NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 21, 2023
S23A0710. BELTRAN-GONZALES v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Ricardo Beltran-Gonzales appeals his conviction for
malice murder in connection with a stabbing at Hays State Prison,
which resulted in the death of fellow inmate Nathaniel Reynolds.1
1The stabbing occurred on January 18, 2013. On July 8, 2013, a
Chattooga County grand jury charged Appellant with malice murder, felony
murder, and aggravated assault. Leonardo Ramos Rodrigues, whose case is
not part of this appeal, was separately charged with the same crimes. On
September 26, 2013, the State filed a notice of joint trial seeking to try
Appellant together with Rodrigues. A joint jury trial was held from February
24 to 26, 2014. The jury found Appellant and Rodrigues guilty on all counts,
and the court sentenced them both to serve life in prison for malice murder.
The court merged Appellant’s aggravated-assault and felony-murder charges
into his malice murder charge for sentencing purposes, but the felony-murder
charge was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263
Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Appellant filed a motion for new
trial on February 27, 2014, which he amended through new counsel on
December 2, 2016. Following a hearing, the court issued a written order
summarily denying the motion on October 2, 2018. Defense counsel did not
timely file a direct appeal. On March 16, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se habeas
petition, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of appeal. On February 2, 2023, the habeas court granted Appellant
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in recharging the jury on malice murder without also
recharging the jury on Appellant’s defenses. Appellant also argues
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State
jointly trying Appellant with another inmate, Leonardo Ramos
Rodrigues, who was separately charged with committing the same
fatal stabbing. For the reasons explained below, we affirm
Appellant’s conviction.
1. The trial evidence showed the following. In September
2012, Reynolds and Rodrigues were inmates at Hays State Prison.
The men, both of whom were assigned to the “C building” dormitory,
had an altercation on September 6. As a result of the fight, Reynolds
was taken out of the general population and segregated in the
Special Management Unit (“SMU”). While Reynolds was in the
SMU, Appellant arrived at Hays State Prison as a prisoner.
relief in the form of an out-of-time direct appeal. Pursuant to the habeas
court’s order, Appellant filed a notice of appeal in his criminal case directed to this Court. The appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
Eventually, Reynolds asked to be returned to the general
population, and his request was granted in January 2013.
On January 18, 2013, Officers Nicholas Souther and Stefan
Hoglund transported Reynolds from the SMU back to C building.
When they arrived at C building, the officers exchanged paperwork
with Officer Christopher Magness, who was the C building floor
officer. Officer Andrew Liden, who was stationed in C building’s
control room, then saw Appellant “run past the dorm or the control
room door with a sharp piece of metal in his hand” and “stab inmate
Reynolds,” before the men moved out of his line of sight. Meanwhile,
Officers Souther, Hoglund, and Magness heard a commotion nearby.
The officers testified that they turned to see Appellant and
Rodrigues stabbing Reynolds with “prison made knives” made out of
“sharpened pieces of metal,” known as “prison shank[s].” Appellant,
who had one prison shank, and Rodrigues, who had two prison
shanks, cornered Reynolds and “t[ook] turns stabbing him” as
Reynolds “tr[ied] to swat his hands to avoid the blades.” Officer
Daniel Keena, who was stationed at D building ran to the scene and
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likewise witnessed the stabbing.
The officers radioed the code for an inmate fight with weapons.
Shortly thereafter, Correctional Emergency Response Team Officer
Matthew Kennedy ran to the scene, witnessing the stabbing in the
process. He then yelled at Appellant and Rodrigues to stop and get
down on the ground. Appellant laid down his weapon and put his
hands over his head, but Rodrigues refused to comply with the
instructions until Officer Kennedy administered pepper spray.
While officers secured the men, Reynolds collapsed on the
ground. Reynolds died soon after. The State’s medical examiner
testified that Reynolds had ten incised wounds and seven stab
wounds and had died from “[s]harp force trauma of the chest,” which
had “pierced the heart.”
Rodrigues, who was a native Spanish speaker, testified in his
own defense through an interpreter at trial. His testimony included
a description of the incident that resulted in Reynolds being sent to
the SMU. Rodrigues testified that he and others were watching a
soap opera in Spanish when Reynolds approached the television and
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changed the channel. An argument ensued. According to Rodrigues,
he eventually left the room and went outside, but Reynolds followed
him out and stabbed him in the back.
Rodrigues also admitted that he had killed Reynolds, but he
claimed that he had acted in self-defense. Rodrigues testified that,
after eating at the cafeteria, he returned to C building and found
Reynolds standing outside. According to Rodrigues, he feared for
his life because he knew Reynolds had previously threatened to
“finish [Rodrigues] off,” and, after the men made eye contact,
Reynolds started “coming towards” Rodrigues while “put[ting] his
hand in [his pants]” in an apparent attempt to retrieve a weapon.
Rodrigues testified that he “didn’t give [Reynolds] time” to pull out
a weapon and instead “went toward” Reynolds, attacking Reynolds
with two shanks. When asked about Appellant’s involvement in
Reynolds’s killing, Rodrigues said, “The guilty one of [Reynolds’s]
murder is myself. [Appellant has] got nothing to do with this.”
Rodrigues further testified that he had not been friends with
Appellant, that Appellant “wasn’t even [at the prison] when
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[Rodrigues and Reynolds] first had the problem,” and that Rodrigues
had acted alone in stabbing Reynolds.
Although opening statements and closing arguments were not
transcribed, testimony at the motion-for-new-trial hearing revealed
that Appellant’s defense at trial was that he was mistakenly
identified as a perpetrator of the stabbing. 2 The jury rejected
Appellant’s defense and found him guilty of the charges
2. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when, in response to a jury question about the law of malice murder,
the court recharged the jury on malice murder without also
recharging the jury on Appellant’s defenses. We disagree.
At trial, the court instructed the jury on the State’s burden to
prove the identity of a defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged
crime, the elements of malice murder, and the law regarding mutual
combat and self-defense. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a
2 Although the court charged the jury on mutual combat and
justification, those defenses were not included in Appellant’s written request
for jury charges and the record does not suggest that Appellant argued those
defenses.
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note to the court stating, “We would like for you to read the law on
malice murder again.” The court proposed to counsel that it would
“simply read the one definition,” and Rodrigues asked the court to
also recharge the jury on “the affirmative defenses.” The court
responded that it would ask the jurors if they wanted a recharge on
other instructions and that the court would reread the instructions
on “mutual combat” and the “affirmative defenses” if the jurors
wanted more. The court then recharged the jury on malice murder
and asked, “Does that answer your question or are there other
portions of the charge that you would like for me to read as well?”
The jury foreperson responded, “No, ma’am, that does it.” The court
then stated, “Now, let me just caution you, don’t take this away from
the rest of the charge[.] [T]he Court’s charge should be taken as a
whole. Everything I charged you in the original charge is equally as
important.” After the jury returned to deliberations, Rodrigues
objected to the court’s failure to recharge the jurors on “the
defenses[,] . . . since we requested that,” and Appellant joined the
objection.
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“A trial court has a duty to recharge the jury on issues for which
the jury requests a recharge.” Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 806 (2)
(b) (860 SE2d 731) (2021). “[O]ur case law contains no general
mandate requiring trial courts, when responding to a jury’s request
for a recharge on a particular issue, to also recharge on all principles
asserted in connection with that issue.” Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29,
32-33 (3) (829 SE2d 131) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Rather, when the jury does not request additional instructions, “the
need, breadth, and formation of additional jury instructions are left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Barnes v. State, 305 Ga.
18, 23 (3) (823 SE2d 302) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted)).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
recharge the jury only on malice murder. Appellant argues that “the
trial court maybe should have recharged the jury on the affirmative
defenses [in addition to recharging the jury on malice murder], so as
to not leave an erroneous impression in the minds of the jury.” But
the court directly responded to the jury’s specific request that the
court reread the malice-murder instruction, fulfilling its duty to
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recharge the jury at the jury’s request. See Flood, 311 Ga. at 806 (2)
(b). See also Barnes, 305 Ga. at 23 (3) (“[I]t was within the court’s
discretion whether to recharge the jury in full or only upon the point
or points requested by the jury.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
In addition, the court took steps to ensure that the recharge would
not cause confusion or leave an erroneous impression in the minds
of the jurors. Specifically, the court confirmed that the recharge
answered the jury’s question and that the jury did not want the court
to repeat any additional instructions. The court also directed the
jury to consider the court’s instructions as a whole and not to put
undue emphasis on the recharge. Accordingly, this claim fails. See
Dozier, 306 Ga. at 33 (3) (no abuse of discretion where the court
“recharged the jury on party to the crime,” the court “followed up by
asking the jury if the recharge had helped,” and there was “no
indication that . . . the trial court put undue emphasis on the party
to a crime theory, . . . that the jury was confused after the recharge[,]
or that the recharge left the jury with an erroneous impression of
the law” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Barnes, 305
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Ga. at 22-23 (3) (no abuse of discretion in recharging the jury only
on malice murder, even where the court did not “ask[ ] the jury if its
question [about what malice murder was] had been sufficiently
answered,” because “nothing indicate[d] that the jury was confused
after the recharge or that the recharge left the jury with an
erroneous impression of the law”).
3. Appellant also argues that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to object to the State trying Appellant jointly
with Rodrigues. We are unpersuaded that trial counsel performed
in a constitutionally deficient manner.
Before trial, the State filed a notice of joint trial, seeking to try
Appellant and Rodrigues together, even though the men had been
indicted separately. Defense counsel did not object, and the case
proceeded to trial.
As described above, the trial evidence showed that Rodrigues
and Reynolds had a prior altercation on September 6, 2012, which
resulted in Reynolds being segregated in the SMU until the day of
his death on January 18, 2013. The court instructed the jury that
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this evidence could be considered only for the purpose of assessing
“the state of feeling between the defendant and the alleged victim
and the reasonableness of the alleged fears by the defendant
Rodrigues.”
In addition, the State introduced trial evidence, under OCGA §
24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”), that Rodrigues had pleaded guilty to
involuntary manslaughter after stabbing a man in the chest in 2008.
Before the State introduced the Rule 404 (b) evidence, the court
instructed the jury that the evidence could “be considered only to the
extent that it may show the intent that the State is required to prove
in the crimes charged against Mr. Rodrigues in this case presently
on trial” and not “for any other purpose.” The court gave a similar
instruction again at the conclusion of the case.
In his motion for new trial, Appellant claimed that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the joint trial of Appellant and
Rodrigues because the evidence that Rodrigues had a prior difficulty
with Reynolds and had previously stabbed someone prejudiced
Appellant’s defense. Trial counsel was asked at the motion-for-new11
trial hearing whether he thought the evidence regarding Rodrigues’s
prior conviction created a “possibility” that the jury could hold
Appellant “guilt[y] by association” and whether he had ever thought
he should sever the trials. To both questions, trial counsel
responded, “No.” Trial counsel explained that he “wanted the jury
to actually hear about Mr. Rodrigues’[s] conviction” because it was
“very clear that [the conviction] just involved Mr. Rodrigues, not
[Appellant],” and he “thought it was important . . . that the jury be
able to compare [Appellant and Rodrigues] side by side,” so the
jurors could see that Rodrigues “ha[d] this history of violence” while
Appellant “d[id] not.” Trial counsel further testified that he believed
this contrast between the defendants supported the defense theory,
which was that Appellant “was [not] actually involved in this killing”
committed by Rodrigues and had been mistakenly identified as a
perpetrator when correctional officers, who were “dealing with a . . .
large group of inmates, . . . plucked [Appellant] from the ground.”
The trial court summarily denied Appellant’s motion for new trial.
To establish that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
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an appellant must “prove both deficient performance by counsel and
resulting prejudice.” Evans v. State, 315 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (b) (884
SE2d 334) (2023) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To prove that trial counsel
was deficient, an appellant “must demonstrate that his attorney
performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering
all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional
norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 346)
(2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). There is “a strong
presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Monroe v. State, 315
Ga. 767, 781 (6) (884 SE2d 906) (2023) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Overcoming that presumption requires an appellant to
show “that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer
did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Evans, 315
Ga. at 611 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). Further,
“[w]hether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are
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presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233,
241 (2) (c) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Where an appellant fails to show deficient performance, this Court
need not examine whether the appellant has established prejudice.
See Monroe, 315 Ga. at 781 (6).
Here, Appellant has not shown that trial counsel performed
deficiently in failing to object to the joint trial of Appellant and
Rodrigues. As trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial
hearing, he strategically acquiesced in the joint trial of Appellant
and Rodrigues, believing that a joint trial would benefit Appellant’s
mistaken-identification defense. Trial counsel reasoned that trying
the men together would allow the jury to hear that Rodrigues had
previously stabbed a man to death, and that such evidence
supported an inference that Rodrigues, rather than Appellant, was
the likely perpetrator of Reynolds’s stabbing. Although trial counsel
was not asked at the motion-for-new-trial hearing how the evidence
regarding Rodrigues’s prior difficulty with Reynolds impacted his
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trial strategy, that evidence similarly supported the defense theory,
showing that Rodrigues had a motive to stab Reynolds, while
Appellant did not.
Appellant contends that it would have been “more beneficial”
to sever the cases if trial counsel wanted the jury to distinguish
between Appellant and Rodrigues. But “[t]he fact that present
counsel would pursue a different strategy does not render trial
counsel’s strategy unreasonable.” Walker v. State, 294 Ga. 752, 757
(2) (e) (755 SE2d 790) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Further, although Appellant also asserts that the jury likely used
the evidence of Rodrigues’s prior difficulty and prior conviction
against Appellant, the record does not support Appellant’s
contention. There was no evidence presented at trial suggesting
that Appellant was involved in the prior altercation between
Rodrigues and Reynolds, which occurred before Appellant arrived at
the prison. Further, as trial counsel testified at the motion-for-newtrial hearing, it was “very clear” from the trial evidence that
Appellant was not involved in the stabbing that resulted in
15
Rodrigues’s prior conviction. Moreover, the trial court instructed
the jury that evidence pertaining to Rodrigues’s prior difficulty and
prior conviction could be used only against Rodrigues. See Charles
v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 660 (4) (884 SE2d 363) (2023) (“[T]he jury is
presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court absent clear
evidence to the contrary.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Under the circumstances, we cannot say that trial counsel’s
strategy of allowing the two defendants to be tried together to
support an inference that only Rodrigues was responsible for the
crime was objectively unreasonable, such that no attorney would
have pursued it. See Slaton v. State, 303 Ga. 651, 654 (3) (b) (814
SE2d 344) (2018) (holding that trial counsel did not make a “patently
unreasonable” decision not to move for a severance on the ground
that evidence would be admitted that was only admissible against
the co-defendant because that evidence “generally supported
appellant’s defense that [the co-defendant was the one who had]
committed the murder” (citations and punctuation omitted)); Gomez
v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 466 (12) (b) (801 SE2d 847) (2017) (holding
16
that it “was not a patently unreasonable trial strategy” not to “seek
to sever [the defendant’s] trial” on the ground that some inculpatory
evidence about the co-defendant was only admissible against the codefendant, where trial counsel “believed that the more bad things
that came out about [the co-defendant], regardless of the source[,]
were good for [the defendant].” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
This claim therefore fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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