NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 28, 2025
S25A0048. SHORT v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
In November 2019, Appellant Angelo Short was convicted of
malice murder and related crimes arising from the stabbing death
of Peggy Gamble, along with other crimes committed within 48
hours of Gamble’s death.1 On appeal, Short challenges the trial
1 The crimes occurred in Muscogee County on November 27-29, 2016. A
Muscogee County grand jury returned an indictment on October 16, 2018,
charging Short with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault for
Gamble’s killing (Counts 1, 2, and 3, respectively), burglary in the first degree
and theft by taking for Short’s entry into Gamble’s home and taking of items
after the killing (Counts 4 and 5, respectively), robbery of a Piggly Wiggly after the killing (Count 6), and obstruction of an officer arising from Short’s arrest
on November 29, 2016 (Count 7). Short was tried November 4-8, 2019, and the
jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On November 19, 2019, Short was
sentenced to life in prison without parole plus 40 years in total, delineated as
follows: life without parole for Count 1 (malice murder), with which Count 2
(felony murder) and Count 3 (aggravated assault) were merged; 20 years
consecutive for Count 4 (burglary in the first degree); 20 years consecutive for
Count 6 (robbery); and 12 months concurrent with Count 1 for the
misdemeanors in Count 5 (theft by taking) and Count 7 (obstruction of an
officer). We note that the trial court erred at sentencing by merging Counts 2
court’s admission of incriminating statements that he gave to
officers with the Columbus Police Department (“CPD”) during
custodial interviews conducted by Detective Stuart Carter and
Sergeant Lance Deaton. 2 Specifically, Short argues that the trial
court erred in ruling that his statements, which amount to a
confession, were not induced by the slightest hope of benefit or
remotest fear of injury. OCGA § 24-8-824.3 We disagree and affirm.
and 3 into Count 1, rather than vacating Counts 2 and 3 by operation of law.
See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 53 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014) (“[W]hen a valid
guilty verdict is returned on both malice murder and felony murder of the same
victim, the defendant should be sentenced for the malice murder, and the
alternative felony murder count stands vacated by operation of law as simply
surplusage.”) (cleaned up). However, this error in nomenclature does not affect
Short’s sentence and is otherwise harmless. Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877, 890-891 (IV) (808 SE2d 681) (2017).
Short timely filed a motion for new trial on November 19, 2019, which
was twice amended. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied Short’s amended motion for new trial by order dated December
30, 2022. Short timely filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2023. His appeal
was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and
submitted for decision on the briefs.
2 Audio and video recorded interviews were conducted on November 29,
2016 (the “November 29 interview”), December 5, 2016 (the “December 5
interview”), December 14, 2016, and February 1, 2017. Short’s confession was
obtained during the December 5 interview.
3 Under Georgia statutory law, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it
shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-824. Short
challenges the admission of his confession only as a matter of statutory law
and raises no constitutional due process argument.
2
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial showed that 83-year-old Gamble was stabbed to
death in her home in Columbus during the overnight hours of
November 27-28, 2016.4 CPD officers discovered Gamble’s body
around noon on November 28, 2016, observed signs of forced entry
at her home, and learned that several items were missing, including
Gamble’s gold 1988 Toyota Corolla. Seeking leads and the public’s
assistance to locate Gamble’s car, CPD issued a BOLO 5 for the
Corolla and a press release to the media. Late in the evening on
November 28, 2016, CPD officers received a tip connecting Short to
Gamble’s car. 6 Officers responded to the tipster’s location and
4 A medical examiner testified that Gamble’s death was a homicide
caused by 13 stab and sharp force injuries at various lengths and depths. The
murder weapons – two kitchen knives taken from Gamble’s home – were
recovered by CPD officers during the investigation of the crimes, and a forensic
scientist who examined the knives testified that blood on one of them partially
matched Gamble’s DNA.
5 BOLO stands for “[b]e on the lookout [for].” See BOLO, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Police sometimes use this expression for people or
vehicles that they are trying to locate.”).
6 Specifically, Angela Champion was at her home in Columbus when
Short, an attendee of Champion’s Thanksgiving get-together earlier in the
week, pulled up in Gamble’s car. Champion recognized the car from the news
and called the police, but Short had left the scene on foot by the time officers
arrived.
3
discovered Gamble’s car, but Short was nowhere to be found.7
By daybreak on November 29, 2016, Short was a suspect in
Gamble’s killing, and CPD officers spent the day on the lookout for
him. Short robbed a Piggly Wiggly that morning, but CPD officers
were unable to locate him until around 6:00 p.m., in response to a
series of calls regarding Short’s location. CPD officers converged on
that area, and Short barricaded himself inside a vacant apartment
before being subdued and arrested. Short was then taken to CPD
headquarters, where the first custodial interview occurred.
Detective Carter and Sergeant Deaton first interviewed Short
in the hours immediately after his arrest on November 29, 2016.
During this interview, Short confessed to the Piggly Wiggly robbery
after being advised of his Miranda 8 rights and waiving the same.9
Short admitted during this interview that he knew Gamble and that
7 Several other witnesses testified to seeing Short in or with Gamble’s
car on November 28, 2016 at various locations in Columbus. Some of them,
including Taquawn Pollard and Madison Reese, even rode in the car with Short
on this date as he and others attempted to sell Gamble’s car for drug money,
committed thefts, and bought and used crack-cocaine.
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
9 Short also signed an advice and waiver of rights form during the
November 29 interview.
4
he recognized her car, but Short did not admit or deny his
involvement in Gamble’s killing or the theft of her car. Throughout
this interview, the officers encouraged Short to tell the truth and
suggested that they already knew Short killed Gamble and stole her
car. The officers also suggested at various points that telling the
truth would be helpful to Short when it came to a potential plea deal
or sentencing recommendation. Of note, the officers pointed out that
“there is a difference between life in prison with no parole or if you
plead out to a sentence[,]” opined that the district attorney’s office
“might” offer Short a plea deal, suggested that “if” the district
attorney offered a plea deal, “it could be 25 years,” and told Short
that “anything [the district attorney’s office] could offer [him] is a lot
shorter than life without parole.” The officers also told Short that
they would “have an input” when it came time for the district
attorney to make a sentencing recommendation to the court. At the
end of the interview, Short was photographed, his clothing was
collected by the officers, and he was taken to the county jail.
A week later, on December 5, 2016, Detective Carter
5
transported Short from the county jail to CPD headquarters for a
second interview. At the start of this interview, Short told Detective
Carter and Sergeant Deaton that he wanted to talk with them about
his “housing situation,” and said that he tried to contact them from
the county jail but was unable to do so since he had been in solitary
confinement since his first day there. In so doing, Short recalled
telling someone that he did not feel safe in the county jail. Short
thought this person might have been Detective Carter, but Detective
Carter responded, “[t]hat must have been over at the jail if they
asked you if you felt safe.” Detective Carter and Sergeant Deaton
then proceeded to update Short on their investigation and told Short
that he was going to be charged with Gamble’s murder. They also
told Short that blood was found on the clothing collected from him
during the previous interview and informed Short that they were
expediting forensic testing on that blood. Detective Carter said “this
is a case that could get a death penalty case” in light of “the victim
and the circumstances that are involved[,]” and suggested that, if
“one drop” of Gamble’s blood was found on Short’s clothing, such a
6
discovery would “smoke” him since it “would not leave any doubt.”
Detective Carter also opined that, “[i]f there’s physical evidence to
support what we got, then they could go for a death penalty case if
they elected to do that. I’m not saying they are going to. I’m just
saying it's a possibility.” A few minutes later, Detective Carter
theorized how he thought Short was “at the end of his rope[.]”Short
agreed that “this will probably be it” for him, to which Detective
Carter responded:
I’m not sure what you mean by that. I can tell you this: if
you take this to a jury trial, and our evidence comes back
the way we anticipate it to come back and -- if the DA’s
office, knowing they are going to a jury trial, they push for
the death penalty, you’re right, it is the end for you. OK?
Short then told the officers that he wanted to talk to his mother, and
arrangements were made for Short’s mother to bring him lunch to
CPD headquarters later that day.
Before his mother arrived, Short told the officers he was ready
to “tell the story now.” At this point, the officers advised Short of his
7
Miranda rights for a second time, and Short again waived them.10
Short proceeded to tell the officers that he went to Gamble’s home
on November 28 so that he “could get a couple of dollars or
something like that[,]” that Gamble gave Short her car with
permission and an instruction to fill it up with gas for her, but that
Short “stayed gone with the car” instead. Short said that he ran into
Pollard shortly thereafter, and that Pollard suggested the two men
return to Gamble’s home, which they did. Short told the officers that,
when they arrived at Gamble’s home, Pollard went inside and killed
Gamble while Short stayed in the car. The officers told Short they
did not believe his story and implored him to “get it all out” and “be
honest.” Detective Carter said, “[i]f you lie to me, I can’t go to the
DA’s office and give you a good recommendation[,]” and told Short
the “worst thing” he could do for himself was lie.
When Short’s mother arrived, the two ate lunch in the
interview room for approximately 90 minutes without the officers
10 A second advice and waiver of rights form was signed prior to Short’s
confession during the December 5 interview.
8
present. The camera in the interview room continued to record.
Short did not confess to committing the crimes to his mother, but
they discussed the fact that Short was in solitary confinement
because he was having “conflict” with other inmates. Short’s mother
expressed concern for her son’s safety, but Short assured her that
she did not need to worry. During their conversation, Short
mentioned that he requested to be placed in a protective custody cell
where he would “have no trouble” with other inmates, but did not
specify who he talked to and said he did not know “how that works
out.” Near the end of their lunch, Short’s mother told him to “do
what’s right.”
When Short’s mother left, Detective Carter and Sergeant
Deaton resumed their interview, and Short confessed that he “did
everything.” Specifically, Short reiterated that he went to Gamble’s
home to ask for money, but now said that Gamble turned him away,
so Short kicked in her door, went inside, took money from Gamble’s
purse, two TVs, and Gamble’s car. Short said that Gamble promised
not to tell anyone about the incident, but he did not believe her, so
9
he “grabbed a knife” from her kitchen and “stabbed her.” Short later
clarified that he used two knives from Gamble’s kitchen in the
killing and said that he could take the officers to where he disposed
of them.
After Short confessed, he asked the officers to “help [him] try
to get the best deal [he] can in this situation.” Detective Carter
responded that, “once [his case] turns over to the DA’s office, they’re
in full control[,]” but added that he would “sit down” with the district
attorney’s office on Short’s behalf. Detective Carter also told Short
that, “in a confession-type thing, that normally kind of takes the
death penalty kind of off the table.” At the conclusion of the
interview, Short directed CPD officers to the murder weapons,
which were recovered and later admitted at trial. Detective Carter
testified at trial that he took Short back to the county jail afterward,
where he spoke with a jail employee “in [Short’s] presence” about
Short “having issues” with other inmates and Short’s request to be
placed in protective custody.
10
A pre-trial Jackson-Denno 11 hearing was held regarding the
admissibility of Short’s confession. After receiving testimony from
Detective Carter and admitting the recorded interviews and advice
and waiver of rights forms into evidence, Short’s counsel said his
client would not be testifying and argued that Short’s confession
should be excluded from trial because it was induced in violation of
OCGA § 24-8-824 based on the “[t]otality of the circumstances, hope
or benefit, promise, threats of harm, any number of issues.” Counsel
for the State argued in rebuttal that Short “was not promised
anything” and that no “hope of benefit was held out.” After
arguments, the trial court said the hearing was “done” and went off
the record. However, the trial court went back on the record minutes
later because Short was “adamant” about testifying.
Short then testified that, after the November 29 interview, he
was placed in general population at the county jail, where he was
“being threatened” by other inmates. Short said he was “in fear for
[his] life” at that time and reported his concerns to jail employees.
11 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
11
One of those employees, according to Short, gave him the option of
staying in general population or going to solitary confinement. Short
said that he chose the latter and that he remained in solitary
confinement until Detective Carter transported him to CPD on
December 5. Short also said that, after being interviewed on
December 5, he was returned to solitary confinement and remained
there “until another interview[.]”Short testified that he “made
[Detective Carter] aware of what was going on at the jail” –
specifically, that he was concerned for his safety, had been placed in
solitary confinement, and wanted to be moved to protective custody.
Short said he made these facts known to Detective Carter “in the
car,” that Detective Carter responded by saying that “he would see .
. . what he could do for me depending on how I cooperated with
him[,]” that Detective Carter promised Short “protective custody for
[his] cooperation[,]” and affirmed that he confessed “based on those
promises” by Detective Carter.12
12 Short did not clarify when he talked with Detective Carter “in the car,”
and Detective Carter was not recalled at the Jackson-Denno hearing to testify
12
After the Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court preliminarily
ruled that Short’s confession was admissible and formalized that
preliminary ruling at the start of trial. Short objected to the ruling,
and “reserve[d] the right to ask for those specific instructions during
the jury charge.”13 Key portions of the recorded interviews, including
Short’s confession, were admitted into evidence during the State’s
case-in-chief and played for the jury. At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and a sentence was
imposed by the trial court.
Short timely moved for a new trial, arguing in relevant part
that “[t]he trial court erred by allowing defendant’s pre-trial
statements to be introduced into evidence.” At a motion for new trial
hearing, Short argued his confession was “induced by a hope of
benefit” because the officers allowed Short to have lunch with his
in response to Short’s contentions. The record reflects that the hearing ended
abruptly when Short collapsed on the stand and required medical intervention.
Afterward, the trial court gave both parties an opportunity to add to the record,
but no further arguments were made.
13 Short raised no objection to the proposed jury instructions at the
charge conference, and the jury was ultimately instructed that, “[a] statement
induced by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury is not
voluntary.”
13
mother during the December 5 interview and because of “the threats
that were involved” in procuring it – namely, the officers’ “death
penalty talk[,]” as well as threats from other inmates, which
ultimately resulted in Short being placed in protective custody. In a
post-hearing brief, Short maintained that the trial court “should
have suppressed Short’s statement because of the hopes of benefit,
and actual benefits, and fears of injury offered and afforded prior to
his confession.” Short’s motion for new trial was denied by order
dated December 30, 2022. This appeal followed.
1. Short argues that his confession was induced by both the
“slightest hope of benefit” and the “remotest fear of injury,” such that
the trial court erred by admitting his confession at trial. OCGA § 24-8-824. We disagree.
Under Georgia law, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall
have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by
the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-824. We have held that the “slightest hope of benefit” referred to
by the statute “is not to be understood in the colloquial sense, and
14
that the phrase refers to promises related to reduced criminal
punishment – a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at
all.” State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809 (2) (912 SE2d 533) (2025)
(cleaned up). The phrase “remotest fear of injury,” in turn, refers to
“physical or mental torture or coercion by threats.” State v. Lynch,
286 Ga. 98, 100 (1) (686 SE2d 244) (2009) (citations and internal
quotations omitted) (decided under former code). When a defendant
argues that a custodial statement made to law enforcement was
involuntary under OCGA § 24-8-824 and seeks exclusion of that
statement before trial, the State bears the burden of establishing
the admissibility of the statement by a preponderance of the
evidence. Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 710 (2) (854 SE2d 523)
(2021) (citation omitted). In evaluating such arguments, the trial
court “must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether the defendant’s statement is admissible under
OCGA § 24-8-824.” Leverette, 320 Ga. at 809 (2) (citing Henderson,
310 Ga. at 710 (2)). See also Leverette, 320 Ga. at 821 n.15 (Peterson,
P.J., dissenting) (discussing applicable standard of review). Whether
15
a statement offers a hope of benefit or threatens harm “is not itself
sufficient to render a defendant’s later statements to law
enforcement inadmissible[.]” See Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 325
(2) (b) (830 SE2d 195) (2019) (explaining that a violation of OCGA §
24-8-824 requires officers to have “actually induced the defendant’s
statements”) (cleaned up); Pulley v. State, 291 Ga. 330, 332 (2) (729
SE2d 338) (2021) (observing “the key inquiry is whether the alleged
promise actually induced the statement that Appellant seeks to
suppress”) (cleaned up). We review the trial court’s admissibility
decision de novo where “the controlling facts can be definitively
ascertained, exclusively by reference to evidence, such as a recording
of a police interview, that is uncontradicted and presents no
questions of credibility.” Leverette, 320 Ga. at 809-810 (2) (citations
omitted). Otherwise, “the reviewing court accepts the trial court’s
determinations as to the credibility and weight of conflicting
evidence unless they are clearly erroneous and independently
reviews the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.”
Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531, 542 (3) (b) (858 SE2d 718) (2021)
16
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court ruled that Short’s post-Miranda
confession was admissible because Short “knowingly was informed
of his rights” and “waived those rights . . . repeatedly” and allowed
Short’s confession to be admitted into evidence at trial over Short’s
objection. These rulings expressly rejected Short’s argument that his
confession was induced in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 based on the
“[t]otality of the circumstances, hope or benefit, promise, threats of
harm, any number of issues.” Thus, while the trial court’s rulings
did not reference any “hope of benefit,” “fear of injury,” or OCGA §
24-8-824 itself, the express rejection of Short’s contrary position and
decision to admit Short’s confession at trial is, by necessary
implication, a ruling that Short’s confession was obtained consistent
with the dictates of OCGA § 24-8-824 and not induced by an
impermissible hope of benefit or fear of injury.
Short advances two arguments on appeal as to why his
confession was inadmissible at trial: one is based on an alleged “hope
of benefit” and the second is based on an alleged “fear of injury.” We
17
address them in turn.
(a) Short maintains that his confession was induced by the
slightest hope of benefit when officers “repeatedly reiterated that a
confession and guilty plea would allow him to obtain a 25-year
sentence and avoid imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole or the death penalty.” This contention fails because, when
viewed in context, none of the statements made by officers relating
to a plea deal or possible sentence amounted to “promises related to
reduced criminal punishment.” Leverette, 320 Ga. at 809 (2) (citation
omitted). See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 712 (2) (explaining that
“exhortations or encouragement to tell the truth, conveying the
seriousness of the accused’s situation, or offering to inform the
district attorney about the accused’s cooperation while making clear
that only the district attorney can determine charges and plea deals
– do not amount to a hope of benefit”) (citation omitted).
Throughout the recorded interviews, the officers suggested
that telling the truth or giving a confession might be helpful to Short
or play a beneficial role in plea negotiations or when it came to a
18
potential future sentence. However, the officers did not promise
Short that a plea offer would be made to him or tie a promise of a
plea offer to any particular sentence or punishment. While the
officers pointed out that there could be a “difference” in his
punishment depending on “if [he] pled out to a sentence,” they made
clear that it was the district attorney’s office, rather than
themselves, who “might” offer him a plea. Insofar as a particular
punishment or sentence is concerned, the officers stated that “if” the
district attorney offered Short a plea, “it could be 25 years,” and
simply pointed out a fact when observing that “anything they could
offer you is a lot shorter than life without parole.” Moreover, while
the officers told Short they would “have an input” with the district
attorney and said they would make a “good recommendation” on
Short’s behalf if he told the truth, the officers made clear that the
district attorney, rather than themselves, would have the final word
on any plea deal or sentencing recommendation. These
noncommittal statements by the officers did not amount to
“promises related to reduced criminal punishment.” Leverette, 320
19
Ga. at 809 (2) (citation omitted). See Perez v. State, 309 Ga. 687, 693-694 (2) (848 SE2d 395) (2020) (concluding that officers’ statements
to a defendant “that he could help himself by being honest and by
telling [the officers] what really happened” was “not the equivalent
of offering a hope of benefit”); Samuels v. State, 288 Ga. 48, 50 (1)
(701 SE2d 172) (2010) (“Sheriff Marshall’s suggestion that he may
at some point be willing to talk to the district attorney did not
constitute a reward of a lighter sentence[.]”) (citation omitted);
Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 273 (2) (553 SE2d 598) (2001) (“It also
does not render a statement involuntary for the police to tell a
suspect that the trial judge may consider her truthful cooperation
with the police.”), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev,
296 Ga. 764, 783 (3) (b) (770 SE2d 808) (2015); Arline v. State, 264
Ga. 843, 844 (2) (452 SE2d 115) (1995) (“Merely telling a defendant
that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution
does not constitute a ‘hope of benefit’ sufficient to render a statement
inadmissible[.]”) (citation omitted).
The same is true to the extent that Short argues the officers
20
induced his confession with an improper hope of benefit by referring
to his case as a “death penalty case,” by insinuating that discovery
of Gamble’s blood on Short’s clothing would “smoke” him, and by
suggesting – after Short had confessed – that his confession
“normally kind of takes the death penalty kind of off the table.” With
respect to these statements, “context matters.” Leverette, 320 Ga. at
811 (2) (citation omitted). These first two statements were made in
the context of Detective Carter discussing the “possibility” that the
district attorney’s office “could go for a death penalty case . . . if they
elected to do that.” And Detective Carter immediately followed up
on that statement by clarifying: “I’m not saying they are going to
[pursue the death penalty], I’m just saying it’s a possibility because
this woman is 83 years old, OK?” In context, these statements are
no more than “simply an explanation of the seriousness of his
situation” as a suspect accused of murdering an 83-year-old woman
and do not otherwise render his confession inadmissible. See
Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 288-289 (1) (C) (695 SE2d 604) (2010)
(concluding that officer’s suggestion that defendant was “already
21
looking at a death penalty case” and “could ‘get the needle’”
amounted to no more than an explanation of the seriousness of the
defendant’s situation) (citation omitted).
Finally, the statement made by Detective Carter that Short’s
confession “normally kind of takes the death penalty kind of off the
table” is not only equivocal, but came after Short’s confession had
been obtained, and “any hope of benefit given by the police to a
defendant after the defendant has already confessed cannot be said
to have induced the confession and thus does not affect its voluntary
nature.” Chandler v. State, 262 Ga. App. 639, 640 (1) (583 SE2d 494)
(2003). See Budhani, 306 Ga. at 325 (2) (b) (noting requirement of
actual inducement).
For the reasons stated above, Short’s hope of benefit argument
fails.
(b) Short also maintains that his confession was induced by the
remotest fear of injury “because he was at risk of harm by other
inmates in the Muscogee County Jail and was induced to confession
so as to be placed in protective custody.” The facts of this case do not
22
involve allegations of physical or mental torture by law enforcement
officers, and to the extent Short makes a fear of injury argument, it
is predicated upon coercion by threats and a theoretical risk of harm
at the hands of a third party. Short essentially argues that Detective
Carter knew Short was being threatened by other inmates and that
Detective Carter used that threat to induce Short’s confession.14 This
argument fails because the record does not show actual inducement.
See Pulley, 291 Ga. at 332 (2) (explaining the need for “a causal
connection between the police conduct and the confession”);
Leverette, 320 Ga. at 821 n.15 (Peterson, P.J., dissenting) (discussing
requirement that a “statement actually induce[] the defendant’s
confession”) (citations omitted).
Short testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that Detective
14 While Short presents his “fear of injury” argument on appeal in a
manner that is separate and distinct from his “hope of benefit” argument, he
blended those arguments below. Because Short testified to the facts underlying
his “fear of injury” argument during the Jackson-Denno hearing, and because
the trial court rejected his generalized arguments under OCGA § 24-8-824 that
were based, at least in part, on those predicate facts, we think that the distinct “fear of injury” argument that Short pursues on appeal has been fairly
preserved for ordinary appellate review. The trial court’s construction of
Short’s argument poses no issue here since Short’s argument fails regardless
of its characterization under OCGA § 24-8-824.
23
Carter offered him “protective custody for [his] cooperation[,]” that
Detective Carter made this offer at an unspecified time “in the car[,]”
and that he gave his confession “based on those promises.” However,
the recorded interviews contain minimal discussion of any “fear of
injury” on Short’s part and no use of that fear on the officers’ part to
induce a confession. Nearly three hours prior to giving his confession
during the December 5 interview, Short raised with the officers the
issue of his “housing situation” and alluded to fearing for his safety
inside the county jail. This was the only mention of such matters to
the officers prior to Short’s confession, and Detective Carter
responded to Short in that moment that it “must have been over at
the jail if they asked you if you felt safe.” Short later briefly
discussed being in solitary confinement and having some “conflict”
with other inmates during lunch with his mother, but at no point do
the recorded interviews contain any discussion of what Short
testified to at the Jackson-Denno hearing.
Therefore, in denying Short’s pre-trial motion, the trial court
rejected Short’s contention that his confession was induced by an
24
offer of “protective custody for [Short’s] cooperation[,]” relying
instead on what could be gleaned from the recorded interviews
themselves. Under our deferential standard of review, the trial court
was free to do so, and Short has not shown that doing so constitutes
reversible error in this case. Absent Short’s discredited testimony,
there is nothing in the record to support his contention that the
officers used a fear of injury to coerce and actually induce his
confession.
2. Because we conclude that Short’s confession was obtained
consistent with OCGA § 24-8-824 and that the trial court did not err
in concluding otherwise, we need not address Short’s derivative
argument that the trial court erred by admitting physical evidence
(here, the murder weapons) that were recovered as a result of that
confession. Such an argument is also foreclosed by our precedent.
See Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 784 (3) (b) (concluding that “the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine does not, as a matter of law, apply to
violations of OCGA § 24-8-824”).
3. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that Short’s
25
confession was not induced by either a hope of benefit or fear of
injury in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. Therefore, the trial court did
not err by admitting Short’s confession at trial. We affirm.
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur. Warren, PJ, concurs
specially in part.
26
WARREN, Presiding Justice, concurring specially in part.
Although I agree with the majority opinion’s ultimate
conclusion that Short’s convictions should be affirmed in this case, I
respectfully disagree with much of its reasoning in Division 1 and
therefore concur specially in that division. In particular, I believe
that this Court may review Short’s “fear of injury” contention on
appeal for plain error only.
Short contends in his appellate brief in this Court that the trial
court should not have admitted his confession under OCGA § 24-8-824 on the basis that it “was induced by remotest fear of injury
because he was at risk of harm by other inmates in the Muscogee
County Jail and was induced to confession so as to be placed in
protective custody.” But he did not clearly make that argument
during the Jackson-Denno or in the trial proceedings below. Indeed,
Short filed no written motion to exclude his statements under OCGA
§ 24-8-824, and at the Jackson-Denno hearing, Short’s counsel cited
the statute, offered only a glancing reference to “fear of injury,” and
then focused almost exclusively on claims pertaining to an
27
impermissible “hope of benefit.” 15
I also am not convinced that the trial court ruled on the “fear
of injury” argument under OCGA § 24-8-824 that Short now raises
on appeal. In an email to counsel following the hearing, the trial
court preliminarily ruled that Short’s “custodial statements” “after
his advice of rights” were admissible, noting that the statements he
made “prior to his advice of rights” would not be admitted.
Then at the beginning of the trial, the trial court admitted
15 In this respect, counsel began his argument by saying that “there
[were] several issues. Totality of the circumstances, hope or benefit, promise,
threats of harm, any number of issues.” He then focused on law enforcement
officers’ alleged offers of a “hope of benefit,” asserting that they offered Short “a plea to a 25-year sentence” and promised to take the death penalty “off the
table”—without mentioning the “remotest fear of injury” claim that Short now
raises on appeal. To be sure, Short later testified that other inmates at the jail had “threatened” him; he told Detective Carter that he was concerned for his
safety; Detective Carter promised Short “protective custody for [his]
cooperation”; and Short confessed “based on these promises.” But Short did
not make clear whether his testimony pertained to a claim of fear of injury or
to a claim of hope of benefit (or to both), and trial counsel did not clarify
whether Short sought to exclude his confession on the basis of fear of injury.
(On this point: after Short testified, the trial court asked if trial counsel wanted to add anything to the record, and counsel said, “No.”)
Given all this, it is difficult for me to conclude that the trial court’s
“express rejection of Short’s contrary position and decision to admit Short’s
confession at trial is, by necessary implication,” a ruling that Short’s confession was not induced by a fear of injury in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. Maj. Op.
at 18.
28
Short’s confession in an oral ruling, saying that Short “knowingly
was informed of his rights, waived those rights, and that was done
repeatedly, multiple times throughout the interviews,” with no
mention of OCGA § 24-8-824, “hope of benefit,”16 or “fear of injury.”
Given our admonition that the tests for determining the
voluntariness of a confession under OCGA § 24-8-824 and under the
Constitution are not the same (and that language about “knowing
waiver of rights” typically is responsive to claims about
constitutional voluntariness), I have trouble concluding that the
trial court implicitly ruled on a fear of injury claim. See, e.g., State
v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (770 SE2d 808) (2015) (explaining
the difference between statutory claims based on OCGA § 24-8-824
16 Because Short’s trial counsel more clearly raised a hope of benefit
argument at the Jackson-Denno hearing and sought to exclude Short’s
confession on that basis, it is possible that the trial court’s admission of Short’s confession was an implicit ruling on that issue and was thus preserved for
ordinary appellate review—although I have my doubts, given that the court’s
preliminary and oral rulings focused on only Short’s waiver of rights and the
constitutional voluntariness of his statements (rather than statutory
voluntariness under OCGA § 24-8-824). In any event, because Short’s hope of
benefit claim fails even under ordinary appellate review (as the majority
opinion concludes), it would also fail under the more stringent plain-error test.
See, e.g., Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855, 863 (901 SE2d 170) (2024).
29
and claims of constitutional voluntariness under the United States
Constitution and noting that our decisions have sometimes
conflated the analysis of whether a confession is voluntary under the
separate standards). As discussed above, trial counsel made no
specific argument that Short’s confession was induced by a fear of
injury, and the context of Short’s testimony at the Jackson-Denno
hearing did not make such a claim “apparent.” OGGA § 24-1-103 (a)
(1).17 As I see it, plain-error review applies to Short’s fear of injury
claim, and Short’s claim fails under the second prong of the plainerror test. See Hassan v. State, 318 Ga. 673, 677 (899 SE2d 693)
(2024) (explaining that under OGGA § 24-1-103 (a) (1), “a trial
court’s ruling that admits evidence is ordinarily reviewable only
where ‘a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
17 Nor can I conclude, as the majority opinion does, that the fear of injury
claim Short now raises easily fails under ordinary appellate review because
the trial court—in purportedly implicitly ruling on a fear of injury argument
that was not clearly presented to it—also implicitly rejected Short’s testimony
and relied instead on video recordings of law enforcement interviews that
“contain minimal discussion of any ‘fear of injury.’” Maj. Op. 25-26.
30
apparent from the context’” and that “[w]ithout preservation of error
as provided in OCGA § 24-1-103, an appellate court reviews an
evidentiary ruling only for plain error pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103
(d)”). See also Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 569 (878 SE2d 208)
(2022) (noting that an unpreserved claim that a defendant’s
confession was induced by a fear of injury, in violation of OCGA
§ 24-8-824, is reviewable only for plain error).
“To establish plain error, the appellant must point to an error
that was not affirmatively waived, and that error must have been
clear and not open to reasonable dispute, must have affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, and must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Hassan, 318 Ga. at 677 (cleaned up). “If the appellant fails to meet
one element of the plain error test, his claim fails.” Id.
Here, Short has not established that the trial court—in failing
to determine on its own accord that Short’s confession was induced
by the “remotest fear of injury” in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824—
committed a clear error beyond reasonable dispute. Under our cases
31
interpreting OCGA § 24-8-824, “[t]he ‘remotest fear of injury’ that
renders an incriminating statement involuntary and inadmissible is
‘physical or mental torture’ or coercion by threats.” State v. Lynch,
286 Ga. 98, 100 (686 SE2d 244) (2009) (interpreting a former version
of OCGA § 24-8-824) (citation omitted). See also Mitchell, 314 Ga.
at 573 (“‘Physical or mental torture is the type of fear of injury that
prevents a confession from being admissible’ under OCGA § 24-8-824.”) (citation omitted). At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Short
testified, among other things, that he had been threatened by other
inmates; he told Detective Carter that he was concerned for his
safety in the jail; Detective Carter promised Short “protective
custody for [his] cooperation”; and Short confessed “based on these
promises.” But Short has cited no authority, and I have found none,
showing that these particular circumstances obviously “constituted
physical or mental torture” or coercive threats “of the type to render
an in-custody statement involuntary and inadmissible”—the
standard we have said applies to claims of “fear of injury” under
OCGA § 24-8-824. Browner v. State, 296 Ga. 138, 142 (765 SE2d
32
348) (2014). See also Lynch, 286 Ga. at 98-101 (affirming the trial
court’s suppression of the defendant’s statement to detectives
because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
supported the trial court’s express findings that the detectives beat
the defendant, used “a taser,” removed his clothes, and withheld
medical attention, such that the defendant’s statement was induced
by the remotest fear of injury under a former version of OCGA § 24-8-824); Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 684-685 (724 SE2d 366)
(2012) (explaining that under the plain-error test, the error must be
so obvious that “‘the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in
detecting it’”) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (102
SCt 1584, 71 LE2d 816) (1982)). And because under the particular
circumstances presented in this case, Short has not met his burden
of establishing that the trial court clearly erred by failing to exclude
his confession on the ground that it was induced by the “remotest
fear of injury” in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824, Short has failed to
33
establish that the trial court plainly erred in this regard.18
18 To be clear, I do not intend to suggest that a criminal defendant could
never establish a fear of injury claim under OCGA § 24-8-824 by alleging that
his fear was caused by an act of a third party (such as an inmate). Indeed, the
plain text of the statute does not appear to require that the defendant’s
confession be induced by a State actor. See OCGA § 24-8-824 (“To make a
confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”)
(emphasis added). I merely conclude that Short’s testimony, by itself and as
presented to the trial court here, did not clearly and obviously establish a fear
of injury under our current case law, so the trial court did not plainly err by
failing to exclude Short’s confession under OCGA § 24-8-824 on that basis.
I also note that Short does not contend that Detective Carter’s alleged
offer to place Short in protective custody in exchange for cooperation in the
murder investigation constituted a hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. In
any event, under our current case law, such an offer would not constitute a
hope of benefit. See, e.g., State v. Leverette, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (912 SE2d 533,
537) (2025) (explaining that a hope of benefit is a “‘promise[ ] related to reduced criminal punishment—a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at all’”)
(citation omitted). But see id. at 547 n.17 (Peterson, PJ, dissenting) (asserting
that our case law has “repeatedly parrot[ed]” the “unsupported assertion” that
a hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 must relate to the charge or sentence
facing the suspect).
34