NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S24C1320
February 18, 2025
The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
The following order was passed:
ATLANTIC GAMES, INC. v. GEORGIA LOTTERY
CORPORATION.
The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in
this case.
All the Justices concur.
Court of Appeals Case No. A24A0279
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta
I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk
PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.
I concur in the Court’s denial of certiorari in this case. Atlantic
Games argues that the General Assembly’s delegation of
rulemaking authority to the Georgia Lottery Corporation in this
case was without clear statutory guidance in violation of the Georgia
nondelegation doctrine, and asks us to reconsider our decision in
DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699 (398 SE2d 567) (1990). We have
previously indicated interest in reconsidering that decision, and the
nondelegation issues that Atlantic Games raises are important. But
this case is not a good vehicle for reaching any of those issues, as the
Court of Appeals did not address them below. Nevertheless, I take
this opportunity to explain Georgia’s nondelegation doctrine and
why DOT appears impossible to reconcile with that doctrine’s
historic contours.1
1 Although nondelegation issues can arise as a result of the action of any
governmental entity vested by the Georgia Constitution with governmental
power, the prototypical case involves an act of the General Assembly
challenged as delegating legislative power to an executive branch agency. For
simplicity, I generally will use that single context as representing all the other contexts throughout this opinion.
2
1. Constitutional basis for the nondelegation doctrine.
The nondelegation doctrine derives from the fact that the
Georgia Constitution vests specific powers in specific government
entities;2 at its core, the doctrine simply means that when the
Georgia Constitution vests power in a governmental entity, that
power is to be exercised only by that entity. We have characterized
this principle as critically important to our system of ordered liberty:
“To permit the General Assembly to abdicate and transfer to
administrative agencies of government essential legislative
functions, would strike down our constitutional system, and
inaugurate the police state, condemned by every advocate of
individual liberty and freedom.” Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734, 740
(58 SE2d 534) (1950). As between branches of state government, this
principle is best understood through a general structural
2 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (“The legislative power of
the state shall be vested in a General Assembly which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. V, Sec. II, Par. I
(“The chief executive powers shall be vested in the Governor. The other
executive officers shall have such powers as may be prescribed by this
Constitution and by law.”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I (“The
judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following classes
of courts . . . .”).
3
separation-of-powers lens: when the Georgia Constitution vests one
branch with power, by implication that means that branch cannot
give its power to another branch.
Within the universe of nondelegation cases, I see two distinct
subcategories that each provide an additional constitutional basis.
First, the text of the Georgia Constitution’s Separation of Powers
Paragraph3 expressly prohibits persons with power of one branch of
state government from exercising any power that is vested in either
of the other two branches of state government. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Farmer, 223 Ga. 605, 607 (157 SE2d 276) (1967) (striking down
statute delegating legislative taxing power to executive branch
agency as violation of separation of powers provision found in Ga.
Const. of 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII). Second, principles of selfgovernment and state sovereignty4 prohibit a government entity in
3 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“The legislative, judicial,
and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person
discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of
either of the others except as herein provided.”).
4 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I (“All government, of right,
originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted
4
which the Georgia Constitution has vested power from delegating
that power to entities outside Georgia government, such as private
parties, other state governments, and the federal government. 5 See,
solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to them.”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I,
Sec. II, Par. II (“The people of this state have the inherent right of regulating
their internal government. Government is instituted for the protection,
security, and benefit of the people; and at all times they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it.”).
5 We have in many cases invalidated delegations of power from the
General Assembly to Georgia local governments. Some of those cases cite as
the source of the constitutional rule only the provision of the Georgia
Constitution that vests the legislative power in the General Assembly; these
may represent the nondelegation doctrine in its purest form. See, e.g., Jamison
v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 51 (1) (165 SE2d 647) (1969) (striking down
statute attempting to delegate “strictly legislative” power of fixing municipal
corporate limits). Sometimes we have also suggested separation-of-powers
reasons for such cases. See, e.g., Turner County v. City of Ashburn, 293 Ga.
739, 742-749 (749 SE2d 685) (2013). I have previously articulated my view that
the Georgia Constitution’s Separation of Powers Paragraph does not apply to
local governments. See City of Union Point v. Greene County, 303 Ga. 449, 461-463 (812 SE2d 278) (2018) (Peterson, J., concurring) (noting line of caselaw
beginning in 1910 holding that the Georgia Constitution’s Separation of
Powers Paragraph does not apply to local governments, as well as our
inconsistent application of that caselaw). But I have also noted the possibility
that at least some “separation-of-powers principles are found in more than
simply the Separation of Powers [Paragraph]; like the United States
Constitution (which lacks such a [Paragraph]),” it is possible that such
principles applicable even to local governments might “also arise from the
nature and structure of the Georgia Constitution.” Id. at 462 (Peterson, J.,
concurring). In any event, although these local government cases are all
relevant to understanding the nature and application of the nondelegation
doctrine, it’s important to recognize that their precise holdings have often been
abrogated by later changes to the Georgia Constitution’s provisions regarding
local governments.
5
e.g., Rogers v. Med. Ass’n of Georgia, 244 Ga. 151, 153 (2) (259 SE2d
85) (1979) (striking down statute delegating to private organization
the power to appoint members to a state board when Constitution
“mandate[d] that public affairs shall be managed by public officials
who are accountable to the people”); Green v. City of Atlanta, 162
Ga. 641 (5) (135 SE 84) (1926) (“The city of Atlanta cannot abandon
its legislative power and confer it upon the federal authorities.”).
2. Nondelegation analytical principles.
I see in our caselaw what is essentially a three-step test to
evaluate whether the nondelegation doctrine has been violated.
First, we determine whether a statute or other allegedly delegating
government action actually purported to delegate any power.
Second, if so, we determine whether the delegating entity had that
power in the first place. And third, if so, we determine whether the
delegation was permissible. I will take each step in turn.
A. Whether government action has actually delegated
any power.
An executive branch administrative agency has “only such
6
powers as the Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication
conferred on it[,]” and “such implied powers only as are reasonably
necessary to execute the express powers conferred.” See Bentley v.
State Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 152 Ga. 836, 838 (111 SE 379) (1922).
Thus, if a statute does not either expressly or implicitly confer the
powers alleged to have been improperly delegated, the alleged
delegation has not actually occurred and our inquiry ends. See, e.g.,
R.R. Comm’n of Georgia v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 151 Ga. 256, 258
(106 SE 282) (1921); Zuber v. S. Ry. Co., 9 Ga. App. 539, 544-545 (71
SE 937) (1911) (holding that because “the Legislature had not paved
the way by furnishing in advance the legislative object on which the
administrative act was to operate,” the railroad commission’s
regulations “must fall”). Because even implied delegations must
derive from express authority, many cases start and end at this
step.6
6 See, e.g., North Fulton Med. Ctr. v. Stephenson, 269 Ga. 540, 542-544
(501 SE2d 798) (1998) (striking down regulation because it conflicted with
statute and agencies cannot “enlarge the scope of, or supply omissions in, a
properly enacted statute[,]” “change a statute by interpretation,” or “establish
7
This step is also where early applications of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance appear: “This court will never presume
that the General Assembly intended to enact an unconstitutional
different standards within a statute that are not established by the legislative
body”); Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Anderson, 218 Ga. App. 528, 529 (462 SE2d 439)
(1995) (invalidating administrative rule attempting to add a requirement
inconsistent with the “clear authority of the statute”); HCA Health Servs. of
Ga., Inc. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 502-503 (2) (458 SE2d 118) (1995) (striking
down agency’s regulation in excess of authority because agency had “no
constitutional authority to legislate[;]” its power was limited to the
performance of an administrative function: “to promulgate rules for the
enforcement of the General Assembly’s enactments”); Rielli v. State, 174 Ga.
App. 220, 222 (3) (330 SE2d 104) (1985) (“An administrative rule promulgated
without statutory authority is invalid.”); Local Div. 732 v. Metro. Atlanta, 253
Ga. 219, 222 (3) (a) (320 SE2d 742) (1984), overruled in part on other grounds
in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477 (109 SCt 1917, 104 LE2d 526)
(1989) (without “express statutory authority,” MARTA lacked “the power to
delegate to arbitrators the authority to determine the conditions of
employment of the agency’s employees”); O’Neal v. Georgia Real Estate
Comm’n, 129 Ga. App. 211, 212 (199 SE2d 362) (1973) (Commission lacked
authority to adopt rule that amended or repealed constitutional or statutory
rights); Gartrell v. McGahee, 216 Ga. 125, 128 (1) (114 SE2d 871) (1960)
(striking down delegatee’s attempt to delegate power delegated to it by statute
because the statute conferred limited that authority expressly to the
delegatee); Crawley v. Seignious, 213 Ga. 810, 812-813 (102 SE2d 38) (1958)
(striking down regulation that conflicted with the statute); Hunt v. Glenn, 206
Ga. 664, 667 (58 SE2d 137) (1950) (The Board, “as an administrative agency of
the State . . . may make rules and regulations which are in harmony with the
purposes of the law, but it is without authority to make any rule or regulation
which alters or limits the statute being administered.”); S. Co-Operative
Foundry Co. v. Drummond, 76 Ga. App. 222, 224 (45 SE2d 687) (1947)
(delegatee was “a creature of the statute, and was established by the
Legislature as an administrative body”; “[i]t has no inherent powers and no
lawful right to act except as directed by the statute”; “[i]t may exercise its rule making powers under and within the law, but not outside of the law or in a
manner inconsistent with the law”).
8
law. Where the language of an act is susceptible of a construction
that is constitutional, and another that would be unconstitutional,
that meaning or construction will be applied which will sustain the
act.” Glustrom, 206 Ga. at 739. Many close cases end with the
application of this doctrine. See, e.g., Premier Health Care Invs.,
LLC v. UHS of Anchor, LP, 310 Ga. 32, 49-54 (3) (f) (849 SE2d 441)
(2020) (construing statute narrowly to avoid interpreting statute as
delegating impermissible authority to the Department of
Community Health); Glustrom, 206 Ga. at 739-740 (resolving
nondelegation challenge by interpreting statute as not delegating
impermissible authority to State Revenue Commissioner); Southern
Co-op. Foundry Co. v. Drummond, 76 Ga. App. 222, 224-225 (45
SE2d 687) (1947) (resolving nondelegation challenge by interpreting
regulation as inconsistent with authority conferred by statute).
We also see at this step what appears to be a version of the
major questions doctrine, which may not be all that different from
constitutional avoidance: “The power to permit a street-railroad
company to discontinue or abandon service upon a particular line or
9
upon a particular part of its system is so extraordinary as to
preclude the idea that the General Assembly would have left such
power to implication merely. It is more reasonable to assume that
the General Assembly would have given such power in express
terms.” Railroad Commission, 151 Ga. at 258-259 (2).
B. Whether the delegating governmental entity
possesses the delegated power in the first place.
Even when delegations are permissible, one can delegate no
more than the power one possesses. Sometimes, a governmental
actor seeks to delegate a power it doesn’t have. In such cases, we
strike down the statute not as a matter of nondelegation, but
because it was simply beyond the power of the government actor. In
a case involving a nondelegation challenge to a statute delegating
taxing power over a particular commodity to a state executive
branch agency, we explained as follows:
[Because] it is not a tax which the General Assembly has
constitutional power to impose only on that particular
agricultural commodity for any one of the purposes
enumerated in the aforementioned provision of the
Constitution, it is elementary that the General Assembly
10
is without constitutional authority to create an
instrumentality of the State and clothe it with power to
impose a tax on such commodity, a power which it does
not itself possess. The State can never do indirectly that
which it cannot lawfully do directly.
Agricultural Commodities Authority v. Balkcom, 215 Ga. 107, 109
(1) (109 SE2d 276) (1959) (striking down statute as beyond the
power of the General Assembly). See also, e.g., Ogletree v. Dozier, 59
Ga. 800, 801-802 (1877) (striking down statute authorizing county
commissioners to hire out prisoners, on the grounds that the power
to hire out prisoners “belongs, if it be exercised at all, to the
governor”); cf. City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 361-362 (254 SE2d 315) (1979) (“[B]ecause the state may not do
indirectly that which it cannot lawfully do directly[, ] the General
Assembly must have express constitutional authorization for its act
in allowing a county to impose a tax for a particular purpose.”).
C. Whether the delegation is permissible.
If a statute delegates authority to an executive branch
administrative agency, and the General Assembly actually has
constitutional authority to legislate on the subject, we then move to
11
the final analytical step: whether the delegation was permissible.
And in framing it in terms of “delegation,” we’ve immediately gone
at least sort of wrong.
The point of the nondelegation doctrine is that all power vested
in a governmental entity by the Georgia Constitution is reserved for
that entity to exercise itself. In the context of action by the General
Assembly, that means that all of the State’s legislative power must
be exercised only by the General Assembly. If a statute delegates
legislative power for an agency of another branch to exercise, by
definition that’s impermissible. So, in one sense, any “delegation” of
power the General Assembly possesses (which is only the legislative
power) is unlawful.
But the General Assembly can by law impose the responsibility
to execute a particular law on a particular agency. That is, in fact,
the nature of the executive power: to execute laws enacted by the
General Assembly. See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. V, Sec. II, Par.
II (“The Governor shall take care that the laws are faithfully
executed . . . .”). So our caselaw that speaks of determining what
12
delegations are permissible may be better understood as
determining whether a statute delegates legislative authority (and
thus is impermissible), or merely legislates in a way that confers
responsibility on a particular executive branch agency to execute
that particular statute. See Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80,
84 (5) (1853) (upholding statute challenged on nondelegation
grounds because “no Legislative power is delegated to the Courts by
the acts under consideration. There is simply a ministerial act to be
performed — no discretion is given to the Courts”).
Although “it is not easy to draw an exact line” between
delegation of legislative power and legislation that merely identifies
the executive branch agency responsible for executing a statute and
gives that agency guidance in so doing, see Southern Ry. Co. v.
Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 285 (65 SE 665) (1909), the line in our historic
precedent turns on the extent to which the statute provides objective
guidelines to direct the agency’s exercise of power; sometimes, that’s
best thought of as similar to the requirements enforceable in
mandamus. See Franklin Bridge Co., 14 Ga. at 84 (5) (noting that
13
the nature of the duties assigned under the statute “is made
obligatory upon the Courts; and should they refuse to discharge it, a
mandamus would lie to coerce them”); Phinizy v. Eve, 108 Ga. 360,
361-363 (1) (33 SE 1007) (1899) (upholding statute where “[e]very
step [was] prescribed” because the General Assembly declared
among other things “the subjects of taxation; when, how, and by
whom and to whom, returns [we]re to be made; when and by whom
the rate must be calculated; and when and by whom and to whom
the money must be paid”). 7 In other words, statutes that impose on
the agency such clear requirements or conditions that the agency
essentially executes a ministerial duty clearly fall within the bounds
7 See also City of Calhoun v. North Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 233
Ga. 759, 768-770 (5) (b) (213 SE2d 596) (1975) (statute contained sufficiently
definitive standards when its purposes were appropriate, other provisions put
those purposes into effect completely and thoroughly, and it limited the
delegatee’s authority to applying standards set forth in the act, making rules
and regulations according to such standards, and administering them);
Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 365 (4) (3
SE2d 705) (1939) (“[O]ne of the most important tests in determining whether
a law amounts to an invalid delegation of legislative power is the completeness
of the statute as it appears when it leaves the hands of the legislature[.]”);
Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 842-843 (3) (196 SE 897) (1938) (statute did
not unlawfully delegate legislative authority because it “sufficiently fix[ed] the policy, general rules, and methods by which the [delegatee] should exercise its
functions”).
14
of permissible “delegations” (if we must call them that). See, e.g.,
Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 659 (2) (94 SE2d 714) (1956)
(statute permitting county boards of education to reorganize schools
in their jurisdiction conferred “merely administrative powers” that
were and had been a function of county boards of education).
Similarly, we have upheld statutes that distinguish between
“the power to pass a law” — which necessarily requires discretion as
to what the law shall be — “and the power to adopt rules and
regulations to carry into effect a law already passed” — which
requires some — but far less — discretion as to the law’s execution,
see Georgia R.R. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694, 699 (1) (1883); statutes that
are complete when they leave the hands of the legislature, see
Telford v. City of Gainesville, 208 Ga. 56, 63 (1), 65-67 (3), 67 (4) (65
SE2d 246) (1951); and statutes that take effect upon the happening
of some event, see City of Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317, 324-325
(6) (1875).
By contrast, our historic precedent consistently has struck
down statutes that delegate broad discretion, see, e.g., Georgia
15
Franchise Practices Comm’n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800,
802 (4) (262 SE2d 106) (1979) (statutory guidelines that leave the
agency “broad discretion” are insufficient) and Richter v. Chatham
County, 146 Ga. 218, 219-221 (2) (91 SE 35) (1916) (striking down
statute where General Assembly “made no effort to legislate
anything in regard to the system of [voter] registration”); and
statutes that leave “the authority to a ministerial officer to define
the thing to which the statute is to be applied,” see Sundberg v.
State, 234 Ga. 482, 484 (216 SE2d 332) (1975) (striking down
criminal statute delegating authority to designate “depressant or
stimulant drug[s]” that the statute generally criminalized, because
it “attempted to delegate . . . authority to determine what acts (the
possession of such substances) would constitute a crime,” even
though statute provided some detail on this point).
In short, a statute conferring on an executive branch agency
the authority to administer the statute survives a nondelegation
challenge when the statute imposes clear, objective guidelines that
cabin the agency’s discretion in meaningful and judicially
16
enforceable ways. Although our historic caselaw does not require the
elimination of all agency discretion, it does not permit much agency
discretion. That caselaw has been frank about the difficulty of
drawing a precise line at where some discretion becomes too much
discretion, but the line definitely exists, and our Court has not
hesitated to strike down statutes that have crossed it.8 (And when
8 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wilkerson, 258 Ga. 608, 608-609 (372 SE2d 432)
(1988) (striking down statute allowing others to specify grounds for recall
election as “impermissible delegation of legislative authority” because the
Constitution required the General Assembly to specify such grounds and “this
[was] a mandate which the General Assembly [could] not escape”); Campbell,
223 Ga. at 607 (striking down statute seeking to delegate legislative power to
levy taxes to programs because, although constitutional amendment
authorized creation of programs, “it did not authorize the delegation of the
State’s taxing power” to them); Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 95-96 (230 SE2d
853) (1976) (striking down criminal statute directing that “any person . . . who
shall violate any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the [delegatee]
shall be made guilty of a misdemeanor” because it gave a ministerial officer
authority to define the thing to which the statute was to be applied); Bibb
County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. 817, 826 (51 SE2d 658) (1949) (striking down statute
that “by its own terms undertook to vest in the board ‘full power and authority,
in its discretion, to inaugurate, constitute, and administer pension and or other
insurance benefits” (punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Long v. State,
202 Ga. 235, 237 (42 SE2d 729) (1947) (striking down statute attempting “to
authorize the county commissioners to make a law, by defining the act, the
violation of which would be a misdemeanor” and to change and modify the
terms of an existing penal statute by prescribing a speed limit according to
their discretion); Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 816 (187 SE 20) (1936)
(striking down statute giving grand jury “uncontrolled and unguided”
discretion in fixing a salary the Constitution required the General Assembly
alone to set because the General Assembly could not delegate “essentially
legislative” functions, including “uncontrolled and unguided discretion”).
17
in the gray area, our step one constitutional avoidance doctrine often
makes finer line-drawing unnecessary.)
3. Interpretive principles make our historic caselaw critically
important to determining the scope and nature of our current
nondelegation doctrine.
The relevant constitutional text of the various vesting clauses
and the separation of powers paragraph in today’s Georgia
Constitution was materially identical (for all purposes relevant to
nondelegation) through multiple previous Georgia constitutions.9
9 A separation of powers provision has been in every Georgia
Constitution, and has been carried forward without material change from its
1877 version to the current Constitution of 1983. See Ga. Const. of 1877, Art.
I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII (“The legislative, judicial and executive powers shall
forever remain separate and distinct, and no person discharging the duties of
one, shall, at the same time, exercise the functions of either of the others,
except as herein provided.”); Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII (same as 1877); Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IV (same as 1877); Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (same as 1877 with changes to punctuation).
The legislative power vesting provision has been carried forward without
material change since its initial appearance in the 1789 Constitution to the
current Constitution of 1983. See Ga. Const. of 1789, Art. I, Par. I (“The
legislative power shall be vested in two separate and distinct branches, to wit,
a Senate and House of Representatives, to be styled, ‘The General Assembly.”);
Ga. Const. of 1798, Art. I, Par. II (same as 1789 with changes to capitalization
and punctuation); Ga. Const. of 1861, Art. II, Sec. 4917, Par. II (“The
Legislative power shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); Ga. Const. of 1865, Art. II, Sec. II
18
(“The legislative power shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall
consist of a senate and house of representatives, the members whereof shall be
elected and returns of the elections made in the manner now prescribed by law
. . . .”); Ga. Const. of 1868, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (“The Legislative Power shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives, and until otherwise directed, the Members thereof, after the
first Election, shall be elected, and the Returns of the Election made as now
prescribed by Law.”); Ga. Const. of 1877, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (same as 1861
with changes to capitalization and punctuation); Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. III,
Sec. I, Par. I (“The legislative power of the State shall be vested in a General
Assembly which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); Ga.
Const. of 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (same as 1945); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.
III, Sec. I, Par. I (same as 1945 with changes to capitalization).
The executive power vesting provision was carried forward without
material change from the 1789 Constitution through the 1976 Constitution.
See Ga. Const. of 1789, Art. II, Par. I (“The executive power shall be vested in
a governor, who shall hold his office during the term of two years, and shall be
elected in the following manner:”); Ga. Const. of 1798, Art. II, Par. I (“The
executive power shall be vested in a governor, who shall hold his office during
the term of two years, and until such time as a successor shall be chosen and
qualified;”); Ga. Const. of 1861, Art. III, Sec. 4954, Par. 1 (same as 1798 with
changes to capitalization); Ga. Const. of 1865, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (“The
executive power shall be vested in a governor, the first of whom under this
constitution shall hold the office from the time of his inauguration, as by law
provided, until the election and qualification of his successor.”); Ga. Const. of
1868, Art. IV, Sec. I, Par. I (“The Executive Power shall be vested in a Governor
who shall hold his Office during the Term of four years, and until such time as
a Successor shall be chosen and qualified.”); Ga. Const. of 1877, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. II (same as 1868 but changed term from four to two years and changes to
capitalization); Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I (same as 1877 with
changes to capitalization); Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I (same as
1945). A material change then occurred in the vesting clause as it appeared in
our current Constitution of 1983, albeit a change not relevant to nondelegation:
the 1983 Constitution was the first to vest in the Governor only the “chief”
executive powers and expressly added a reference to other executive officers in
the vesting clause. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. V, Sec. II, Par. I (“The chief
executive powers shall be vested in the Governor. The other executive officers
shall have such powers as may be prescribed by this Constitution and by law.”)
19
Because these constitutional provisions from which the
nondelegation doctrine is derived have remained the same over
time, the nondelegation principles that we draw from our caselaw
prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution form important
context for understanding the scope of the 1983 Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 184 (II) (B)
(824 SE2d 265) (2019); Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry
County Bd. of Commissioners, 315 Ga. 39, 62 (2) (c) (iii) (880 SE2d
168) (2022). See also Nels S.D. Peterson, Principles of Georgia
Constitutional Interpretation, 75 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 35 (2023) (“[T]he
presumption flowing from a consistent and definitive construction
could be understood as privileging pre-1983 constitutional precedent
over post-1983 constitutional precedent, as the older precedent
would be indicators of original meaning in ways that the newer
And the judicial power vesting provision has been carried forward since
its initial appearance in the 1798 Constitution to the current Constitution of
1983. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 315 Ga. at 46 (2) (a) (citing relevant
constitutional provisions). The only real change that occurred was in the 1983
Constitution, which added the word “exclusively,” although our caselaw
appears to have read the prior vesting clauses as exclusive as well. See id.
20
precedent is not.”).
4. DOT v. City of Atlanta is wrong and should be
reconsidered.
In the face of our historic caselaw about what constitutes
sufficient guidelines, DOT is clearly an aberration. In DOT, this
Court upheld a statute delegating to a state commission the power
to approve the exercise of eminent domain (long understood to be
part of the legislative power)10 over public property if the
commission found such a taking was “reasonable, necessary, and in
the public interest.” 260 Ga. at 700-702. The statute did so without
providing any guidelines to guide the commission in determining
when a taking was “reasonable, necessary, and in the public
interest.” Id. The Court held that the statutory requirement that the
takings be “reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest” was
10 See Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Min. Co., 119 Ga.
354, 355 (1) (46 SE 422) (1904) (“The right of eminent domain is a sovereign
right of the state. It is inherent in every sovereignty, and existed before
constitutions were adopted. It lies dormant until the Legislature sets it in
motion.”). See also S. Ry. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 441-442 (134
SE2d 12) (1963).
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itself a sufficient guideline because “[i]n other cases we . . . found
that delegations of the power of eminent domain such as that here
contain sufficient guidelines.” Id. at 703-704 (1) (citing State v.
Moore, 259 Ga. 139 (376 SE2d 877) (1989); Eaves v. Harris, 258 Ga.
1 (364 SE2d 854) (1988); Williamson v. Housing Authority of
Augusta, 186 Ga. 673 (199 SE 43) (1938)).
But these cases do not support this proposition. First, Moore
and Eaves post-dated the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, so their
holdings cannot form part of the context we consider as informing
the original public meaning of that Constitution. Second, both of
those cases included guidelines that were far more restrictive than
the ones present in DOT. The statute in Moore provided that, before
exercising discretion in designating certain roads for oversized
vehicles and “to provide reasonable access requirements in
compliance” with the statute, the delegatee “must first consider”
mandatory guidelines set forth in the statute. 259 Ga. at 142 (8).
And the statute at issue in Eaves permitted the Governor to suspend
public official indicted for a felony “[i]f, and only if” an appointed
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commission recommended suspension. 258 Ga. at 2. And third,
neither of those cases grappled at all with our pre-1983 caselaw.
Williamson, meanwhile, the only pre-1983 case DOT cited on this
point, did not discuss guidelines at all, and it escapes me how we
even came to cite it in DOT on this point. 258 Ga. at 680-681 (4). In
short, DOT’s holding that a statute empowering an executive branch
agency to wield legislative power subject only to the “guidelines”
that the agency’s decisions be “reasonable,” “necessary,” and “in the
public interest” was unsupported by any case it cited and completely
out of step with the many previous decisions of this Court enforcing
a robust nondelegation doctrine. Although that historic caselaw is
frank about the difficulty of line-drawing in a close case, that
caselaw is clear that the line exists, and it requires far more than
the empty “guidelines” present in DOT. In an appropriate case, we
should seriously consider whether to overrule DOT.
Of course, stare decisis is an important principle of Georgia
law. See Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471, 508-520 (870 SE2d 758) (2022)
(Peterson, J., dissenting); Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’
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Comp., 309 Ga. 44, 62-65 (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (Peterson, J.,
dissenting). But stare decisis applies with less force in constitutional
cases. See Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a
Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014).
And stare decisis also applies with less force to opinions that have
not made a serious attempt at deciding the legal question at issue.
See Wasserman v. Franklin County, No. S23G1029, 51 (II) (B) (1)
(Ga. Jan. 28, 2025) (“Such precedents embody just the sort of
‘arbitrary discretion’ (whether actual or apparent) that can be
especially harmful to the rule of law, see The Federalist No. 78, at
529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), so we are more
open to replacing them with (ideally) carefully reasoned rules of
decision that courts can apply evenhandedly to future cases.”);
Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 170-172 (1) (880 SE2d 544) (2022)
(Pinson, J., concurring). As explained above, DOT may well be such
an opinion. Although I do not prejudge the application of stare
decisis to DOT, that opinion seems to me to have an uphill battle
when we eventually reconsider it. And we should.
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