State v. Wierson

majority opinion

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 28, 2025

S24G1299. THE STATE v. WIERSON.

PINSON, Justice.

Michelle Wierson was charged with vehicular homicide after

she allegedly caused a fatal car accident while speeding. Before trial,

two psychiatrists concluded that, at the time of the accident, Wierson lacked the mental capacity to tell right from wrong and suffered

from a delusional compulsion that caused her to speed. Relying on

those conclusions, Wierson filed notice of an intent to plead not

guilty by reason of insanity. The State then moved to introduce evidence that, a few weeks before the accident, Wierson stopped taking

some of her psychiatric medications. The trial court granted the

State’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a pre-trial appeal, holding that evidence of medication non-compliance is not relevant to whether the statutory defenses of insanity are available to a defendant. We granted review to address that question, and also

to reconsider Bailey v. State, 249 Ga. 535 (291 SE2d 704) (1982),

which held that those statutory defenses are not available to a defendant who brought about the relevant mental state “intentionally”

or “voluntarily.”

1. Background

(a) Wierson was charged with homicide by vehicle and reckless

driving after she allegedly drove at high speed and struck another

car, killing a passenger in the other car. Wierson had before been

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and at the jail after her arrest, she

was described as being in a “manic state . . . exhibiting multiple

symptoms of bipolar manic episodes.” She was soon released on bond

to a mental-health facility for treatment and evaluation. The doctor

who saw her there noted that Wierson’s prescribed treatment for her

condition included at least four medications. But there was evidence

that Wierson had stopped taking at least three of those medications

several weeks before the accident.

After her release from the facility, Wierson was examined by

two more psychiatrists, one hired by the defense and the other appointed by the court. The two psychiatrists concluded that, on the

day of the accident, Wierson was under a delusion that God had told

her that her daughter’s life was in danger, that it was God’s will that

she rush to rescue her daughter, and that God was driving her car.

The psychiatrists agreed that, because of that delusion, Wierson was

not able to distinguish right from wrong and was suffering from a

delusional compulsion that overmastered her will to resist committing the alleged offense.

Based on the psychiatrists’ conclusions, Wierson filed a notice

of intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. Under the

Georgia Code, a defendant can be found not guilty by reason of insanity if she qualifies for either of two statutory defenses, which we

will refer to collectively as the “insanity-defense statutes.”1 The first,

which is based on “mental incapacity,” provides:

A person shall be found not guilty of a crime if, at the time

1 We use this term although the statutes themselves do not use the word

“insanity,” because the Code provides elsewhere that a person who “meet[s] the criteria” of these statutes is considered “[i]nsane at the time of the crime.” See OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (1).

of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime,

the person did not have the mental capacity to distinguish

between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission,

or negligence.

OCGA § 16-3-2. The other defense, which is based on a “delusional

compulsion,” provides:

A person shall be found not guilty of a crime when, at the

time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the

crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or

congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his

will to resist committing the crime.

OCGA § 16-3-3. As noted above, Wierson’s psychiatrists found both

that she was not able to distinguish right from wrong and that she

suffered from a delusional compulsion, so her plea invoked both insanity-defense statutes.

The State responded to Wierson’s insanity plea with a motion

in limine to admit evidence that Wierson had stopped taking at least

some of her prescribed medications. The State argued that if Wierson planned to mount an insanity defense, the jury should hear evidence that Wierson had voluntarily contributed to her mental state,

“just as if the issue were voluntary intoxication or other voluntary

incapacitation.” Wierson countered with a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of “medication non-compliance.” She contended

that the only question relevant to an insanity defense is whether the

defendant was under the relevant mental state at the time of the

alleged offense.

(b) The trial court granted the State’s motion to introduce evidence of medication non-compliance. The court explained that the

question was novel in Georgia law. But it concluded that evidence of

medication non-compliance was relevant to Wierson’s insanity defense, and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

In an appeal before trial, the Court of Appeals reversed. See

Wierson v. State, 372 Ga. App. 102 (903 SE2d 792) (2024).2 The court

2 The Court of Appeals’ decision resolved two consolidated appeals: Wierson’s appeal of the trial court’s medication non-compliance order, which is the subject of this opinion (Case No. A24A0241), and the State’s cross-appeal from a separate trial court order that had declined to prevent Wierson from asserting the insanity defense at all (Case No. A24A0242). See Wierson, 372 Ga. App. at 104. In the latter appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court’s order and concluded that Wierson could assert the insanity defense. See id. at 112-113 (3). We did not grant review of the court’s judgment in that appeal, and it is not addressed by this opinion.

held that evidence of medication non-compliance should have been

excluded because it was not relevant. See OCGA § 24-4-402 (“Evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.”). As to the insanity defenses, the court explained that the insanity-defense statutes make no mention of how or why a defendant may have come to

her mental state, but say only that she is not guilty if she has that

mental state at the time of the offense. See Wierson, 372 Ga. App. at

105 (1) (a). The court then reasoned: “To conclude that a defendant

may still be found guilty of a crime if her mental incapacity or delusional compulsion can be attributed to medication noncompliance

would be to write an exception into the statutes, which this Court is

not authorized to do.” Id. at 107 (1) (a). The court therefore held that

Wierson’s failure to take her medication was not relevant to her insanity defenses.

Separately, the court held that evidence of medication noncompliance was not relevant to show Wierson’s intent to commit vehicular homicide and reckless driving — an argument that the State

made for the first time on appeal. Id. at 105 (1) (a), 111 (1) (b). The

court reasoned that the charged offenses did not require the State to

prove that Wierson intended to speed or to drive recklessly, but only

that she voluntarily committed the act that the statute prohibits, so

it did not matter whether she believed she was justified in doing so.

See id. at 111 (1) (b).

The Court of Appeals then addressed the authority that the

State relied on, most notably Bailey, 249 Ga. 535. Bailey involved a

paranoid schizophrenic who, against his doctor’s advice, voluntarily

entered a highly stressful situation, and then “overreacted” and

killed two people. Bailey, 249 Ga. at 536-537 (1). This Court concluded in Bailey that a “delusional compulsion” defense was not

“available” to the defendant because, even if he was suffering from

such a delusion, he had “brought that delusion about” voluntarily.

Id. at 537-538 (1). In this case, the State relied on Bailey and argued

that Wierson similarly “brought [her] delusion about” by not taking

her medication. But the Court of Appeals majority concluded that

Bailey did not control because its holding was limited to its facts:

“The holding in Bailey was simply that the particular facts of that

case did not justify a jury charge on delusional compulsion.” Wierson, 372 Ga. App. at 108-109 (1) (a).

Judge Padgett dissented. The dissent agreed with the majority

that the insanity-defense statutes do not create an exception for

medication non-compliance or other self-inducement. See id. at 114.

But the dissent believed that this case was controlled by Bailey,

which recognized an exception to the insanity-defense statutes that

applied to this case. See id. at 114-115.

We granted review to determine (1) whether evidence that a

defendant voluntarily contributed to her mental state at the time of

the crime is relevant to whether the statutory insanity defenses are

available, and (2) whether Bailey should be reconsidered.

2. Analysis

(a) The Insanity-Defense Statutes

To start, let’s put aside Bailey for the moment and consider the

statutory insanity defenses on their own. When we interpret a statute, we give the text its “plain and ordinary meaning” at the time it

was enacted, Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d

337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and we find that

meaning by reading the relevant language “in its most natural and

reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language

would,” State v. Islam, 321 Ga. 30, 32 (912 SE2d 632) (2025) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To that end, we must consider the text

not by itself, but in the “context in which it appears,” Islam, 321 Ga.

at 32 (citation and punctuation omitted), including the surrounding

statutory language, the statute’s structure and history, and other

law that makes up the legal backdrop against which the language

was enacted. See State v. Harris, 319 Ga. 665, 667 (906 SE2d 402)

(2024) (citation omitted). We also have a set of rules and presumptions to help us identify the most reasonable meaning from among

the possible meanings. Among these canons of construction, we have

said that we generally should avoid a construction that would make

some statutory language “mere surplusage,” Middleton v. State, 309

Ga. 337, 342 (3) (846 SE2d 73) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). And, just as important — and it should go without saying —

we may not read into a statute language that the General Assembly

did not enact. See, e.g., White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 118 (2) (823 SE2d

794) (2019) (court “was not authorized to write a ‘relevance’ exception into” the Rape Shield Statute); Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423,

427 (4) (736 SE2d 397) (2013) (declining to construe language in

wiretap statute that grants superior courts the general authority to

issue investigative warrants as granting courts the broad authority

to authorize wiretaps outside their judicial circuits, because “[i]f our

legislature had intended to grant superior courts” that broad authority, “it could have done so explicitly”).

With those principles in mind, we turn to the statutory insanity defenses. The plain language of those statutes says that a defendant is not guilty if, “at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime,” she lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong or was under a delusional compulsion

that made her unable to resist committing the crime. OCGA §§ 16-3-2 & 16-3-3. Neither statute provides any exception to when these

defenses are available. They do not say anything about the cause of

the defendant’s mental state at the time of her “act, omission, or

negligence.” And they do not say that the insanity defenses do not

apply if the defendant helped bring about her own mental state, nor

do they consider the defendant’s mental state before the crime. Put

simply, the plain language of the insanity-defense statutes gives not

even a hint that these defenses would not be available to a person

who has “brought about” the relevant mental state voluntarily,

whether by not taking medication or otherwise.

The absence of any such language is especially notable when

the insanity-defense statutes are considered in their relevant context. See Harris, 319 Ga. at 667. Those statutes are part of Article 1

of Chapter 3 of Title 16 of the Georgia Code, which deals with “Defenses to Criminal Prosecutions” that are based on the defendant’s

“Responsibility.” Within Article 1, the Code section right next door

to the insanity-defense statutes establishes a defense based on the

defendant’s intoxication. See OCGA § 16-3-4. That intoxication-defense statute uses language that tracks the insanity-defense statutes: “A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time

of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person,

because of involuntary intoxication, did not have sufficient mental

capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such

act.” OCGA § 16-3-4 (a). But notably, quite unlike the insanity-defense statutes, the intoxication-defense statute goes on to include an

exception to the defense in a separate subsection: “Voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission.”

OCGA § 16-3-4 (c). By including that explicit exception, the intoxication-defense statute enacts the General Assembly’s judgment

that, in some cases, a defendant who bears some responsibility for

her own mental state may not avail herself of a mental-state defense. It shows that the General Assembly knows how to carve out

that kind of exception. Yet the General Assembly did not do so for

the insanity defenses. Generally, when two statutes deal with the

same subject matter, are grouped together, and use largely the same

language, but one includes an additional provision that the other

does not, this is strong evidence that the omission was intentional.

See Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 288-289 (794 SE2d 31) (2016)

(“This Court is mindful of the long-recognized doctrine of statutory

construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which discourages

judicial recognition of exceptions not specifically set forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly stated.” (emphasis added)); Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 13-14 (3) (644 SE2d 814)

(2007) (noting that when interpreting statutes, the express inclusion

of one thing gives rise to an inference that those omitted were intended to be excluded).

If that were not evidence enough that these statutes do not

take away a person’s insanity defense if someone “brings about”

those mental states “voluntarily,” consider the legal backdrop

against which these statutes were enacted. See Summerlin v. Ga.

Pines Cmty. Serv. Bd., 286 Ga. 593, 594 (2) (690 SE2d 401) (2010)

(“The General Assembly is presumed to enact all statutes with full

knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to

it.”). These statutes were enacted in their current form in 1969. See

Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1250, 1270, § 1 and Compiler’s Note. Before that,

their predecessor statute also provided a legal defense for those

without mental capacity (though the old law used the terms “lunatic” and “person insane”). The old law, which goes back to at least

1817 (when it was first codified), distinguished between a defendant’s periods of “lunacy or insanity,” on the one hand, and what it

called “lucid intervals,” on the other, and it made clear that the defendant was culpable only for acts committed during the lucid intervals:

A lunatic or person insane, without lucid intervals, shall

not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with

which he may be charged, provided the act so charged as

criminal was committed in the condition of such lunacy or

insanity; but if a lunatic has lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals as if he had no deficiency.

Code Ann. 1933 § 26-303 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Code Ann.

1882 § 4296; Code Ann. 1860 § 4192; Penal Code of 1817, Div. I, Sec.

V (Ga. L. 1816, p. 143). Like the current statutes, the former law

was explicit that the key question was the defendant’s mental capacity at the time of the crime. And the decisional law applying those

old Code sections likewise focused on the defendant’s mental capacity at the time of the crime, without regard to how it came about.

See, e.g., Clark v. State, 167 Ga. 341, 346 (145 SE 647) (1928) (trial

court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant would “not be

excusable . . . on the ground of mental disease or insanity” if he “committed the act charged against him . . . and . . . at the time of the

commission he was not mentally incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong”); Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554, 556 (28 SE

68) (1897) (“under the law of this State no person can be legally convicted of a crime committed while in a moment of irresponsibility

growing out of an unsound mind”); Orange v. State, 77 Ga. App. 36,

40 (47 SE2d 756) (1948) (although the defendant had been adjudged

insane before the crime, it was up to the jury to decide “whether he

was insane at the time of the commission of the crime”); Murphy v.

State, 70 Ga. App. 387, 389-390 (28 SE2d 198) (1943) (“the only matter at issue, before the commissioners at the time of their inquiry, is

whether or not the accused was insane at that particular time” of

the offense, although evidence of the defendant’s acts before and after the offense may be relevant “for the purpose of shedding light on

the defendant’s state of mind at the time the alleged crime was committed”). All of which is to say that, for more than a century before

our current insanity-defense statutes were enacted, Georgia law has

recognized similar defenses, and yet it never mentioned whether the

person induced her lack of mental capacity as even a relevant consideration, much less an exception to this longstanding defense.

The State points out that certain Court of Appeals decisions

have generally authorized juries to consider evidence of the defendant’s actions and mental state before the crime. But those decisions

merely held that evidence of the defendant’s behavior before the

crime (and during and after the crime) could be relevant to the question of whether the defendant in fact had the relevant mental state

“at the time of” the incident — whether lacking the mental capacity

to tell right from wrong or under a delusional compulsion. See, e.g.,

Wilson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 274, 281 (70 SE 1128) (1911) (“Whether

an act was caused by a diseased mind is to be determined primarily

from the indicia presented by the act itself, and then from the results

of an examination of the physical, moral, and mental condition of

the accused before, at, and after the act in question.” (emphasis

added)); Murphy, 70 Ga. App. at 389-390. In other words, a jury

could always consider evidence from before the crime to determine

the defendant’s mental state “at the time of the act, omission, or

negligence constituting the crime.” But none of those decisions held

that how that mental state came about — whether “voluntarily” or

otherwise — mattered to whether these defenses were available. So

those decisions are consistent with the straightforward conclusion

that these statutes do not make the defenses unavailable to a person

who “brought about” the relevant mental state.

In short, the plain language of these statutes, their context,

and their long history all align: the insanity defenses are available

even to a person who has “voluntarily” induced the relevant mental

state. And applied to this case, that would mean that whether Wierson stopped taking her medication some weeks before the accident

is not relevant to whether the statutory insanity defenses are available to her.

(b) Reconsidering Bailey v. State

But we cannot stop there. As we mentioned earlier, one of our

decisions, Bailey, is in conflict with this otherwise straightforward

conclusion that the insanity-defense statutes do not make the defenses unavailable to a person who voluntarily induced the relevant

mental state before the crime at issue was committed. That conflict

was highlighted by the Court of Appeals below: the majority distinguished Bailey and held that its exception did not apply to Wierson’s

medication non-compliance, while the dissent would have held that

Bailey controlled, making the insanity defenses unavailable in this

case. So we turn to Bailey now, addressing first the disagreement

below about whether it controls this case, and then whether it

should be reconsidered.

(i) Bailey involved a defendant with paranoid schizophrenia

who, against his doctor’s orders, put himself into a highly stressful

situation and ultimately killed two people. Bailey, 249 Ga. at 537-538 (1). Bailey contended that he shot the victims while suffering

under a delusional compulsion, see id. at 536 (1), and so he tried to

invoke the statutory delusional-compulsion defense. But the trial

court refused to sustain that plea or to instruct the jury about the

statutory defense of delusional compulsion. Id. at 536-537 (1).

This Court affirmed that decision. In doing so, we acknowledged that, under our precedent, the statutory defense of delusional

compulsion is available if there is evidence “that the defendant was

laboring under a delusion, that the act itself was connected with the

delusion and furthermore that the delusion would, if true, justify the

act.” Id. at 537 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted). But then we

took another step: without reasoning or precedent in support, we declared that the “necessary implication” of the insanity-defense statutes was that “a chronic paranoid schizophrenic may no more voluntarily and intentionally induce his delusion than a chronic alcoholic

voluntarily may induce his drunkenness then expect the homicide

to be excused rather than criminal.” Id. (citing Code Ann. 1933 § 26-704, predecessor to OCGA § 16-3-4, the intoxication-defense statute). And so we concluded that, even if Bailey had suffered from a

delusion that “properly would invoke” the delusional-compulsion defense, the defense was not available to him because he “brought that

delusion about with as much premeditation as a chronic alcoholic

who, in the same circumstances, might have prepared himself for

the impending confrontation by imbibing alcohol to excess.” Id. at

538 (1).

(ii) The question whether a precedent controls a decision in a

later case turns on the scope of the relevant holding of that precedent. In a system of precedent, courts are bound to stick to and apply our past decisions rather than deciding each case on a blank

slate. See Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 645 (II) (B)

(1) (911 SE2d 583) (2025). Courts “apply” those past decisions by

discerning the reasoning that was necessary to their outcomes and

using the same reasoning (often distilled into rules of decision or legal principles, standards, or tests) in the cases before them. That

reasoning that was necessary to the past decision is, speaking generally, its holding. See Holding, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.

2024) (“[a] court’s determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision”); Bryan A. Garner et

al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 44 (2016) (defining a holding as

“the parts of a decision that focus on the legal questions actually

presented to and decided by the court”). So, when we ask whether a

precedent “controls” in a case before us, what we are really asking

is whether any holding in a past decision would require a particular

outcome if applied to the facts of the case before us.

Pinpointing the holding of a past decision is more art than science. There exists a range of views on how to define a holding as a

general matter. See Garner at 45-46 (discussing how “commentators

and judges don’t uniformly define what counts as a holding”). And

even if we can agree to define a holding generally as the reasoning

necessary to a decision, figuring out what reasoning is truly “necessary” can be tricky, particularly when the reasoning set out in an

opinion is wide-ranging (which parts were really necessary?) or ambiguous (what exactly was the reasoning?) or even implicit (what

were they thinking?). One judge’s holding may be another’s dicta.

Compare, e.g., Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 5, 10 (6) (222 SE2d 357) (1976)

(saying that the Court “held” in State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 (222

SE2d 354) (1976), that it is not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense in the absence of a written request), with Wipfel v. State, 320 Ga. 84, 88 (2) (a) (907 SE2d

639) (2024) (describing the same legal principle from Stonaker as

“necessarily dicta”).

But one point of relative agreement is that a holding must be

something more than the result of the case given its precise facts.

See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (II) (B) (116

SCt 1114, 134 LE2d 252) (1996) (“When an opinion issues for the

Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion

necessary to that result by which we are bound.”). Were it otherwise

— if the only binding feature of past decisions was that their particular result is mandated given an identical set of facts — no precedent would be truly binding on future courts and litigants. After all,

no two cases are precisely the same, and the universe of factual circumstances is infinite. And indeed, when courts “distinguish” past

precedents, they do not look for just any facts that are different from

the case before them, but rather for circumstances relevant to, and

which place the current case outside of, the rule of decision of the

precedent in question. See, e.g., Holmes v. State, 318 Ga. 213, 222-223 (2) (b) (ii) (897 SE2d 829) (2024) (distinguishing precedent holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the State from introducing a psychiatrist’s testimony from an earlier competency-to-stand-trial hearing at the penalty phase of a death-penalty trial to support future dangerousness,

because, in the case before the Court — and unlike in the precedent

decision — the defendant “put his mental condition at issue” by

claiming an insanity defense); Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 743 (IV) n.18 (890 SE2d 209) (2023) (distinguishing cases concerning foreseeability in the context of proximate

cause as not controlling on question of foreseeability in the context

of the duty of care, because the two kinds of foreseeability are “distinct”); Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 266, 274 (5) (a) (830 SE2d 99)

(2019) (distinguishing precedent concerning Georgia’s constitutional

protection against self-incrimination because those cases did not address question before the Court of whether the State can elicit testimony that the defendant failed to come forward to the police with

information about the crime). So although we do not purport here to

set out a precise definition of a holding, we can safely say that the

holding of a judicial decision is more than just its result on a given

set of facts — it includes, to some degree, the reasoning or principles

that were necessary to that decision.

This is where the Court of Appeals went wrong in reading Bailey. The court concluded that Bailey did not control the decision

whether one of the insanity defenses was available to Wierson here

because “[t]he holding in Bailey was simply that the particular facts

of that case did not justify a jury charge on delusional compulsion.”

Wierson, 372 Ga. App. at 108-109 (1) (a). As we just explained, that

“facts plus result” view of a holding is too narrow. The Bailey Court

announced and applied a clear (if unsupported) rule: the insanity

defenses are not available to someone who “brought about” or “in24

duced” a delusion “voluntarily” or with some degree of “premeditation.” Bailey, 249 Ga. at 537-538 (1).

If Bailey’s rule is that the insanity defenses are not available

to a defendant who intentionally takes some action to induce one of

the relevant mental states, we see no serious basis for distinguishing

this case. Sure, this Court applied that rule to a “chronic paranoid

schizophrenic” who ignored his doctors’ “advice to avoid highly

stressful confrontations,” id. at 537 (1), whereas this case involves a

person with bipolar disorder who may have intentionally stopped

taking her psychiatric medication. But there is no indication in Bailey that the particular kind of mental illness or specific delusioninducing conduct had any bearing on the legal rule it announced and

applied. To the contrary, we cited the intoxication-defense statute,

which included an exception for all voluntarily intoxicated defendants, see Code Ann. § 26-704 (1968), indicating that the no-voluntary-inducement rule was not specific to the unique facts of that

case. See Bailey, 249 Ga. at 537 (1).3 So those distinctions cannot

remove this case from Bailey’s reach. Under Bailey’s rule, just as

Bailey was not entitled to a jury instruction on the insanity defenses

because he “induced” his delusions, evidence that Wierson induced

her delusions by voluntarily skipping her medications would be relevant to whether the insanity defense would be available to her.

(iii) Having now determined that the insanity-defense statutes

cannot be construed to incorporate Bailey’s holding that those statutory defenses are not available to a person who induces the relevant mental state, and that Bailey controls this case, we must decide

whether to keep following Bailey.

“When we consider whether to follow one of our past decisions,

stare decisis is the strong default rule.” Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 645

(II) (B) (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). As we have explained

before, a system built on following precedent rather than arbitrary

discretion not only keeps the body of law more stable, predictable,

3 For this reason, we disagree with the special concurrence’s view that

Bailey’s holding “applies only when the delusion itself was intentionally induced.”

and reliable, but also promotes and preserves the rule of law. See id.

In rare cases, however, following a past decision “would do more

harm to the rule of law than overruling it would.” Johnson v. State,

315 Ga. 876, 887 (3) (885 SE2d 725) (2023). So when we reconsider

a precedent, our task is, at bottom, to decide which cost to the rule

of law is greater: “whether getting the law right is worth the cost to

the rule of law of unsettling what had been settled.” Wasserman, 320

Ga. at 647 (II) (B) (1). This assessment cannot be reduced to a “mechanical formula or a multi-factor test,” but we have identified some

guideposts to follow. Id. Among these are features that bear directly

on “rule-of-law concerns,” like indications that the earlier court was

making policy rather than doing law, id. at 645 (II) (B) (1), as well

as a limited set of “practical consequences,” like upending certain

“reliance interests” or “deeply entrenched” rules, id. at 647 (II) (B)

(1).

Applying those considerations here, we conclude that Bailey

must be overruled. Cases that are “unreasoned,” or that “disregard[ ]

the basic legal principles that courts use to do law,” are “ripe for

overruling,” because leaving apparently arbitrary or policy-driven

decisions in place can be “especially harmful to the rule of law.” Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 645-646 (II) (B) (1) See also Cobb County v.

Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 94 (1) n.5 (901 SE2d 512) (2024); Ammons v.

State, 315 Ga. 149, 171 (880 SE2d 544) (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring); Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471, 479 (2) (a) (870 SE2d 758) (2022).

Bailey fits that bill. Bailey turned on a question of statutory construction: whether a statutory delusional-compulsion defense was

available to a defendant who had voluntarily induced his delusion.

But to answer that question, we never even tried to interpret the

statute. Had we done so, we would have been compelled to conclude

that the statute’s language offered no basis for an exception to the

defense and its context confirmed that the legislature did not include

such an exception. But instead, we cited an exception to the statutory intoxication defense found next door to the delusional-compulsion defense, and rather than applying the “long-recognized” rule of

construction that would have confirmed the absence of such an exception, we divined and created a new exception to the defense that

the legislature had plainly declined to include. See Mooney, 300 Ga.

at 288-289 (“This Court is mindful of the long-recognized doctrine of

statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which

discourages judicial recognition of exceptions not specifically set

forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly

stated.” (emphasis added)). See also, e.g., White, 305 Ga. at 118 (2);

Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 427 (4). In doing so, it appears that we improperly substituted our judgment for that of the legislature and

made a policy decision instead of doing law — precisely the sort of

decision that our Court has not hesitated to overrule. See, e.g.,

Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 812 (3) (b) (771 SE2d 362) (2015)

(overruling statutory construction decision that had, among other

things, “disregarded the plain language” of the relevant statute to

create an unwritten exception to it and “undermined the policy-making authority of the General Assembly”).

Bailey is not saved by its status as a statutory-construction

precedent. It is true that leaving a wrong decision of statutory construction in place may be relatively less harmful to the rule of law

than declining to disturb a bad constitutional construction precedent: because it is generally easier to revise a statute than it is to

amend the Constitution, the likelihood that a wrong decision of statutory construction will remain part of our body of law is relatively

lower than if the decision involves constitutional construction.4 See,

e.g., Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2) (c) (iv) (806 SE2d 505)

(2017). But we have also consistently said that “stare decisis applies

with less force” when, as here, “we have misinterpreted a statute by

failing to consider the statute’s language at all.” Nalls v. State, 304

Ga. 168, 179-180 (3) (b) (815 SE2d 38) (2018). See, e.g., State v.

Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 122 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (overruling statutory-construction decision that was “reached without any meaningful analysis”); Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464, 467 (1) (796 SE2d

261) (2017) (overruling statutory-construction precedent that was

two sentences long and contained no statutory construction);

4 Reasonable minds may differ on how much less “permanent” an incorrect statutory construction precedent is compared to a constitutional construction precedent, particularly in Georgia, where constitutional amendments are somewhat easier to get across the finish line than at the federal level.

Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 (3) (b) (overruling precedent that disregarded language of statute and applied no canons of statutory construction); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 653 (3) (697 SE2d 757)

(2010) (overruling statutory-construction precedent that, in a “oneand-a-half page opinion,” failed to consider the “customary legal

meaning” of a statutory term and did not “look to our then-existing

case law interpreting that term”). See also Mobley v. State, 307 Ga.

59, 73-75 (4) (a) (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (criticizing as “unsound” a

prior decision that interpreted a statute without giving consideration to its legal context or the background law of Georgia at the time

of its enactment). As Justice Blackwell once explained,

We have a duty to ascertain the meaning of the statutory

law, and we must endeavor to do so in a way that is consistent with the familiar and settled principles of statutory interpretation. Sometimes we may get it wrong, and

yet, if we have made our best effort, it may be more appropriately left to the General Assembly to set things

right. But before we call it a day and declare our judicial

work at an end, we ought to try at least once to undertake

the sort of careful textual analysis (including a consideration of relevant context) that, if done properly, would reveal the most natural and reasonable understanding of

the statute. . . . “We ought not follow unreasoned precedent without reason.”

Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 516 (789 SE2d 175) (2016) (Blackwell, J., dissenting) (quoting Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 803 (784

SE2d 343) (2016) (Blackwell, J., dissenting)). Just so here.

Finally, a look at the practical consequences we have considered in assessing stare decisis does nothing to save Bailey. We are

aware of no “reliance interests” that have built up around Bailey’s

judge-made exception to the insanity-defense statutes, nor can we

imagine that citizens make decisions about their behavior based on

that exception. See Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 647 (II) (B) (1). Nor has

Bailey become “deeply entrenched” in our law, see id. To the contrary, as far as we can tell, the decision has been cited in only eight

other appellate opinions (before this case) since it issued in 1982,

and only one of those opinions, a concurrence, referred to the holding

at issue here. See VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 751 n.3

(507 SE2d 555) (1998) (Beasley, J., concurring). So these considerations do not cut against overruling Bailey either.

For these reasons, stare decisis does not preserve Bailey’s hold32

ing that the statutory insanity defenses are not available to a defendant who “intentionally” or “voluntarily” induced the relevant

mental state. That holding is overruled.

We can now return to Wierson’s case. Given our conclusions

above, resolving this case is straightforward. Wierson pleaded not

guilty by reason of insanity, and she put up evidence — the two psychiatrist reports — that, at the time of the accident, she lacked the

mental capacity to tell right from wrong and also suffered from a

delusional compulsion. Under OCGA §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3, if the jury

were to credit that evidence, then Wierson cannot be guilty of a

crime, full stop. The State sought to introduce evidence that Wierson

may have stopped taking her medication before the accident, but the

State’s only justification to the trial court for the relevance of that

evidence — that it would show that Wierson’s mental state was “voluntary” — fails, because that is not a basis for making the statutory

insanity defenses unavailable to Wierson.

Two final points. First, the State made an additional argument

for the first time in the Court of Appeals about the relevance of medication non-compliance: that it was relevant not to whether Wierson

could assert an insanity defense, but to whether Wierson had the

requisite criminal intent. See Wierson, 372 Ga. App. at 105 (1). But

the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, see id. at 110-111 (1)

(b), and we did not grant review on the question. So although the

State has made the same argument in its briefing in this Court, we

do not reach the issue. See Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306

Ga. 847, 853 (3) (834 SE2d 77) (2019) (declining to reach issue on

which Court did not grant certiorari); State v. Fletcher, 252 Ga. 498,

500 n.1 (314 SE2d 888) (1984) (same).

Second, on a related note, our conclusion here does not foreclose the admission of evidence of medication non-compliance for all

purposes when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity.

For example, as we noted above, evidence that a defendant was not

following her medical course of treatment before an alleged offense

might be admissible to show that, at the time of the offense, she

lacked mental capacity or suffered from a delusional compulsion —

that is, that she satisfies the requirements for asserting one of the

statutory insanity defenses. But in this case, neither Wierson nor

the State proffered the medication non-compliance evidence for that

purpose. So whether that evidence might be relevant to another purpose is not before us, and we do not address it further.

3. Conclusion

In sum, we ultimately agree with the Court of Appeals that evidence of Wierson’s medication non-compliance was not admissible

to show that she “voluntarily” induced her lack of mental capacity

or delusional compulsion, because the statutory insanity defenses

are available without regard for whether that was true. We also

agree with the Court of Appeals that Bailey does not compel a different conclusion, but for a different reason than the Court of Appeals gave. Contrary to that court’s view, Bailey would control here.

But it was wrongly decided, and today, after considering stare decisis, we overrule its holding that created a judge-made exception to

the statutory insanity defenses. Finally, we do not reach the remaining issues decided by the Court of Appeals in Case No. A24A0241.

Judgment affirmed. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington,

McMillian, and LaGrua, JJ, concur. Peterson, CJ, and Colvin, J., concur specially.

PETERSON, Chief Justice, concurring specially.

I agree with much of what is said in the majority opinion.

I agree with the majority opinion’s construction of the insanitydefense statutes. I agree that our invention of an exception to those

statutes in Bailey v. State, 249 Ga. 535 (291 SE2d 704) (1982) was

error. And I agree that we should affirm the judgment of the Court

of Appeals.

Where I part ways with the majority opinion is what to do

with Bailey. The majority opinion defines Bailey’s holding broadly

such that it would control this case, and then proceeds to overrule

Bailey. But the majority opinion’s definition of Bailey’s holding is

unnecessarily broad; in my view, Bailey’s holding is reasonably

understood to be narrow enough that it does not apply here.

The majority opinion frames the holding of Bailey as rendering

the insanity defenses unavailable “to a defendant who intentionally

takes some action to induce one of the relevant mental states.” Op.

at 25. If that is the holding of Bailey, I agree that the holding would

control this case. But Bailey’s discussion of intentionality was not

limited to taking the action that induced the delusion; i.e., it was not

just about intentionally (rather than merely negligently) failing to

take precautions against delusions. Instead, Bailey’s reasoning

indicates that its rule applies only when the delusion itself was

intentionally induced: “a chronic paranoid schizophrenic may no

more voluntarily and intentionally induce his delusion . . .” 249 Ga.

at 537 (1). And the Bailey Court reiterated this point three

paragraphs later: “it must be said that he brought that delusion

about with as much premeditation as a chronic alcoholic who, in the

same circumstances, might have prepared himself for the impending

confrontation by imbibing alcohol to excess.” Id. at 538 (1).

Read in that light, I understand Bailey’s holding as this: a

defendant may not voluntarily and intentionally cause a state of

mind that the defendant knew may well result in criminal activity

and then be relieved of criminal responsibility because of the

intentionally induced state of mind. In that reading, the inducing of

the state of mind is akin to a conspiracy to do the bad act initiated

at a time before the state of mind was present. And this case involves

no evidence of any such intentionality; unlike Bailey, where the

intentional inducement of delusion happened in the minutes before

the crime, here the discontinuation of medication happened weeks

before the criminal act. So Bailey does not apply, and we have no

need to reconsider it here.

Accordingly, I would arrive at the same conclusion as the Court

of Appeals that Bailey’s holding does not apply to this case (albeit

for somewhat different reasons), and thus I cannot join the majority

opinion, although I do concur in the judgment.

I am authorized to state that Justice Colvin joins in this

concurrence.

State v. Wierson

Summary · law.co

Key issues

Procedural posture

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain