CAMPBELL v. THE STATE (Four Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 22, 2024

S24A0578. CAMPBELL v. THE STATE.

S24A0580. SANDERS v. THE STATE.

S24A0581. PARRISH v. THE STATE.

S24A1180. SPEAKS v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Justice.

In November 2018, Jordan Campbell and Roderick Parrish

were convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the

death of Rebecca Foley. At the same trial, Shacqeal Sanders and

Henry Speaks were convicted of malice murder and other crimes

related to the death of James Pastures and aggravated assault of

Maurice Harris. All four defendants were also convicted of gangrelated charges. They appeal their convictions. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm in all four cases.1

1 Foley was killed in January 2013, and Pastures was killed and Harris

was assaulted in January 2015. In August 2016, a Chatham County grand

jury indicted Campbell, Parrish, Sanders, Speaks, and Kevin Smith together

in a 59-count indictment. (Smith’s case is not part of this appeal.) Campbell

and Parrish were jointly charged with malice murder of Foley, two counts of

felony murder based on aggravated assault, felony murder based on possession

of a firearm by a first offender probationer, two counts of aggravated assault

(with a deadly weapon and with intent rob), two counts of possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, and eight counts of violation of the

Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Gang Act”) (based on each

alleged count). Parrish was also charged with possession of a firearm by a firstoffender probationer and violation of the Gang Act based on that crime.

Sanders and Speaks were jointly charged with malice murder of Pastures,

felony murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit murder (based on Pastures

and Harris), two counts of aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit

murder (of Harris), five counts of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony, and twelve counts of violations of the Gang Act.

The defendants’ first trial resulted in a mistrial on October 26, after

evidence was presented that one of the jurors was threatened by relatives of

Campbell and Parrish. The case was then re-tried from October 29 to

November 18, 2018. The jury found Campbell guilty on all counts, except

malice murder and the related gang count, on which the jury could not reach a

verdict. The jury found Parrish guilty on all counts except malice murder and

the associated Gang Act count, on which the jury could not reach a verdict.

The jury found Sanders guilty on all counts, except criminal attempt to commit

a felony and two violations of the Gang Act, on which the jury could not reach

a verdict. The jury found Speaks guilty on all counts except criminal attempt

to commit a felony, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of possession

of a firearm during a felony, and three Gang Act counts, on which the jury

could not reach a verdict. All of the counts on which the jury could not reach a

verdict were later nolle prossed.

The defendants were sentenced in November and December 2018. The

trial court sentenced Campbell to serve life without parole for one felony

murder count, and a total of 65 additional years for the counts that were not

vacated or merged. The court sentenced Parrish to serve life without parole

for felony murder and an additional 75 years on the counts that were not

vacated or merged. The court sentenced Sanders to serve life without parole

for malice murder and an additional 105 years for the counts that were not

vacated or merged. The court sentenced Speaks to serve life without parole for

malice murder and an additional 70 years for the counts that were not vacated

or merged. Each defendant filed a timely motion for new trial and amended it

with new counsel.

2

1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.

(a) Gang Evidence

Extensive testimony about the East Gangster Bloods (EGB)

gang, a subset of the Bloods gang, was presented. Sergeant Robert

Santoro testified that members of this gang commit crimes to make

money for the gang and “do violence” to “gain status within the

gang.” He explained that the gang “operates based off . . . violence,

fear, and intimidation,” and the gang members “share[] firearms

and weapons and they pass them from one to the other.”

Sergeant Santoro also testified that documents recovered from

In January 2023, after evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the

motions filed by Campbell, Parrish, and Sanders. The court granted Speaks’s

motion to be resentenced because the sentence for conspiracy to commit

murder was outside of the statutory range, but denied the rest of his motion

for new trial. Each defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. This Court

dismissed Speaks’s first appeal as not ripe because although the trial court

ruled that Speaks would be resentenced, the resentencing had not yet occurred.

On remand, Speaks was resentenced to life with the possibility of parole for

malice murder, 10 years in prison for the conspiracy charge that did not merge

and 5 years for the firearm possession count that was not merged or vacated;

the sentences for the gang counts (15 years for each of the three counts that

were not merged or vacated) were converted to probation. Speaks then filed a

timely appeal. Campbell’s, Sanders’s, and Parrish’s cases were docketed to the

April 2024 term of this Court; Speaks’s case was docketed to the August 2024

term. All of the cases were submitted for a decision on the briefs. We have

consolidated these appeals for purposes of this opinion.

3

EGB gang members indicated that Sanders and Speaks were highranking members of the gang and that Campbell and Parrish were

members with no rank. Testimony and photographs also showed

that the defendants had gang-related tattoos, wore gang colors, and

displayed gang signs. In interviews with police officers, Campbell

and Parrish admitted that they were members of the Bloods gang,

and Parrish said that Smith and Pastures were members. Harris

testified that he, Campbell, Parrish, Smith, and Speaks were all in

the Bloods gang.

(b) Foley’s Murder

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on January 21, 2013, Rebecca Foley

drove into the parking lot of her apartment building. Her boyfriend

arrived in his car “at least a couple minutes” later and saw her car

“up against” a parked car. He found her “laid over to the side” in the

driver’s seat of her car, and he called 911. 2 Foley had been killed by

a gunshot to her back.

2 He made this 911 call at 6:55 p.m.

4

Two months later, in March 2013, two men in a car shot at

Samuel Barnes and then crashed into the backyard of Jennifer and

Timothy Parker’s house. Jennifer saw one man, whom she later

identified in a photo line-up and in court as Kevin Smith, get out of

the car after the crash carrying a gun. Smith asked Timothy to take

the gun. Timothy refused, but Jennifer gave Smith a plastic bag,

and Smith put the gun in the bag and tied it. After he tied it,

Jennifer noticed there was a smear of what appeared to be blood on

the outside of the bag. The second man, whom Jennifer later

identified in a photo line-up as Pastures, came out of the driver’s

side of the car and “banged” on the Parkers’ door, saying, “You didn’t

see nothing. . . It was just me.” The police later arrested Smith and

Pastures. When police searched the area around the Parkers’ yard,

they found the plastic bag with the gun, which was a Taurus 585

.380-caliber. The blood on the bag matched Smith’s DNA. Through

forensic testing, police established that the gun matched the bullet

and shell casing found at the scene of Foley’s shooting two months

earlier.

5

Detective Alan Sammons interviewed Smith twice. In a March

2013 interview, Smith said that on the night of the wreck he was in

the car with Pastures, that they were on the way home from

drinking at a club, and that “they were driving fast and all of a

sudden they were in a wreck.” Smith said that “he never saw a gun

in the car.” In the interview on May 13, 2013, Smith admitted that

he had a gun on the night of the wreck and said that he got it from

Parrish in early March 2013. The day after his May interview,

Smith called his girlfriend from jail to ask her to provide an alibi for

him for January 21, 2013, even though the girlfriend “wasn’t sure of

his whereabouts” on that day. Smith also called Campbell, and

Campbell said, “I just hope that s**t don’t come back to me . . . cause

the n**ga was there, bros,” and “It was two of your homies, too.”

Smith assured Campbell that he gave the police “straight run

arounds.” 3

3 Smith also made statements about Foley’s murder and the car accident

with Pastures in a document entitled “Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit,”

which was found in Smith’s cell in October 2018. That document is discussed

further in Division 5 below.

6

Campbell and Parrish were also interviewed by police officers

in May 2013 about Foley’s murder. Campbell said that Smith and

Pastures were his “homeboys,” but that he did not know anything

about Foley’s murder and was not near the area where the murder

occurred. Parrish said that on January 21, 2013, “Pastures and

others came to his house and ask[ed] him to come along and take

part in a lick.” 4 Parrish refused and stayed home. When Pastures

and the others returned, they stood “in front of his house in the

street talking,” and Parrish heard them talk “about having shot a

white girl on White Bluff Road”5 and “having to get rid of the Taurus

.380.” Parrish also said that “Pie,” a nickname later identified as

Speaks’s, said that “the girl was shot because she drove off and the

lick had failed.” Parrish said that the gun used in the shooting

belonged to Campbell and he saw Smith give it to Campbell in the

early morning hours of January 22, 2013.

4 Investigator Sammons, one of the officers who interviewed Parrish,

testified that “lick” means “armed robbery.”

5 The apartment building where Foley was shot was located off White

Bluff Road.

7

Parrish was interviewed again in July 2015 and said that his

May 2013 statement—that is, that he did not go with Smith and

Pastures—was a lie. He then offered police the following narrative.

On January 21, 2013, Smith and Pastures came to his house and

asked if he wanted “to ride around and find something to do.”

Parrish agreed, and he and Campbell went “riding around” with

them. Campbell told them to go to the apartment complex where he

was living at the time. 6 Once there, Campbell went inside his

apartment and returned about ten minutes later. Then Smith said,

“I see something, Man,” and told Pastures to “pull up in there.”

Pastures moved the car, and Smith got out and ran up to a “lady at

the mailbox.” The woman, who was in her car at this point, “pull[ed]

up some” to get away, and then “he”—referencing Smith—“shot.”

Parrish “didn’t even know what was going on” and “just panicked,”

got out of the car, and “just ran, because [he] was scared.” Campbell

also got out of the car and ran.

6 Evidence presented at trial showed that this complex was across the

street from Foley’s apartment complex.

8

Parrish said that he knew that Pastures and the others with

whom he got in the car referred to themselves as “Team Spank,” and

“spank” means “to shoot.” Parrish told the police that he would take

them to where he saw the shooting happen, but he then took them

to a place where he would not have been able to see the area where

the police knew the murder occurred. Parrish said that he was

afraid of retaliation from the EGB and so had stopped spending time

around his old neighborhood and around EGB members, but police

officers knew that he spent time with Campbell, who was an EGB

member, and that he was seen in pictures with other EGB members.

Parrish was arrested after this interview.

In April 2016, Jay Buchans, who shared a cell with Parrish,

talked to Sergeant Santoro about statements Parrish made to him

regarding Foley’s murder.7 Buchans said that Parrish told him the

following. There were “three or four of them” driving around in the

car,” including “their driver and [Parrish’s] stepbrother,” Campbell. 8

7 Buchans’s interview is further discussed in Division 5 below.

8 Campbell’s mother was married to Parrish’s father.

9

“They had a pistol” and were “looking for somebody to rob” to “get

some money, buy some dope, flip it, and make some money.” Parrish

and Campbell had decided that they were “going to get some money

or somebody was going to die.” Near the apartments where

Campbell lived, they approached a “girl” to rob her. Campbell got

out of the car, and the “guy that was driving the car and . . . the other

guy [who] was in the car” were “trying to talk Campbell out of it.”

Parrish “hung out and made sure the driver didn’t drive off.” The

“girl” tried to drive away, and Campbell “shot her in the back of the

head”; then Parrish and Campbell “ran over” to Campbell’s

apartment building. The gun Campbell used belonged to Parrish;

Campbell told Parrish, “Give it here. I’ll do it.” Campbell then gave

the gun back to Parrish after the shooting, and Parrish “sold it to

this guy that got caught with it.”9

9 Buchans was interviewed by police officers again a few days before trial

began, and he said that he did not “want to recall” what he told police in his

April 2016 interview and indicated that he was afraid of retribution from the

Bloods gang, saying “I can’t go up there with a bunch of Bloods. . . . They’ll put a hit out on me. I just can’t do it.” At trial, Buchans recanted much of what

he told the police, testifying that the information was “little facts and lies” he

10

Sergeant Santoro testified about maps created based on

records showing which cell phone towers Campbell’s and Parrish’s

phones were connected to on the day of the murder. The records

showed that at around 6:03 p.m., Campbell’s and Parrish’s phones

were both in the area that was served by the same cell phone tower

as Parrish’s house.10 At 6:16 p.m., Parrish’s phone started to move

away from his house and toward the apartment complex where

Foley was murdered. And at 6:42 p.m., Parrish’s phone was in the

area of the murder. The next time Campbell’s phone connected to a

cell phone tower was at 6:55 p.m., and the phone was in the cellphone-tower sector next to the murder location. Sergeant Santoro

told because he was “trying to get out of trouble” and wanted a deal on his

criminal charges. Buchans testified that in his 2016 interview he made up

some information and gleaned other information from news stories and trial

documents Parrish had in the jail cell he shared with Buchans. Sergeant

Santoro testified that in his 2016 interview, Buchans gave details that had not

been released to the media and Buchans told the detective that he had not

looked at any of Parrish’s case paperwork.

10 Initially, Parrish said that he had loaned his phone to another gang

member on the night of the murder, and that the gang member returned it to

him the next day. But eventually Parrish admitted that story was a lie and

that he had his cell phone with him on the night of Foley’s murder. Campbell

also admitted that he had his phone that night.

11

explained that this location was consistent with Campbell’s cell

phone leaving the scene after the shooting and moving toward

Campbell’s apartment. 11 Both phones then moved away from the

murder scene, and a few minutes before 7:30 p.m., they were near

Parrish’s house.

(c) Pastures’s Murder

In January 2015, Pastures and his roommate, Harris, heard

that they were in trouble with the gang, and on January 19,

Pastures asked Sanders and Speaks to return the guns that Sanders

had been keeping for Pastures. 12 Around 5:00 p.m., Sanders and

Speaks arrived at Pastures and Harris’s apartment, ostensibly to

return the guns. Harris testified that Pastures went to Sanders and

11 As explained above, Foley’s boyfriend called 911 at 6:55 p.m. The State

argued that Foley’s murder must have occurred shortly before that, between

the time Foley arrived at the apartment complex and the time her boyfriend

arrived.

12 Harris testified that a “couple of weeks” before Pastures was shot,

Sanders shot a gun from Pastures and Harris’s apartment into the neighbor’s

apartment, and they were not sure if the neighbor had been shot. At that point,

Pastures had “six or seven guns” in the apartment, and Harris told Pastures

to “get [the guns] out of here . . . [b]ecause I know the police are coming.”

Sanders then took the guns.

12

Speaks’s car first. Sanders then called Harris to the car, and as

Harris approached, he saw Sanders shoot Pastures. Harris started

running away. As he ran, Pastures’s friend, who was sitting in a car

nearby, saw Speaks chasing and shooting at Harris. Harris was not

hit, but Pastures had been shot twice and died from his injuries.

Cell phone records indicated that Sanders’s and Speaks’s phones

were traveling together before and after Pastures’s murder; there

was no phone activity during the time of the murder.

Evidence was presented at trial that gang members were

suspicious that Pastures had spoken to police about Foley’s murder

and that Pastures had been “put on a plate,” which one of the lead

investigators testified was a gang term that meant Pastures would

be killed. In a call Smith made from prison on May 25, 2013, to

Yusef Sanders, Sanders’s father and a fellow gang member, Smith

explained that the police knew that the alibi his girlfriend had given

for him was false and that the only person he told about his

girlfriend providing this alibi was “James.”13 Yusef said they were

13 Pastures’s first name was James.

13

trying to find out who was “talking.” In his July 2015 interview with

police, Parrish said that the gang “had word” that Pastures was

talking to the police. A document found in Parrish’s prison cell said,

“No time for a case, so we killing the witness.” Buchans, Parrish’s

cellmate, testified that Parrish told him that after the Foley murder,

they were “worried about the driver telling,” and further testified

that he got the impression that Campbell ordered the guy that was

driving the car to be killed.

Sergeant Santoro testified about a document found in Speaks’s

cell, which was stipulated to have been written by Speaks. Sergeant

Santoro described this letter as a “rehearsed version of what” was

“supposed to be said” about Pastures’s murder at trial. In this story,

Speaks and Sanders drove to Pastures’s apartment and when they

were returning Pastures’s guns, Pastures pulled a “gun off his hip”

and said he heard that Speaks and Sanders were supposed to kill

him; Sanders then shot Pastures in self-defense.

Arguments Raised by Campbell, Parrish, and Speaks

2. Campbell, Parrish, and Speaks argue that the trial court

14

erred by denying the defendants’ motion to sever the trial of the

defendants and counts related to Foley’s murder from the trial of the

defendants and counts related to Pastures’s murder. As explained

above, Campbell and Parrish were indicted for crimes related to

Foley’s murder, and Speaks was indicted for crimes related to

Pastures’s murder, so if the trial court had granted their motion to

sever, Campbell and Parrish would have been tried together for the

crimes related to Foley’s murder and, separately, Speaks, along with

Sanders and Smith, would have been tried together for the crimes

related to Pastures’s murder.14

We review the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever for an

abuse of discretion. See McCabe v. State, 319 Ga. 275, 286 (903

SE2d 78) (2024). As to the joining of defendants for trial, “[w]hen

[two or more defendants are] indicted for a capital felony when the

14 Parrish alone briefly argues that his case should have been severed

not only from the defendants related to the other (Pastures) murder, but also

from the defendants charged with the same murder as he was (the Foley

murder). He does not, however, offer any argument distinct from the

arguments rejected below. Thus, this claim, to the extent Parrish has properly

raised it, is similarly rejected.

15

death penalty is waived, or for a felony less than capital, . . . such

defendants may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the

trial court.” OCGA § 17-8-4.

When ruling on the motion to sever [defendants], a trial

court should consider three factors: (1) the likelihood of

confusion of the evidence and law; (2) the possibility that

evidence against one defendant may be considered

against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or

absence of antagonistic defenses. To show that severance

is required, the defendant must do more than point to the

presence of antagonistic defenses or the possibility that

he has a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial.

Rather, he must show that a joint trial was so prejudicial

as to amount to a denial of his right to due process.

McCabe, 319 Ga. at 286 (citation and punctuation omitted). As to

the joinder of counts, “a defendant has a right to severance where

the offenses are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same

or similar character because of the great risk of prejudice from a

joint disposition of unrelated charges,” but where the joined counts

are “based upon the same conduct or on a series of acts connected

together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, severance

lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge since the facts in

each case are likely to be unique.” White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 378-16

383 (903 SE2d 891) (2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). If

“evidence of one offense would be admissible at a separate trial for

the other,” the offenses “are not joined together ‘solely because they

are the same or similar character,’” meaning severance is not

required, and “[t]ypically, a trial court does not abuse its discretion

in denying a motion to sever where evidence of one charge would be

admissible in the trial of the other and there is no evidence that the

joinder confused or misled the jury.” Id. (citation omitted).

Because the two groups of defendants here were not charged in

any of the same counts, the defendants argue that the combination

of the counts related to the two murders at the same trial allowed

the State to present evidence that would have been inadmissible in

the trials for the one of the murders alone. We disagree. The two

murders were connected by the evidence that Pastures was killed by

EGB gang members to cover up Foley’s murder, which was

committed by other EGB members. Thus, at a trial of Foley’s

murder, evidence of Pastures’s murder would have been relevant to

prove the gang charges because it showed the gang’s efforts to cover

17

up Foley’s murder, indicating that Foley’s murder was “criminal

gang activity.” See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any

person . . . associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or

participate in criminal gang activity . . . .”). And at a trial of

Pastures’s murder, evidence of Foley’s murder could have been

presented to show the motivation for Pastures’s murder. See

Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 492 (863 SE2d 137) (2021) (holding

that the evidence of a shooting in which the appellant was not

charged was admissible in appellant’s trial because it “pertained to

the chain of events” of the charged crimes and “indicat[ed] that these

incidents were related to the ABG gang”); White, 319 Ga. at 378-383

(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to

sever the trial of counts of financial crimes from a murder trial

where the financial crimes provided some evidence of the

defendant’s motive for the murder).

Also, the Foley-murder and Pastures-murder defendants did

not present defenses antagonistic to each other, and they have not

shown any likelihood that the jury considered evidence about one

18

defendant against another or was confused about the evidence or the

law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion to sever. See McCabe, 319 Ga. at 287-288 (holding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever

when the evidence the defendant argued would not have been

admitted in a severed trial “was a relevant part of explaining the

plan and motive for his criminal conduct”); Daniels v. State, 302 Ga.

90, 100 (805 SE2d 80) (2017) (holding that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever when “evidence

of the gang activities of his co-defendants would have been

admissible at [the defendant’s separate] trial”).

3. Campbell, Parrish, and Speaks also argue that the trial

court erred by admitting evidence of juror intimidation that

happened at their first trial.

(a) Near the beginning of the second trial, the State gave notice

of its intent to introduce evidence of juror intimidation that

happened in the first trial. The defendants objected, arguing that

the evidence was not admissible because there was no evidence that

19

any of the defendants directed the intimidation. The trial court

ruled that the evidence was admissible, concluding that arguments

about the defendants’ lack of involvement “goes to the weight, not

the admissibility.”

Juror Number 8 from the defendants’ first trial testified at the

second trial (the one at issue here) that on October 25, 2018, as she

was leaving the courthouse after a day of testimony, she was sitting

in her car at a traffic light and another car pulled up next to her.

The passenger in that car shouted at her, “All clear, BLATT,

BLATT” and made a hand gesture that looked like a gun. The juror,

who had heard testimony during the first trial about gang terms

such as “BLATT,” testified that she understood this to mean, “you’re

gone, you’re out of here, you’re dead.” When the court heard about

this threat the next day, it declared a mistrial.

At the second trial, Sergeant Santoro testified that “BLATT” is

a gang term that means “Blood Love All The Time” and that the

people who threatened Juror Number 8 were Roderick Parrish, Sr.,

(Parrish’s father and Campbell’s stepfather) and Anne Parrish

20

(Campbell’s mother and Parrish’s stepmother). In its opening

statement, the State mentioned the juror intimidation, explaining

that the people in the car trying to intimidate the juror were “Anne

Parrish and Roderick Parrish, Sr. The father of Roderick Parrish

and Jordan Campbell. . . . That’s what this gang does. That’s the

terror they try to spread.” In closing argument, the State again

mentioned the juror intimidation evidence, saying: “You heard about

Anne Parrish and Roderick Parrish, Sr., who was willing to yell

threats at a juror to thwart the previous trial of the case. They were

willing to risk that on behalf of their children.”

During the final jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury

that evidence of “third persons’ contact with a juror at the prior trial

was conditionally admitted . . . and may be considered by you on the

issues of criminal gang activity, if any, and conspiracy.” The court

explained that none of the defendants was charged with juror

intimidation and defined that crime. The court further explained

that to consider this evidence with regard to a defendant, the jury

must first find that “the alleged intimidation was made with the

21

authorization of such defendant,” and if the jury found that the

defendant or defendants did authorize the alleged intimidation and

it was done in the course of criminal gang activity or in furtherance

of a conspiracy, the jury could consider the evidence “on the issues

of conspiracy and criminal gang activity only.” The court said that

if the jury did not find that intimidation occurred and that a

defendant or defendants authorized it, the jury should “disregard”

the evidence.15

(b) Evidence of an attempt to influence a juror may be relevant

to show “consciousness of guilt” of the charged crimes. See West v.

State, 305 Ga. 467, 474 (826 SE2d 64) (2019). However, such

evidence is relevant evidence of the defendant’s guilt only if the

15 In the jury instructions, the court initially told the jury to consider the

evidence only if it found that the State proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” that

the defendants authorized the intimidation. After the court finished the jury

charge and dismissed the jury, the State objected to the court’s use of “beyond

a reasonable doubt” in this instruction. The trial court recalled the jury and

corrected this instruction, saying: “I mistakenly said that the State would have

to prove the intimidation occurred beyond a reasonable doubt,” but because the

defendants were not charged with the offense of juror intimidation, “it’s not a

beyond reasonable doubt kind of thing.” The court then repeated the

remainder of the instruction, including that the jury should not consider the

evidence at all if the jury found that a defendant did not authorize it.

22

defendant was involved in the attempt. See id. (concluding that the

evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was involved in

the attempt to influence the juror where the defendant’s prison

podmate, with the defendant next to him at the time, called the

podmate’s mother and asked her to create a fake Facebook profile

and use it to influence a juror). See also Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5,

12 (815 SE2d 875) (2018) (explaining that evidence of an attempt to

influence a witness may be introduced “where it is established that

the attempt was made with the authorization of the accused” and

that “evidence of a threat or attempt to influence a witness made by

a third party must be linked to the defendant in order to be relevant

to any material issues”).

Here, the evidence presented did not establish that the

defendants were involved in the juror intimidation. The only

evidence presented that any of the defendants authorized Roderick,

Sr., and Anne to threaten the juror was the use of a gang term (i.e.,

BLATT), which suggested a link between the intimidation attempt

and the gang in which the defendants were members, and the

23

familial connection Roderick, Sr., and Anne had with Campbell and

Parrish. However, there was no evidence that anyone in the gang,

let alone one of the defendants, directed the juror intimidation, and

the mere familial relationship was not sufficient “to support a

reasonable and plain inference” that the attempt to intimidate the

juror was made “with the authorization” of Campbell or Parrish.

Thus, the trial court erred by admitting the evidence of juror

intimidation. See Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 672 (631 SE2d 679)

(2006) (holding that evidence of intimidating a witness should not

have been admitted because “[t]he mere family relationship between

appellant and [the person accused of intimidating the witness] is not

enough, without more, to constitute adequate proof of the necessary

authorization”).

However, this error was harmless.

The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless

error is whether it is highly probable that the error did

not contribute to the verdict. In determining whether the

error was harmless, we review the record de novo and

weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors

to have done so.

24

Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 762 (893 SE2d 899) (2023) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

First, we note that, as explained above, the trial court

instructed the jury to consider the evidence of juror intimidation

only if it found that one or more of the defendants authorized the

intimidation, and not to consider the evidence at all if the jury found

that a defendant did not authorize the intimidation. And “we

presume that the jury followed” the instructions it was given. See

Rooks, 317 Ga. at 763 (noting that a limiting instruction given with

evidence supported a conclusion that the assumed erroneous

admission of the evidence was harmless).

As to Campbell and Parrish, the State presented strong

evidence of their guilt for the charged crimes. As discussed above,

Campbell indicated on the phone with Smith that he was worried

about any charges related to Foley’s murder “com[ing] back to

[him].” Also, Parrish told police that both he and Campbell drove

with Pastures and Smith to the apartment complex and were in the

car with them right before Foley was shot, and Parrish told Buchans

25

that he and Campbell drove to the apartment complex in order to

rob someone, that they planned “to get some money or somebody was

going to die,” and that Campbell shot Foley. Also, the locations of

Campbell’s and Parrish’s cell phones were consistent with their

being present at the location of Foley’s murder. The evidence also

showed that Campbell and Parrish were in a gang; that its members

committed crimes to make money for the gang; that Campbell and

Parrish planned to rob someone to “get some money, buy some dope,

flip it, and make some money”; and that after the Foley murder,

Pastures was “put on a plate” by the gang because gang members

were suspicious that he was talking to the police.

Moreover, as discussed above, the only evidence linking

Campbell and Parrish to the threat against Juror 8 was the use of

gang terms and Campbell’s and Parrish’s familial relationships with

the people who engaged in the intimidation. Thus, it is “highly

probable” that this evidence did not contribute to the jurors finding

Campbell and Parrish guilty of the charged crimes. See Adams v.

State, 318 Ga. 105, 119 (897 SE2d 396) (2024) (concluding that the

26

admission of evidence that the defendant’s brother stole a gun and

gave it to the defendant was harmless in part because the State

never argued that the appellant “played any role in the theft of the

weapon or was even aware that it had been stolen” and to the extent

the evidence “impugn[ed] anyone’s character,” it impugned the

character of the defendant’s brother, who was not charged in the

case).

As to Speaks, the evidence showing that he took part in

Pasture’s gang-motivated murder was strong, including that Speaks

went to Pastures and Harris’s apartment with Sanders, and

Sanders’s friend saw Speaks shoot at Harris as Harris ran away.

Moreover, there was no evidence linking Speaks to Roderick, Sr., or

Anne in any way. In fact, in opening statement and closing

argument, the State focused on the familial link Roderick, Sr., and

Anne had to Parrish and Campbell—not Speaks—including arguing

in closing that Roderick, Sr., and Anne tried to intimidate a juror

“on behalf of their children.” Thus, it is highly probable that the

evidence of juror intimidation in the first trial did not contribute to

27

the jurors finding Speaks guilty of the charged crimes. See Adams,

318 Ga. at 119.

4. Campbell, Parrish, and Speaks argue that the trial court

erred by instructing the jury on “deliberate ignorance.”

(a) The State requested that the trial court charge the jury

on “deliberate ignorance,” arguing that the instruction was justified

because the defendants gave conflicting accounts of how much they

knew about whether a robbery was going to happen before Foley was

killed, and noting that Parrish in particular said that he did not

know there was going to be a robbery or murder. The court granted

the State’s request.

During closing argument, the State referenced this instruction,

saying:

There’s another concept you need to think about

with respect to knowledge; it’s called deliberate

ignorance. The State can show or prove knowledge, if we

can show that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to

the obvious. And I’m talking about Roderick Parrish and

the stories he has told that “We had no idea, [Campbell]

and I had no idea there was going to be a robbery.”

Now, of course he actually told the police in 2013

28

there was going to be a robbery. And he has all this social

media about, this is what I do, a robbery. I do licks.[16]

But what did he say? “Oh, we had no idea.” Well, they’re

out to do these kinds of things, and he’s in a car with Team

Spank; right? If you find a conscious—conscious purpose

to avoid knowledge, you may infer knowledge. You can’t

go through life (inaudible). He knows what’s going on.

They all know what’s going on.

In the final jury instructions, the court instructed the jury:

Knowledge on the part of a defendant that the

crimes charged in the indictment were being committed

and that the defendant knowingly and intentionally

participated in or helped in the commission of such crimes

must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State must prove an intent to engage in the

criminal endeavor. If you find from the evidence in this

case that the defendant had no knowledge that a crime

was being committed or did not knowingly and

intentionally commit, participate, or help in the

commission of the alleged offenses, then it would be your

duty to acquit such defendant.

On the other hand, should you find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge that

the crimes charged in the indictment were being

committed and that the defendant knowingly and

16 The State presented evidence of the following Facebook messages

Parrish sent. On January 18, 2013 (three days before Foley’s murder), Parrish

told a person who said he “need[ed]” a “lick” that “licks” were “[e]verywhere”

and the person should “get some wheels.” Also on January 18, Parrish sent a

message to another person saying, “I got something.” When the person asked

what, Parrish responded, “A lick.”

29

intentionally participated or helped in the commission of

it, then you would be authorized to convict such

defendant.

Knowledge of a violation of a criminal statute may

be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or

deliberate ignorance. If a party has his suspicions

aroused but then deliberately omits to make further

inquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is

deemed to have knowledge. The element of knowledge

may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a

defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would

otherwise have been obvious to him. A finding beyond a

reasonable doubt of conscious purpose to avoid

enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge.

Stated another way, a defendant’s knowledge of a

fact may be inferred from willful blindness to the

existence of the fact. Whether or not you draw such

inference is a matter solely within your discretion.

You are not authorized to find a person who was

merely present at the scene of the commission of a crime,

at the time of its perpetration, guilty of consent in and

concurrence in the commission of the crime, unless the

evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that such

person committed the alleged crime, helped in the actual

perpetration of the crime, or participated in the criminal

endeavor.

After the instructions were finished, Speaks objected to the

“deliberate ignorance” instruction.

(b) “A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the

30

facts support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high

probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely

contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense

in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” Huckabee v. State, 287

Ga. 728, 734 n.7 (699 SE2d 531) (2010). “To authorize a jury

instruction, there need only be produced at trial slight evidence

supporting the theory of the charge.” Gray v. State, 319 Ga. 72, 75

(901 SE2d 556) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Because Speaks objected to the trial court’s giving the

deliberate ignorance instruction, we review the claim as to him de

novo. See id. (“Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to

authorize the giving of a jury charge is a question of law, which this

Court reviews de novo.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). But

“even when we find error in a jury charge, we will not reverse when

the error is harmless, that is, when it is highly probable that the

instruction did not contribute to the verdict. To determine whether

an instructional error was harmless, we assess it in the context of

the instructions as a whole.” Everett v. State, 318 Ga. 697, 700 (899

31

SE2d 699) (2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). Moreover, we

weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have

done. See id.

Speaks argues that there was no evidence that he was

deliberately ignorant of any of the charged crimes. We agree. There

was no evidence Speaks “was aware of a high probability” that he

and Sanders were going to shoot at Harris and Pastures but

“purportedly contrived to avoid learning all of the facts.” Huckabee,

287 Ga. at 734 n.7. Instead, the evidence indicated that he traveled

to Harris and Pastures’s apartment with Sanders and opened fire at

Harris. Thus, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on

deliberate ignorance as to Speaks. See id.

However, this error was harmless for the same reason it was

error for the trial court to give the instruction: there was no evidence

that Speaks was deliberately ignorant. In fact, the State did not

even argue that Speaks was deliberately ignorant. Thus, it is highly

probable that the jury did not rely on the theory that Speaks was

deliberately ignorant of the crimes (rather than fully aware of them),

32

and thus highly probable that the instruction did not contribute to

the verdicts. See Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 139 (839 SE2d 525)

(2020) (explaining that this Court will “generally deem harmless a

jury instruction that indicates that a defendant could be found guilty

under a theory for which there was no evidence or even argument”).

(c) Because Campbell and Parrish did not object to the

deliberate ignorance instruction after it was given at trial, we review

this claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (explaining

that the “failure to make a timely objection” to an allegedly improper

jury instruction “shall preclude appellate review, unless such

violation constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of

the parties”). This Court has established the following test for

“determining whether there is plain error in jury instructions under

OCGA § 17-8-58 (b)”:

“First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of

deviation from a legal rule—that has not been

intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,

affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal

error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to

reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected

the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary

33

case means he must demonstrate that it affected the

outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and

finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the

appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—

discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Baker v. State, 319 Ga. 456, 461-462 (902 SE2d 645) (2024) (citing

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (718 SE2d 232) (2011)). “If one prong

of the plain error test is not satisfied, we need not address the other

prongs of the test.” Baker, 319 Ga. at 462.

Pretermitting whether Campbell and Parrish have shown that

the trial court committed a clear or obvious error by instructing the

jury on deliberate ignorance, their claim fails because any such error

did not likely affect the outcome of the trial and thus did not affect

Campbell’s and Parrish’s substantial rights. Even if evidence the

State relied on in arguing that Campbell and Parrish were

deliberately ignorant—i.e., Parrish’s statement that he and

Campbell did not know the other men in the car were planning a

robbery—constituted slight evidence of deliberate ignorance, the

jury was unlikely to credit this evidence, which was contrary to

34

Parrish’s account to Buchans and even contrary to Parrish’s first

story to police officers, in which he said Pastures and the others

invited him to take part in a “lick.” Thus, the jury was unlikely to

find that Campbell or Parrish “had his suspicions aroused but then

deliberately omit[ted] to make further inquiries.”

Because Campbell and Parrish have failed to show that the

trial court’s giving of the deliberate ignorance jury instruction

affected their substantial rights, their claim of plain error fails. See,

e.g., Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 724-725 (859 SE2d 25) (2021)

(holding that the alleged error of instructing the jury on an unlawful

act with which the appellant was not charged “did not likely affect

the outcome of Appellant’s trial” where “the jury instructions as a

whole . . . left no doubt that the jury could find Appellant guilty only

if the State proved that he had attempted to purchase marijuana as

charged”).

Further, to the extent the defendants argue that the deliberate

ignorance instruction could have led the jury to find the defendants

guilty without finding that the defendants intentionally

35

participated in the crimes, we reject this argument. The jury was

instructed that to find a defendant guilty, it needed to find both that

the “defendant had knowledge” of the crimes and that “the

defendant knowingly and intentionally participated” in the

commission. We generally presume that the jury follows

instructions, see Rooks, 317 Ga. at 763, and see no reason not to

apply that presumption here.

Arguments Raised by Campbell

5. Campbell argues that certain out-of-court statements made

by his non-testifying co-defendants should have been excluded from

evidence under the Confrontation Clause of the United States

Constitution. Specifically, he argues that Parrish’s statements to

Buchans and Smith’s “attempt to concoct his alibi” in the

“Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit” should not have been

admitted into evidence because Campbell did not have the

opportunity to confront Parrish and Smith. 17

17 In his brief, Campbell mentions several other statements made by his

co-defendants that were admitted at trial, but he makes no argument as to

36

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d

177) (2004), the United States Supreme Court explained: “Where

testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands

why, or even if, these statements were inadmissible. Thus, to the extent he

attempts to challenge any of these statements, any such challenge is

abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error or subpart

of an enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to authority, and

citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.”).

As to the statements for which he does challenge the admissibility, he

contends that these statements were not made in furtherance of a conspiracy.

He does not, however, explain how this affects the admissibility of the

statements under the Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. We need not decide that

question, however, because, as discussed in this division, these statements do

not implicate the Confrontation Clause. We also note that the trial court

concluded that some co-defendant statements, which would otherwise be

inadmissible hearsay, were admissible under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E),

because the statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy. See id.

(explaining that “[a] statement by a co[-]conspirator of a party during the

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement made

during the concealment phase of a conspiracy” is not “excluded by the hearsay

rule”). See also OCGA § 24-8-802 (“Hearsay shall not be admissible except as

provided by this article[.]”). Campbell, however, does not cite these or any

other provisions of the Georgia Evidence Code related to hearsay or even argue

that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. Thus, we do not consider

whether these statements were inadmissible under the hearsay provisions of

our Evidence Code.

37

what the common law required: unavailability and a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 68. See also State v.

Smith, 302 Ga. 837, 838 (809 SE2d 720) (2018) (“Testimonial

statements of witnesses absent from trial can be admitted only

where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant

has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And the Court explained in Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt. 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), that

“powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a

codefendant” can “pose[] a substantial threat to [a defendant’s] right

to confront the witnesses against him.” Id. at 135-137. “A

defendant’s right under the Confrontation Clause is violated under

Bruton . . . when there is a joint trial of co-defendants and the

testimonial statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial

is used to implicate the other co-defendant in the crime or crimes on

trial.” Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772, 797 (896 SE2d 549) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

“A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose was to

38

establish evidence for use in a future prosecution.” Hampton v.

State, 308 Ga. 797, 802 (843 SE2d 542) (2020) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557

U.S. 305, 310 (129 SCt 2527, 174 LE2d 314) (2009) (describing

“testimonial” statements as “‘statements that were made under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to

believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

trial’”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). “[T]he [Confrontation]

Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for

purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.

(a) Campbell’s Confrontation Clause challenge to Parrish’s

statement to Jay Buchans.

As discussed in Division 1 above, evidence was presented that

Parrish told his cellmate Buchans about Foley’s murder. Because

Campbell challenged the admission of Parrish’s statement to

Buchans in the trial court, we review the trial court’s decision to

admit that statement for an abuse of discretion. See McCord v.

39

State, 305 Ga. 318, 322 (825 SE2d 122) (2019). In his interview with

police, Buchans described this conversation, which also included

Parrish explaining his trial strategy to Buchans, as Parrish “trying

to feel me out to see what I could tell him.” 18

Parrish’s statement to Buchans was not testimonial. There

were no circumstances that “would lead an objective witness

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use

at a later trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310. Thus, Campbell’s

Confrontation Clause argument fails. See Hampton, 308 Ga. at 802

(rejecting the defendant’s Confrontation Clause argument because a

co-defendant’s statements to his cellmate “to get advice about his

false alibi, not to establish evidence for use in a future prosecution”

was not testimonial).

(b) Campbell’s Confrontation Clause challenge to Smith’s

“Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit”

The “Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit” was found in

Smith’s cell, and, as Campbell highlights, the document includes

18 Evidence was presented that Buchans had at least nine prior

convictions.

40

Smith’s attempt to establish an alibi by asserting that he was not at

the scene of Foley’s murder but was instead taking part in a “major

drug trade.” Specifically, in the document, Smith explained that

although he “made statements prior to this one to seem as if [he]

was there and could recall” Foley’s shooting, those statements were

a part of his plan to frame Campbell and Parrish for the shooting,

and the “truth is, [he] wasn’t there.” Instead, Smith said that he

was “actually taking part in a major drug trade” and that “to cover

up facts of the drug trade, [he] tried to call on alibis to create a

witness.” But “it wasn’t true,” and in fact “[a]ll the statements [he]

gave before now were not true.”19

19 In the document, Smith also gave the following account of what

happened the night of the wreck. Smith was riding with Pastures that night

because Pastures had contacted him saying “it’s an emergency and we really

need to talk.” While they were driving, Pastures revealed to Smith that

Pastures, Campbell, and Parrish were “part of a robbery that went bad.”

Pastures also told Smith that Campbell sold Smith the gun as part of “a plan

[Parrish] and [Campbell] came up with in order to get rid of the murder weapon

from the robbery gone bad.” Smith wanted to turn in the gun to the police

precinct, but Pastures said it was “too late” and instead shot at a man Pastures

said “would’ve carried out the hit from [Parrish] and [Campbell] on him.” After

the wreck, Smith was “overwhelmed with fear,” and he decided that “since no

one would probably believe I wasn’t part of the murder,” he would “at least

make sure that [Parrish] and [Campbell] went down for it just like they tried

41

Campbell did not challenge the admission of the “Declaration

of Truth” at trial, so our review of the admission of that document is

limited to plain error, which, as explained above, requires that,

among other things, Campbell must point to an error that was “‘clear

or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” Baker, 319

Ga. at 461-462 (citing Kelly, 290 Ga. at 32). See also Moody v. State,

316 Ga. 490, 523 (888 SE2d 109) (2023) (explaining that when a

defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, “we

apply the four-pronged [plain error] analysis articulated in State v.

Kelly”).

Pretermitting whether the “Declaration of Truth” was

to frame me for it.” Smith further asserted in the document that he and his

co-defendants were not part of “some type of unit or structured street gang”

and “[t]here [were] never any meetings or any orders for violence on anyone’s

life ever.”

On appeal, the only part of the “Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit”

that Campbell argues was inadmissible is Smith’s “attempt to concoct his

alibi.” Campbell does not argue that the State presented any other parts of the

“Declaration of Truth,” such as Smith’s assertion that Pastures, Smith, and

Campbell were involved in Foley’s murder, for the truth of the matter asserted.

Thus, we consider only whether Smith’s “attempt to concoct his alibi” in the

“Declaration of Truth, Sworn Affidavit” was admissible under the

Confrontation Clause.

42

testimonial,20 Campbell has failed to show that its admission

violated the Confrontation Clause because Smith’s attempt to

establish an alibi for himself in the “Declaration of Truth” was

presented by the State not to show its truth, but to show that Smith

was shifting his story and creating a new narrative to exculpate

himself. After Investigator Sammons testified about Smith’s

statement in the document that he heard about the attempted

robbery from Pastures while they were in the car on the night of the

wreck, the following exchange between the prosecutor and

Investigator Sammons occurred:

PROSECUTOR: And is this basically an explanation of

things that are happening the night of this wreck?

INVESTIGATOR SAMMONS: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Or the explanation that he’s giving at

this point?

INVESTIGATOR SAMMONS: Well, that’s an

explanation, yes.

20 There were some indications in the document that Smith intended to

give it to government officials for use in trial. Specifically, the document begins with a letter from Smith to the District Attorney and Assistant District

Attorney, in which Smith requests that he be granted a plea deal for 15 years

in exchange for giving the State this “Declaration of Truth” that “will stand at

the trial of my codefendants as testimony.” However, the document was not

actually sworn or given to law enforcement.

43

And in closing argument, the prosecutor noted that Smith’s counsel

had argued that the “Declaration of Truth” was true and Smith

“knew about the murder because James Pastures told him about it.”

The prosecutor then said:

Problem. You’re telling us what’s in that declaration of

truth is truth. Well, in that letter, Kevin Smith says that

he was in a major drug deal, not at his mom’s. So if you’re

saying that’s true, why do you put up mom to come in here

and give you an alibi?[ 21] Because none of it is true. The

truth is, he was at the scene. He was involved in the

murder of Rebecca Foley and he’s guilty. All of these lies

equal guilt.

Because this document was introduced for “purposes other

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,” Campbell has

not shown that it was a clear and obvious error for the trial court

not to exclude the document under the Confrontation Clause. See

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“[T]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does

not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than

establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”). See also Myrick v.

21 Smith called his mother as a witness at trial, and she testified that

Smith was at home with her and his daughter on the evening of Foley’s murder.

44

State, 306 Ga. 894, 901 (834 SE2d 542) (2019) (holding that the

admission of a detective’s recounting of an unavailable witness’s

statements “did not violate the Confrontation Clause” because the

detective’s recounting was “clearly not meant to establish as true”

what the witness had said); Carter v. State, 302 Ga. 200, 204-205

(805 SE2d 839) (2017) (“[E]ven if we were to assume that Walker’s

recorded statements are testimonial, an assumption that is highly

questionable, there is no [C]onfrontation [C]lause violation where,

like here, the out-of-court statements are used for ‘purposes other

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’”) (citation

omitted).

6. Campbell also contends that the trial court erred by

admitting evidence of his gang membership because it was not

relevant. See OCGA § 24-4-402 (“Evidence which is not relevant

shall not be admissible.”). Campbell was charged with eight counts

of violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the

“Gang Act”). These counts alleged that Campbell participated in

criminal gang activity “while associated with a criminal street gang,

45

to wit: Bloods.” See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for

any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to

conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the

commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code

Section 16-15-3.”). Thus, the State was required to prove, among

other things, that Campbell was “associated with” the Bloods street

gang, so evidence proving his membership in this gang was relevant,

and the trial court did not err by admitting it. See Rooks, 317 Ga.

at 753 (explaining that to prove that the defendants “participated in

criminal street gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State

was required to prove,” among other things, “the defendant’s

association with the gang”).22

22 Campbell appears to argue that because the State did not prove that

the crimes committed against Foley were meant to “further the interest of the

gang,” see OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), evidence of his gang membership was not

admissible. See Rooks, 317 Ga. at 753 (explaining that to prove a violation of

OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State was required to prove, among other things, that

“the crime was intended to further the interest of the gang.”). This argument,

however, sounds in sufficiency, not admissibility. And neither of the two cases

cited by Campbell to support this argument dealt with the exclusion of

evidence because the State had failed to prove a nexus between the gang and

the criminal activity. Instead, these cases explained that such a failure meant

that a conviction for a gang charge could not stand. See Moore v. State, 305

46

Arguments Raised by Parrish

7. Parrish contends that the trial court erred by allegedly

allowing the State to change its plea offer after Parrish accepted it.

(a) Before voir dire began on the first day of trial, the trial

court stated that it was the court’s understanding that all of the

defendants except Parrish had rejected the State’s plea offers and

asked what the State’s position was as to entering a plea agreement

with Parrish. The State responded: “[A]bsent the terms that we had

discussed we are not willing to proceed.” The court responded, “You

haven’t come to a meeting of the minds with regard to the

requirements?” The State agreed with the trial court’s

characterization, but Parrish’s counsel disagreed, explaining:

The terms being discussed now were not discussed prior

to my talking to Mr. Parrish. The initial terms were—

and I was very—I felt very certain that he would plead.

He would receive life with the possibility of parole, plus a

Ga. 251, 254 (824 SE2d 377) (2019) (explaining that “the trial court ultimately

set aside Moore’s conviction on the charge of criminal gang activity . . . based

on its finding that the evidence failed to show the requisite nexus between

Moore’s crimes and furtherance of the gang’s interests”) (punctuation omitted);

In the Interest of W. B., 342 Ga. App. 277, 277, 283 (801 SE2d 595) (2017)

(reversing the adjudication of delinquency for criminal gang activity because

there “was insufficient evidence to support a finding that [the appellant] had

engaged in criminal gang activity”).

47

number of years. Okay, and that was the entire

agreement, and he accepted that agreement.

The prosecutor responded:

The only thing that we were trying to find out at the time

that counsel was sent back, was whether or not any of

these defendants would be willing to plead to murder and

plead to life. The additional terms and negotiations were

left to after we get past that hurdle. That was my

understanding.

She further explained:

We have not reached any of the additional terms under

these circumstances and . . . it is the State’s position that

absent some sort of actual verifiable proffer from Mr.

Parrish and—and given the extensive statements and

their use—possibly used against him at trial. He is not

very reliable as a witness. We’d have to get something

additional from him. He’s not willing to do that. And

because of where we are and the posture of this case, we’re

not willing to proceed with any kind of plea offer at this

time, absent his actual testimony.

The trial court pointed out that if Parrish entered a plea

agreement, he would be subject to subpoena to testify, and the

prosecutor agreed, again saying, “[W]e are not comfortable

proceeding, absent some nailed down sense of what he would say.”

The court said it understood that Parrish was not inclined to provide

48

testimony, and Parrish’s attorney agreed, but further explained that

he thought the offer he presented to Parrish “was a complete offer”

and “[a]ll this other stuff came up for him subsequently accepting

the offer of life, plus a number of years, with the possibility of parole.

It was never discussed that all five had to take it or he had to testify

or anything like that. It was never even mentioned.”

The court asked Parrish about the plea offer on the record.

Parrish’s counsel reiterated: “[T]he first offer we related to Mr.

Parrish, the offer subsequently had more conditions added to it and

he’s aware of the new conditions that were added.” The State then

put on the record what the offer would be:

[T]he basics of it would be murder, [Parrish] would enter

a plea to life. We would take life without parole off the

table. So, it would be a life sentence. He would be eligible

for parole. And there was a number of years, I believe,

ninety years consecutive. Again, that would be negotiable

if Mr. Parrish was able to provide testimony and confirm

what he would say, if called as a witness.

The court then went over the possible sentences for each of the

charges Parrish faced and asked if Parrish accepted or rejected the

offer. Parrish rejected the offer.

49

At the motion for new trial hearing, Parrish’s attorney testified

that after the first trial ended in a mistrial, the State extended plea

offers to the defendants to plead for life:

[T]hat was all they said, was he can plead to life. And we

were given an opportunity to meet with Mr. Parrish in the

courtroom by ourselves to discuss it. And he accepted. He

was gonna plead and take the life sentence because they

were seeking life without parole.

Counsel explained that all of the other defendants rejected the plea,

and then Parrish was “told that either every, single one of the

defendants had to plead or [Parrish] had to testify against the

codefendants. But that was not originally—there were no conditions

when we originally offered the plea.” On cross-examination,

Parrish’s trial counsel acknowledged that Parrish could have been

called on to testify even if his testimony was not expressly part of

the plea deal, but counsel had not discussed this possibility with

Parrish. In denying Parrish’s motion for new trial, the court

concluded that Parrish “did not prove the requisite meeting of the

minds or the intent to accept the plea knowing he would be subject

to be called by the State to testify.”

50

(b) In making this argument that the trial court erred by

“allowing the State to modify its plea offer after it was accepted,”

Parrish relies heavily on Syms v. State, 331 Ga. App. 225 (770 SE2d

305) (2015), in which the Court of Appeals held that the trial court

erred by denying the appellant’s motion to enforce a plea agreement.

See id. at 226-228. In Syms, defense counsel and the State affirmed

to the trial court at a calendar call that “they had reached a plea

agreement,” but the State later attempted to change that

agreement. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded: “This is

simply a case where an agreement as to terms was clearly made, and

then the State changed its mind and no longer wanted to honor the

plea agreement.” Id. at 228 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, by contrast, the evidence indicated that Parrish and the

State had not settled on the terms of the agreement. The record

shows that the parties never presented a plea agreement to the trial

court or represented that they had reached such an agreement

regarding the terms of any plea agreement. Even when a potential

agreement was discussed, the State represented that its

51

understanding was that the plea negotiation was not finished when

Parrish’s attorney brought the first part of the offer to Parrish to see

if he had any interest in pleading guilty, and the trial court

apparently found the State’s understanding credible. See Goodwin

v. State, S24A0518, 2024 WL 4351087, at *3 (Ga. Oct. 1, 2024)

(explaining, in the context of the withdrawal of a guilty plea, that

credibility determinations are within the purview of the trial court

and that if the “trial court does not make explicit factual and

credibility determinations, we presume implicit findings were made

supporting the trial court’s decision”) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And then Parrish rejected the State’s plea offer on the

record after the trial court informed him of the possible sentences

for each charge.

Thus, because Parrish has failed to show that the State

modified its plea offer as he alleges, this claim fails.

Argument Raised by Sanders

8. Sanders contends that the trial court erred by disqualifying

John Rodman as his counsel.

52

(a) Sanders hired John Rodman to represent him before trial;

Rodman filed an entry of appearance on July 27, 2018, and he

represented Sanders at a pre-trial hearing on August 16, 2018. At

that hearing, the trial court noted that Rodman had a potential

conflict of interest because he was also representing Yusef,

Sanders’s father, and the State asserted that it might call Yusef as

a witness.

In an order entered on August 23, 2018, the trial court held

that Rodman was disqualified from representing Sanders. The court

explained that Yusef was indicted on weapons charges based on

evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant executed in

connection with Sanders’s indictment in this case and that the State

planned to present evidence about an April 2012 incident in which

Yusef and Sanders allegedly shot at a residence with the gun used

in Foley’s murder. 23 The State also planned to present evidence that

Yusef had contacts with gang leaders out of state and that some of

23 Evidence was presented that in April 2012, Sanders and Yusef shot at

a residence in retaliation for one of their relatives being harmed; a bullet found at that residence forensically matched the gun used to shoot Foley.

53

Sanders’s co-defendants were calling Yusef from prison to seek

advice about the case. The court noted that although Rodman

concluded that there was no conflict, the case was complex

(involving many defendants and counts), and Rodman “[could] not

anticipate every question that the State might ask . . . that could

implicate Yusef or [Sanders] in the numerous alleged activities

connected to this indictment.” The trial court further explained that

if Yusef testified “in a manner that is contrary to Mr. Rodman’s

understanding or that is adverse to Shacqeal Sanders’s case, Mr.

Rodman could quickly find himself in quandary about impeaching

one client, Yusef Sanders, or providing ineffective assistance of trial

counsel to the other client, Shacqeal Sanders,” and noted that “Yusef

Sanders is not a third party witness who is merely connected to this

indictment by his familial connection to Shacqeal Sanders . . . he is

implicated in at least two incidents involving firearms that are

either directly or potentially linked to Shacqeal Sanders.”

Citing Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 (c) (3), which

says that “[c]lient informed consent is not permissible if the

54

representation: . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it

reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate

representation to one or more of the affected clients,” the court

further concluded that “[a] waiver would not be appropriate in this

set of circumstances.” At the next hearing, on August 28, 2018, the

trial court informed Sanders that Rodman could not represent him,

and Sanders objected to this ruling.

Although Yusef was subpoenaed for trial, he was never called

as a witness. However, evidence about the April 2012 incident was

presented, and the State played for the jury the recording of a jail

call in which Sanders talked to another gang member about the trial

for Foley’s and Pastures’s murders and Sanders told the member:

“Push up on pops. Holler at him” to get information. Additionally,

Yusef was charged with criminal contempt in relation to his

violation of the rule of sequestration at Sanders’s trial. 24

24 On October 26, 2018, the trial court held a contempt hearing at which

Yusef was represented by Rodman. Investigator Sammons testified that

Sanders called Yusef from jail on October 23 and 24, and Yusef told Sanders

that he was arranging to have people come into the courtroom for trial so he

55

At the motion for new trial hearing, Rodman testified that he

was hired to represent Yusef, who was charged with possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, and within “a couple of months,”

Rodman was also retained to represent Sanders. Rodman

determined that there was no conflict in representing both of them,

and Sanders and Yusef were willing to waive any potential conflict.

In denying Sanders’s motion for new trial, the motion for new trial

court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by

disqualifying Rodman, explaining: “Neither Rodman nor appellate

counsel has shown how Rodman could have ethically proceeded

where his client Yusef was involved in an incident involving use of

the murder weapon, was integral to the concealment phase of the

conspiracy, and an active participant in attempted disruption of the

trial proceedings by gaining knowledge in violation of the rule of

sequestration. Nor has there been any effort to show how thorough

had “eyes and ears in the courtroom.” Investigator Sammons explained that

Yusef knew that because he had been served with a subpoena as a potential

witness, he was not allowed to come into the courtroom or to learn about what

happened in the courtroom. The trial court concluded that Yusef had violated

the rule of sequestration and sentenced him to serve 20 days in prison.

56

and sifting cross-examination of Yusef could have been conducted by

his own attorney.”

(b) A criminal defendant who does not require appointed

counsel has a right to choose who will represent him, and that right

is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIV of the Georgia

Constitution of 1983. See Registe v. State, 287 Ga. 542, 544 (697

SE2d 804) (2010).

The right to choose one’s counsel is not unqualified,

however. As relevant to this case, it is well-established

that a defendant does not have a right to be represented

by an attorney who is ethically prohibited from doing so,

most commonly due to a conflict of interest.

Id. “[T]he courts must recognize a presumption in favor of [an

accused’s] counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome

not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [of interest] but by a

showing of a serious potential for conflict.” Heidt v. State, 292 Ga.

343, 346 (736 SE2d 384) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Rule 1.7 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

prohibits a lawyer from representing a client “if there is a significant

57

risk that . . . the lawyer’s duties to another client . . . will materially

and adversely affect the representation of the client.” Although this

representation is permitted in some situations if both clients give

informed consent, see Rule 1.7 (b), if the representation “involves

circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will

be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the

affected clients,” such representation is not permissible even with

client informed consent. See Rule 1.7 (c) (3). See also Registe, 287

Ga. at 544 (“[T]he defendant’s waiver of his attorney’s conflict of

interest does not always cure the problem, because courts have an

independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted

within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal

proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “The trial court’s decision on whether an

ethical requirement bars a lawyer from representing a defendant is

reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id.

Sanders argues that because the State only postulated about

what might happen with respect to Yusef that could create a

58

potential conflict of interest and did not call Yusef as a witness at

trial and Sanders waived any potential conflict inherent in the

representation, the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying

Rodman as his counsel. We disagree.

Although the State ultimately did not call Yusef as a witness,

at the time when the trial court had to rule on Rodman’s ability to

serve as Sanders’s counsel ethically, the trial court reasonably

expected Yusef to be called as a witness. Moreover, evidence of

Yusef’s involvement with the charged crimes was in fact presented

at trial. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (108 SCt

1692, 100 LE2d 140) (1988) (a trial court “must pass on the issue

whether or not to allow a waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal

defendant not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken

place”).25 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

25 Sanders implies that the State never actually intended to call Yusef

and instead raised this possibility only to disqualify Sanders’s chosen counsel.

But Sanders points to no record evidence supporting that theory, and we see

none. To the contrary, the evidence presented at Sanders’s trial showed that

the connections between Yusef and the charged crimes gave the State good

reason to anticipate that it may call Yusef as a witness at that trial.

59

Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

determining that Sanders’s purported willingness to waive the

conflict did not allow for Rodman’s representation because it was

“reasonably unlikely” that Rodman would “be able to provide

adequate representation” to both Yusef and Sanders given Sanders’s

connection with the charged crimes and the potential that Rodman

would be faced with the “quandary” of “impeaching one client . . . or

providing ineffective assistance of trial counsel to the other client.”

See Rule 1.7 (c) (3). See also Heidt, 292 Ga. at 347 (holding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying the

defendant’s chosen counsel when counsel also represented someone

“who was anticipated to testify in the prosecution of Heidt, and who

herself was charged with intimidating a witness in his prosecution”).

Thus, Sanders’s claim fails.

Arguments Raised by Speaks

9. Speaks contends that the trial court erred by denying his

request for a jury instruction on common criminal intent. Speaks

requested that the jury be charged that “a common criminal intent

60

must be proven in order to establish a defendant is a party to a

crime.” The trial court declined to give this instruction, and Speaks

objected.

To determine whether a trial court erred in failing to give

a requested jury instruction, we must read and consider

the instructions as a whole. Where the jury charge, taken

as a whole, sufficiently instructs the jury on a point of law,

a trial court does not err in failing to give an unnecessary,

additional instruction.

Payne v. State, 318 Ga. 249, 257 (897 SE2d 809) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

Here, as quoted in Division 4 (a) above, the jury was instructed

that it should not find a defendant guilty unless it found beyond a

reasonable doubt that he “knowingly and intentionally participated

or helped in the commission of” the charged crime, and the jury was

instructed that it was not authorized to find guilty someone who was

“merely present” at the scene of the crime. Viewed as a whole, the

jury was adequately instructed on party to the crime, and the trial

court did not err by failing to give this additional instruction about

intent. See Payne, 318 Ga. at 257. See also Adkins v. State, 314 Ga.

61

477, 483 (877 SE2d 582) (2022) (“We see no error in the trial court’s

decision not to give the requested charge on grave suspicion because

the concept was covered in other jury instructions that the court did

give to the jury.”).

10. Speaks contends that the trial court erred by commenting

in front of the jury that Speaks requested a jury instruction on

justification.

(a) During Speaks’s closing argument, his attorney mentioned

documents seized from Speaks’s jail cell that discussed a plan to

offer a self-defense story to explain Pastures’s murder. In

particular, counsel indicated that the jury was “probably going to

believe it’s false.” The State then objected, saying: “[Speaks’s

attorney] just said that that could be false. He’s requested a charge

on self-defense, which is an affirmative defense that requires the

admission of the act. He cannot now argue that it is false.” The

court responded, “I thought that was made clear,” and pointed out

that Speaks requested the self-defense charge. Speaks’s counsel

agreed. The court said: “You need to stick with your—you requested

62

that charge. It’s in the charge, because you requested it.” But the

court also acknowledged that Speaks could “present alternate

theories.” The court told Speaks’s counsel to “leave it there,” and

counsel apologized. Counsel then resumed his closing argument.

After he had finished his closing argument and the jury had been

excused, counsel noted his objection to the court saying in front of

the jury that he requested the jury charge on justification, and the

court noted the objection for the record.

In the final jury instructions, the trial court explained to the

jury that “[i]n jury trials, the lawyers of the parties submit their

requests to charge. And they’re required to do that by a Uniform

Superior Court Rule. And all of them did so.” The court also

explained: “An affirmative defense is a defense that admits the doing

of the act charged, but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it. . . .

Speaks and [Sanders] have raised the affirmative defense of

justification.” Then the court explained the defense of justification.

(b) OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) provides: “It is error for any judge,

during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the

63

jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not

been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” Speaks asserts that

the trial court’s comment—that is, that Speaks requested an

instruction on self-defense—was, in effect, expressing an opinion on

an issue. Speaks did not, however, raise a timely, contemporaneous

objection to the trial court’s statement, because he did not object as

soon as the trial court told the jury that he requested the instruction;

instead, he waited to raise this objection until after he had finished

his closing argument and the jury had been excused. See Cowart v.

State, 294 Ga. 333, 336 (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (holding that Cowart’s

objection to a statement the prosecutor made “[n]ear the end of the

State’s rebuttal closing argument” was “not timely” because Cowart

did not raise it until “[a]fter the prosecutor completed her argument

about a minute later” and “the jury left the courtroom”).

We therefore limit our review of this claim to plain error. See

OCGA § 17-8-57 (b) (“Except as provided in subsection (c) of this

Code section, failure to make a timely objection to an alleged

violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall

64

preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain

error which affects substantive rights of the parties.”).26 As

discussed above, to show plain error, Speaks must show, among

other things, that the trial court committed an error that was “‘clear

or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” Baker, 319

Ga. at 461-462 (citing Kelly, 290 Ga. at 32). See also Bamberg v.

State, 308 Ga. 340, 352 (839 SE2d 640) (2020) (applying the plain

error test described in Kelly to evaluate a claim for plain error under

OCGA § 17-8-57 (b)).

Speaks has failed to make this showing. Speaks asserts that

with the above exchange, the trial court expressed an opinion on an

issue by informing the jury that Speaks “admitted the act forming

the basis of the offense.” To begin, it is not at all clear what alleged

falsehood “it” referred to in the prosecutor’s assertion, “He cannot

now argue that it is false.” More importantly, the trial court’s

response of “I thought that was made clear” and explanation that

Speaks had requested a self-defense instruction appear to have done

26 Subsection (c) is discussed in footnote 28 below.

65

nothing more than inform the jury that Speaks requested an

instruction on self-defense. The court then explained to the jury in

its final charge that attorneys request certain charges, and the court

explained the defense of justification. It is not clear or obvious that

the trial court’s comment, particularly when considered in context,

constitutes expressing an opinion on any issue in violation of OCGA

§ 17-8-57. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 263 (824 SE2d

326) (2019) (“Given the context in which the comments [that it was

‘important’ for the jury to ‘get your sense of whatever you are to

glean from this video tape here in the courtroom’ because it would

not have the video during deliberations] were made, it is hardly clear

and obvious that the jurors would have viewed the judge’s

instructions as commenting on the weight of the evidence as opposed

to providing a straightforward explanation that they would not have

additional opportunities to review the video during deliberations.”);

Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 174 (815 SE2d 38) (2018) (holding that

the trial court’s failure to give an instruction limiting the selfdefense instruction to the defendant who requested it was not an

66

expression or intimation of the judge’s “opinion as to what has or has

not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused” because, considered

in context, “no reasonable jury would have understood the court’s

abstract statements about the law as intimating that the judge

believed that [the defendant] had shot [the victim]”).

Moreover, in making his argument, Speaks relies on two Court

of Appeals cases that indicated that “‘[g]enerally, a prosecutor

should refrain from mentioning that the defendant requested the

lesser included charge.’” Woodruff v. State, 356 Ga. App. 659, 665

(848 SE2d 670) (2020) (citing Newman v. State, 334 Ga. App. 439

(779 SE2d 678) (2015)).27 Speaks has not cited any cases, however—

nor have we found any—indicating that the trial court’s statement

that Speaks requested an instruction on a specific affirmative

defense was an erroneous expression of an opinion. Thus, in order

27 Woodruff and Newman did not rely on OCGA § 17-8-57, as Speaks does

here, because they dealt with statements made by the prosecutor, rather than

the trial court. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) (“It is error for any judge . . . .”), (c) (“Should any judge . . . .”) (emphasis added). We do not determine whether

these cases were correctly decided.

67

to conclude that the trial court erred here, we would need to

substantially expand the Court of Appeals precedent noted above,

and “an error is not plain under current law if a defendant’s theory

requires the extension of precedent.” Wilson v. State, 312 Ga. 174,

179 (860 SE2d 485) (2021).28 Speaks’s claim of plain error therefore

fails on the second prong of plain-error review. See Roberts, 305 Ga.

at 263.

11. Speaks contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a

28 To the extent Speaks contends that he is entitled to a new trial because

the trial court “express[ed] an opinion” as to his guilt, this argument also fails. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (c) (“Should any judge express an opinion as to the guilt

of the accused, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or the trial court in a

motion for a new trial shall grant a new trial.”). The trial court’s indication

that Speaks requested an affirmative defense was not an expression of an

opinion on Speaks’s guilt of the charged crimes. See Boyd v. State, 306 Ga.

204, 214-215 (830 SE2d 160) (2019) (holding that the court’s instruction that

“[p]arties to a crime is a legal concept” that would be explained in the court’s

final jury instructions was not an expression of the defendant’s guilt).

To the extent Speaks raises an additional argument based on the

prosecutor’s statement about what is required to assert an affirmative defense,

it is not preserved for appellate review because Speaks did not raise this

objection at trial. The plain-error review provided by OCGA § 17-8-57 does not

apply to statements made by prosecutors, and we see no other basis to apply

plain-error review to such a claim. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328-329

(781 SE2d 772) (2016) (explaining that Georgia’s evidence code provides for

plain-error review of rulings that admit or exclude evidence and thus does not

provide for plain error review of a prosecutor’s statements during closing

argument, which are not evidence).

68

matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions for

malice murder, conspiracy to murder Harris, possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony, and violation of the Gang Act. A

criminal conviction cannot stand if “it is found that upon the record

evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 324 (99 SCt 278, 161 LE2d 560) (1979). In considering

this claim, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

convictions. See id. at 319. “Every person concerned in the

commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with

and convicted of commission of the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a). See

also Ward v. State, 316 Ga. 295, 298 (888 SE2d 75) (2023) (“To be

convicted as a party to a crime, the defendant must have “shared a

common criminal intent with the direct perpetrators of the crime,

which may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct

before, during, and after the offense.”) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

As discussed above, the evidence presented at trial showing

69

that Speaks committed the charged crimes included eye-witness

testimony that Speaks and Sanders drove to Pastures and Harris’s

apartment together, that they called Harris to the car, and that

Speaks shot at Harris as Sanders shot at Pastures. The evidence

also showed that Speaks was a high-ranking member of the EGB

gang and that Pastures had been “put on a plate” by the gang

because he was suspected of talking to the police. As a matter of

constitutional due process, this evidence was sufficient to support

the jury’s conclusion that Speaks was a party to Pastures’s murder,

which was committed with “malice aforethought” 29; that Speaks

conspired with Sanders to murder Harris,30 that Speaks possessed a

firearm during the commission of these felonies,31 and that Speaks

29 “A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with

malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another

human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).

30 “A person commits the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime when

he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any

one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the

conspiracy.” OCGA § 16-4-8.

31 “Any person who shall have on or within arm’s reach of his or her

person a firearm . . . during the commission of, . . . : (1) Any crime against or

70

violated the Gang Act by committing these crimes to further the

interests of the gang of which he was a member.32 See id. at 298-299

(holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the

appellant guilty as a party to the crime of murder and aggravated

assault where an eyewitness identified the appellant as one of the

parties involved in the victim’s stabbing, and the witness explained

that Ward’s gang was executing the “hit” put out on the victim);

Dixon v. State, 309 Ga. 28, 34 (843 SE2d 806) (2020) (holding that

the evidence was sufficient to prove a violation of the Gang Act

where the evidence showed that the charged offense was committed

“to retaliate for [one of the victims’] verbal and physical conduct that

involving the person of another; . . . and which crime is a felony, commits a

felony.” OCGA § 16-11-106 (b).

32 To establish that a defendant violated OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State

must prove:

(1) the existence of a “criminal street gang,” defined in OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) as “any organization, association, or group of three or more

persons associated in fact, whether formal or informal, which

engages in criminal gang activity”; (2) the defendant’s association

with the gang; (3) that the defendant committed any of several

enumerated criminal offenses, including those “involving violence,

possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon”; and (4) that the crime

was intended to further the interests of the gang.

Rooks, 317 Ga. at 753.

71

Dixon viewed as disrespectful of Dixon’s gang”).33

Cumulative Error Analysis

12. We have held that as to Parrish, Campbell, and Speaks,

the trial court made two errors. 34 Thus, we consider whether the

cumulative prejudicial effect of these errors deprived the defendants

of a fair trial. See Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 16 (885 SE2d 790)

(2023) (“When this Court has identified or presumed more than one

error, although the effect of each on its own might have been

harmless to the defendant’s trial, we have looked to whether the

combined effect of the errors harmed the defendant.”).

As to all three defendants, we have concluded that or

pretermitted whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of

33 Speaks asserts that the jury’s verdicts were “inconsistent.” For

example, the jury could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder (Harris)

count, but it found Speaks guilty of conspiracy to commit murder as to Harris.

Any inconsistency, however, does not prove that the evidence was insufficient

as a matter of constitutional due process. See Howard v. State, 318 Ga. 681,

684 (899 SE2d 669) (2024) (“[A]n acquittal on one count is not itself a basis to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to another count.”).

34 We need not do any review of the effect of cumulative errors as to

Sanders because he “has failed to establish any trial court errors.” Blocker v.

State, 316 Ga. 568, 583 (889 SE2d 824) (2023).

72

juror intimidation and instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance.

It is “highly probable” that the combined effect of these two errors

“did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (838

SE2d 808) (2020) (explaining that in considering cumulative

prejudice, we must “bear in mind the relevant standards for the

errors at issue” and reiterating that “a nonconstitutional trial court

error is harmless if the State shows that it is highly probable that

the error did not contribute to the verdict”) (citation and punctuation

omitted).35 As discussed above, the State presented no evidence that

Parrish or Campbell directed the juror intimidation, and the

evidence that they were fully aware of the planned robbery of Foley

was strong, whereas any evidence that they were “deliberately

ignorant” was quite weak. As to Speaks, he had no association—not

even familial—with the juror intimidation evidence, and he did not

35 Although we reviewed one of the errors as to Campbell and Parrish for

only plain error, we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the

cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmlesserror standard for preserved non-constitutional errors. See Lane, 308 Ga. at

21 (declining to “decide exactly how multiple standards may interact under

cumulative review of different types of errors”).

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claim that he was ignorant of the charged crimes. Moreover, the

jury was instructed to disregard the juror intimidation evidence if it

did not find that a defendant authorized the intimidation, and the

jury was instructed that it could find a defendant guilty only if the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the “defendant had

knowledge” of the crimes and that “the defendant knowingly and

intentionally participated” in the commission. (Emphasis added).

There is no evidence that the jurors did not follow these instructions.

Thus, it is highly probable that the cumulative effect of the two trial

court errors did not affect the jury’s verdicts as to Parrish, Campbell,

and Speaks. See Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 16 (885 SE2d 790)

(2023) (holding that it was “highly probable” that the court’s

erroneous admission of two pieces of evidence did not contribute to

the verdict where even though “the 1997 convictions for a violent

crime held the potential for prejudice, and the good character

evidence invited sympathy for the victim and his widow, the jury

was charged that it was not permitted to be influenced by sympathy

for either party,” and we “typically presume juries follow the

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instructions that they are given by the trial court, absent evidence

to the contrary”).

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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