In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 24, 2025
S25A0062. ARNSDORFF v. THE STATE.
PINSON, Justice.
Tony Arnsdorff and Scott Pinholster were jointly indicted but
tried separately for malice murder and other crimes related to the
death of Courtney Wells. 1 The evidence at trial showed that days
1 Wells died on January 10, 2017. On March 19, 2018, an Effingham
County grand jury returned an indictment that charged both Pinholster and Arnsdorff, individually and as parties to the crime, with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2, 3), aggravated assault (Counts 4, 5), aggravated battery (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 7-9), and concealing the death of another (Count 10), all arising from the shooting death of Wells. Arnsdorff alone was charged with tampering with evidence (Count 11).
Their trials were severed, and Arnsdorff alone was tried by a jury from September 9-10, 2019, and found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Arnsdorff to life without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1) followed by a consecutive term of ten years to serve in prison for concealing the death of another (Count 10) and then a consecutive term of five years to serve in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7); he was also sentenced to a term of five years in prison for tampering with evidence (Count 11) to be served concurrently with Count 10. The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Arnsdorff timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later amended before her death Wells got into an argument with Pinholster, with
whom she had a romantic relationship, and left Pinholster’s home to
stay with Arnsdorff for a few days. Then, when Arnsdorff tried to
take Wells back to Pinholster’s home, she refused to go and left
Arnsdorff, who drove to Pinholster’s home alone. Pinholster then
spent the next day trying to find where Wells had gone, all the while
remaining in constant contact with Arnsdorff. Once Pinholster
found out where Wells was staying, Arnsdorff hid in the backseat of
Pinholster’s truck when Pinholster picked Wells up, and he stayed
hidden until they reached a remote area. There, Arnsdorff revealed
through new counsel. After a hearing on October 13, 2021, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on October 24, 2022. On February 15, 2023, Arnsdorff moved to set aside that order because it had not been provided to his counsel until after the time to appeal had expired. The trial court granted that motion and reissued the order denying the motion for new trial on February 15, 2023. Arnsdorff thereafter filed a notice of appeal from that order. But because the trial court did not vacate its October 24, 2022 order before issuing the new one, this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. See Arnsdorff v. State, S23A0819 (Ga. May 16, 2023). After the remittitur was transmitted to the trial court, Arnsdorff filed a second motion to set aside the order on his motion for new trial on July 10, 2023. On July 3, 2024, the trial court entered an order that vacated the October 24, 2022 and February 15, 2023 orders and denied the motion for new trial as amended. Arnsdorff filed a timely notice of appeal from that order on July 25, 2024. His appeal was docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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himself and punched Wells in the face moments before Pinholster
retrieved a shotgun from the backseat (where Arnsdorff had just
been hiding) and shot Wells multiple times. Arnsdorff then helped
move Wells’s body from the roadway, did not report the crime, and
initially lied to the police about what he knew about Wells’s death.
On appeal Arnsdorff contends that his convictions should be
reversed because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he
caused Wells’s death or that he was a party to Pinholster’s crimes
against her. He also contends that the trial court plainly erred by
charging the jury on flight and by instructing the jury that
Arnsdorff’s statements should be received with “great care and caution.” Finally, he argues in the alternative that if the Court concludes there was sufficient evidence to support his malice murder
conviction, the trial court erred by imposing a five-year felony sentence instead of a misdemeanor sentence for tampering with evidence (Count 11).
Each claim fails. When viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (A) (99
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SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence of Arnsdorff’s conduct
before, during, and after Wells was shot was constitutionally sufficient to show he was a party to the crimes of malice murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Even
viewing the evidence as reasonable jurors would instead, see Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 674 (1) n.2 (889 SE2d 914) (2023), the trial
court’s error in instructing the jury on flight likely did not affect
Arnsdorff’s substantial rights, so he has not shown plain error. He
also has not established plain error in regard to the instruction that
his out-of-court statements should be received with “great care and
caution” because he has not shown that giving this instruction was
a clear and obvious error. Finally, the trial court did not err by imposing a felony sentence for tampering with evidence.
1. Arnsdorff contends that there was not sufficient evidence
that he committed the crimes of malice murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony or that he was a party to
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Pinholster’s commission of those crimes.2 Instead, he says the evidence showed that Pinholster shot and killed Wells, and Arnsdorff
was merely present during the shooting.
In considering whether evidence was constitutionally sufficient
as a matter of federal due process, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and evaluate whether the evidence authorized rational jurors to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Scoggins
v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 833 (1) (896 SE2d 476) (2023). A jury may find
a defendant guilty of a crime if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant directly committed the crime or if he was a “party
thereto,” meaning he “cause[d]” another person to commit the crime,
“aid[ed] or abet[ted]” its commission, or “[i]ntentionally advise[d],
encourage[d], hire[d], counsel[d], or procure[d] another to commit
2 To the extent that Arnsdorff purports to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting Counts 2-6 and 8-9, those challenges are moot because those counts either merged or were vacated by operation of law. See, e.g., Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 100 (2) n.2 (897 SE2d 368) (2024). And he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of Count 10 (concealing a body) or Count 11 (tampering with evidence), so we do not review them. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). We address the sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 1 and 7 only.
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the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), (b) (1)-(4).
(a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial showed the following.
On January 15, 2017, the body of a deceased woman, later identified as Wells, was found 40 or 50 feet from a “really remote” dirt
road. It was later determined that Wells died from multiple shotgun
wounds to the head, neck, torso, and upper extremities. Various personal belongings were found near Wells’s body, including a letter
with her name on it that had been sent to the address where Pinholster lived. Investigators later learned that Wells had been in a romantic relationship with Pinholster.
The police executed a search warrant at Pinholster’s home and
located a fired Remington shotgun shell in a jewelry box, a wooden
box full of Remington and Rio shotgun shells, and two 12-gauge
shotguns, one of which was loaded with Rio shells. A Rio shell was
collected from the crime scene.
A GBI firearms and toolmarks examiner determined that both
the Rio shotgun shell collected near Wells’s body and the Remington
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shotgun shell found in the jewelry box in Pinholster’s home were
fired from the same firearm. But they were not fired from either of
the shotguns found in Pinholster’s safe.
Soon after the police told Wells’s stepfather about her death,
Pinholster came to Wells’s stepfather’s home to give his condolences
even though Wells’s stepfather had been told he was the only person
outside of law enforcement who had been informed of the death.
Around the same time, Wells’s stepfather saw Arnsdorff driving a
four-wheeler “real slow” across the street. Wells’s stepfather had
seen Wells with Pinholster before and recognized Arnsdorff but did
not know him.
Wells’s brother spoke to Wells on the phone on the day she was
killed. She told him Arnsdorff had kicked her out of his truck and
was going to throw her belongings in a ditch near Wells’s family’s
home. This was the first time Wells had mentioned Arnsdorff to her
brother. Wells also wrote on Facebook that Arnsdorff had her belongings in his truck.
On the same day that Wells’s body was found, Sergeant John
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Bradley of the Effingham County Sheriff’s Office spoke to Arnsdorff,
who denied knowing anything about Wells’s death. Two days later,
Arnsdorff was interviewed by Investigator Richard Beckum and told
Beckum he had been with Wells on January 8, 2017, until about
12:30 a.m. the next morning. Arnsdorff said that he and Wells had
gotten into an argument, and she left his home and started walking
down Highway 80; Arnsdorff said that was the last time he saw her.
Arnsdorff said that, after Wells left, he went to Pinholster’s home
“for a few minutes” and then to a home in Pembroke, Georgia, where
he stayed until 3:00 p.m. on the 9th. Arnsdorff also said he had
“heard a lot of things” including that the Mexican Cartel was after
him and Wells and that the Ghost Face Gangsters were possibly involved. Arnsdorff also gave a written statement that was consistent
with what he told Beckum, and the statement was admitted into
evidence and read to the jury.
Several months later, Sergeant Bradley and Erick Riner, a former investigator for the District Attorney’s Office, interviewed
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Arnsdorff. Arnsdorff was not under arrest at the time of the interview. Arnsdorff told them that Wells had been “in and out of his life
for a few years.” Arnsdorff said he was at Pinholster’s home when
Pinholster and Wells got into an argument. Wells then put her belongings in Arnsdorff’s truck, and Arnsdorff drove Wells to his home,
where they stayed for around three days.
Arnsdorff said he learned that Pinholster had a letter for Wells
and that he planned to drive Wells to Pinholster’s home to collect
the letter on January 8. But when Wells learned he was driving her
to Pinholster’s home, she got out of the truck and walked toward her
family’s home, and Arnsdorff continued to Pinholster’s home alone.
Wells’s belonging were still in Arnsdorff’s truck when he arrived at
Pinholster’s home, and Pinholster went through the belongings and
found items that belonged to his daughter and “got mad.” Pinholster
then took a .38-caliber revolver and “went looking for” Wells. While
Pinholster was looking for Wells, he remained in touch with
Arnsdorff. Meanwhile, Arnsdorff went to a hotel in Pembroke where
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he said he smoked marijuana with another person, watched television, and fell asleep.
At first, Arnsdorff told investigators that he did not have
“firsthand knowledge of what had happened to [Wells].” Arnsdorff’s
account “changed, however, as the interview continued.” He said
Pinholster told him he knew where Wells was and “ordered”
Arnsdorff to lay down in the backseat of the truck as Pinholster went
looking for Wells. Pinholster then drove the truck to a home where
he picked up Wells and then drove to a dirt road. Arnsdorff remained
in the backseat or floorboard of the truck as Pinholster drove. Wells
“started bad-mouthing Arnsdorff” (who was still hiding in the
backseat) and “telling lies about him,” so he sat up when Pinholster
told him to and “punched [Wells] in the mouth.” Arnsdorff also said
that Wells had a “photo of him on [her] cell phone that could be incriminating” and he wanted her to delete it.
According to Arnsdorff, Wells then got out of the truck, and he
moved to the front passenger seat. Pinholster then reached under
the backseat, pulled out a shotgun, positioned the shotgun across
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Arnsdorff’s chest and out the passenger window, and fired at Wells
five or six times. After that, Pinholster got out of the truck and
Arnsdorff heard “multiple” gunshots.
Arnsdorff said that after Pinholster shot Wells, he got back in
the truck and started to drive away but then turned around and
went back to where they had left Wells’s body. Pinholster took
Wells’s cell phone, left, and later “destroyed the phone” and threw it
out the passenger window. (But Arnsdorff said this was not the
phone with the supposedly incriminating photo on it.) Pinholster
then turned the truck around and again returned to Wells’s body.
Pinholster and Arnsdorff pulled her body out of the roadway and to
the nearby wood line where her body was found on January 15.
Records for cell phones associated with Pinholster and Wells
were introduced into evidence through a Verizon Wireless records
custodian. These records included copies of text messages, call information, and cell site information. Investigators also received records
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from AT&T for a phone number that was associated with Arnsdorff.3
Unlike Verizon, AT&T does not store the contents of text messages.
The records showed that Wells’s phone called Pinholster’s
phone at 5:35 a.m. on January 9, 2017, and the call lasted a little
over 58 minutes. Just after 6:30 a.m. that morning (so right after
the call between Pinholster’s phone and Wells’s phone ended), Pinholster’s phone placed a call to Arnsdorff’s phone then sent a text to
Arnsdorff’s phone saying, “Bubba, you’ve got to call me back right
now. She just called me, I know where she’s at, and she’s supposed
to be coming here.” Pinholster’s phone also called Wells’s phone a
second time, soon after calling and texting Arnsdorff’s phone, and
that call lasted around 12 minutes. Pinholster’s phone then sent another text to Arnsdorff’s phone: “Call me back now.” There were then
several calls made between Pinholster’s phone and Arnsdorff’s
phone, which lasted a total of almost 42 minutes. After this series of
calls, Pinholster’s phone called Wells’s phone twice, then called
3 The State introduced the AT&T phone records along with a declaration
of authenticity. See OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (6), 24-9-902 (11).
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Arnsdorff’s phone again.
That evening, Pinholster’s phone called both Wells’s and
Arnsdorff’s phones several times between 5:12 p.m. and 8:41 p.m.
Pinholster’s phone continued to communicate with both Wells’s and
Arnsdorff’s phones that night. At 11:18 p.m., Pinholster’s phone sent
a text to Arnsdorff’s phone: “You ready??” Less than a minute later,
Pinholster’s phone sent two texts to Wells’s phone: “Are you coming
over, Baby Doll?” and “I’m still up.” A text from Wells’s phone said,
“Yeah,” and then Pinholster’s phone sent another text to Wells’s: “I
want to go dirt road riding.” A reply came from Wells’s phone: “Well,
give me a second, bring the best stuff you got and I’ll go with.” Pinholster’s phone then called Wells’s phone (the call lasted less than 2
minutes), and his phone then immediately called Arnsdorff’s phone
twice. Pinholster’s phone then sent a text to Arnsdorff’s phone: “Call
me, man, right now. It’s so f**king important. Call me back right
now.” Pinholster’s phone then placed a call to Wells’s phone that
lasted less than a minute; sent a text to Wells’s phone: “Really?”; and
placed another call to her phone that lasted 58 seconds. Pinholster’s
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phone then sent a series of text messages to Wells’s phone: “I’m not
going to come if you’re not going to answer the phone, Baby. I don’t
know where you are.”; “Baby Doll, I need you to call me now. I’m not
joking. I know where you are -- I know where you’re at already”; “Are
you ready for me to come get you?”; “I’ve got everything you need,
are you ready”; “And I mean everything!”; “And I talked to Tony
[Arnsdorff], I know where your stuff is too.” Pinholster’s phone then
placed another call to Wells’s phone that lasted less than one minute.
The phone records showed that at 12:34 a.m. on January 10,
2017, Wells’s phone was located on Shirley Drive, near the home
where Pinholster picked her up. The records showed that Wells’s
phone sent a text message to Pinholster’s phone at 1:06 a.m. but it
was not received on his phone until after 2:01 a.m., which suggested
Pinholster’s cell phone was powered off or out of service at the time
the text message was sent. The last “ping” on Wells’s phone was at
2:02 a.m., one minute after Pinholster’s phone was powered on and
it received the delayed text message. Cell site location data placed
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both Wells’s and Pinholster’s phones at Riverside Drive at that time.
AT&T’s “true-call record” showed that Arnsdorff’s cell phone was located at a motel in Pembroke, Georgia at that time.
Two hours later, at 4:14 a.m., Pinholster’s phone sent a text to
Wells’s phone that was never received. It read, “I just want to let you
know I made it home a while ago, LOL. Sorry, I hope you’re going to
be okay at that roach motel.” There were no further messages between Pinholster’s phone and Wells’s phone after that.
(b) The evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Arnsdorff was guilty of malice murder. The required
criminal intent for malice murder — whether the defendant directly
committed the crime or was a party to another’s direct commission
— is malice, which incorporates the intent to kill. See Scoggins, 317
Ga. at 836 (1) (a); OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). And although presence alone
is not enough to convict someone of a crime, a defendant’s “presence,
companionship, and conduct before, during, and after” the crime
may authorize the jury to reasonably infer he shared the criminal
intent of the person who directly committed the crime. See Scoggins,
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317 Ga. at 836 (1) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the
evidence at trial showed that both Arnsdorff and Pinholster had argued with Wells in the days before she was killed. There was also
evidence that, while Pinholster directly communicated with and arranged to meet Wells on the night he shot her, Pinholster also remained in continuous contact with Arnsdorff as he made those arrangements. The evidence of the timing and contents of Pinholster’s
text messages and phone calls to Wells and Arnsdorff leading up to
the shooting authorized the jury to reasonably infer that Pinholster
was updating Arnsdorff about his plans to meet Wells throughout
the day. The evidence also showed that Arnsdorff hid from Wells in
the backseat of Pinholster’s truck when they picked Wells up, and
Arnsdorff remained hidden as Pinholster drove Wells to the remote
location where he later shot her. When they got to the remote location, Arnsdorff revealed himself, punched Wells, and moved to the
front passenger seat of the truck, and Pinholster retrieved his shotgun from the backseat, where Arnsdorff had been hiding moments
before, and shot Wells. So the jury could infer that Arnsdorff knew
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about the shotgun. Considering these inferences together, the evidence — when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty
verdict, see id. at 833 (1) — authorized the jury to conclude that Pinholster kept Arnsdorff informed of his progress in locating and arranging to meet with Wells in the hours leading up to her death, and
Arnsdorff hid in the backseat with the shotgun because the two men
shared an intent to shoot and kill Wells, with whom they had each
recently argued. Even if the evidence showed that Pinholster, not
Arnsdorff, pulled the trigger, the jury was authorized to infer from
Arnsdorff’s admitted presence during the crime combined with his
conduct before — including his argument with Wells, calls and texts
with Pinholster as Pinholster sought to locate and arranged to meet
Wells, his hiding in the backseat when Pinholster picked up Wells,
and his punching Wells in the face — and after — including helping
move Wells’s body from the roadway and not reporting the crime —
that he shared Pinholster’s criminal intent to kill Wells. See id. at
836 (1) (a). So there was sufficient evidence that Arnsdorff was a
party to the crime of malice murder. See id.
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(c) The evidence was also sufficient to support the jury’s finding
that Arnsdorff was guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. For this offense, it is not necessary for the State
to prove that the defendant personally possessed a weapon as long
as it proves he acted as a party to this crime. See Stroud v. State,
318 Ga. 744, 750-751 (2) (900 SE2d 619) (2024). Because the evidence showed that Wells died from gunshot wounds inflicted by Pinholster, and we have already concluded that the jury was authorized
to conclude that Arnsdorff shared Pinholster’s criminal intent to
shoot Wells, there was sufficient evidence that Arnsdorff was a party
to the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony. See id.
2. Arnsdorff contends that the trial court erred by instructing
the jury that it could consider evidence of flight and that it should
consider his out-of-court statements with “great care and caution.”
As Arnsdorff acknowledges, he did not object to either instruction at trial, so we review these claims only for plain error. See Baker
v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 161 (2) (907 SE2d 824) (2024); OCGA § 17-8-18
58 (b). To establish plain error, a defendant must show that an error
was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and affected his substantial rights, meaning that it
likely affected the outcome. See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2). And
if that showing is made, then we have the discretion to remedy the
error if it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). If any one of these requirements is not met, a claim of plain
error fails. Id.
(a) At the State’s request, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury on flight:
Ladies and gentlemen, evidence of alleged flight has been
introduced. Such evidence is governed by the rules concerning circumstantial evidence you have already been
given. Furthermore, you may only consider it if you find
more likely -- if you find it more likely than not that the
Defendant actually committed the acts and that the reason was to evade the charges on trial now.
We have long held that it is clear and obvious error to instruct
a jury that it may consider evidence of a defendant’s flight. See
Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 219 (4) (a) (850 SE2d 90) (2020) (citing
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Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 518 (3) (b) (397 SE2d 683) (1990)). So
Arnsdorff has shown that the trial court committed a clear and obvious error.
But Arnsdorff’s claim of plain error fails because he has not
established that this instructional error likely affected the jury’s
verdict.4 See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2). The trial court’s instruction, although improper, referred to Arnsdorff’s “alleged flight” and
instructed the jury that it could “only consider” this circumstantial
evidence of guilt “if” the jury found he had “actually committed the
acts” of flight to “evade the charges on trial now.” See Rawls, 310
Ga. at 219 (4) (a). This particular instruction likely did not “cause[ ]
the jury to give undue weight to the flight evidence.” Id. The only
evidence offered by the State that Arnsdorff “fled” was the evidence
that he did not stay at the crime scene or report the crime after Wells
was shot. And that evidence was only a small piece of the balance of
evidence against Arnsdorff, which was significant. See id.
4 The parties do not contend that the error was affirmatively waived, and
nothing in the record appears to indicate so. See Baker, 320 Ga. at 161-162 (2).
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In assessing harm from an instructional error, we “review the
record de novo” and “weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done.” See Johnson, 316 Ga. at 674 (1) n.2 (citation and punctuation omitted). Viewed in that way, there was significant evidence that Arnsdorff had argued with Wells soon before
she was killed, was in constant communication with Pinholster before they picked up Wells on the night she was killed, hid from Wells
in the backseat of Pinholster’s truck where the shotgun was located,
and helped move her body. Given this evidence, the specifics of the
jury instruction, and the limited evidence of flight, there is little reason to believe that the instruction caused the jury to give undue
weight to the flight evidence in reaching its guilty verdict, such that
it likely affected the jury’s verdict. See Rawls, 310 Ga. at 219-220 (4)
(a). So Arnsdorff has not shown that this error likely affected his
substantial rights and, thus, has not established plain error. Id.
(b) The trial court gave the following charge to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, you should consider with great
care and caution, the evidence of out of court statements
allegedly made by the Defendant offered by the State.
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You, the jury, may believe in any such statement in whole
or in part, believing that which you find to be true and
rejecting that which you find to be untrue. You, alone,
have the duty to apply the general rules for testing the
believability of witnesses and to decide what weight, if
any, you should give to all or any part of the statement. A
Defendant’s out of court statement that is not supported
by other evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction,
even if you believe the unsupported statement.
Arnsdorff contends that the trial court plainly erred by giving this
instruction, pointing to a pair of Court of Appeals decisions that discouraged the use of this charge and called for the pattern charge to
be revised. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 359 Ga. App. 688, 692 (2) n.3
(859 SE2d 845) (2021); McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350, 353 (3)
(667 SE2d 142) (2008). But neither decision held that giving this instruction was error, see id., and this Court has held that giving it
was not a clear and obvious error, see Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 792-795 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021). See also OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All
admissions shall be scanned with care, and confessions of guilt shall
be received with great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated
by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”). So the alleged
error was not clear and obvious, which means that Arnsdorff has not
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established plain error for this claim either. Id.
3. Arnsdorff contends that the trial court erred by imposing a
felony sentence for tampering with evidence and that the court
should have imposed a misdemeanor sentence instead. This claim
fails. We have interpreted OCGA § 16-10-94 to require imposing a
misdemeanor sentence if the defendant tampered with evidence for
the purpose of obstructing his own prosecution, even when the underlying crime is a felony. See Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 770
(2) (c) (873 SE2d 150) (2022) (citing Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 268
(3) (857 SE2d 447) (2021)). 5 But a person who tampers with evidence
“involving the prosecution or defense of a felony and involving another person shall be guilty of a felony” and must be sentenced to
serve at least one year in prison and up to ten years if the felony
5 We noted in Goodman that this interpretation, which appears to have
been uncritically imported from a Court of Appeals decision, is doubtful. See id. at 770 (2) (c) n.7 (referring to English v. State, 282 Ga. App. 552, 553-556 (2) (639 SE2d 551) (2006)). But we explained there that “our case law is binding until overruled, this case presents a poor vehicle to reconsider it, and considerations of stare decisis might warrant retaining it in any event.” Id. Just so here. And added to that, neither party has asked us to revisit that interpretation here, and Arnsdorff’s felony sentence would be upheld whether or not that precedent were reconsidered.
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prosecution being tampered with was for a “serious violent felony,”
which includes murder. See OCGA §§ 16-10-94 (c), 17-10-6.1 (a) (1).
That provision applies here: the indictment charged Arnsdorff with
tampering with evidence “involving the prosecution of the offense of
Scott Pinholster, a felony, with intent to prevent the apprehension
of Scott Pinholster, another person” by moving Wells’s body and destroying her cell phone. Because Arnsdorff was charged with and
convicted of moving Wells’s body and destroying her phone to prevent Pinholster’s apprehension and prosecution for felonies,
Arnsdorff was properly sentenced for felony tampering with evidence. See OCGA § 16-1-94 (c).
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ, concur.
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