NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 4, 2025
S25A0034. BYRD v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Appellant Mickey Lewis Byrd, Jr., challenges his bench-trial
convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with
the shooting death of Steven Moore. Appellant contends that the
evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions,
that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
right to a jury trial, and that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1
1 The crimes occurred on November 3, 2019. On February 4, 2020, an
Evans County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1),
felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 5). At a bench trial held on January 12, 2022, the trial
court found Appellant guilty of all counts except Count 5. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for
Count 1 and a term of five years for Count 4, running consecutive to Count 1.
Although the trial court purported to merge the felony-murder count into the
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial showed the following. On the evening of November
3, 2019, Moore, who was also known as “Brutus,” and others
organized a party for teenagers at a club in Claxton, located in
Evans County. While the party was intended for teenagers, adults
were also present, serving as chaperones. Witnesses saw both
Appellant and Moore before and during the party. At some point
during the party, Appellant, who was a chaperone, remarked that if
someone at the party “act[s] up, I have my stick on me . . . ,” meaning
that if someone at the party “goes off wrong or gets on the wrong
track, [Appellant had a gun in his] pocket.” Soon after, the party was
“shutdown” because a “dis song” was played. The song created “a lot
of chaos and a lot of drama. So, they stopped playing music and cut
on the lights, and everybody left the building.” As everyone at the
malice-murder count, the felony-murder count was vacated by operation of law.
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 153 (886 SE2d 818) (2023). Count 3
merged. On February 3, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he
amended with new counsel on April 10, 2023. After an evidentiary hearing on
April 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on May 13,
2024. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in
this Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
party began to filter outside, witnesses saw Moore move his car from
one side of the club’s parking lot to another side. After Moore parked
and got out of his car, Appellant approached him.
None of the witnesses who testified knew the substance of the
conversation between Appellant and Moore, but some witnesses
testified that the two appeared to be involved in an “altercation.”
Some witnesses saw the altercation start, while others inferred a
dispute from the small crowd forming around Appellant and Moore,
along with efforts to separate the two. The altercation escalated, and
Moore slapped Appellant in the face. Immediately after being
slapped, Appellant was seen walking to his or someone else’s car and
grabbing a black gun. Appellant then walked back to where Moore’s
car was parked. As Moore got in his car, preparing to leave the club,
two witnesses, Sabrina Williams and Samira Williams, saw
Appellant shoot Moore three times. Another witness testified that
she heard the shots but did not see Appellant shoot Moore. There
was also other evidence showing that Z.M., Appellant’s girlfriend’s
teenage daughter, who was attending the party, sent several text
3
messages to her mother that night, stating, “Mickey probably going
to jail,” “I saw everything[,] I can’t believe I saw tha[t],” and
“[Mickey] killed Brutus.” 2
After the shots were fired, some of the teenagers frantically ran
back into the club, looking for somewhere to hide. When the
teenagers were asked what happened by those still inside the club,
they responded, “Mickey out there shooting.” Appellant then ran
into the club with the black gun in his hand. When Appellant came
in the club he was screaming, “Somebody help me, somebody help
me.” Appellant left shortly thereafter and was seen running down a
residential street near the club. Appellant’s girlfriend told
investigators that the night of the shooting, he came to her brother’s
home, where she was visiting at the time, and told her that he did
not mean to kill Moore.3
2 Although Z.M. initially told investigators during a recorded interview,
which was played at trial, that she saw Appellant shoot Moore, she testified at
trial that she did not see the shooting and only heard the shots.
3 At trial, Appellant’s girlfriend testified that it was not Appellant who
told her that he did not mean to kill Moore, but that it was other people who
informed her of that fact.
4
At the scene of the shooting, officers recovered three spent shell
casings that were Winchester WMA 9mm cartridge casings. Officers
assumed, but could not conclusively say, that the casings were fired
from the same weapon.
Investigators were unable to identify a suspect in Moore’s
killing for several days because of the unwillingness of several
witnesses to come forward about what happened at the club.
However, investigators later gained enough information from
cooperative witnesses and obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant,
but they were unable to locate him. He was eventually arrested in
Statesboro. After being transported back to Claxton, Appellant
agreed to speak with investigators and was given warnings required
by Miranda4 but maintained that he did not kill Moore and that the
two of them were “family.”
At trial, a gang expert testified that based on Appellant’s
tattoos and photos and messages on his public Facebook profile,
Appellant belonged to the Gangster Disciples, a criminal street and
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
5
prison gang. Particularly, one of Appellant’s tattoos suggested that
he was a “hitman” for the gang, meaning that he oversaw
disciplining other members who failed to abide by the laws of the
gang. The expert also testified that a gang member who is slapped
would perceive such action as disrespectful and could create
“extreme violence” by shooting the person who slapped them.
At trial, the medical examiner testified that she recovered
three bullets from Moore’s body and concluded that the gunshot
wounds were the cause of death. The trajectory of the wounds
indicated that the bullets entered Moore’s body at a downward angle
from left to right.
2. In his first enumeration of error, Appellant contends that
the evidence presented at trial was constitutionally insufficient to
support his convictions. Appellant’s entire argument on sufficiency
is as follows:
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
defendant’s convictions, “the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
6
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). Based on the evidence recited above,
sufficient evidence does not support Byrd’s convictions.
Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) provides that in all briefs filed in cases,
except for death penalty matters, “[a]ny enumerated error or
subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument,
citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed
abandoned.” As presented in his brief, Appellant’s argument
regarding the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his convictions does not comport with this rule.
This Court’s former Rule 22 provided that “[a]ny enumerated
error not supported by argument or citation to authority in the brief
shall be deemed abandoned.” Supreme Court Rule 22 (2019)
(emphasis supplied). The previous Rule 22’s use of the disjunctive
“or” suggested that litigants satisfied the rule if they either provided
argument or citation to authority to support their enumeration of
error. However, the rule was changed as of 2024 to include the
conjunctive “and,” demonstrating that to satisfy the rule, litigants
7
must do more than just make an argument or cite authority, but
must now ensure that argument, citation to authority, and citation
to the record are all present to avoid having an enumeration deemed
abandoned. If it were not the case that litigants needed to satisfy all
three requirements, “and” in the current version would be
superfluous and the Court would have achieved nothing by
amending the rule.5
With this understanding of the rule in mind, we conclude that
Appellant’s constitutional sufficiency enumeration is abandoned.
Here, although Appellant cites Jackson v. Virginia and, presumably,
incorporates by reference other factual assertions in his brief which
contain record citations, he fails to make any specific argument
explaining why the evidence presented at his bench trial was
constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions. Recently, we
have declined to address similarly made arguments in the context of
5 Notwithstanding this rule, we recognize that there will be instances
where it may be difficult to say whether a party’s filing satisfies our
understanding of Rule 22. As such, we note that we have discretion to make
exceptions to our own rules and will do so when necessary.
8
constitutional sufficiency. See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832,
837 n.6 (896 SE2d 476) (2023) (“Thus, instead of considering all
conceivable sufficiency-related issues, we limit our consideration to
only the argument that Scoggins actually makes in challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence as to his malice murder conviction . . . .”)
(emphasis supplied); Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 653-655 (884
SE2d 363) (2023) (concluding that the defendant failed to carry his
burden on his constitutional sufficiency claim where he failed to
articulate why the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions, “much less formulate[] an argument showing that the
trial evidence failed to prove an essential element of any crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt”). See also Sauder v. State, 318
Ga. 791, 816 n.21 (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (“Sauder makes no specific
argument and cites no authority to support any of these claims, so
we do not address them.”); Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531, 547 n.11
(899 SE2d 103) (2024) (deeming Appellant’s argument abandoned
for failure to make any “substantive argument”). Indeed, the way
Appellant’s brief presents the insufficiency issue does not provide
9
this Court with any meaningful opportunity to analyze why the
record evidence does not support his convictions.
Moreover, with respect to the type of sufficiency-of-theevidence claim at issue here, nearly every criminal offense has
multiple elements and likely one or more defenses, and most
criminal appeals are of multiple convictions. So, by merely reciting
the evidence, pointing to those facts, and saying the evidence was
not sufficient, an appellant does not give this Court enough
information to ascertain what the basis for the insufficiency claim
is. Under such circumstances, an appellate court would have to
scour the entire record as it relates to each and every element of each
and every conviction (and each and every defense) to determine
what might not be supported by sufficient evidence. This is the type
of expedition Rule 22 seeks to prevent. Instead, a defendant must
articulate how and why the evidence was not sufficient, given the
elements of and defenses presented with respect to each conviction
being challenged on sufficiency grounds. Therefore, based on this
understanding of Rule 22, Appellant’s cursory sufficiency argument
10
is deemed abandoned.
3. Appellant next claims that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial under the U.S. Constitution. He contends that the colloquy
between him and the trial court did not meet the State’s burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant waived his right to
a jury trial. This argument fails.
“The constitutional right to a jury trial may be waived only if
the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did so
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” Agee v. State, 311 Ga.
340, 343 (857 SE2d 642) (2021). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (89 SCt 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). Relevant for
our purposes, the State may satisfy this burden by “showing on the
record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived.”
Id. “Moreover, to ensure that a defendant has waived the right to a
jury trial voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the trial court
should conduct a colloquy with the defendant personally.” Dugar v.
State, 314 Ga. 376, 382-383 (877 SE2d 213) (2022) (cleaned up). “We
11
review a trial court’s acceptance of a waiver of a constitutional right
for clear error.” Agee, 311 Ga. at 344.
The record demonstrates that the trial court did not clearly err
in finding that Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. Here, the trial court
queried on the record whether Appellant understood that he had a
constitutional right to a jury trial, that the right was his to exercise,
and that only he could decide whether to waive it. The trial court
further inquired into whether Appellant understood the pros and
cons of waiving the right to a jury trial and whether he was
influenced to waive the right by the State agreeing to withdraw its
right to seek enhanced punishment under the recidivist statute. The
trial court also highlighted that in a bench trial, the judge, not a
jury, is the finder of fact. Finally, the trial court confirmed with
Appellant that it was his desire to waive his right to a jury trial and
elect to have a bench trial by having him and trial counsel sign a
12
waiver form. And Appellant signed the waiver form. 6 Throughout
the colloquy, Appellant responded that he understood the right he
was waiving, as well as the consequences of waiving that right, and
wanted to precede with a bench trial. Therefore, the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that Appellant knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. See Dugar, 314 Ga.
at 382-383 (concluding that the defendant’s waiver of her right to a
jury trial was adequate where the trial judge questioned her on the
record about her decision to waive and emphasized the importance
of discussing the decision with counsel before waiving); Agee, 311
6 The waiver form provides, in relevant part:
1. The Defendant has been fully and completely informed and
advised of the right to have the above-styled case tried before a
jury; and[] further acknowledges that this a valuable,
constitutional right.
2. The State of Georgia, by and through the Office of the District
Attorney, is prepared to try the Defendant’s case before the next
available jury impaneled for trial.
3. The Defendant does not wish this case to be tried before the
next available jury but rather requests that the case be tried
before the Judge of Superior Court who shall act as the finder
of fact and law.
4. The Defendant personally, knowingly, voluntarily[,] and
intelligently waives the right to a trial by jury.
13
Ga. at 343-345 (concluding that the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial where
the trial court thoroughly questioned the defendant on whether he
understood his constitutional right to a jury trial and was
voluntarily choosing to waive that right, acknowledging the “pros
and cons” of that decision); Watson v. State, 274 Ga. 689, 690-691
(558 SE2d 704) (2002) (concluding that defendant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial where
he was asked personally on the record about proceeding with a bench
trial, and defendant orally affirmed the waiver).
4. Finally, Appellant claims that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel with respect to his trial counsel’s
recommendation that he waive his right to a jury trial. To prevail on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must prove
both that the attorney’s performance was professionally deficient
and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to his case. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
674) (1984). To establish deficient performance, Appellant must
14
show that his attorney’s acts or omissions were objectively
unreasonable, considering all the circumstances at the time and in
the light of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687-690. To
establish the required prejudice, Appellant must show that but for
his attorney’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable
probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “This burden,
though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.” Ellis v. State, 292
Ga. 276, 283 (736 SE2d 412) (2013). See also Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (106 SCt 2574, 91 LE2d 305) (1986) (“As
is obvious, Strickland’s standard, although by no means
insurmountable, is highly demanding.”). Appellant has not carried
his burden here. See Isaac v. State, 319 Ga. 25, 28 (901 SE2d 535)
(2024) (“If [Appellant] fails to make a sufficient showing on one part
of the Strickland test, we need not address the other part.”).
Here, Appellant’s sole articulated reason for claiming trial
counsel was deficient is because trial counsel expressed some regret
15
about his decision to recommend Appellant waive his right to a jury
trial. Particularly, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel
testified that he found one of the State’s witnesses not credible and
believed a jury would have reached a similar conclusion.
The reasonableness of trial counsel’s strategic decision to
advise a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial should be
“examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under
the particular circumstances of the case.” Taylor v. State, 312 Ga. 1,
15 (860 SE2d 470) (2021) (cleaned up). Here, the record
demonstrates that trial counsel’s advice to Appellant to waive his
right to a jury trial was based on strategy and was reasonable.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified as
follows. On the day of jury selection, Appellant, for the first time,
expressed some desire about testifying at trial regarding how he
feared for his life the night of the shooting. 7 Appellant explained to
counsel that he was a member of the Gangster Disciples and that
the gang had internal rules requiring a member to seek permission
7 Appellant ultimately chose not to testify.
16
from someone with “fourth floor clearance” to kill another member
of the gang. However, if the killing was preceded by a “random” or
“spontaneous” fight, one would not have to seek such permission.
Absent an unintentional fight, failure to seek permission to kill
another member could subject one to discipline from others in the
gang. Accordingly, Appellant allegedly found out that another
member of the gang was planning to start a fight with him at the
party so they could kill him, and therefore, avoid seeking permission
from a higher-ranking member in the gang. Appellant also
explained that he was a “hitman” in the gang, responsible for
disciplining members who violated the rules of the gang.
Counsel advised Appellant that if he elected to have a jury trial
and testified, and the jury heard about his gang affiliation and his
role as a “hitman,” the jury would view this as “character evidence.”
Specifically, counsel believed that the jury would only hear that they
have a “hitman in town,” disregarding any fear Appellant may have
had when he shot Moore. There was also some concern that the “very
white conservative jury” pool in Evans County would view a “black
17
man in a gang” in a negative light. Appellant shared the concerns
about the jury and “didn’t think that the [jurors] would give him a
fair shot based on him being a gang member.” Moreover, the State
planned to present the testimony of a gang expert, further
exacerbating the concern of the jury hearing about Appellant’s gang
affiliation. Accordingly, trial counsel recommended that Appellant
waive his right to a jury trial because he believed a judge would not
be swayed by Appellant’s gang ties and focus primarily on the crimes
at issue. This discussion between Appellant and trial counsel lasted
approximately forty minutes.
The record shows that trial counsel’s advice to Appellant to
waive his right to a jury trial was not so patently unreasonable that
no competent attorney would have given the same advice. Counsel’s
recommendation was primarily based on the concern that if
Appellant testified about the reason he feared for his life the night
of the shooting, the particular demographic of potential jurors would
disregard that fear because Appellant was a gang member and a
“hitman.” See Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 684 (872 SE2d 722) (2022)
18
(concluding that counsel was not deficient for advising the defendant
to waive his right to a jury trial because the decision was based in
part on counsel’s concern for what impression the defendant’s
“overall demeanor” would leave on the jury). And notwithstanding
whether Appellant testified, there was going to be gang evidence
presented through the State’s gang expert that the jury would hear.
Moreover, Appellant’s contention that trial counsel’s deficiency is
evidenced by his regret after the fact is without merit, as “trial
counsel’s decisions relating to strategy and tactics are not judged by
hindsight.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we cannot say that trial
counsel’s reasons for advising Appellant to waive his right to a jury
trial were “objectively unreasonable considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”
Dugar, 314 Ga. at 385 (cleaned up). Therefore, this claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except McMillian,
J., who concurs in judgment only as to Division 2.
19