NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 10, 2025
S25A0256. COSTON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A DeKalb County jury found Ladarion Tijuan Coston guilty of
murder and other crimes in connection with the November 2020
shooting death of Caleb Simmons. 1 Coston contends the evidence
1 The crimes occurred on November 29, 2020. On January 10, 2022, a
DeKalb County grand jury indicted Coston and Marcus Yancey for the crimes
of malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4); armed robbery
(Count 5); aggravated assault (Count 6); possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon (Counts 7 and 8); and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony (Counts 7). On July 28, 2023, a jury found Coston and Yancey guilty
on all counts. The trial court sentenced Coston to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for murder; life in prison without the possibility of parole for armed robbery, to be served consecutively to the sentence for murder; ten
years in prison for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to be served
consecutively to the sentences for murder and armed robbery; and five years
in prison for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, to be served
consecutively to the sentences for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The felony murder counts were vacated by
operation of law and the aggravated assault count was merged with the
murder count. Coston filed a timely motion for new trial on August 22, 2023,
which he amended on June 4, 2024. After a hearing on June 14, 2024, the trial
court denied Coston’s amended motion for new trial on July 26, 2024. Coston
filed a timely notice of appeal on July 29, 2024. The case was docketed in this
Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions, his trial
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, the trial
court plainly erred in admitting certain evidence, and the
cumulative effect of these errors warrants reversal. For the reasons
explained below, we see no merit to these contentions and affirm.
1. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdicts, shows the following. On November 29, 2020, Coston and
his co-defendant, Marcus Yancey, shot and killed Simmons while
robbing him during a drug sale at the Avana City North apartment
complex in DeKalb County. The immediate aftermath of the
shooting was witnessed by Nickolas McKiness, who lived in the
apartment complex near the mailbox area of the breezeway where
the shooting occurred. While in his apartment, McKiness heard a
gunshot. He opened his door, peered outside, and saw Simmons’s
body on the breezeway floor with blood beginning to pool around his
head. Simmons’s belongings were scattered around his body.
McKiness called 911 at 2:19 p.m. to report the crime. About a minute
after he heard the gunshot, McKiness observed a man running
2
toward the breezeway, shouting: “That’s my brother!” The man knelt
by Simmons’s body and picked up cash, a bag, and a handgun.
McKiness later identified this man as co-defendant Yancey.
Mikal Yamini, another resident of the apartment complex,
drove into the complex’s parking lot shortly after the shooting
occurred. As he entered the parking lot, he saw a vehicle speeding
out of the parking lot. Yamini also saw a man wearing a red and
yellow track suit scale the fence surrounding the complex, struggle
to get over the fence, and then run away. Yamini reported his
observations to the police.
Police officers arrived at the apartment complex at 2:24 p.m.
Witnesses directed the officers to the breezeway where Simmons’s
body lay, surrounded by shell casings and loose dollar bills. The
officers obtained descriptions of the perpetrators from McKiness,
Yamini, Yinessia Miller, and Drismia Yilla. Miller and Yilla did not
testify at trial. The witnesses gave detailed descriptions of the men
to the police, including descriptions of the clothing they wore. One
of the men wore all black; the other wore a yellow and red tracksuit.
3
Eyewitness Yilla, whose statement was admitted at trial as an
excited utterance, described the man in black clothing as having a
small cheek tattoo that contained straight lines. After speaking with
the witnesses, the officers noticed a blood trail and followed it for
about 150 feet to a grassy area near the fence surrounding the
complex. There they found a black bag that contained money and
marijuana.
The medical examiner testified that Simmons died as a result
of a gunshot wound to the head. He described a contact gunshot
wound directly above Simmons’s left eyebrow that indicated that the
shooter had pressed his gun directly to Simmons’s head when he
fired it. Simmons also suffered a gunshot wound to his thigh.
Several days after Simmons’s death, Simmons’s family and
friends went to the police station to provide information to
investigators. Simmons’s family gave the investigators images of
Simmons’s telephone call logs. The logs showed that, shortly before
the shooting, Simmons had been communicating with someone
calling from a phone number ending in -5834. This number had a
4
Memphis area code.
Simmons’s friend, Erek Frye, told investigators that, two days
before Simmons’s murder, he and Simmons had met two men from
Memphis who wanted to buy some marijuana. Frye testified that,
while they were at the Shell gas station on Lavista Road, “two dudes
approached us” to “buy some weed.” During the encounter, the men
obtained Simmons’s phone number and “linked up with [Simmons]
a few days after.” Frye said the men were from Memphis. One of
the men had a dreadlocks hairstyle and identified himself as
“Black.” Frye identified this person as Yancey. Frye was unable to
identify Yancey’s associate because the man wore a mask that
covered his mouth and forehead. He recalled, however, that Yancey’s
associate wore a blue hat with the logo for the Kansas City Royals
baseball team. Although Frye was unable to positively identify
Coston at trial, he confirmed that the hat that the shooter was
wearing in the surveillance video was the same hat he saw on the
man who accompanied Yancey to the gas station two nights before
the murder.
5
After the investigators obtained Simmons’s cell phone records,
they noticed that the phone number ending in 5834 was saved in
Simmons’s phone under the name: “Black.” Investigators later
identified the number as belonging to co-defendant Yancey.
Simmons’s cell phone records showed that he received an incoming
call from Yancey’s phone number at 1:46 p.m. on the day of the
murder and then made an outgoing call to that number at 2:06 p.m.,
minutes before McKiness’s 911 call.
Investigators also obtained a surveillance video recording from
the apartment complex. The recording, which was shown to the jury,
shows Yancey on the phone in the apartment breezeway. He is
wearing a bright yellow top and red pants. While he is on the phone,
Yancey walks near the mailboxes with Simmons. The video then
shows Simmons opening a bag and displaying the contents to
Yancey. Shortly thereafter, Yancey shows cash to Simmons. Seconds
later, another man appears. He is wearing black pants, a black
sweatshirt with an image on the front, and a blue baseball cap with
a logo. Thirty-eight seconds later, the man draws a handgun from
6
his pants and points it at Simmons. Yancey follows suit, drawing his
own weapon and pointing it at Simmons. As Simmons hands the
cash to Yancey, the other man points his gun at Simmons’s head.
The other man then pushes Simmons, who turns and pushes (or is
pushed into) Yancey. The other man grabs Simmons’s arm, presses
the gun to his head, and fires the weapon. Simmons collapses to the
ground, and blood pools around his head. Yancey and the other man
flee. Minutes later, Yancey reappears and takes items from and
around Simmons’s body, including a gun and the bag Simmons was
carrying at the beginning of the video. Yancey then flees.
Investigators obtained an arrest warrant for Yancey on
December 1, 2020, and he was arrested in Memphis on January 8,
2021. Following Yancey’s arrest, investigators worked to identify the
second man involved in the shooting. Investigators learned that the
person Yancey spoke with on the phone immediately before the
shooting used a phone number ending in -6256. A call was placed
from that number to Yancey at 2:14 p.m. on November 29, 2020, five
minutes before McKiness’s 911 call reporting the shooting.
7
Investigators received information in August 2021 pointing
them to a person known as “Snagg” or “Tijuan Broome,” a known
associate of Yancey’s. Investigators viewed Snagg’s Facebook page
and saw an image of him wearing a sweatshirt that appeared to be
the same sweatshirt that the second man wore in the surveillance
video recording of Simmons’s murder. Further investigations into
Snagg’s Facebook account revealed that the page was owned by
Coston, whose middle name is Tijuan. In a series of Facebook
messages to various people, Coston revealed his full name, date of
birth, address, and partial Social Security Number. Coston also
posted images of himself on November 15, 2020, showing a dollarsign facial tattoo and a blue Royal’s baseball hat and black
sweatshirt like those seen in the surveillance video recording. Even
after he was arrested, Coston kept his Facebook page and an
Instagram profile active.
Coston’s Facebook messages also showed he was in Atlanta at
the time of the murder. On November 25, 2020, Coston responded to
a message, stating that he was “Headed to the A,” which an
8
investigator testified is slang for “Atlanta.” On November 27,
Coston told someone that he was “in the A[.]” And on November 28,
Coston sent a message to another person, stating he was “way in the
A wit[h] it.” In December 2020, Coston provided his phone number
to people on Facebook around 35 times. The cell phone number
Coston provided was the same number that Yancey was
communicating with at 2:14 p.m. on November 29, 2020,
immediately before the shooting. Coston also posted multiple
pictures of Yancey on his Facebook account. Further, Coston
communicated with Yancey’s relatives after Yancey’s January 2021
arrest, referring to one of Yancey’s relatives as “Ma” and telling
another of Yancey’s relatives: “Love you too, sis.”
Investigators also obtained geolocation information for
Yancey’s and Coston’s cell phone numbers. Both phones were in
Memphis at 3:31 p.m. on November 25, 2020, and then traveled
together through Birmingham, Alabama, and arrived in Tucker,
Georgia at 11:38 p.m. Both phones were active in the Atlanta area
over the next several days. At 2:14 p.m. on November 29, 2020,
9
Coston’s phone called Yancey’s phone. Coston’s phone was then
inactive until December 2, 2020, when the phone was back in
Memphis. Yancey’s phone was active in Atlanta at 5:00 p.m. on
November 29, 2020, but then was inactive until November 30, 2020,
at 1:16 p.m. when the phone was back in Memphis.
Following his arrest, Coston was photographed. The
photograph shows that Coston has a dollar sign tattoo on his face
with parallel lines in it.
Yancey testified at trial and he admitted being in Atlanta and
arranging a drug sale with Simmons and Frye. Yancey said he
contacted Simmons on November 29, 2020, and agreed to buy a
pound of marijuana from Simmons for $2,500. Yancey said he got
nervous when Simmons arrived at the apartment complex for the
sale because Simmons had a gun. Moreover, when they began the
transaction, “it was supposed to be a pound [of marijuana] in the
bag, [but] there weren’t no pound.” Instead, Simmons only produced
a few ounces of marijuana. These things allegedly prompted
Yancey’s “partner” to pull his gun. Yancey claimed that he drew his
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gun after his partner “spazzed out” and Simmons reached for his
own gun. Yancey claimed that he “blacked out” and ran off when the
shooting occurred. But then he immediately returned to the
breezeway because he believed that he had dropped his own gun and
phone. He testified that he was “out of [his] mind” and “just picked
up everything” that was lying by Simmons’s body. Further, he
testified that his partner was not Coston but instead a man named
“Montrel Bland,” who was deceased at the time of trial. When
Yancey was shown a picture of Bland, who did not have a dollar-sign
facial tattoo, he said that he did not know if Bland had a face tattoo
because he “wasn’t paying attention.”
The parties stipulated that Coston was a convicted felon at the
time of the crimes.
Coston contends this evidence was entirely circumstantial and
did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and
therefore, is insufficient to prove his guilt of the crimes charged2
2 OCGA § 16-5-1 (a) provides that: “A person commits the offense of
murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
11
beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. First, the evidence was not
entirely circumstantial. 3 Therefore, we need not address whether
the proved facts “exclude[d] every other reasonable hypothesis save
that of [Coston’s] guilt” of the crimes charged. OCGA § 24-14-6. See
also Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 630 (2) (859 SE2d 46) (2021) (“[I]f
there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the
implied, causes the death of another human being.” “Express malice is that
deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which
is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.” OCGA § 16-5-1(b).
Malice is implied where “no considerable provocation appears and where all
the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Id.
OCGA § 16-8-41 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that a person commits the
offense of armed robbery when “with intent to commit theft, he or she takes
property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by
use of an offensive weapon.” OCGA § 16-11-106 provides that a person commits
the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when
that person has a firearm “on or within arm’s reach of his . . . person . . . during the commission of . . . (1) any crime against or involving the person of another.” Finally, OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) provides that a person commits the offense of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when that person has been
convicted of a felony by any court “of this state or any other state” and he
receives, possesses, or transports a firearm.
3 The evidence against Coston, a convicted felon, was not solely
circumstantial. The surveillance video recording showing Coston shooting
Simmons was direct evidence of Coston’s guilt. See Walker v. State, 314 Ga.
390, 394 (2) (b) n.5 (877 SE2d 197) (2020) (“A video-recording of events alleged
to depict a crime constitutes direct evidence of the crime.”). “[I]t was for the
jury to decide whether or not the [video recording] establish[ed] that [Coston]”
was the person who shot Simmons. Thomas v. State, 296 Ga. 485, 487 (1) (769
SE2d 82) (2015). Additionally, the State submitted certified records – direct
evidence – establishing that Coston was a convicted felon when he possessed
the murder weapon. Walker, 314 Ga. at 394 (2) (b).
12
circumstantial evidence statute does not apply to a sufficiency
analysis.”). Second, sufficient evidence supported each of Coston’s
convictions.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper
standard of review is whether a rational trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). “[I]t was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.” Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340, 343 (1) (a) (839 SE2d 640)
(2020) (citation omitted).
The State presented ample evidence from which the jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Coston, a convicted felon,
robbed and murdered Simmons by shooting him with a handgun.
The State presented the video-recording of the shooting as well as
witness testimony and other evidence from which the jury could
identify Yancy’s partner as Coston.
For example, Yilla, an eyewitness, recounted seeing a small
13
tattoo on Yancey’s partner’s right cheek. The tattoo contained
straight lines. The jury could have inferred that she was describing
Coston’s dollar-sign facial tattoo and that Yancey’s testimony that
his accomplice was Montreal Bland, who was deceased at the time
of trial, was not credible given that Bland did not have a tattoo on
his face. The State also presented evidence of Coston’s Facebook
profile, which displayed an image of his tattooed face as the profile
picture and revealed other identifying information, including his
birthdate. The Facebook profile also showed photographs of Coston
wearing the same clothes, including the same distinctive sweatshirt
and hat, that the second man wore in the video recording of the
shooting. The State also presented evidence that Coston shared his
phone number on Facebook – the same number that Yancey called
minutes before the shooting. And Coston told his Facebook friends
that he was in Atlanta between November 25, 2020, and November
29, 2020.
The State additionally presented phone records showing that
Yancey communicated with the phone number ending in -6256 –
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which the jury could have inferred was Coston’s phone number –
immediately before Yancey’s accomplice appeared in the
surveillance video. Further, records for the phone number ending in
-6256 show that the phone’s user traveled to Atlanta with Yancey
four days before the shooting.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts
and deferring to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility
of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find Coston guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crimes of malice murder, armed robbery,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at
319 (III) (B). See also Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 482-484 (847
SE2d 317) (2020) (concluding that the evidence was constitutionally
sufficient to authorize the defendant’s malice murder conviction
where the forensic evidence linked the defendant to the victim and
the crime).
2. Coston contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally
15
deficient in two respects: (a) by allowing the admission of State’s
Exhibit 55, which he contends was “flagrantly prejudicial 404 (b)
evidence”; and (b) by failing to impeach a State’s witness with a prior
unsworn statement.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient and that the deficient performance
resulted in prejudice to the defendant. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3) (689 SE2d 280) (2010).
To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that
his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d
637) (2013) (citation omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-688. This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption
that trial counsel’s performance was adequate. See Marshall v.
State, 297 Ga. 445, 448 (2) (774 SE2d 675) (2015). “If an appellant
16
fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the
Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the
other prong.” Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (2) (690 SE2d
801) (2010).
(a) State’s Exhibit 55 is an affidavit attached to a search
warrant. It describes a June 2021 shooting in the same apartment
complex as the one at issue in this case and identifies Coston as a
suspect. Trial counsel testified that she did not object to the exhibit
being entered into evidence or seek redactions to it because no
witness would testify about the contents of the affidavit and the
affidavit would not accompany the jury into deliberations. In its
order denying Coston’s motion for new trial, the trial court
determined that, although State’s Exhibit 55 was entered into
evidence, it “was never shown or published to the jury. This exhibit
also never went back with the jury to be considered during their
deliberations.” The record shows that counsel knew the jury would
not see or hear about the affidavit, and that is exactly what occurred.
Under these circumstances, it would make no sense for counsel to
17
object, especially when objecting may have drawn the jury’s
attention to the affidavit. For these reasons, Coston has not shown
that counsel’s performance in this regard was deficient. See Gittens
v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 847 (2) (e) (838 SE2d 888) (2020) (no showing
of deficient performance where defendant failed to show that no
competent attorney would have made the same decision).
(b) Coston contends that his trial counsel was deficient for
failing to “impeach with statements of Yinessia Miller.” 4 Miller, who
did not testify, gave an unsworn written statement to the police. In
that statement, Miller said she saw a man who was about five feet,
seven inches tall walking around the apartment complex about 30
to 45 minutes before the shooting. Coston argues that Miller’s
statement would have corroborated Yilla’s statement that the
shooter was about five feet, six inches tall – shorter than Coston’s
five feet, eleven inches. During defense counsel’s cross-examination
4 Coston does not specify in his appellate brief which witness or witnesses
should have been impeached with Miller’s statements. Rather, Miller simply
asserts that counsel should have sought to have Miller’s statement admitted
into evidence.
18
of an investigator, the investigator testified that Yilla described the
shooter as being five feet, six inches tall, which is about five inches
shorter than Coston. «V3: 230»
Coston has not carried his burden of showing that counsel was
deficient in this respect. Miller did not testify at trial; Coston does
not contend that defense counsel should have called Miller as a
witness at trial; Coston has not identified any other person who
could have been impeached with Miller’s statement; and Coston has
not made any argument demonstrating that Miller’s statement
would have been admissible at trial for any other purpose. Miller’s
statement is plainly “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c).
Therefore, Miller’s statement was inadmissible hearsay unless an
exception applied. See OCGA § 24-8-802. See also Lopez v. State, 311
Ga. 269, 273 (2) (a) (857 SE2d 467) (2021). Because Coston has not
shown that Miller’s statement would have been admitted at trial
pursuant to any exception to the rule against hearsay, we can only
19
conclude that the statement was inadmissible. “And failing to
introduce inadmissible evidence is not deficient performance.” Davis
v. State, 315 Ga. 252, 263 (882 SE2d 210) (2022) (citation omitted).
3. Coston contends that the trial court committed plain error
in admitting State’s Exhibit 55. State’s Exhibit 55 is a search
warrant and supporting affidavit seeking information from Yancey’s
social media account. Coston presents no argument concerning the
admission of State’s Exhibit 55. Therefore, any claim of plain error
with respect to the admission of State’s Exhibit 55 is deemed
abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error
or subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument,
citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed
abandoned.”).
Although Coston enumerated as error the admission of State’s
Exhibit 55, the substance of his argument appears to pertain to the
trial court’s ruling admitting in evidence Yilla’s statement (which
was not State’s Exhibit 55) as an excited utterance. To the extent
that Coston raises on appeal an argument that the trial court erred
20
in admitting Yilla’s statement to police, the record shows the
following. The State filed a “Motion to Admit Hearsay Evidence”
pursuant to OCGA § 24-8-803, in which the prosecutor proffered
that Yilla had moved out of state and that efforts to locate her and
place her under subpoena had been unsuccessful. Further, Yilla’s
statement was made roughly 20 minutes after the murder and was
made at the end of the breezeway where Simmons’s body lay. The
prosecutor contended that Yilla was “visibly shaken and breathing
heavily and [made] several comments about being upset.” At the
pretrial hearing on the motion, the prosecutor added that Yilla’s
statement was made for the purpose of attempting to locate Coston,
and that the officers issued a “BOLO” immediately after talking to
Yilla and the other witnesses. Further, Yilla made her statement
while “the victim [was] being actively worked on by EMS and [was]
being moved to the ambulance.” Defense counsel objected to the
admission of the statement. After hearing arguments of counsel, the
court ruled that the statement was admissible over objection as an
excited utterance. The trial court reiterated its ruling in its written
21
order denying Coston’s motion for new trial, finding that Yilla was
unavailable and that her statement was admissible as an excited
utterance.
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that
Yilla’s statement was admissible under the excited utterance
exception to the rule against hearsay. 5 See Lyons v. State, 309 Ga.
15, 21 (4) (843 SE2d 825) (2020) (“The admission of evidence is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial
court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”). As we have
explained:
The excited utterance exception says that “[a] statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition” shall not be excluded by the
hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-8-803 (2). We have explained
that “ ‘the excited utterance need not be made
5 Coston mistakenly contends the trial court’s ruling should be evaluated
for plain error. However, because the trial court definitively ruled that Yilla’s
statement was admissible over counsel’s objection, Coston’s claim of error was
preserved for ordinary appellate review. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Once the
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding any
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer
of proof to preserve such claim of error for appeal.”). See also Rashad v. State,
318 Ga. 199, 209 (3) (897 SE2d 760) (2024).
22
contemporaneously [with] the startling event.’ ” Robbins
v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389 (793 SE2d 62) (2016) (quoting
United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 817 (11th Cir.
2010)). Rather, the court should consider the totality of
the circumstances in determining whether the statement
was made while the declarant was “ ‘still . . . under the
stress or excitement that the startling event caused.’ ”
Robbins, 300 Ga. at 389 (quoting Belfast, 611 F3d at 817
(citing cases affirming the admission as excited
utterances of statements made even hours after the
startling event)).
Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90, 94-95 (829 SE2d 75) (2019) (footnote
omitted).
Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ruled that Yilla’s statement was
admissible. The record supports the court’s finding that Yilla was
unavailable for trial and that her statement was made under the
stress of excitement caused by a shooting that she recently had
witnessed. The trial court could reasonably find that the fatal
shooting was a startling event. Moreover, the court could reasonably
conclude that the “visibly shaken” Yilla was still under the stress of
the event 20 minutes later, especially given that the shooter was still
at large and Yilla made her statement while the victim was bleeding
23
to death in her presence. See Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 725 (5)(873
SE2d 166) (2022) (Witnesses were still under the stress of the
shooting, given that “the video recording shows that [they] were
screaming and crying as they made their unsolicited statements; the
statements were made approximately ten minutes after the
shooting, while [the victim] was still on the scene bleeding to
death[.]”);Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 732 (2) (b) (ii) (832 SE2d 792)
(2019) (Witness statements on police recording were excited
utterances because “stress and excitement caused by the shooting
had not yet dissipated” when “police officers responded just minutes
after the shooting, and [the victim] was still bleeding profusely as he
waited for an ambulance.”). See also Belfast, 611 F3d at 817-818 (VI)
(A) (Statement was an excited utterance even when made four to
five hours after the startling event because the victim was unable to
leave the place where the event occurred and thus likely continued
to experience trauma from the incident.).
4. Lastly, Coston contends that the “cumulative prejudice of
multiple errors is sufficiently harmful to warrant a new trial[.]” To
24
establish reversible cumulative error, Coston was required to show
that “(1) at least two evidentiary errors, or one error and one
deficient performance of counsel, were committed at trial, and that
(2) those errors, considered along with the entire record, ‘so infected
the jury’s deliberation that they denied [Coston] a fundamentally
fair trial.’ ” Smith v. State, 320 Ga. 825, 839 (912 SE2d 563) (2025)
(quoting State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020)).
However, Coston has not carried his burden of showing that at least
two such errors were committed during his trial. Consequently, this
claim of error fails. See Henderson v. State, 318 Ga. 752, 76059 (3)
(900 SE2d 596) (2024).
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
25