NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 6, 2025
S25A0412. MORGAN v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Deangelo Deshawn Morgan challenges his 2023 convictions for
the fatal shooting of Sabron Mosby and aggravated assault of
Donoven King. 1 Morgan was tried separately from his co-indictees,
Cleavanta Jerrideau and Glenn Darius Smith, both of whom were
1 The crimes occurred on October 15, 2018. On March 28, 2019, a Bacon
County grand jury indicted Morgan, Cleavanta Jerrideau, and Glenn Darius
Smith for malice murder in the death of Mosby and for aggravated assault by
shooting at King. As the trial of Morgan, Jerrideau, and Smith was about to
begin, Morgan’s counsel was allowed to withdraw because of a recently
discovered conflict of interest related to a potential witness. The trial court
severed Morgan’s trial and proceeded with Jerrideau’s and Smith’s trial; both
Jerrideau and Smith were acquitted. At a trial from October 2 through October
4, 2023, the jury found Morgan guilty of the offenses for which he was indicted.
On October 4, 2023, the trial court sentenced Morgan to serve life in prison
with the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive term of
twenty years in prison for aggravated assault. Morgan filed a timely motion
for new trial, and new counsel filed a brief asserting amended grounds on
August 27, 2024. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion for new trial on October 7, 2024. Morgan filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning
in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
acquitted. In this appeal, Morgan contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding (1) evidence that allegedly showed
that the shooting was drug related and (2) evidence implicating
other potential suspects. He also asserts that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective by failing to “properly” argue for the
admission of the evidence that was excluded and by advising
Morgan not to testify. As explained below, these claims fail, and we
affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that Morgan and
Mosby, who were in their early to mid-twenties, had grown up
together, had been close, with Morgan considering Mosby “his older
brother,” and both lived in their hometown of Alma, Georgia.
Jerrideau and Smith had also grown up in Alma and were friends
with Morgan. Shortly before the October 15, 2018 shooting, Morgan
and Mosby had “a falling out over . . . females” and were “not seeing
eye to eye” and were “bumping heads.” On the morning of the
shooting, Morgan, his girlfriend Paizsa Murchison, and his cousin
Bree’Onka Vaughn drove in Morgan’s car to Waycross to rent a car
2
— a red Ford Fusion. Murchinson rented the car, but Morgan paid
for it. After leaving Waycross in the rental car, the three made
several stops in Alma before returning to Morgan’s home, including
stopping to visit Devante Batton. Sometime later that day, Morgan
left in the rental car alone while Murchinson stayed at Morgan’s
home. After leaving his home, Morgan stopped at Smith’s home
around 8:30 p.m. Just before the shooting, Smith and Jerrideau were
seen standing outside of a church very close to where Mosby lived.
Around 8:50 p.m. that evening, Mosby was in his front yard with
King and others around a barrel fire. Mosby’s aunt, who lived two
doors down, was inside her home and saw a red car passing by her
house slowly and then pass by again going in the other direction
toward Mosby’s home. Less than two or three minutes after Mosby’s
aunt saw the red car, she heard gunfire. Mosby was shot four times,
twice in the back and twice in the leg. He also suffered burns from
falling onto the barrel fire. He was declared dead at the scene, and
the medical examiner determined that the cause of death was
multiple gunshot wounds.
3
Right after the shooting, King ran to Mosby’s aunt’s home,
telling her, “They’re shooting at me and [Mosby].” Mosby’s aunt
called 911, and Chief Cody Phillips of the Alma Police Department
responded to the scene. Chief Phillips called in the GBI. Chad Lott,
a GBI crime scene specialist, recovered over 90 cartridge casings,
which were three different sizes. Some were 9mm cartridges, which
are “usually a handgun round.” The other cartridges were ones used
in a “high-powered rifle” or an “AK style rifle,” and those cartridges
were fired from two different guns. The guns that were fired were
never recovered. Near Mosby’s body, Lott recovered a handgun with
one live bullet in the chamber and a full magazine. Lott also
recovered a clown mask from the street directly in front of Mosby’s
home. Swabbings from the mask contained a mixture of the DNA of
“at least three individuals,” one of whom was later determined to be
Morgan. Jerrideau was excluded as a contributor to the DNA
mixture, and the results as to Smith were inconclusive.
When Morgan returned to his home, Murchinson saw that he
had a black handgun. Morgan and Murchinson left Morgan’s home
4
and spent the night in a hotel in Waycross with Vaughn. That
evening, Morgan told Murchinson and Vaughn that “he did it,” that
“he got out of the car and he was shooting,” and that he was wearing
a clown mask at the time. Vaughn saw Morgan with a small black
gun at the hotel.
Morgan did not testify at trial, but GBI Special Agent Jason
Nipper testified about a statement that Morgan gave approximately
five to six hours after the shooting. Morgan came to the Bacon
County Sheriff’s office, voluntarily spoke with Special Agent Nipper
after being requested to do so, consented to having a buccal swab of
his DNA taken, and left after giving the statement. In his statement,
Morgan said that he had no involvement with the shooting on
October 15 and that he spent the day at his home with a woman
named “Lyric,” after he had argued with Murchinson. He received a
phone call about the shooting sometime during the evening of
October 15, and afterward, he and Lyric drove to Lyric’s home in
Hazelhurst. While he was in Hazelhurst, he received a call from his
mother who told him that the police wanted to speak with him, so
5
he came back to Alma. He said that his cell phone was no longer
working, despite having said that he recently received calls about
Mosby’s death and from his mother.
Lyric Conaway testified that she had been with Morgan in the
early morning hours of October 15 but was not with him later that
day, was not with him when he learned about the shooting, and did
not drive to her home in Hazelhurst with him later that evening.
According to Murchinson’s and Vaughn’s testimony, Morgan,
Murchinson, and Vaughn drove the rental car to Jacksonville,
Florida, the day after the shooting to have a bullet hole in the
windshield repaired. But before driving to Florida, Vaughn smashed
the windshield with a cooking pot because she wanted to hide the
bullet hole. They also purchased cleaning supplies and cleaned and
vacuumed the rental car. Murchinson and Vaughn were later
arrested in connection with Mosby’s death, 2 and while Murchinson
was in jail, she wrote a letter to Morgan, telling him that it appeared
2 Murchinson and Vaughn subsequently pleaded guilty to tampering
with evidence.
6
that Vaughn told police that Morgan was the shooter, but that
Murchinson “would never get [Morgan] locked up.” The letter also
stated that Murchinson had “cleaned my phone out” and that she
“did everything to help” Morgan.
The police recovered the rental car at a body shop in
Jacksonville, Florida, and discovered a large hole in the windshield
and bullet defects on the outside of the car. Before Morgan’s trial,
Jerrideau and Smith, Morgan’s co-indictees, were tried together and
both were acquitted.
Additional facts necessary to address Morgan’s contentions are
set forth below.
1. Morgan asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in excluding certain evidence that he contends would have shown
that the shooting was drug-related or that would have shown that
other persons committed the crime. Specifically, Morgan contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding him from
presenting the following evidence: (1) that at the time Mosby was
killed, he had items in his pockets that Morgan characterizes as
7
“suspected drugs”; (2) that Batton, who spent time with Morgan on
the day of the shooting, was, at the time of trial, in jail on an
unrelated murder charge; (3) that Jerrideau’s girlfriend disposed of
“the murder weapon” at Jerrideau’s direction; and (4) that drugs and
guns were seized in a search of the home of Smith. We address each
contention in turn.
(a) After the jury had been selected, the trial court heard
motions in limine and granted the State’s motion to exclude evidence
that Mosby had potentially drug-related evidence on him at the time
he died. Specifically, the State’s motion stated that there was a $10
bill with a “pink powder residue” in Mosby’s wallet and that in
Mosby’s pockets, there was “a small amount of suspected marijuana”
and an “Aleve” bottle containing “suspected crack cocaine.” In its
motion and at the hearing, the State argued that the substances
were never tested, and thus, there was no evidence that Mosby
possessed illegal drugs when he was killed. The State also argued
the contents of Mosby’s pockets were not relevant and that even if
the evidence was relevant, it should be excluded under OCGA § 24-8
4-403 because the probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice given that the jury might conclude
that Mosby was a drug dealer whose “death was somehow justified.”
After hearing arguments, the trial court granted the State’s motion.
Morgan contends that this evidence was “intrinsic evidence”3
and that its exclusion prevented him from arguing the shooting
occurred over drug use. Pretermitting whether the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the evidence, it is highly probable
that any such error did not contribute to the verdicts because of the
strong evidence of Morgan’s guilt. See Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859,
863 (2) (896 SE2d 516) (2023) (“A trial court’s evidentiary error
warrants reversal only if it was harmful. The test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (cleaned up)). Here,
3 “[E]vidence is considered intrinsic to the charged offense when it is (1)
an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the
crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense.” Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 236 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 501) (2022)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
9
the evidence that Morgan shot Mosby included Morgan’s own
statement that he did so while wearing a clown mask and the
presence of his DNA on the clown mask found at the scene. The fact
that Mosby possessed a small quantity of suspected drugs at the
time he was killed would have had little impact on the jury’s
assessment of the evidence as a whole. Thus, it is highly probable
that any error in excluding this evidence did not contribute to the
verdicts. See Wilson v. State, 319 Ga. 550, 555-556 (2) (905 SE2d
557) (2024) (holding that any assumed error in excluding speculative
testimony was harmless where the evidence against the defendant
was strong and the testimony did not rebut that strong evidence);
Jones v. State, 315 Ga. 177, 122-124 (4) (800 SE2d 509) (2022)
(assuming that the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary
rulings and concluding that any error was harmless because there
was “strong” evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the admission of
the challenged evidence would have had “little” impact on the jury’s
assessment of the trial evidence as a whole).
(b) Morgan also challenges the exclusion of evidence that he
10
contends would show that another person murdered Mosby. Under
OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”), evidence that a person other than the
defendant committed the crime is generally relevant, 4 and relevant
evidence is generally admissible. See OCGA § 24-4-402. But “[b]efore
testimony can be introduced that another person committed the
charged crime, the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable
inference of the defendant’s innocence and, in the absence of a
showing that the other person recently committed a crime of the
same or similar nature, must directly connect the other person with
the corpus delicti.” Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 260 (3) (824 SE2d
326) (2019) (quoting cases, including Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570,
573 (501 SE2d 810) (1998), setting forth test under old Evidence
Code). 5 Additionally, evidence that offers mere speculation and
4 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence that has “any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”
5 The Klinect test we apply here is an artifact of the old Evidence Code,
which might have been wrong under that old code, and might be wrong under
the current code. See Pittman v. State, 318 Ga. 819, 831-835 (901 SE2d 90)
(2024) (Peterson, PJ, concurring). But here – as in Pittman – no party has
challenged our precedent that carried the Klinect test forward under the
current Evidence Code. Accordingly, we apply that precedent here.
11
conjecture that a third person could have been involved in the crime
does not raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence
and thus is not relevant. See Pittman v. State, 318 Ga. 819, 826-827
(4) (901 SE2d 90) (2024). As explained below, the evidence Morgan
sought to introduce did not raise a reasonable inference of his
innocence.
(i) During trial, Morgan elicited testimony that the State had
not sought a DNA sample from several people, including Batton,
even though Morgan spent two hours at Batton’s home shortly
before the shooting. Outside the presence of the jury, Morgan
indicated that he intended to ask Special Agent Nipper on crossexamination about where Batton was currently located. According
to Morgan, Batton was in jail in another county on an unrelated
murder charge. There was no proffer regarding the facts underlying
Batton’s murder charge. The State objected, and the trial court ruled
that Morgan could not ask about Batton’s current location or the
charges he was facing.
On appeal, Morgan suggests that because Batton was charged
12
with murder and because Morgan and Batton had spent time
together a few hours before the murder, evidence that Batton was in
jail on an unrelated murder charge was admissible. However,
evidence that Morgan had been with another person a few hours
before the shooting and that at some point that person had been
charged with an unrelated murder, without more, does not raise a
reasonable inference of Morgan’s innocence. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Morgan from asking
about Batton’s location or pending charges. See Payne v. State, 314
Ga. 322, 333 (3) (g) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (holding that evidence
that another person may have been at the crime scene at some
unknown point in time and had been convicted of an unrelated crime
did not raise a reasonable inference of appellant’s innocence). See
also Palmer v. State, 318 Ga. 511, 529-530 (5) (899 SE2d 192) (2024)
(holding that evidence that two months after the crime for which
appellant was on trial — the fatal shooting of appellant’s estranged
wife and his step-daughter — appellant’s son shot at another person
in a drug-related dispute would not have raised a reasonable
13
inference of appellant’s innocence, in part because there was no
evidence of appellant’s son having any animus toward the victims).
(ii) Morgan also challenges the trial court’s ruling that he could
not call two witnesses whom he contended would present evidence
inculpating his co-indictees Jerrideau and Smith. 6 The first witness,
Brandi Waters, testified outside the presence of the jury that she
had been Jerrideau’s girlfriend in 2018; that after Jerrideau was
arrested for Mosby’s murder and while he was in jail, he called her
and asked her to go to the home of another person, retrieve a “Draco”
or “Draco-style” firearm from that person, and call a second person,
who would come “pick it up for $1,000.” Waters testified that she
did as Jerrideau asked. The second witness was Emmanuel County
Investigator Kendra Fitzgerald. According to Morgan’s proffer,
Investigator Fitzgerald would testify that during the investigation
of Mosby’s murder, investigators found “burnt magazines, burnt
ammo casings, drugs, plastic bags, and rifle magazines” behind
6 Morgan does not assert any other basis for the admission of the
testimony related to Jerrideau and Smith.
14
Smith’s house.
With regard to Waters’s testimony, Morgan argues that the
testimony was relevant because it showed that Jerrideau arranged
for the disposal of the “murder weapon,” although he does not cite to
any evidence in the record that supports characterizing the gun as
“the murder weapon.” And there was no proffer that the gun that
Waters transferred at Jerrideau’s direction was the murder weapon.
Nor was there a proffer as to the caliber or style of the gun, such
that there was nothing to connect the “Draco-style” gun to the shell
casings recovered from the scene of the crime. Thus, in the absence
of any evidence connecting the gun to the murder of Mosby, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. See
Klinect, 269 Ga. at 573 (3) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in precluding appellant from eliciting testimony about his
co-indictee, who was tried separately and acquitted, where such
testimony only reflected on the co-indictee’s character and did not
show that the co-indictee had a motive to kill the victim, did not
connect him to the corpus delicti, and did not show that he had
15
committed a similar crime by similar methods).
With regard to Fitzgerald’s testimony that burnt gun
magazines and drugs were found in a search of Smith’s property,
Morgan concedes in his brief that the evidence would not exonerate
him, but he asserts that because there were 90 cartridge cases of
different sizes, the evidence showed that more than one person was
involved and that the evidence found behind Smith’s home was
relevant to show Smith’s motive to shoot Mosby — a drug deal gone
bad. However, as noted above, there was no evidence presented or
proffered that Mosby’s shooting was related to a drug deal. Rather,
the only evidence of motive was that Morgan and Mosby had a
falling out over women. The mere existence of burnt gun magazines
and drugs on Smith’s property bears no logical connection to Mosby’s
shooting. And precisely because the evidence did suggest that more
than one person was shooting at Mosby, evidence related to who
those other persons might be does not raise a reasonable inference
of Morgan’s innocence, especially given Morgan’s own inculpatory
statements to Murchinson and Vaughn and the discovery of his DNA
16
on the clown mask recovered on the street at the site of the shooting.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the evidence related to Jerrideau and Smith. See Klinect, 269 Ga. at
573 (3) (501 SE2d 810) (1998). See also De La Cruz v. State, 303 Ga.
24, 28 (3) (810 SE2d 84) (2018) (“[E]vidence that merely casts a bare
suspicion on another or raises a conjectural inference as to the
commission of the crime by another is not admissible.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)).
2. Morgan asserts that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel in three ways: first, by counsel’s failure “to
properly argue for the admission of the drug evidence” related to
Mosby and Smith; second, and relatedly, by counsel’s failure to seek
a certificate of immediate review after the trial court’s oral ruling
excluding evidence of Mosby’s possession of purported drugs at the
time of his death; and third, by counsel’s advice to Morgan that he
not testify. We will address each contention in turn, applying the
constitutional standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
17
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to
the defendant.” Moss v. State, 311 Ga. 123, 126 (2) (856 SE2d 280)
(2021) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-695). “To prove deficient
performance, [an appellant] must show that his counsel performed
in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the
circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Ward
v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 273 (4) (869 SE2d 470) (2022) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from
counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the
particular circumstances of the case, and decisions
regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for
an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
followed such a course.
Taylor v. State, 312 Ga. 1, 15-16 (6) (860 SE2d 470) (2021) (citations
and punctuation omitted).
“To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a
reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient
18
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” Moss,
311 Ga. at 126 (2). “If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of
proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does
not have to examine the other prong.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel, “we accept the trial court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we independently apply the relevant legal principles
to the facts.” Bowman v. State, 319 Ga. 573, 577 (2) (905 SE2d 605)
(2024) (citation omitted).
(a) Morgan first contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to “properly argue for the admission of the drug
evidence” related to Mosby and Smith, and, relatedly, that his trial
counsel was deficient in failing to seek a certificate of immediate
review after the trial court’s oral ruling that the purported drug
evidence related to Mosby was not admissible.
However, Morgan has not set forth the arguments he contends
counsel should have made to secure the admission of the evidence
19
related to Mosby and Smith or to obtain a certificate of immediate
review, and thus, he cannot show that the failure to make
unspecified arguments was objectively unreasonable. See Swinson
v. State, 311 Ga. 48, 55-56 (2) (b) (855 SE2d 629) (2021) (rejecting
claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to properly file and
argue motion where appellant failed to identify other arguments
counsel should have made), disapproved of on other grounds, Outlaw
v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 401 (2) n.5 (858 SE2d 63) (2021). Thus, Morgan
has failed to show that his trial counsel performed deficiently with
regard to the drug evidence related to Smith and Mosby or in failing
to seek a certificate of immediate review.
(b) Morgan next contends that his trial counsel performed
deficiently by advising him not to testify at trial. Whether to testify
in one’s own defense is a tactical choice to be made by the defendant
after consultation with his lawyer, and trial counsel’s advice to a
defendant not to testify is a strategic decision. See Nabors v. State,
320 Ga. 43, 47 (1) (907 SE2d 684) (2024). “It is generally enough for
counsel to advise the defendant about the ‘pros and cons’ of
20
testifying and explain that the ultimate choice is the defendant’s to
make.” Id. at 48 (cleaned up).
Here, Morgan’s trial counsel testified at the motion-for-newtrial hearing that he advised Morgan several times that it was
Morgan’s choice whether to testify and that he reviewed the pros
and cons of testifying with Morgan. Trial counsel explained that he
had concerns with how the jury would view Morgan’s credibility if
he did testify, given that Morgan had provided Special Agent Nipper
with the name of an alibi witness, but that witness, Lyric Conaway,
testified that she was not with Morgan that evening at all. Morgan
has not shown that his trial counsel’s advice or strategy was “so
patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
followed such a course.” Nabors, 320 Ga. at 49 (1). Because trial
counsel’s advice to Morgan to not testify was a strategic one and was
not patently unreasonable, we conclude that Morgan has failed to
show that his trial counsel’s advice was deficient. See Nabors, 320
Ga. at 49-50 (1); Goff v. State, 308 Ga. 330, 334 (1) (840 SE2d 359)
(2020).
21
Accordingly, Morgan’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel fail. 7
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
7 In his brief, Morgan cites State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (1) (838 SE2d 808)
(2020), and states, without elaboration or further argument, that “when taken
in aggregate [the enumerations of error] present unmistakable evidence of
injustice.” Because we have assumed only one evidentiary error and have
determined that Morgan’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently, cumulative
error analysis under Lane is not applicable. See Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240,
251 (5) n.16 (882 SE2d 329) (2022) (holding that to show cumulative error, an
appellant must show that at least two errors were committed).
22