NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 6, 2025
S25A0416. WALLACE v. STATE.
WARREN, Presiding Justice.
Antonio Wallace, who was convicted of felony murder in 2011
and has a pending habeas case, seeks original copies of autopsy
photographs that were collected as part of the criminal case against
him. After he requested these photographs under the Open Records
Act and the District Attorney refused to provide them, he filed a
motion seeking disclosure in the superior court where he was
convicted.
OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) excludes autopsy photographs from
required disclosure under the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70,
et seq., with a few exceptions, including if the disclosure is for
“medical purposes” or is “in the public interest.” Wallace argues that
his request for autopsy photographs fits within these two exceptions.
The trial court found those arguments unconvincing and denied his
motion. We affirm the trial court’s order.
1. In January 2011, Wallace was convicted of felony murder in
Ware County. This Court affirmed his conviction in 2020. See
Wallace v. State, 309 Ga. 823, 823 (848 SE2d 72) (2020). Wallace
asserts that in December 2021, he filed a habeas corpus petition in
Wheeler County that is still pending. In August 2024, Wallace filed
in his criminal case a “motion for limited disclosure of original trial
exhibits,” requesting “an order permitting the limited disclosure of
the state’s original autopsy evidence, particularly photos from the
autopsy, to Dr. Jan Gorniak.”
In his motion, Wallace asserted the following facts. At his trial
for felony murder, evidence was presented that the autopsy of the
victim was conducted in Florida by a medical examiner licensed in
Florida. In preparing his habeas petition, Wallace retained the
services of Dr. Jan Gorniak, the former Chief Medical Examiner of
Fulton County. Wallace asked Dr. Gorniak to review the victim’s
autopsy because Wallace believed that his trial counsel may have
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been ineffective by failing to argue that the autopsy was improper
because it was not completed by a medical examiner licensed in
Georgia.
Dr. Gorniak asked to see the original autopsy photographs
because “the copies provided in discovery and in Wallace’s copy of
the trial exhibits were blurry” and in “black and white.” Wallace’s
counsel filed “a request to review the District Attorney’s file under
the Open Records Act,” and included a request that the District
Attorney’s office send the original autopsy photographs to Dr.
Gorniak. The District Attorney’s office “declined to make the
materials available” to Dr. Gorniak, citing OCGA § 45-16-27 (d),
which, with a few exceptions, exempts autopsy photographs from
required disclosure under the Open Records Act. Wallace argued
that his requested disclosure fits within exceptions in OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) that allow for disclosure of autopsy photographs if the
requested disclosure is for “medical purposes” or “in the public
interest.”
On September 18, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on
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Wallace’s motion. Wallace’s counsel argued that Dr. Gorniak’s
review of the autopsy photographs was necessary to establish
prejudice for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
object to the autopsy. The victim’s sister testified that the victim
died in a hospital in Florida and that his family opposed disclosure
of the autopsy photographs. The trial court denied Wallace’s motion.
Wallace now appeals, raising the same arguments he did in the trial
court.
2. Wallace seeks the autopsy photographs under the Open
Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70, et seq. In relevant part, OCGA § 50-18-71 (a) says: “All public records shall be open for personal
inspection and copying, except those which by order of a court of this
state or by law are specifically exempted from disclosure.” OCGA
§ 45-16-27 (d) provides a specific exemption from disclosure for
autopsy photographs: “Autopsy photographs shall not be subject to
disclosure pursuant to [the Open Records Act].”
That exemption from disclosure does not apply, however, “to
the disclosure of such photographs to . . . physicians for medical
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purposes.” OCGA § 45-16-27 (d). The statute also provides:
A superior court may, in closed criminal investigations,
order the disclosure of such photographs upon findings in
writing that disclosure is in the public interest and that
it outweighs any privacy interest that may be asserted by
the deceased’s next of kin.
Id. Wallace argues that the autopsy photographs he seeks are
subject to disclosure because the disclosure is for “medical purposes”
and “in the public interest” under OCGA § 45-16-27 (d).
A. “Medical Purposes” Exception
Wallace argues that the disclosure of the autopsy photographs
is for “medical purposes” under OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) because Dr.
Gorniak will “review the autopsy photos” and “form an opinion”
about the autopsy that was conducted in Florida. However, at the
hearing on his motion, Wallace acknowledged that the purpose of
this review was to investigate a potential claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel that he may raise in his habeas corpus
case. Based on Wallace’s representations, the trial court found that
the “purpose of [Wallace’s requested] disclosure is so that the doctor
may review the autopsy photos, form an opinion, and ultimately
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testify in the habeas proceeding, not the furtherance of any medical
purpose,” and concluded that the “requested disclosure is
indisputably for a legal purpose.”
We agree with the trial court. Indeed, we cannot say that the
investigation or development of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is a “medical purpose” under OCGA § 45-16-27 (d).
Dictionary definitions of “medical” from around the time OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) was enacted suggest that a “medical” purpose means
related to the practice of medicine. 1 See, e.g., The American
Heritage Dictionary, Fourth Edition (Houghton Mifflin Company
2000) at 1091 (defining “medical” as “1. Of or relating to the study
or practice of medicine. 2. Requiring treatment by medicine”);
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh Edition
(Merriam Webster 2003) at 771 (defining “medical” as “1: of, relating
to, or concerned with physicians or the practice of medicine 2:
1 In determining the “ordinary meaning” of a word or phrase in a law, we
can look to “contemporaneous dictionaries from around the time when the text
was adopted.” State v. SASS Grp., LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 898 (885 SE2d 761)
(2023). OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) was enacted in 2002. See Ga. Laws 2002, p. 667.
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requiring or devoted to medical treatment”). By contrast, Wallace’s
admitted reason for seeking the photos is legal in nature, and he has
not offered any reason pertaining to the practice of medicine apart
from that. In other words, although Dr. Gorniak is a medical
examiner, she was hired to use her medical expertise for a legal
purpose—i.e., to help develop a legal claim for Wallace’s legal case.2
B. “In the Public Interest” Exception
Wallace also argues that disclosure of the autopsy photographs
to Dr. Gorniak is “in the public interest,” which he says “outweighs
any privacy interest that may be asserted by the deceased’s next of
kin.” OCGA § 45-16-27 (d).
The basis for Wallace’s argument is his contention that OCGA
§ 45-16-24 should be applied to the victim’s autopsy. OCGA § 45-16-24 provides guidelines for conducting autopsies when “an individual
dies in any county in [Georgia],” including that when the death is
a result of violence, . . . it shall be the duty of any law
enforcement officer or other person having knowledge of
2 We are aware of no cases from this Court or the Court of Appeals
interpreting the “medical purpose” exception to OCGA § 45-16-27 (d), and
Wallace has cited none.
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such death to notify immediately the coroner or county
medical examiner of the county in which the acts or
events resulting in the death occurred or the body is
found,
OCGA § 45-16-24 (a), and the notified “coroner or county medical
examiner . . . shall order a medical examiner’s inquiry of that death,”
OCGA § 45-16-24 (b). “Local medical examiner” is defined as “a
licensed physician appointed by the state medical examiner to
perform scene investigations, external examinations, limited
dissections, autopsies, or any combination of such duties.” OCGA §
45-16-23 (b). But the victim in Wallace’s case did not die in “any
county in Georgia”; he died in Florida. Thus, OCGA § 45-16-24 did
not govern his autopsy.
Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s finding that disclosing
the autopsy photographs is not “in the public interest” under OCGA
§ 45-16-27 (d). As explained above, the victim’s family objected to
the disclosure of the photographs, which the trial court noted in its
order denying Wallace’s motion. See OCGA § 45-16-27 (d)
(explaining that the court may order the disclosure of autopsy
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photographs if it finds that disclosure “is in the public interest and
that it outweighs any privacy interest that may be asserted by the
deceased’s next of kin”) (emphasis added).
Wallace contends that the objection the victim’s family made is
outweighed because it is in the public’s interest to allow a Georgialicensed medical examiner to review an autopsy that was conducted
in Florida but used to prosecute a defendant in Georgia. However,
he offers no authority to support that proposition, and we agree with
the trial court’s finding that because the terms of OCGA § 45-16-24
“are wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case,” Wallace’s claim
that applying the statute is “in the public interest” and that this
“public interest” outweighs the objection made by the victim’s family
fails.
C. Conclusion
Because the autopsy photographs at issue in this case were
“not subject to disclosure” under the Open Records Act, see OCGA
§ 50-18-70, et seq., and the disclosure of autopsy photographs
requested by Wallace is not for “medical purposes” and did not meet
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the requirements to be “in the public interest” under OCGA § 45-16-27 (d), the District Attorney was not required to disclose the
photographs to Wallace.3 We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial
of Wallace’s motion for disclosure.
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, and Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
3 We express no opinion on whether there are other ways that Wallace
could obtain the autopsy photographs.
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PETERSON, Chief Justice, concurring.
I agree with the opinion of the Court that OCGA § 45-16-27 (d)
provides at least two separate bases for permitting access to autopsy
photos — (1) if the disclosure is to a physician “for medical purposes”
(i.e., the medical purposes exception) and (2) if the superior court
finds “that disclosure is in the public interest and that it outweighs
any privacy interest that may be asserted by the deceased’s next of
kin” (i.e., the public interest exception). And I agree that the
particular claim that Wallace asserts for autopsy photos does not fall
within either exception. I write separately to note, however, that
OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) raises serious due process concerns if applied
restrictively and, in the proper case, these concerns would require
disclosure of autopsy photos under the public interest exception.
In addition to the medical purposes and public interest
exceptions, OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) provides a third basis for disclosure
— to law enforcement and prosecutors “for law enforcement
purposes[.]” I am confident we would interpret this exception as
permitting access to autopsy photos to defend against a habeas
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petition. But authorizing one-sided access to autopsy photos for
which there is a legitimate litigation need would raise serious due
process concerns.4
Prisoners have a due process right “to contest the legality of a
conviction or the constitutionality of prison conditions through
habeas corpus proceedings.” See Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 772
(1) (479 SE2d 678) (1996); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
821 (97 SCt 1491, 52 LE2d 72) (1977), overruled in part by Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (116 SCt 2174, 135 LE2d 606) (1996). And we
have previously held that statutes declaring information to be
confidential must yield to a person’s constitutional rights. See Head
v. Stripling, 277 Ga. 403, 408-409 (1) (c) (590 SE2d 122) (2003)
(affirming the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s habeas petition
4 Although civil litigants may be able to obtain autopsy photos through
the normal discovery process, there are practical impediments to a pro se
prisoner’s ability to avail themselves of these alternatives. And, while I tend to think that the scope of OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) is limited to records sought via an
open records request and thus would not apply to bar obtaining autopsy photos
through the discovery process, the opinion of the Court expresses no opinion
on that question (because no such discovery efforts are before us). Because the
opinion of the Court does not resolve OCGA § 45-16-27 (d)’s scope, I address
due process issues that may arise if subsection (d) is applied unequally
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on the basis that the state improperly withheld exculpatory
evidence, even though the evidence was protected by state
confidentiality laws); Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 576 (2) (555
SE2d 451) (2001) (trial court erred in denying criminal defendant
access to the juvenile records of the State’s witnesses, because his
“rights under the confrontation clause are paramount to the State’s
policy of protecting [the privacy of] juvenile offenders”). Accord
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (94 SCt 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974)
(holding that a state’s policy interest in protecting the
confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record must yield to the
defendant’s constitutional right to effective cross-examination of an
adverse witness); United States v. Cyphers, 553 F2d 1064, 1069 (7th
Cir. 1977) (noting that a presentence investigation report, which is
usually kept confidential, may be subject to disclosure if it is
“absolutely essential to effective presentation of a defense and
therefore required in the interests of justice”). Thus, this due process
right encompasses the right to access at least some information
necessary to litigate a colorable claim. See Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga.
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302, 308 (3) (758 SE2d 794) (2014). When a statute would prohibit
access to such information, trial courts should resort to permissible
ways of offering access if doing so avoids having to decide the
constitutionality of the statutory prohibition. See id.
In the context of OCGA § 45-16-27 (d), granting the State —
but not prisoners — access to autopsy photos for use in habeas
proceedings would likely violate a prisoner’s due process rights
when the prisoner has a legitimate litigation need for the photos.
And because the public has a substantial interest in not applying a
statute in an unconstitutional way, it seems to me that a trial court
would need to find that a prisoner who can demonstrate a legitimate
litigation need for autopsy photos has thereby demonstrated that his
request is in the public interest. Of course, OCGA § 45-16-27 (d) also
directs trial courts to weigh the asserted public interest against any
privacy interests asserted by the deceased’s next of kin. But it seems
to me that the public interest in avoiding a due process violation by
giving a prisoner with a legitimate litigation need (as opposed to a
bored prisoner on a fishing expedition) access to necessary evidence
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virtually always outweighs any privacy interest of the deceased’s
next of kin (especially when those interests can be accommodated by
a protective order).
But Wallace does not make this argument on appeal. Instead,
to support his claim under the public interest exception, Wallace
makes only one argument: that he needs the autopsy photos to
demonstrate that the autopsy was not conducted properly under
OCGA § 45-16-24. But, as the Court’s opinion correctly points out,
OCGA § 45-16-24 — which provides guidelines for autopsies of
individuals who die in Georgia — simply does not apply to Wallace’s
case, where the victim died in Florida. Thus, Wallace has not
demonstrated a legitimate litigation need for the autopsy photos, so
the due process issue I raise is not implicated today.
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