NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S25Y0025. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the amended
petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent
Curtis Lee Allen (State Bar No. 009905) after this Court rejected his
first petition due to “several deficiencies that preclude[d] final
resolution of th[e] matter.” See In the Matter of Allen, 319 Ga. 505,
506 (904 SE2d 354) (2024) (“Allen I”). In his amended petition, Allen,
who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia and Florida
since 1994, has corrected the deficiencies in his original petition. He
again requests that this Court impose a ten-day suspension, nunc
pro tunc to the date of a ten-day suspension he received in Florida
for his conduct in representing an insurance company in two cases.
The State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition, and, given
the current record before us, we do so.
As recited in Allen I:
To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against
him in Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a
consent judgment, pursuant to which the Florida
Supreme Court entered an order on December 28, 2023,
suspending him from the practice of law for ten days,
effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for
one year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics
School, and entering judgment against him in the amount
of $1,450.10 for the cost of the Florida Bar’s action against
him.[ ] Allen states that he served his suspension from
January 29 to February 7, 2024. The State Bar of Georgia
then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action against
Allen pursuant to [Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”)] 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed this petition
for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-227
(b).
In his petition, Allen explains that in the first
disciplinary matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of
Appeal observed in a published opinion that, while
representing an insurance company, Allen “made
argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the
insureds and their counsel” while conducting
examinations under oath. In the second matter, while
representing the same insurance company in a dispute
over attorney fees, he made comments about the opposing
party and counsel “which were not consistent with the
high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he
was found to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3
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(Misconduct and Minor Misconduct), 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for
Rights of Third Persons), and 4-8.4 (d) (Misconduct). Allen
observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is analogous to GRPC
4.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary rule
equivalent to Florida Rule 3-4.3 or Rule 4-8.4 (d). Allen
states that in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar,
he stipulated to four aggravating factors: prior
disciplinary history, pattern of misconduct, multiple
offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law.
See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts
that the Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors:
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or
emotional problems arising from or related to his stressful
divorce at the time of his misconduct, full and free
disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the
disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA
Standards 9.32 (b), (c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court
that he has taken steps to ensure that his future conduct
will be professional and will comply with disciplinary
rules.
Allen I, 319 Ga. at 506-507 (footnotes omitted).
Based on those facts, Allen requested, as substantially similar
discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law in
Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his ten-day
Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon
the entry of its opinion. But this Court rejected his original petition
because Allen attached none of the Florida documents associated
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with the Florida discipline and because he failed to show that he
stopped practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida,
as was necessary to establish his entitlement to suspension nunc pro
tunc. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136)
(2010) (explaining that when a lawyer requests discipline nunc pro
tunc, it is his responsibility to demonstrate that he voluntarily
stopped practicing law, the date on which his law practice ended,
and that he complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in
such a decision).
In his amended petition, Allen attaches the documents
associated with the Florida discipline, which confirm the facts and
resolution of the Florida disciplinary matter, and he explains that,
after graduating from a Georgia law school, he was admitted to the
bars of both Georgia and Florida in 1994, but he immediately moved
to Florida and has practiced law exclusively within that state
throughout his career. Allen notes that, because he has never
practiced law in Georgia in any capacity, he has no Georgia clients
to notify of his suspension and no Georgia office to close, but states
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that he did promptly notify his Florida clients of his suspension.
Based on that showing, Allen again requests that this Court suspend
his license for ten days, nunc pro tunc, and concurrent with the
Florida suspension, noting that such an action will allow automatic
reinstatement upon entry of this Court’s opinion
The State Bar admits that Allen has corrected the issues that
this Court identified with his original petition and asserts that it
has found no record of Allen ever practicing law in Georgia or
representing Georgia clients. It thus urges this Court to accept the
petition and impose the requested discipline.
Given the record currently before this Court, it appears that
the imposition of a suspension nunc pro tunc is appropriate here.
See Onipede, 288 Ga. at 157; In the Matter of Hutt, 291 Ga. 171, 172
(728 SE2d 552) (2012) (instating suspension nunc pro tunc to the
date of the Florida suspension where “the record indicate[d] that
[lawyer] did not practice law in Georgia during the period of his
Florida suspension and instead promptly sought the imposition of
reciprocal discipline,” and the Bar “support[ed] the request”). See
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also In the Matter of Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894)
(2023) (accepting attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal
discipline and imposing ten-day suspension, which is generally not
a disciplinary sanction available in Georgia, because the requested
suspension was “identical” to discipline imposed in Florida).
Accordingly, we accept Allen’s amended petition for voluntary
reciprocal discipline and suspend him from the practice of law for
ten days, nunc pro tunc to January 29, 2024, the date his suspension
became effective in Florida. Allen is also hereby reinstated, given
that his ten-day suspension will have been completed by the date on
which this opinion will be issued.
Petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline accepted. Ten-day
suspension, nunc pro tunc to January 29, 2024; reinstated. All the
Justices concur.
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