NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 6, 2025
S25A0410. ROUTH v. THE STATE.
PINSON, Justice.
Jousha O’Shea Routh was convicted of felony murder and other
crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Saiful Bhuyia and
Rizanul Islam. 1 On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused
1 The crimes occurred on September 10, 2017. On March 2, 2018, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Routh for malice murder of both victims
(Counts 1 and 2), felony murder of both victims predicated on attempted armed
robbery (Counts 3 and 4), felony murder of both victims predicated on aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 6), felony murder of both victims predicated on
criminal damage to property (Counts 7 and 8), attempted armed robbery of
Bhuyia (Count 9), aggravated assault of both victims (Counts 10 and 11), criminal damage to property (Count 12), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 13). Routh was tried before a jury from February
3 to 7, 2020. The jury found Routh not guilty of the malice murder of Islam
(Count 2), did not reach a verdict as to the malice murder of Bhuyia (Count 1),
and found Routh guilty of all other counts. The trial court later nolle prossed
Count 1. On February 10, 2020, the trial court entered a final judgment sentencing Routh to life in prison for each of the two counts of felony murder predicated on criminal damage to property (Counts 7 and 8), to be served consecutively, 30 years in prison for the attempted armed robbery of Bhuyia (Count 9),
also to be served consecutively, 20 years in prison for each of the two counts of
aggravated assault (Counts 10 and 11), to be served concurrently with the first
its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of the lead detective
on two occasions: first, by limiting Routh’s questions about whether
the detective ever expressed doubts that Routh was the shooter; and
second, by preventing Routh from asking the detective if he knew
whether the fingerprints at the crime scene, which were matched to
Routh, could have been left before the shooting. But the trial court
did allow some questioning about the detective’s doubts, and it had
discretion to limit Routh’s cross-examination to ensure that Routh
did not take unfair advantage of a prior evidentiary ruling that
would have prevented the State from responding. The trial court
also had discretion to conclude that Routh’s question about the age
of the fingerprints was outside the scope of the officer’s lay testimony. So we affirm Routh’s convictions.
life sentence, and 5 years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 13), to be served consecutively, for a total term of
imprisonment of two life sentences plus 35 years. The remaining counts were
merged or vacated by operation of law.
Routh timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later amended. He
waived an evidentiary hearing on the motion. On October 22, 2024, the trial
court denied Routh’s motion for new trial. Routh filed a timely notice of appeal.
The case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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1. The evidence at trial showed the following. At around
9:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting, Bhuyia, Islam, and two other
workers at a small convenience store that Bhuyia co-owned were
locking up after closing when they saw a white car coming down the
street. The car stopped briefly and then began to drive away. But
then the car turned around, cut its lights, and came back. Two men
jumped out and demanded money from the victims.
Bhuyia and Islam fled to Bhuyia’s car, which was parked
nearby. The two men from the white car chased them and tried to
open the door of Bhuyia’s car. The two other store workers, meanwhile, had run away and hidden in some bushes. As they were running, they heard two shots, and then a “big boom.” After the perpetrators left the scene, the workers came out of the bushes and went
over to Bhuyia’s car. The car had crashed into the side of the building. Both victims had been shot. Bhuyia was dead, and Islam died
from his injuries a few days later.
The store workers called the police. When officers arrived, they
interviewed the workers and viewed footage of the shooting captured
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by a surveillance camera outside the store. (The surveillance footage
was later played for the jury at trial.) The video showed that the
man from the passenger side of the white car had tried to unlock the
door of Bhuyia’s car while the victims were trying to drive away.
When officers dusted Bhuyia’s car door for fingerprints, they found
some usable fingerprints and palm prints. Those prints were compared against a law enforcement database. They were matched to
Routh.
With Routh identified as a suspect, the police obtained his
phone number and his cell phone records. One of Routh’s most frequent contacts was Shea Paul, who was later revealed to be Routh’s
girlfriend, and so the police obtained her phone records as well. Officers also reviewed Paul’s social media accounts. That led them to
the Facebook page of Paul’s mother, where officers saw a photo of a
white car that looked a lot like the one in the surveillance video.
Officers ran that car’s license plate number using a database they
had access to, and learned that the car was recorded at an intersection a quarter mile from the crime scene a few minutes after the
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shooting.
The police spoke to Paul and ruled her out as a suspect based
on her interview and her cell phone location data. But Paul told the
police that Routh sometimes used her mother’s car, too. And Routh’s
cell phone location data did not rule him out as a suspect. Instead,
it showed that someone used his phone near the scene of the murder
at 8:45 p.m. and 8:51 p.m. — about ten to fifteen minutes before the
shooting — and that the phone was not used again until 1:32 a.m.
the next morning, which suggested to the State’s cell-phone expert
that the phone was turned off for that time period.
Law enforcement officers showed Paul the surveillance footage
of the murder. At trial, she was shown the footage again. She identified Routh as the shooter. In making that identification, Paul testified that she recognized Routh’s clothing and “[h]is mannerisms,
how he ran, pulls the pants up, everything.”
2. Routh contends that the trial court wrongly prevented him
from asking the lead detective about the detective’s remark that he
did not know whether Routh was the shooter. We review a trial
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court’s rulings about the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 538, 541-542 (3) (796 SE2d 666)
(2017).
(a) Before trial, the State moved in limine to exclude references
to any self-serving hearsay statements Routh may have made “unless and until the State opens the door or the Defendant testifies.”
The State was especially concerned about statements Routh made
during his custodial interview with police. The court granted the motion to exclude Routh’s statements in his interview. The court later
clarified that any reference at all to the interview was excluded.
At trial, when Routh’s counsel cross-examined the officer who
had conducted the interview, Detective Calvin Thomas, counsel
asked him, “Did you ever say to Mr. Routh that you don’t know
whether he did the shooting?” Counsel was referring to a part of the
interview where the detective showed Routh some of the evidence
against him and said, “You’ve heard of fingerprint dust and DNA,
and things of that nature. . . . Left palm driver’s door, left palm . . .
on the rear door. So this puts you there. All right? Now, whether you
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did the shooting I don’t know. Okay? But this puts you there.”
The State objected that the trial court had excluded Routh’s
police interview. Counsel argued that he was not trying to introduce
the interview or Routh’s self-serving hearsay, only the detective’s
statement. But the State responded that it would be unable to rehabilitate the detective or give context to his statement without referencing the interview, which had been excluded. The trial court
agreed that counsel could not take the single statement from the
interview out of context. But the court allowed counsel to ask the
detective whether, on the date of the interview, he believed Routh
was the shooter.
Counsel asked the detective that question. The detective said
that he did know Routh was the shooter at that time. Counsel then
tried to impeach the detective with the excerpt from the interview.
The State objected again. This time, the trial court ruled that counsel could ask the detective whether he had made the statement, but
without revealing the existence of the interview. The court further
ruled that the State on re-direct would then be allowed to ask the
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detective how he formed his opinion that Routh was the shooter.
Counsel then asked Detective Thomas: “[D]id you state that
you didn’t know whether or not Jousha Routh was the shooter. Did
you say that?” The detective responded, “I made that statement to
him. I did.” Counsel then moved on to other questions. On redirect,
the State asked the detective why he believed Routh was the
shooter. The detective said his belief was based on the fingerprint
evidence from the scene, the cell phone location evidence, and
Routh’s connection with Paul and her mother.
(b) Any person charged with a criminal offense “shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.
Const. Amend. VI. See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par.
XIV (“Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this
state . . . shall be confronted with the witnesses testifying against
such person.”); OCGA § 24-6-611 (b) (“The right of a thorough and
sifting cross-examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against the party.”). But that right “is not an absolute
right.” Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 796 (4) (733 SE2d 715) (2012)
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(citation omitted). Criminal defendants are not guaranteed a crossexamination that is “effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Carston v. State, 310 Ga. 797, 800 (2)
(854 SE2d 684) (2021) (citation omitted). Instead, trial courts have
discretion to impose reasonable limits on the scope of cross-examination, see Smith, 300 Ga. at 541-542 (3), and a trial court’s limitations on cross-examination will generally be upheld as reasonable
“so long as the court does not cut off all inquiry on a subject that the
defense is entitled to cross-examine on.” Ellington v. State, 314 Ga.
335, 345 (3) (877 SE2d 221) (2022) (citation omitted).
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion when it restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Thomas.
The court had excluded Routh’s police interview, a ruling that Routh
does not challenge on appeal. So when counsel tried to ask the detective about a statement that was made during the interview, it
was reasonable for the court to put some boundaries on those questions to ensure that the court’s order in limine was fairly applied.
Cf. Harvey v. State, 296 Ga. 823, 832-834 (2) (b)-(c) (770 SE2d 840)
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(2015) (trial court had discretion to grant mistrial when defendant
brought up aspects of police interview that had been excluded by
order in limine). To that end, the court did not allow counsel free
rein to bring up the detective’s statement with no context. But it also
did not “cut off all inquiry on [the] subject.” Ellington, 315 Ga. at 345
(3) (citation omitted). Instead, the court allowed counsel to use the
detective’s statement to impeach his testimony about his mental impressions during the interview, and then allowed the State to ask
limited follow-up questions to put the detective’s statement in context. Those rulings reflect a careful approach to the issue that fairly
enforced the court’s order. The court was well within its discretion
to impose those reasonable limits on cross-examination. See Smith,
300 Ga. at 541-542 (3). See also Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 685
(5) (889 SE2d 914) (2023) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by
restricting the defendant from asking certain questions on cross-examination that could have impugned the witness’s character or
given the jury a false impression about the underlying facts, since
the defendant was allowed to ask about a broad range of topics and
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to impeach the witness in other ways).
3. Routh also contends that the trial court wrongly prevented
his trial counsel from asking Detective Thomas whether, in his opinion, Routh’s fingerprints could have been left on the victim’s car
sometime before the shooting. The State objected that the question
called for speculation and was outside the detective’s area of expertise. The trial court sustained the State’s objection and explained
that Detective Thomas “[had] not been admitted as an expert in fingerprints, as to when fingerprints can be left and how long they can
remain on an object or anything of that nature.”
Under OCGA § 24-7-701 (a) (Rule 701 (a)), a lay witness may
give opinion testimony if the opinion is (1) “[r]ationally based on the
perception of the witness,” (2) “[h]elpful to a clear understanding of
the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,” and
(3) “[n]ot based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.” See also Durden v. State, 318 Ga. 729, 733 (1) (899 SE2d
679) (2024). We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision
whether to allow lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 (a). See Gude
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v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 868 (4) (874 SE2d 84) (2022).
Detective Thomas, the lead investigator in the case, gave factual testimony about the steps in the police investigation. It was
within the scope of that testimony for the detective to tell the jury
that, as a matter of historical fact, Routh was identified as a suspect
when his fingerprints were found on the victim’s car. But it is less
obvious that the detective’s opinion about the possible age of those
fingerprints was admissible. Detective Thomas was not qualified as
an expert in fingerprints, and no one had laid a foundation with respect to his “experience and training” in fingerprints. See Holmes v.
State, 301 Ga. 143, 145 (1) (800 SE2d 353) (2017) (explaining that
law enforcement officers can give opinion testimony, even if they are
not qualified as experts, “if an adequate foundation is laid with respect to their experience and training”) (citation omitted). And although a lay witness might be allowed under Rule 701 (a) to give an
opinion about fingerprint evidence if the opinion could be based in
common, non-expert knowledge, answering other questions about
fingerprint evidence might require more technical or specialized
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knowledge. Indeed, in this very case, the State called a latent fingerprint examiner who was qualified as an expert. See also, e.g.,
Isaac v. State, 319 Ga. 25, 27 (1) (901 SE2d 535) (2024) (discussing
an “expert in fingerprint examination and analysis” who testified
that “fingerprints on a car could be wiped or washed down”). Given
the circumstances here — where the prints were found outside on a
car that was exposed to the elements — the trial court could reasonably conclude that the age of Routh’s fingerprints was a matter that
required “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” see
OCGA § 24-7-701 (a), and thus fell on the expert side of that line,
see Isaac, 319 Ga. at 27 (1). The court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Detective Thomas, who was not admitted as an expert in “when fingerprints can be left and how long they
can remain on an object,” and for whom no foundation was laid as to
his experience and training in fingerprints, could not offer an opinion on the question. See Gude, 313 Ga. at 868 (4).
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ, concur.
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