NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 18, 2025
S24A0984. THE STATE v. LEVERETTE.
COLVIN, Justice.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Jaylen
Leverette’s motion to suppress incriminating statements he made
during an audio-recorded, custodial interview. The trial court
excluded Leverette’s statements under OCGA § 24-8-824, which
provides in relevant part that a confession is inadmissible if it was
“induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit.” As explained
below, however, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding
that law enforcement officers made statements during the interview
that offered a hope of a benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. Accordingly,
we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the court to consider
in the first instance Leverette’s other asserted grounds for excluding
his statements.
1. On February 25, 2019, a Sumter County grand jury returned
an eight-count indictment against Leverette, Patrick Etheridge,
Christopher Hale, Jr., and Christopher Hale, Sr., charging each
defendant with one count of aggravated assault and one count of
felony murder. In brief, the indictment alleged that, on August 1,
2018, Etheridge drove Leverette to the home of Hale, Sr., where
Leverette fired shots into the home, initiating an exchange of gunfire
in which Hale, Sr. or Hale, Jr. killed a bystander, Jarvis Willis, while
shooting at Etheridge and Leverette’s fleeing vehicle.
On September 15, 2023, Leverette filed a pretrial motion to
suppress custodial statements he had made to a GBI agent on
August 9, 2018. In the motion, Leverette argued that the statements
were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824, the Georgia
Constitution, the United States Constitution, and several United
States Supreme Court precedents.
During a Jackson-Denno 1 hearing on November 21, 2023, the
audio recording of Leverette’s custodial interview was admitted into
1 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
2
evidence. During the first hour and 19 minutes of the interview,
which was conducted by GBI Agent Clint Karsten, Leverette waived
his Miranda 2 rights and said that he had heard about the shooting.
But he said that he did not know why other people were saying that
he was involved in the shooting, and he denied having ever gone to
the location where the shooting occurred.
Major Ralph Stuart entered the room an hour and 20 minutes
into the interview and spoke with Leverette for approximately 11
minutes before leaving. The audio recording of that 11-minute
period, which was the focus of Leverette’s motion to suppress,
showed the following. Major Stuart told Leverette that they could
track the location of Leverette’s phone within three feet of where he
was. He then told Leverette three times that officers did not believe
that Leverette had fired the bullet that killed the bystander, saying:
“Y’all haven’t been accused . . . of firing the shots that killed a man.
I think you need to understand that. Okay? That’s not why we’re
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).
3
here”; “Nobody thinks for one minute that car that the shots was
fired from killed an innocent person, and I want to make that clear”;
and “The good news in your corner is you’re not being accused, or
nobody in that car is being accused, of the bullet hitting that man
that died.”
Major Stuart then told Leverette that the agents already knew
what the truth was, and that “[n]ot telling the truth of what actually
happened is going to cause you a lot more trouble than telling the
truth.” Major Stuart asked Leverette, “Do you want to tell this agent
the truth or do you want to go ahead . . . with what you got? ’Cause
what you got is going to drown you.” Then, Major Stuart said
Leverette’s friends and his phone were going to “give [him] up,” told
Leverette that they “already kn[e]w what car [he] was in,” and asked
Leverette if he had ever been in Etheridge’s car before.
Major Stuart went on to discuss how telling the truth would
make Leverette feel and the potential impact on his reputation. He
said: “That little bad feeling you’ve got in your stomach right now, it
can get a lot better just as soon as you tell that man the truth,” or
4
“it’s fixing to get a lot worse”; “Now you can get rid of that little
uneasy feeling in your stomach right now and tell him what he
already knows or you’re going to make it worse”; “Do you want to
look like you’re an honest person or do you want to look like you’re
a liar?”; and “You can walk out that door with a little bit better
feeling in your stomach, not be so queasy, after you tell him the truth
or that little feeling in your stomach is going to come back.”
Shortly after, Major Stuart informed Leverette that his friends
had already given him up, and that Leverette’s phone was going to
verify what they said. Major Stuart further said that Leverette had
made a big mistake by lying, and that the agent was giving him a
chance to “take it back.” Major Stuart then told Leverette, “We want
to hold the man accountable that fired the round, not nobody in the
car. [Hale, Sr., has] been held accountable, him and his son. . . .
That’s what we’re here for.” Major Stuart asked Leverette if he
“want[ed] to tell [the agent] the truth about being in the car.” And
he emphasized again that they did not believe Leverette had shot
the bystander, saying, “We know that nobody in the car even shot
5
the innocent bystander, much less you.”
Major Stuart also made several statements indicating that
Leverette was going to get himself into more trouble by lying than
by telling the truth, saying: “You’re not important, but you fixing to
make yourself important”; “So you want to sit here and stick to this
stupid story and make you look like a fool and get held more
accountable for the lie you’re telling now than the one we was asking
you about”; and your story “makes you look like you guilty of
something.”
After Major Stuart left the interview room, Agent Karsten
stated, “We don’t think people in the car shot the person that died.”
And Leverette then made several incriminating statements to Agent
Karsten, admitting that he and Etheridge were present for the
shooting, that there was an exchange of gunfire, and that Leverette
had fired a gun toward the house from the passenger seat of the
vehicle.
The trial court granted Leverette’s motion to suppress his
statements under OCGA § 24-8-824, finding that, although
6
Leverette’s confession had not resulted from a fear of injury,
“Leverette confessed under a clear hope of benefit.” 3 The court found
that
[Major] Stuart made several statements to Leverette that
he and Eth[e]ridge were not accused of firing the shots
that killed the victim and that he could “make things
worse” by not speaking up about being at the scene. . . .
[Major] Stuart told Leverette he could “walk out that
door” feeling better about the situation if he admitted his
involvement. Finally, [Major] Stuart made several
statements to the defendant that the occupants of the car
were not facing responsibility for the shooting. For
example, [Major] Stuart stated we “want to hold the man
accountable that fired the round . . . not nobody in the
car.”
(Emphasis in original.) According to the trial court, these
statements constituted “assurances” that Leverette “would not be
charged with offenses holding him ‘responsible’ for the fatal
shooting.” And the court found that these assurances persuaded
Leverette to admit his involvement in the shooting. The State timely
appealed.
3 The trial court’s finding that Leverette’s confession was not induced by
fear of injury under OCGA § 24-8-824 has not been challenged on appeal.
Accordingly, we do not address that finding.
7
2. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that Major Stuart offered Leverette a “hope of benefit”
under OCGA § 24-8-824, as that phrase has been defined in our case
law. We agree.
Georgia law provides that, “[t]o make a confession admissible,
it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by
another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”
OCGA § 24-8-824. We have held that “[t]he phrase ‘slightest hope of
benefit’ is not to be understood in the colloquial sense,” and that the
phrase instead “refers to promises related to reduced criminal
punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at
all.” Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 658 (2) (a) (859 SE2d 1) (2021)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
A court must consider “the totality of the circumstances” in
determining whether the defendant’s statement is admissible under
OCGA § 24-8-824. Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 710 (2) (854
SE2d 523) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And we review
a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of a defendant’s
8
statements de novo where, as here, “the controlling facts can be
definitively ascertained, exclusively by reference to evidence, such
as a recording of a police interview, that is uncontradicted and
presents no questions of credibility.” Torres v. State, 314 Ga. 838,
851 (2) (e) (iii) (878 SE2d 453) (2022) (citation and punctuation
omitted). See also State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 39 (1) & n.1 (897
SE2d 432) (2024) (explaining that an appellate court may not resolve
factual disputes, but that an appellate court may rely on undisputed
facts that “definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to
evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of
credibility,” and that “[a]udio or video evidence may match that
description” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Here, the trial court erred in concluding that Major Stuart gave
Leverette assurances that he would not be charged with murder if
he spoke to law enforcement officers about the shooting and thus
erred in concluding that Leverette’s admissions were induced by a
hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. In reaching its conclusion,
the trial court focused on three categories of comments made by
9
Major Stuart. But our precedent makes clear that none of those
comments constituted an impermissible hope of benefit under
OCGA § 24-8-824, that is, a “promise[ ] related to reduced criminal
punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at
all.” Lewis, 311 Ga. at 658 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).
First, the trial court focused on comments made by Major
Stuart that indicated Leverette would make things worse by not
telling the truth. These comments included statements that: “Not
telling the truth of what actually happened is going to cause you a
lot more trouble than telling the truth”; “Do you want to tell this
agent the truth or do you want to go ahead . . . with what you got?
’Cause what you got is going to drown you”; “So you want to sit here
and stick to this stupid story and make you look like a fool and get
held more accountable for the lie you’re telling now than the one we
was asking you about”; and your story “makes you look like you
guilty of something.” But “[i]t is well established that interview
tactics such as telling the [defendant] that he could ‘help himself’ by
telling the truth do not violate OCGA § 24-8-824.” Henderson, 310
10
Ga. at 712 (2). See also Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 722 (4) (878
SE2d 247) (2022) (“Statements that a person . . . ‘ha[s] an
opportunity to help himself out by telling the truth’ do not offer an
improper hope of benefit” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And
we have similarly held that statements indicating that a defendant
will be “on the hook” for a more serious criminal charge if he fails to
tell officers what happened do not violate the statute but instead
permissibly “emphasize[ ] the gravity of the situation” and suggest
that the defendant would be “well served by offering his version of
events.” Dawson v. State, 308 Ga. 613, 619-622 (3) (842 SE2d 875)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Johnson v. State,
295 Ga. 421, 424-425 (2) (761 SE2d 13) (2014) (a detective did not
“indicate that a confession would result in lesser charges,” only that
the defendant “would be well served by offering his version of events
as a means of justifying or mitigating his role in the assaults,” where
he told the defendant that he wanted to hear the defendant’s
“version of events” and warned that the detective could walk out of
the interview “and change this charge from aggravated assault to a
11
f**[*]ing murder charge”).
Second, the trial court focused on a comment in which Major
Stuart said, “You can walk out that door with a little bit better
feeling in your stomach, not be so queasy, after you tell him the
truth.” But “context matters.” Peacock, 314 Ga. at 722 (4). And in
context, Major Stuart’s comment could not reasonably be
interpreted as a promise that Leverette would be released if he told
the truth. Instead, it was another comment in a series of comments
indicating that law enforcement officers already knew that
Leverette was involved in the shooting and that the benefit of telling
the truth was that Leverette would feel better and that he would be
seen as an honest person rather than a liar. Specifically, Major
Stuart had previously said: “That little bad feeling you’ve got in your
stomach right now, it can get a lot better just as soon as you tell that
man the truth,” or “it can get a lot worse”; “Now you can get rid of
that little uneasy feeling in your stomach right now and tell [the GBI
agent] what he already knows or you’re going to make it worse”; and
“Do you want to look like you’re an honest person or do you want to
12
look like you’re a liar?”
Even if Major Stuart’s comment could have been interpreted as
a promise that Leverette would be released after he told the truth,
“a promise regarding release after questioning” does not constitute
an improper promise of benefit related to charges or sentencing but
only a promise of “a collateral benefit” that does not render a
confession inadmissible under OCGA § 24-8-824. Price v. State, 305
Ga. 608, 610 (2) (825 SE2d 178) (2019) (citation and punctuation
omitted). See OCGA § 24-8-825 (“The fact that a confession has been
made under . . . a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it.”).
See also Huff v. State, 299 Ga. 801, 803-804 (2) (792 SE2d 368)
(2016) (no improper hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 based
on comments “implying that [the defendant] would be free to see his
children if he admitted his involvement in the crimes,” including
comments “about [the defendant] being present ‘for his children as
they grew up’ and that ‘the truth will set you free’”); Finley v. State,
298 Ga. 451, 453-454 (3) (782 SE2d 651) (2016) (no improper hope of
benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 where a detective told the defendant
13
that “your quickest way to get to see your children or your quickest
way to take a large load off your shoulders, is just to tell the truth”
(punctuation omitted)); Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 629 (4) (754
SE2d 335) (2014) (“While one of the officers interrogating appellant
did tell him he could go home, such statements in context did not
constitute a hope of benefit because no one promised appellant that
he would not be charged with a crime or that he would receive
reduced charges, sentencing or punishment if he made
incriminating statements.”), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020).
Third, the trial court focused on comments by Major Stuart
suggesting that the occupants of the car were not responsible for
firing the bullet that struck and killed the victim. In particular, the
trial court highlighted Major Stuart’s statement that “[w]e want to
hold the man accountable that fired the round, not nobody in the
car.” But “[a]gain, context matters.” Peacock, 314 Ga. at 722 (4).
Here, as recounted above, Major Stuart repeatedly encouraged
Leverette to tell the truth about being in Etheridge’s car by
14
downplaying both Leverette’s moral culpability for the victim’s
death and law enforcement’s interest in him in comparison with the
person who fired the fatal shot. To that end, Major Stuart repeatedly
emphasized that officers were not alleging that Leverette had fired
the fatal bullet because they knew another man had shot the victim.
Specifically, he said: “Y’all haven’t been accused . . . of firing the
shots that killed a man. I think you need to understand that. Okay?
That’s not why we’re here”; “Nobody thinks for one minute that car
that the shots was fired from killed an innocent person, and I want
to make that clear”; “The good news in your corner is you’re not being
accused, or nobody in that car is being accused, of the bullet hitting
that man that died”; and “We know that nobody in the car even shot
the innocent bystander, much less you.” And Agent Karsten used
the same interrogation technique to exhort Leverette to tell the
truth about being in Etheridge’s car after Major Stuart left the room,
telling Leverette, “We don’t think people in the car shot the person
that died.”
These five statements, each of which was made within minutes
15
of, and either before or after, Major Stuart’s “accountability”
comment, used slightly different terminology to convey that
Leverette should be truthful about being in Etheridge’s car during
the shootout because officers knew Leverette had not fired the fatal
bullet. And because Major Stuart’s comment about who officers
“want[ed]” to hold “accountable” similarly emphasized that officers
knew the people in Etheridge’s car did not fire the fatal bullet and
were focused on the person who did, a reasonable person in
Leverette’s position would have understood the comment as yet
another exhortation to tell the truth about being in Etheridge’s car,
not as a statement that he would face “no charges” if he made
incriminating admissions. Lewis, 311 Ga. at 658 (2) (a) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
The dissenting opinion’s conclusion that Leverette was offered
an impermissible hope of benefit finds no support in our precedent.
An investigator’s comments constitute an impermissible hope of
benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824 only if the defendant could have
“reasonably understood” the comments to be “promises related to
16
reduced criminal punishment.” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 868-869
(2) (b), (c) (725 SE2d 320) (2012) (emphasis supplied). See also, e.g.,
Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 374 (2) (744 SE2d 738) (2013)
(focusing on whether the defendant could “reasonably have
understood [an] assurance as a promise that he would not be charged
with crimes . . . even if he admitted his own participation in such
crimes” (emphasis supplied)), disapproved of on other grounds by
Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686 (820 SE2d 640) (2018). And here, even if
Major Stuart’s “accountability” comment could be divorced from its
context and considered in isolation, Leverette could not have
reasonably understood the comment as a promise not to charge him
with murder under our precedent. This is because we have
previously categorized statements indicating that investigators
have “no present intention of charging [the defendant]” as mere
exhortations to tell the truth, rather than as assurances that could
“reasonably [be] understood” as “promise[s] that [the defendant]
would not be charged with crimes.” Edenfield, 293 Ga. at 374-375
(2). And Major Stuart’s “accountability” statement, when considered
17
in isolation, could have at most conveyed to Leverette a present
intention not to charge him with murder because the statement
concerned only who officers “want[ed]” to hold accountable (a
statement about officers’ present desire that might support an
inference about what they presently intended to do), not who officers
“would” hold accountable (a promise about future charging
decisions). Compare id. (no hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824
where “investigators indicated to [the defendant] that they then had
no present intention of charging [him] with anything” because “they
believed [another man] was responsible for killing [the victim]”),
with Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 317, 327 (2) (c) (830 SE2d 195)
(2019) (holding that an investigator’s statements — that, “if you
said, Lieutenant Miller, I’ve been selling for five years[,] . . . there
aren’t any more charges. What you’re charged with now is what
you’re charged with. I’m not going back and charging you” —
constituted “a promise not to bring additional charges — and thus a
hope of benefit — if [the defendant] gave police information about
how long he had been selling XLR11” (punctuation omitted)), and
18
State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 771-772 (2) (770 SE2d 808) (2015)
(holding that a defendant’s statements were induced by an improper
hope of benefit where an FBI agent told the defendant that “he
would ‘keep the murder warrant off’ if [the defendant] talked to
him,” that “one of the things the agent cared most about was
‘keeping [the defendant] out of jail,’” and that “I’m the lead on the
case, and as much as you do for me, I will make sure nothing
happens to you” (punctuation omitted)).
Under our precedent, Major Stuart’s comment about not
“want[ing]” to hold anyone in the car “accountable” clearly falls on
the permissible side of the divide between statements that qualify
as a hope of benefit under the statute and those that do not. See,
e.g., Currier v. State, 294 Ga. 392, 399-400 (3) (754 SE2d 17) (2014)
(no improper hope of benefit where a sheriff told the defendant, who
was later charged with felony murder, that “he would be in less
trouble for concealing [a] body” than for murder, that “no one was
going to come after [the defendant] for getting rid of a dead body he
found in his home,” and that “the most [the defendant] could be
19
charged with would be disposing of a body” if he told the sheriff what
he had heard about the body’s whereabouts). Leverette “could not
reasonably have understood this assurance as a promise that he
would not be charged with crimes against [the victim] even if he
admitted his own participation in such crimes.” Edenfield, 293 Ga.
at 374 (2). And for that reason, it is unsurprising that the dissenting
opinion does not cite any analogous case from our Court supporting
the conclusion that Major Stuart’s comment here constituted a
promise related to reduced criminal punishment. 4
Because the trial court erred in excluding Leverette’s
statements under OCGA § 24-8-824 but failed to consider his
challenges to the admissibility of his statements based on the
Georgia Constitution, the United States Constitution, and certain
United States Supreme Court precedents, we vacate the trial court’s
order suppressing Leverette’s statements and remand for further
4 Although the dissenting opinion casts doubt on our current hope-ofbenefit case law, neither the dissenting opinion nor the parties argue that we
should overrule that precedent or chart a new course in this case. Accordingly,
we apply the law as it stands.
20
proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur,
except Boggs, C. J., Peterson, P. J., and Warren and Pinson, JJ., who
dissent.
21
LAGRUA, Justice.
I join the majority’s holding that Leverette’s statements to law
enforcement were not induced in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 “by
the slightest hope of benefit” under our current precedent. I write
separately because I question whether Leverette’s statements
implicate OCGA § 24-8-824 in the first instance since they do not
amount to a confession. See OCGA § 24-8-824 (“To make a confession
admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear
of injury.”) (emphasis supplied)). Instead, his statements are merely
admissions, OCGA § 24-8-824 does not expressly mention
admissions, and our caselaw extending this statute’s rule to
admissions stands on shaky ground.
As early as 1879, this Court recognized a distinction between
confessions and admissions. See Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600, 603
(1879) (granting new trial where defendant admitted being present
at the crime’s commission, but denied guilt, such that a jury
instruction on confessions was improper). We have reiterated that
22
distinction consistently and on numerous occasions since then. See
e.g. Covington v. State. See 79 Ga. 687, 690 (7 SE 153) (1887)
(distinguishing confessions from admissions); Owens v. State, 120
Ga. 296, 298 (48 SE 21) (1904) (same); Clarke v. State, 165 Ga. 326,
331 (140 SE 889) (1927) (same); Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 771
(48 SE2d 522) (1948) (same); Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 177 (1)
(657 SE2d 863) (2008) (same), overruled on other grounds by Clark
v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 434-435 (3) (b) (883 SE2d 317) (2023); Thomas
v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 30 (2) (b) (838 SE2d 801) (2020) (same). Our
General Assembly has also long recognized the difference in these
two terms of art. See OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All admissions shall be
scanned with care, and confessions of guilty shall be received with
great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other
evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”); Johnson v. State, 61 Ga.
305, 308 (1878) (observing that “[t]he 3792 section of the Code
declares, that ‘all admissions should be scanned with care, and
confessions of guilty should be received with great caution’”).
So, what’s the difference? We summed it up well in Walsh v.
23
State: “An admission differs from a confession in that a confession
acknowledges all of the essential elements of the crime.” 269 Ga.
427, 429-430 (499 SE2d 332) (1998) (citation omitted).5 Put simply,
in a confession, “the entire criminal act is confessed.” Clarke, 165
Ga. at 331 (citing Owens, 120 Ga. at 298). Admissions, on the other
hand – which we have at times referred to as “mere incriminating
statements” – do not acknowledge every essential element of the
crime. Instead, these statements come up short of a true confession
for one reason or another. See English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2)
(796 SE2d 258) (2017) (“[I]n an admission, only one or more facts
entering into the criminal act are admitted, while in a confession,
the entire criminal act is confessed.”) (cleaned up); Thomas, 308 Ga.
at 30 (2) (b) (“A mere incriminating statement is made where the
5 Our caselaw distinguishing admissions from confessions on the basis of
the crime’s essential elements stands in some tension with another line of
cases, where we have described the difference between admissions and
confessions as being “whether the statement is offered by the accused as
exculpatory or inculpatory[.]” See Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 126 (2) (205
SE2d 210) (1974) (concluding that a statement which did not establish all
essential elements of the crime was nonetheless a confession within the
meaning of OCGA § 24-8-824, such that jury instruction on confessions was
not error, because the main fact was admitted without justification or excuse
and “the statement [wa]s not one from which the jury could infer innocence”).
24
accused, though admitting to damaging circumstances, nonetheless
attempts to deny responsibility for the crime by putting forward
exculpatory or legally justifying facts.”) (cleaned up). See also
Covington, 79 Ga. at 690 (“When a person only admits certain facts
from which the jury may or may not infer guilt, there is no
confession. We may use the word confessions for admissions, but to
sum up mere inculpatory admissions and denominate them a
confession, implies that they amount to a confession of guilt.”).
In the present case, Leverette’s statements do not amount to a
confession to the crimes for which he was indicted because they do
not acknowledge all the essential elements of aggravated assault.6
The State can only obtain a conviction at trial on this charge if it
proves, among other elements, that Leverette assaulted another
person within the meaning of the simple assault statute, OCGA §
16-5-20 (a). See Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 87 (3) (a) (901 SE2d 149)
(2024) (citing to pattern jury instructions for elements of aggravated
6 Because aggravated assault is the predicate felony for the felony
murder charge, if Leverette’s statements do not amount to a confession to
aggravated assault, they cannot constitute a confession to felony murder.
25
assault); OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). To satisfy this element, the State must
prove Leverette either “attempt[ed] to commit a violent injury on the
person of another” or “commit[ted] an act which place[d] another in
reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving violent injury.”
OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). But Leverette’s statements do not establish
either on their own. His admission that he fired a weapon at Hale
Sr.’s home does not establish that he attempted to commit a violent
injury on the person of another. While facts presented at trial might
allow a jury to infer that Leverette attempted to do so, his admission
does not establish that he knew the home to be occupied at the time
he fired the shot.7 Moreover, his statements do not establish that his
firing of a weapon at Hale Sr.’s home placed anyone in reasonable
apprehension of immediately receiving violent injury. Again, while
facts presented at trial might support that conclusion, Leverette’s
statements do not suggest that he knew his act of firing the weapon
7 Leverette said that he knew Hale Jr. was outside the home, but that he
aimed at the home itself, rather than at Hale Jr. Additionally, the presence of
vehicles in the driveway does not establish whether Leverette knew someone
was in the home when he fired the shot.
26
caused someone else to be placed in reasonable apprehension of
immediately receiving violent injury. For these reasons, Leverette’s
statements amount to admissions, and do not rise to the level of a
confession, as the State will be put to its proof at trial, and the jury
will be required (at least on these facts) to draw some inferences for
the State to obtain a conviction. See Covington, 79 Ga. at 690 (“When
a person only admits certain facts from which the jury may or may
not infer guilt, there is no confession.”).
With respect to confessions, it has long been the rule that only
voluntary confessions are admissible against a defendant at trial.
See Chulpayev v. State, 296 Ga. 764, 780 (3) (b) (770 SE2d 808)
(2015) (observing pre-founding common law rule that confessions
“made under threats and promises” were inadmissible at trial). The
first statutory iteration of the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824
was derived from this common law “threats and promises” principle
but differed in its word choice: “To make a confession admissible, it
must have been made voluntarily without being induced by another,
by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” See
27
Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 780 (3) (b) (citing Ga. Code of 1863, § 3716).
Once codified, the law in Georgia became that a confession was
deemed involuntary if induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the
remotest fear of injury, and the statutory language of that rule has
remained substantively unchanged to this day.8
Neither OCGA § 24-8-824, nor any of its predecessors, says
anything about “admissions” or “incriminating statements.”
Instead, each iteration of the rule refers only to a “confession,” i.e.,
a statement that “acknowledges all of the essential elements of the
crime.” Walsh, 269 Ga. at 429-430. On its face, this suggests the rule
does not apply to admissions. After all, “when we consider the
meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly
meant what it said and said what it meant[,]” and nothing has ever
8 Compare McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 466 (182 SE 618) (1935) (“In
all of the Codes of Georgia (1863, § 3716; 1868, § 3740; 1873 and 1882, § 3793;
Penal Code of 1910, § 1932; Code of 1933, § 38-411), the rule governing the
admissibility of confessions is embodied in the following pungent language: ‘To
make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without
being induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of
injury.’”), with former OCGA § 24-3-50 (“To make a confession admissible, it
must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”), and OCGA § 24-8-824
(same).
28
been said by the General Assembly about admissions or
incriminating statements in the context of this rule. Deal v.
Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). See id. at
172-173 (1) (a) (“[W]e must afford statutory text its plain and
ordinary meaning . . . if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous,
we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for
statutory meaning is at its end.”) (cleaned up). And yet, despite our
recognition of the difference between these two types of statements,
at some point along the way, we began to treat them as one in the
same for purposes of this rule without the General Assembly ever
telling us to do so.
Putting aside the lack of support in the text itself, I have doubts
about our precedent supporting the extension of this rule to mere
incriminating admissions. The most recent precedent directly on
point is Vergara, where we expressly “reject[ed] the State’s
argument that [former] OCGA § 24-3-50 does not apply to Vergara’s
statements to law enforcement because they constitute
incriminating statements rather than a confession.” 283 Ga. at 177
29
(1) (citation omitted).9 There, we said that “[i]t has long been the law
in this State that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminating
statement is the same as that applied to a confession” and overruled
several cases “[t]o the extent that [they] hold otherwise.” 283 Ga. at
177 (1).10 However, to support that proposition and the overruling of
precedent, we engaged in no independent analysis and gave no
consideration to any of the factors that make up our modern
approach to stare decisis. 11 See id. Instead, we simply pointed to
three cases in support of a conclusion that “the rule as to the
admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that
applied to a confession.” See id. at 177 (1) (citing Fletcher v. State,
90 Ga. 468, 469 (1) (17 SE 100) (1892), Fuller v. State, 109 Ga. 809,
9 We reaffirmed Vergara in Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 771 (2) n.4, where we
similarly rejected the State’s attempt to draw a distinction between “full
confessions and mere incriminatory statements” in the context of the rule set
out at OCGA § 24-8-824.
10 Among the cases overruled by Vergara was Carruthers v. State, which
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress statements made prior to formal custodial
interrogation on the basis that the defendant’s “statement did not constitute a
confession, and, therefore, [OCGA] § 24-3-50 is inapplicable.” 272 Ga. 306, 313
(5) (528 SE2d 217) (2000) (citations omitted) (decided under former code).
11 See Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 156 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 544) (2022)
(citations omitted) (describing stare decisis considerations).
30
811-812 (1) (35 SE 298) (1900), and Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 771
(3) (48 SE2d 522) (1948)). Strictly speaking, however, none of those
cases truly support the proposition asserted.
In Fletcher, for example, the opinion authored by then-Chief
Justice Bleckley suggested that it was “the practice in this State” to
exclude involuntary admissions in 1892 but then specifically noted
a lack of “any direct adjudication upon the precise question” of
whether the rule excluding involuntary confessions also applied to
admissions. Id. at 469. The Fletcher Court then assumed without
deciding that the rule applied to both types of statements for
purposes of the case before it. See id. (“But grant[ing] that the same
rule holds with respect to criminating admissions as with respect to
confessions of guilt . . .”). Ultimately, that assumption did not bear
on the holding in the case, which dealt with whether the trial court
erred by allowing the jury to be present during a preliminary
examination of the law enforcement officers who elicited admissions
from the defendant in seeking to determine whether those
statements were voluntary. See id. at 469-470 (concluding that any
31
error arising from the jury’s presence during the preliminary
examination was harmless because “the admissions were in fact free
and voluntary, and were therefore properly received into evidence,”
but ultimately reversing conviction due to insufficient evidence).
Then there is Fuller, which, after distinguishing confessions
from admissions, suggested that “the sounder view of the law
touching the admissibility of such declarations on the part of one
charged with crime is to exclude them, if not voluntarily made, upon
the same principle as the defendant’s statement would be excluded
if it amounted to a directed confession of guilty.” 109 Ga. at 812-813.
Immediately thereafter, however, the Fuller Court stated that “it is
not necessary to decide directly this question, or to undertake to
reconcile authorities, or determine the weight of authority upon the
subject” of whether admissions and confessions are treated the same
for purposes of exclusion under the rule because, “under the facts of
this case, we think there is nothing in the record which indicates
that this statement of the defendant was not freely and voluntarily
made[.]” Id. at 813. Again, we did not directly hold nor answer the
32
question of whether the rule excluding involuntary confessions
applied to admissions because, even if it did, the statements in this
case were voluntary, and thus admissible without respect to their
characterization. See id. at 812-814.
Finally, the Turner Court held that the trial court erred by
allowing a defendant’s incriminating statement to be admitted at
trial because it was elicited by a sheriff’s suggestion that telling the
truth would result in a lighter sentence. 203 Ga. at 770-771 (1), (2),
and (3). The Turner Court did not itself conclude admissions were
treated the same as confessions for purposes of exclusion but merely
cited to Fuller, 109 Ga. 809, and Mill v. State, 3 Ga. App. 414 (60 SE
4) (1908), for the proposition that “the rule as to [a mere
incriminating statement’s] admissibility is the same as that applied
to a confession.” Id. at 771 (3).12
12 Much like the Vergara Court, in Turner, we simply cited to cases to
support our asserted proposition without conducting any additional analysis.
See 203 Ga. at 771 (3). Moreover, like Vergara, the cases upon which Turner
relies do not persuasively support that proposition.
As explained above, Fuller expressly pointed out that it was not
“decid[ing] directly this question” of whether the rule applied to both
33
As best I can tell, this Court has never fully examined when,
and on what basis, the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824 was
extended to admissions. It might be that, in a case from a past era,
we clearly did so and soundly concluded that involuntary admissions
were subject to exclusion; but if that is so, my research has revealed
no such case. More likely, in my view, is that we have simply relied
upon past assumptions of this Court without scrutiny. At a
confessions and admissions. 109 Ga. at 813. Mill, for its part, was a onesentence decision from the Court of Appeals – which does not bind us in the
first instance – stating only that “[i]nculpatory admissions, as well as plenary
confessions, in order to be admissible against the defendant must be voluntary,
and not induced by ‘the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury.’” 3 Ga. App. at 414. Mill’s support for that statement was drawn from Johnson
v. State, 1 Ga. App. 129 (57 SE 934) (1907), which applied the rule applicable
to confessions to the admissions made in that case. However, I see little
precedential value in Johnson’s reasoning, since the Court of Appeals found
that the rule applied despite observing that the statements were not “admitted
. . . as a confession, or as evidence of inculpatory admissions that might tend
to show the defendant’s guilt[,]” and in light of outside circumstances which
the opinion suggests may have influenced its outcome. See id. at 132 (“In
arriving at the conclusion in this case that these statements are not admissible,
we have been influenced not only by the language itself, but by the situation
presented by the evidence, -- the dominating power and influence of the white
man who had arrested, as he states, on mere suspicion without a warrant, a
negro, and unlawfully searched him, his wife, and his house, and was taking
him to jail.”). It is further worth observing that this Court has never cited to
Johnson, and the Court of Appeals has only done so on a handful of occasions,
with the most recent instance being more than a half-century ago. See Bryant
v. State, 132 Ga. App. 186 (207 SE2d 671) (1974).
34
minimum, I have doubts about whether we should continue to rely
upon Vergara given its misplaced citations and lack of analysis. 13
To be clear, while it is an open question in my mind whether
the rule now codified at OCGA § 24-8-824 applies to admissions, I
do not mean to suggest that involuntary admissions would in all
cases be admissible at trial. Instead, it is my view that the
admissibility of such statements should be evaluated as a matter of
constitutional due process, consistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and its progeny, rather
than under what appears to be a judicially created rule extending
OCGA § 24-8-824 to admissions. In the appropriate case, I encourage
my colleagues to join me in taking a closer look at this issue so that
we may provide clarity on the same.14
13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas,
308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) (794 SE2d
118) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere
admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statue only applies to
confessions. See OCGA § 24-8-823 (“All admissions shall be scanned with care,
and confessions of guilty shall be received with great caution. A confession
alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”).
14 Of course, the General Assembly could also preemptively resolve my
concerns by clarifying whether OCGA § 24-8-824 applies to admissions as well
as confessions.
35
PETERSON, Presiding Justice, dissenting.
1. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because,
even under our current interpretation of OCGA § 24-8-824, we
cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that Leverette’s
statements were induced by the hope of a benefit. Here, Major
Stuart’s statement that “[w]e want to hold the man accountable that
fired the round, not nobody in the car” is reasonably understood to
mean that Leverette would not be charged or arrested for the death
of the “innocent person” if he acknowledged that he was in the car.15
15 Our precedent has not articulated consistently the appropriate
standard for determining whether a confession is inadmissible under OCGA §
24-8-824. Compare Golden v. State, 310 Ga. 538, 542-543 (2) (852 SE2d 524)
(2020) (analyzing whether the defendant’s statement was induced by an
impermissible hope of benefit under “the totality of the circumstances”
(citation omitted)), with Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869-870 (2) (c) (725 SE2d
320) (2012) (analyzing whether the defendant could have “reasonably
understood” law enforcement’s statements as offering a hope of benefit), and
Kessler v. State, 311 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (858 SE2d 1) (2021) (analyzing whether
the defendant’s confession was “actually induced” by the alleged hope of
benefit).
It seems to me that the best way to make sense of our caselaw is that the
applicable standard has two parts: one objective and one subjective. First,
courts determine whether the State made statements that objectively could be
viewed by a reasonable defendant as offering an impermissible hope of benefit
(or threatened injury), considering all the relevant circumstances. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 573 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 208) (2022) (concluding
after “[r]eviewing the exchange as a whole” that the record supported the trial
36
court’s conclusion that “no person in [the defendant’s] position would have
believed that the interviewing detective was making a credible death threat”);
Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 400 (3) (768 SE2d 486) (2015), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (noting that
the “[a]ppellant’s personal belief . . . does not render his statement involuntary” under precursor to OCGA § 24-4-824 and concluding that under “the totality of
the circumstances” that the trial court’s conclusion that the statement was
voluntarily made was not erroneous); Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 374 (2)
(744 SE2d 738) (2013), disapproved of on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304
Ga. 686, 706 (11) (a) n.3 (820 SE2d 640) (2018) (“When its context is considered,
it becomes clear that [the defendant] could not reasonably have understood
[law enforcement’s] assurance as” an impermissible hope of benefit.); Vergara
v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 181 (1) (657 SE2d 863) (2008), disapproved of on other
grounds by Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 435 (3) (b) n.16 (883 SE2d 317) (2023)
(concluding under “the totality of the circumstances that a reasonable person
in [the defendant’s] position” would not have understood the officer’s
statements as an impermissible hope of benefit); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105,
110-111 (3) (686 SE2d 239) (2009), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 303-304 (3) (812 SE2d 225) (2018) (rejecting defendant’s
contention that “a person in [the defendant’s] position would have reasonably
viewed [an officer’s] statement” as an impermissible hope of benefit “[u]nder
the totality of the circumstances”); Gober v. State, 264 Ga. 226, 228 (2) (b) (443 SE2d 616) (1994) (holding that a statement “was not a threat, and was not
otherwise reasonably likely to induce a fear of injury” “[c]onsidering the
totality of the circumstances”); Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425, 426 (2) (489 SE2d
811) (1997) (holding that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances” the
defendant “could not reasonably have believed that, if he implicated himself in
his statement, officers . . . would not charge him with any crime whatsoever”).
In context, this repeated use of “totality of the circumstances” is best
understood not as an uncritical importation of the distinct federal due process
voluntariness standard, see State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 42 (3) (897 SE2d
432) (2024), but as a directive that a reviewing court consider all the relevant
context in determining whether the statement objectively offered a hope of
benefit or threat of harm.
Second, if a statement did offer a hope of benefit or threaten harm, a
court must then determine whether that statement actually induced the
defendant’s confession. See, e.g., Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 326 (2) (830
SE2d 195) (2019) (reasoning that a statement is inadmissible under OCGA §
24-8-824 if (1) law enforcement has promised an impermissible hope of benefit
37
In fact, that’s precisely how I (and the trial court) understand that
statement. «V.1-18-19» And Leverette’s incriminating statements
followed Major Stuart’s statement such that they seem likely to have
been induced by it, as the trial court also found. In response, the
majority asserts that our understanding is unreasonable because
Major Stuart’s “accountable” statement should be understood as
simply another exhortation to tell the truth, because he had also told
Leverette several times that Leverette should tell the truth. But
those other statements by Major Stuart are not “context” that
changes what strikes me as the clear meaning of his “accountable”
statement, they were simply other attempts to convince Leverette to
talk. In short, even a faithful application of our precedent — with all
and (2) the benefit actually induced the defendant’s statement); Lewis v. State,
311 Ga. 650, 658 (2) (a) (859 SE2d 1) (2021) (pretermitting whether law
enforcement’s statements constituted an impermissible hope of benefit and
concluding that the defendant “failed to demonstrate that the statements
induced his [ ] confession”); Pulley v. State, 291 Ga. 330, 332 (2) (729 SE2d 338) (2012) (reasoning that “the voluntariness of a statement does not depend solely
upon whether it was made in response to promises, rather, the court must
determine voluntariness by judging the totality of the circumstances” and “the
key inquiry is whether the alleged promise actually induced the statement that
Appellant seeks to suppress”) (cleaned up, citation omitted). The combination
of these two considerations seems to me sensible in the light of the text of the
statute.
38
of its current flaws — leads to the conclusion that Leverette’s
statement was induced by the hope of a benefit, and thus the trial
court did not err in excluding it. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
2. That said, I also take this opportunity to offer an additional
observation about the statute at issue today. Our caselaw
interpreting OCGA § 24-8-824 has departed far from the statutory
text.
We routinely claim that when “statutory text is clear and
unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our
search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Star Residential, LLC v.
Hernandez, 311 Ga. 784, 785 (1) (860 SE2d 726) (2021) (quoting Deal
v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013)). The
statute we encounter today requires that for a confession to be
admissible, it must “have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear
of injury.” OCGA § 24-8-824. This statute is apparently an exception
to our plain meaning rule, because — over and over and over again
— our recent precedent has flatly ignored and contravened its text.
39
Over 150 years ago, the Georgia Code first incorporated a
provision forbidding the admission of any confession that was
“induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear
of injury.” See Ga. Code of 1860, § 3716. 16 This evidentiary rule, as
a matter of text, has remained materially identical since then and
now appears in OCGA § 24-8-824. For decades, Georgia courts
applied the statute as written and excluded confessions that were so
induced. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 113 Ga. 1039, 1039 (39 SE 846)
16 This appears not to have been the result of legislative action by the
General Assembly, but was instead derived by the codifier from two decisions
of this Court. See Rafe v. State, 20 Ga. 60 (1856); Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225
(1852); see also Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Comm’rs,
315 Ga. 39, 58 (2) (c) (ii) n.14 (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (noting that early codes
were compiled differently from current practice, and that “many statutes
appeared in those codes that had never been individually enacted by the
General Assembly; instead, they were legal principles often derived from
decisions of this Court”). The only actions of the General Assembly regarding
this statute appear to be the regular adoption of codes as a whole (which, of
course, the Single Subject Matter Paragraph prohibits from changing the law).
See Ga. Const. of 1983 Art III, Sec. V, Par. III (“No bill shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is
expressed in the title thereof.”); cf. Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 784 (142
SE 111) (1928) (observing in the context of considering conflict between
legislative acts that “we cannot give to an act of the legislature adopting a Code the same effect as we give to an act dealing with a single subject-matter, and
promulgating a single principle of law”).
40
(1901) (“[A]ny advice to a [defendant] under arrest, by the officer
having her in custody, to the effect that if she knew anything she
had better tell it, vitiates a confession induced thereby.”); Green v.
State, 88 Ga. 516, 516 (15 SE 10) (1891) (concluding confession was
inadmissible when defendant was told “if you know anything, it may
be best for you to tell it”).
The Green Court emphasized that, although “it is difficult to
draw a precise line between” admissible and inadmissible
confessions, courts should “adhere closely to the plain” language of
the statute. 88 Ga. at 518. As a result, confessions were generally
excluded as involuntary if the defendant was advised that providing
information would serve his or her self-interest, while confessions
induced by exhortations to tell the truth were admissible, as they
did not “tend to produce a false statement.” Wilson v. State, 19 Ga.
App. 759, 765, 769 (92 SE 309) (1917) (noting the difference between
the advice to “tell the truth,” which would not render a confession
inadmissible, and a statement that “it will be better for [a defendant]
to tell,” which would render a confession inadmissible because it
41
would induce a party to offer a “confession, regardless of its truth or
falsity”); see also McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 471 (182 SE 618)
(1935) (“There is a material difference between a statement to a
prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and one
wherein he is told that it would be better for him to make a
confession.” (emphasis in original)).
But more recently, this rule has changed, even though the
statutory text has not. See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258 (4)
(271 SE2d 168) (1980) (holding that defendant’s admissions
following officer’s statement of “something to the effect that it looked
like [the defendant was] in a heap of trouble and it would behoove
him if he shot straight with us” was admissible); Arline v. State, 264
Ga. 843, 843-844 (2) (452 SE2d 115) (1995) (holding that an
incriminating statement was admissible even though the detective
“told [the defendant] that the trial court might consider that he was
not the triggerman and that he cooperated with the police”). Tension
developed in the caselaw. Compare King v. State, 155 Ga. 707, 715-716 (118 SE 368) (1923) (holding that a confession was inadmissible
42
when it was induced by the officer’s statement that “as a general
rule courts were lighter on those who did not give them much
trouble” even though the officer also told the defendant that he
“could not promise him anything” and the decision was ultimately
“a matter for the judge”) with State v. Summers, 173 Ga. App. 24,
26-27 (2) (325 SE2d 419) (1984) (holding that an incriminating
statement was admissible despite the officer’s promise that he
“would tell the district attorney of [the defendant’s] cooperation and
thereby possibly lighten any sentence” because the officer cautioned
that “only the judge could reduce the charge or the sentence”). And
then, in 1996, we removed the tension by judicially rewriting the
statute to conclude that “slightest hope of benefit” instead meant
little more than an express statement that the suspect’s charge or
sentence would be reduced. See White v. State, 266 Ga. 134, 134 (3)
(465 SE2d 277) (1996). 17
17 In White, the Court — without any analysis of the statutory text or
prior precedent — asserted that “the promise of a benefit that will render a
confession involuntary under O.C.G.A. § [24-8-824] must relate to the charge
or sentence facing the suspect.” 266 Ga. at 134 (3) (emphasis added) (citing
43
Now, all this said, I am not at all sure that the statute is
necessary these days. Federal law protects defendants from coerced
confessions both through requiring Miranda 18 warnings and
through the application of the totality of the circumstances test for
voluntariness under the Due Process Clause. If the statute does
much more than those two federal protections already offer and thus
excludes confessions made voluntarily and with full knowledge of
the rights included within Miranda warnings, the statute (which,
again, the General Assembly has never actually enacted) may do
more than the General Assembly would like. And if it doesn’t do
more, then litigation about it merely wastes the time of courts,
lawyers, and the public. But so long as the General Assembly leaves
the statute on the books, we should at least consider whether we
Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 27, 28 (1) (230 SE2d 849) (1976)). But Johnson does
not support this proposition. Rather, in Johnson, the Court held that a promise
of a lighter sentence falls within the ambit of § 24-8-824; nothing in the opinion limited § 24-8-824 to promises relating to charging or sentencing. 238 Ga. at
27-28 (1). Courts now repeatedly parrot White’s unsupported assertion. See,
e.g., Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869 (2) (b) (725 SE2d 320) (2012); In re D.T.,
294 Ga. App. 486, 488-489 (2) (669 SE2d 471) (2008); Foster v. State, 283 Ga.
484, 485 (2) (660 SE2d 521) (2008); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 184 (4)
(501 SE2d 562) (1998).
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
44
should apply it as it’s written and as it was historically understood.
This, however, is not the case in which to consider changing
course. Even under our current precedent, the trial court did not err
in excluding Leverette’s statement. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Justice
Warren, and Justice Pinson join this dissent.
45