that Zachary had suffered five stab
wounds – to the right eyebrow, the neck (a major wound), the left
upper back, the left mid torso, and the left lower torso – and
sustained 11 additional lacerations. Zachary was transported to the
hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries. The youngest of the
four children was the only other person in the home at the time of
the stabbing.
3 Espinosa made these claims at the motion to withdraw guilty plea
hearing. During the guilty plea hearing, however, Espinosa never referenced a
demon or any other similar reason for his actions.
3
Following the State’s proffer, the court went through the plea
colloquy with Espinosa. Espinosa stated that he had gone over the
plea form with his counsel, gave true answers to the questions, and
signed the form after they talked. Espinosa affirmed that he
understood the charges. He also confirmed that he had “plenty of
time” to talk with his counsel, told counsel everything he knew about
the case, and was satisfied with counsel’s representation thus far.
Plea counsel agreed that he had discussed Espinosa’s constitutional
rights at length with him, and the court reviewed those rights again
with Espinosa to ensure his understanding. The court described the
sentencing ranges for each of the eight counts against Espinosa and
explained that the maximum possible sentence Espinosa could face
was life without the possibility of parole, plus five years consecutive
and an additional twelve months consecutive. The court also
explained that it could sentence Espinosa in the same manner after
a trial as it could at the guilty plea hearing.
Espinosa then pleaded guilty to the eight charges against him
“of his own free will,” with an understanding of “the consequences of
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his pleas.” The court accepted each of the pleas and sentenced
Espinosa.
On September 7, 2021, Espinosa – through new counsel –
timely filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea, alleging that his plea
counsel was ineffective and that a withdrawal was necessary to
correct the manifest injustice that resulted. 4 A motion to withdraw
guilty plea hearing was held on February 23, 2024. At that hearing,
new counsel argued that plea counsel failed to adequately
investigate Espinosa’s state of mind and that had he done so, he
would have advised Espinosa of a colorable insanity defense.
At the hearing, plea counsel testified that he had practiced in
Georgia since 2007. He had worked both as a public defender and in
private practice as a criminal defense attorney and had handled
thousands of felony cases. Counsel explained the way he typically
4 The deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is the end of
the term in which a trial court enters a judgment of conviction and sentence is
pronounced. See Harris v. State, 319 Ga. 133, 136 (1) (b) & n.2 (902 SE2d 574)
(2024). Espinosa entered his guilty plea, was sentenced, and moved to
withdraw his guilty plea within the same term of court. See OCGA § 15-6-3
(22) (B) (terms of court for Chattooga County Superior Court begin on the first
Monday in February and August).
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handled a murder case, i.e., meeting with the client, requesting
discovery, taking discovery to the client to go over it with them,
speaking with family members, talking to the district attorney about
possible non-jury resolutions, and relaying those to the client.
Counsel testified that he received Espinosa’s case about a year
before the plea hearing took place; that Espinosa described having
“rage” come over him when he got home on December 9, 2020; and
that Espinosa acted rationally in calling 9-1-1 afterwards and was
able to talk to law enforcement at the scene about what happened.
After reviewing discovery and based on his conversations with
Espinosa, counsel “didn’t really see a defense at all” for the case and
had ruled out “pretty much everything.” He could not recall if there
was any law enforcement body camera footage of Espinosa at the
time of his arrest describing the homicide (i.e., indicating that
Espinosa “snapped” or anything about a demon). He had no
recollection of Espinosa ever talking about demons coming over him,
blanking out, or not remembering what happened on the night of the
stabbing. As such, he did not ask Espinosa about his mental health
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or attempt to further ascertain his state of mind that night.
Espinosa told him early on that “he did not want to go to trial” and
instead “wanted to find another resolution.” Counsel spoke with the
district attorney about Espinosa’s interest in a non-jury disposition
if he could get something less than life without parole, but the
district attorney would not consider it. Counsel explained this to
Espinosa and told him that he could go to trial but thought the
chances of succeeding were “slim to none.” Espinosa indicated he
would rather take the plea than go to trial. Counsel testified that he
met with Espinosa four or five times before the plea – spending a
total of about eight hours with him – and at no point did he suggest
that there might be a colorable defense because he “couldn’t think of
one” to offer and “didn’t see a way for [an insanity defense] to be
successful.”
Counsel believed a plea would be Espinosa’s best chance at
receiving parole and would avoid painting Espinosa in a worse light,
given the evidence about him that would be introduced at a trial.
Counsel also noted that, at the sentencing hearing, Espinosa made
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no mention that a demon was to blame for the stabbing; instead, he
provided reasons for his anger: Zachary was “heading in the wrong
direction,” acted distant from his mom and Espinosa, and “started
to act just like his brother being disrespectful, talking back, not
following the house rules, things of that nature.” Ultimately, counsel
testified that he did not believe there was any lapse of reason when
Espinosa took Zachary’s life and felt that Espinosa could distinguish
right from wrong at the time of the stabbing.
Espinosa testified at the hearing, however, that he told plea
counsel during their first meeting (or at least at some point) that he
came home from work on December 9, 2020, “something got over into
[his] head and [he] snapped, like a demon,” and “something
compelled [him] to do something evil.” He did not understand what
he was doing was wrong during the stabbing and was “incapable of
doing the right thing” at the time. Plea counsel did not follow up
about his mental state during the homicide. Instead, counsel advised
him to go forward with the plea deal, specifically because he believed
the judge’s gender might incline her to give a lesser sentence.
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Espinosa took counsel’s advice to accept the plea, but he claimed
that he would not have done so if counsel had told him about the
insanity defense.
2. Espinosa argues that plea counsel was ineffective because he
failed to advise him of a “colorable insanity defense,” and that the
trial court erred in refusing him to withdraw his guilty plea based
on counsel’s ineffectiveness.
After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea
only to correct a “manifest injustice,” such as if a defendant was
denied effective assistance of counsel. Hood v. State, 315 Ga. 809,
812 (1) (884 SE2d 901) (2023). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Espinosa must show that plea counsel’s
performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was
prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To prove deficient performance, Espinosa “must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide
range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s
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decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Hood, 315 Ga. at 812 (1) (cleaned up). To establish
prejudice “in the guilty plea context, [Espinosa] must demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Id. at 813 (1) (cleaned up). If Espinosa fails to meet his
burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, “the reviewing
court does not have to examine the other prong.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted).
“This Court accepts a superior court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim unless they
are clearly erroneous, but we apply legal principles to the facts de
novo.” Hood, 315 Ga. at 813 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).
And “[t]he court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will
not be disturbed absent an obvious abuse of discretion.” Wright v.
State, 314 Ga. 355, 357-58 (877 SE2d 178) (2022) (cleaned up).
Because judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly
deferential, there is a strong presumption that a lawyer rendered
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reasonable professional assistance. See Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268,
270 (2) (a) (737 SE2d 98) (2013).
Espinosa has failed to establish that plea counsel’s decision not
to advise him of a possible insanity defense (and instead to
recommend a plea) was objectively unreasonable. Espinosa does not
claim on appeal that he had past mental health issues or records
that plea counsel should have reviewed, nor does he present any
expert evidence supporting that he was actually insane at the time
of the stabbing. Instead, Espinosa argues that because he told
officers after the stabbing that a “demon got into [him],” counsel
should have advised him of an insanity defense. However, based on
his many years of experience, multiple conversations with and
observations of Espinosa, counsel made the strategic choice to advise
Espinosa to pursue a plea with the hope of obtaining a sentence of
life with the possibility of parole rather than proffering a defense
that counsel believed was inconsistent with the facts, including that
Espinosa conducted an internet search about murdering someone on
the same day as the stabbing and after the stabbing, called 9-1-1
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and spoke intelligently with the responding law enforcement
officers. Moreover, the trial court was authorized to credit plea
counsel’s testimony over Espinosa’s regarding whether they had
discussed Espinosa’s allegedly being overcome by some sort of
“demon” or “evil.” See Simmons v. State, 314 Ga. 883 (3) (c) (880
SE2d 125) (2022) (explaining that a trial court, as finder of fact, is
entitled to credit [plea] counsel’s testimony as to his efforts to
investigate a case). Espinosa has not presented evidence that
overcomes the strong presumption of reasonableness, so it cannot be
said that counsel chose an objectively unreasonable course of action
under the circumstances. See McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142
(1) (702 SE2d 170) (2010) (no ineffective assistance when plea
counsel spoke with the defendant’s psychiatrist and based on that
information as well as his own observations of the defendant “made
a strategic choice that an incapacity defense was not in his client’s
best interest”).
The trial court concluded that Espinosa failed to show that his
plea counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Because
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the record supports the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinosa’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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