NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 7, 2023
S22Y0940. IN THE MATTER OF TAMORRA A. BOYD.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is back before the Court following a
remand for a hearing on the issue of whether respondent, Tamorra
A. Boyd (State Bar. No. 201382), who was admitted to the Georgia
Bar in December 2014, was in default as to the Bar’s previously filed
formal complaint, which charged her with violations of Rules 1.4, 1.5
(b), 7.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). See In the Matter of Boyd, 315
Ga. 390 (882 SE2d 339) (2022) (“Boyd I”) (vacating order granting
the Bar’s motion for default and report and recommendation
imposing a six-month suspension and remanding for a hearing on
default). On remand, special master LaVonda Rochelle De Witt held
a hearing and once again found Boyd to be in default, after which
Boyd, through new counsel, timely requested a hearing for
consideration of matters in aggravation and mitigation of discipline.
Before that hearing could be set, however, Boyd filed a petition for
voluntary discipline, and the State Bar responded, agreeing that a
public reprimand is the appropriate discipline given new
information that Boyd provided in that petition. The special master
then issued a new final report and recommendation, agreeing that a
public reprimand was the appropriate discipline and recommending
that the Court accept Boyd’s petition. We agree.
Procedural History Following Remand
After this Court’s remand in Boyd I, the special master
scheduled a hearing on the issue of whether Boyd had defaulted on
the formal complaint and/or had shown a proper case to open the
default. A hearing was set for March 14, 2023, and, although neither
Boyd nor her then-counsel were present at the hearing, the Bar
presented its case on default and argued that opening the default
would cause prejudice to the Bar’s mission and purpose by making
it appear that the Bar was trying to protect its members at the
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expense of the public and by delaying justice. Following the hearing,
the special master issued a thorough and well-reasoned order again
granting the State Bar’s motion for default and denying Boyd’s
motion to set aside the default, which the special master found had
been willfully abandoned in any event. The special master gave the
parties time to file a proposed report and recommendation or to
request an evidentiary hearing on any remaining issues, including
aggravation and mitigation. Through new counsel, Boyd requested
an evidentiary hearing, but, before that hearing could be set, Boyd
negotiated with the Bar to resolve the issue via a petition for
voluntary discipline, which she filed in July 2023.
In the petition, Boyd acknowledged that the special master not
only found her to be in default, twice, but also previously determined
that a six-month suspension was the appropriate discipline based on
her application of the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”). Nevertheless, Boyd
requested that the special master reconsider that prior
recommendation based on a reevaluation of her conduct in light of
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new information which Boyd provided in the petition and
consideration of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.
Boyd contended that a public reprimand or a suspension shorter
than six months would be more appropriate in this case. The Bar
responded, offering its assent to Boyd’s petition and declining to
contest the accuracy or relevance of the additional averments and
documents offered by Boyd in the petition, including that she did not
act knowingly or intentionally to mislead or harm anyone; that she
had mental health issues and other personal and emotional
problems that may have clouded her judgment; that she has since
obtained the proper diagnosis and treatment for those issues; that
she has refocused her career in a way that is conducive to dealing
with those issues; that she paid full restitution; that she expressed
remorse; and that she provided evidence of her good character and
reputation as a lawyer. Ultimately, the Bar agreed that Boyd
violated GRPC Rules 1.4, 1.5 (b), and 7.1 and stated that, in light of
the additional information provided by Boyd, it had elected not to
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proceed with the prosecution of any Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation at this
time.
Facts Deemed Admitted by Boyd’s Default
In her new report and recommendation, the special master
acknowledged both Boyd’s concession that she is in default and the
Bar’s assent to Boyd’s petition requesting a public reprimand. The
special master noted that, due to Boyd’s default, the following facts
were deemed admitted pursuant to Bar Rule 4-212 (a): Olympia Law
Group (“OLG”) is a California law firm that purports to assist
homeowners in distress with seeking solutions to their mortgage
situations. According to its website, OLG offered its services
nationwide “through its Of Counsel attorneys,” and it marketed and
advertised its mortgage services in Georgia. Boyd signed a contract
with OLG, pursuant to which she was identified as “Of Counsel” for
OLG matters in Georgia and was listed on the “Our Attorneys”
webpage of OLG’s website. In the contract, Boyd agreed “to
represent [OLG] in [Georgia] with respect to [OLG’s] Law Practice
located within [Georgia]” and to provide services as an attorney to
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OLG’s clients, including contacting those clients and providing legal
representation as to any OLG client, case, or matter assigned to her.
In 2018, a Georgia couple contacted OLG for help negotiating
a mortgage loan modification to stop foreclosure of the wife’s home.
On April 11, 2018, the couple signed a contract permitting OLG to
withdraw $750 per month from their bank account in return for
OLG’s help with their mortgage modification. By July 11, 2018, OLG
had withdrawn a total of $3,000 from the couple’s bank account. On
July 26, 2018, the couple’s mortgage servicing company, Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), contacted the wife directly, and
learned of the couple’s retention of OLG. SPS informed the wife that,
although it had not had any contact with OLG or Boyd, SPS had
approved her on July 20, 2018, for a loan modification based on the
application the couple made prior to retaining OLG. The wife
immediately checked the “client portal” on OLG’s website, which
showed that the representation had been “opened,” but did not show
the submission of any information to SPS on her behalf, and she emailed OLG, directing that it stop all loan modification proceedings
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on her behalf, cease all withdrawals from her bank account, and
return the fees it had already withdrawn.
Boyd contacted the wife for the first time on July 28, 2018, and
advised her not to cancel the contract with OLG. The wife again
requested a refund in light of the fact that neither Boyd nor OLG
had performed any of the services promised. That same day, the wife
checked the client portal again and noticed that it now showed that
OLG had submitted the couple’s documents to SPS on July 27, 2018,
even though she had terminated OLG’s services on July 26. The wife
immediately wrote to OLG, again demanding reimbursement. In
September 2018, after some back and forth between the wife and
OLG about the refund, it became clear that no refund would be
coming, and the wife filed a grievance against Boyd.
During the Bar’s investigation of this matter, Boyd advised the
Bar that the couple were clients of OLG; that she was “Of Counsel”
for OLG for Georgia cases but did not directly work on the couple’s
case or consult with the couple as she was not required to by her “Of
Counsel” agreement with OLG; that she only reviewed the couple’s
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submitted information and approved them as clients for OLG; that
she was paid $75 for doing so; and that she never collected funds
from the couple and had no authority to return funds to them. Boyd
provided a copy of the retainer agreement signed by the couple and
herself, as a representative of OLG, pursuant to which she agreed to
oversee and supervise any OLG employees that may assist her with
the representation. Nevertheless, Boyd saw her role as an
“employee” of OLG in its representation of the couple and she
suggested that it was OLG who bore the responsibility for setting
fees and communicating with the couple. Eventually, however, Boyd
provided to the State Bar a certified check in the amount of $3,000
made payable to the wife.
Additional Facts Offered by Boyd
Noting that Boyd provided additional facts to provide context
to her case and that the Bar did not contest the accuracy or relevance
of those facts, the special master accepted the following as fact.
During law school, Boyd sought mental health treatment and was
misdiagnosed with a particular mental health condition by a
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psychiatrist. She obtained treatment appropriate for that diagnosis
and disclosed her condition, and the fact that she was receiving
treatment for it, in her application for admission to the practice of
law in Georgia. After graduating from law school, Boyd started a
solo practice but had difficulties managing her practice.
In 2016, Boyd sought additional mental health care and began
seeing a Georgia Licensed Professional Counselor. In 2019, a year
after Boyd’s conduct that is the subject of this disciplinary matter,
Boyd’s counselor determined that Boyd had been misdiagnosed and
helped to properly diagnose Boyd with a different mental health
disorder. Immediately after receiving the new diagnosis, Boyd went
to her primary care physician and received prescriptions to help
manage her newly-diagnosed condition. Since then, Boyd has filled
the prescriptions regularly and has implemented a regime of
strategies to permit her to meet her deadlines and other work
responsibilities in light of her condition. For example, she ceased
operating a solo practice and reoriented her practice so that she is
working in an environment in which she is more likely to thrive.
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Regarding the events underlying the grievance leading to this
disciplinary matter, Boyd explained that while she was working as
a solo practitioner, she was approached by a representative of OLG.
The representative told her OLG was working to reduce mortgages
for individuals who were unable to make their existing payments,
that OLG had recently expanded to cover numerous states, and that
OLG was fully bar-compliant in each state. Because she needed the
money, Boyd accepted a position with OLG. Boyd asserts that she
had no knowledge that OLG may have been developing relationships
with attorneys outside of California for any purpose other than the
legal expansion of its business and that she believed, at the time,
that she was an employee of OLG. Her belief was based on OLG’s
representations to her, her low level of access to client files, and
OLG’s assertion that this process was fully bar-compliant. Under
their arrangement, OLG paid Boyd $75 per file to perform title and
bankruptcy searches for each client referred to her, but without
Boyd’s knowledge or permission, OLG, through non-attorney
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employees, apparently used Boyd’s name on various documents and
represented to its clients that she was doing loan modification work.
Rules Violated
The special master accepted the conclusions of the Bar and
Boyd that she violated Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall reasonably consult
with the client about the client’s objectives and the means by which
they are to be accomplished; shall keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; and shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation) by her interactions
(or lack thereof) with the couple; that she violated Rule 1.5 (b)
(lawyer shall communicate to the client the scope of the
representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses) by
failing to explain to the couple anything about the rate or basis of
her fee or about the limitations of the scope of her representation;
and that she violated Rule 7.1 (“lawyer shall not make a false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s
services,” in relevant part, in advertising or marketing materials) in
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that Boyd bore the ultimate responsibility to ensure that OLG’s
communications concerning its services in Georgia complied with
the GRPC and that, instead, she permitted OLG to “rent” her law
license to market its mortgage modification services in Georgia
through false and misleading statements, including that it was
authorized to practice law in Georgia and that Boyd would act as
local counsel for OLG’s “clients” in Georgia and actually work on
those clients’ matters. The special master also acknowledged and
accepted the agreement between the Bar and Boyd pursuant to
which the Bar agreed to refrain from pursuing its allegation that
Boyd violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4). The special master recited that the
maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 1.4 and 1.5 is a public
reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 7.1 is
disbarment.
Application of ABA Standards
The special master recognized that this Court relies on the
ABA Standards for guidance in determining punishments in
disciplinary cases, and that those Standards require consideration
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of: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the
potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct; and (d) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The special master
stated, in relevant part, that a reprimand is generally appropriate
when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of
a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury
to a client, the public, or the legal system and that a suspension is
generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in such
conduct. The special master found reason to reconsider Boyd’s
mental state at the time of the violations based on her mental health
and circumstances that affected or could have affected her
judgment. The special master, therefore, accepted Boyd’s
characterization of her conduct as primarily negligent rather than
knowing or intentional, agreeing that while Boyd should have paid
more attention to the red flags that were present in her agreement
with OLG, she did not have actual knowledge of OLG’s alleged
misconduct as it was occurring. Thus, the special master accepted
Boyd’s assertions that, even though she maybe should have known
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she was participating in a deceptive scheme that could lead to
significant losses to Boyd’s and OLG’s clients, she never set out to
deceive anyone. With regard to the client’s “injury or potential
injury,” the special master agreed that Boyd paid full restitution to
the couple even though she was not the party who received their
payments. Ultimately, the special master agreed with Boyd and the
Bar that the presumptive level of discipline after applying the ABA
Standards would be a public reprimand.
The special master found that the penalty could be aggravated
by the fact that Boyd has one prior disciplinary matter and by her
initial refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct.
See ABA Standards 9.22 (a) and (g). In deciding not to apply the
“dishonest or selfish motive” factor, the special master noted that
Boyd had acknowledged the special master’s prior finding that she
should not have accepted OLG’s “too-good-to-be-legitimate”
arrangement, but concluded, in light of Boyd’s recent disclosure of
her mental health issues at the time of the violation, that Boyd’s
judgment was likely clouded by her personal and emotional
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problems and mental disability to the point that her motives were
not as dishonest or selfish as the special master had previously
found. The special master further found that Boyd’s discipline
should be mitigated by the fact that she was inexperienced in the
practice of law, having only practiced for two years before signing
the OLG “Of Counsel” Agreement and fewer than four years when
the underlying grievance was filed. See ABA Standard 9.32 (f). The
special master further agreed to accept as additional mitigating
factors that Boyd made a good faith effort to make restitution by
repaying the couple all of the money OLG received despite having
only received $75 of that money, see ABA Standard 9.32 (d); that
Boyd was suffering from personal or emotional problems and/or a
mental disability, which the special master noted seemed to satisfy
the requirements of ABA Standards 9.32 (c) and (i) (1) – (4); that
Boyd expressed remorse, albeit delayed, in a written letter
submitted to the Bar, see ABA Standard 9.32 (l); and that Boyd had
submitted evidence of her good character and reputation as a lawyer
in that she has been recognized as providing pro bono services to
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eligible clients and engaging in other volunteer activities and has
demonstrated growth in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.32
(g).
Ultimately, the special master concluded that Boyd had
participated in a deceptive marketing scheme which threatened the
public, undermined public trust in the legal profession, and actually
harmed the couple; that her participation was a product of her
negligence and bad judgment as described above; and that the
mitigating factors in this case offset the aggravating factors in a way
that justified a reconsideration of her prior recommendation (i.e., a
six-month suspension). The special master gave credence to Boyd’s
argument that her case is very similar to In the Matter of Paxton,
311 Ga. 363 (857 SE2d 695) (2021) (granting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for Paxton’s
violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 (b) in failing to work diligently
for a client obtained through her relationship with a nationwide loan
modification company), and that close examination of the
aggravating and mitigating factors in this case suggests a similar, if
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slightly more severe, penalty than what was imposed in Paxton
would be appropriate. Therefore, the special master recommended
that this Court accept Boyd’s petition for voluntary discipline and
impose a public reprimand.
Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree that the
special master’s decision to reevaluate the aggravating and
mitigating factors in this case was appropriate given the new
information provided by Boyd. Further, we agree that Boyd appears
to have acted out of negligence and naivete in her dealings with OLG
and the couple and that the aggravating factor of dishonest and
selfish motive does not apply to Boyd’s conduct. In terms of the
proper level of discipline, the parties are correct that the facts of
Paxton are somewhat similar to this case, although it involved the
violation of different Rules and Paxton had no prior disciplinary
history. Nevertheless, we previously have imposed a public
reprimand for violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.5. See In the Matter of
Scott, 313 Ga. 618 (872 SE2d 279) (2022) (accepting petition for
voluntary discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for
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violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.5 in separate client matters where
attorney had no prior disciplinary history); In the Matter of Gantt,
305 Ga. 722 (827 SE2d 683) (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for violations of
Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 in separate client matters where attorney
was cooperative throughout the disciplinary proceedings but had
one prior disciplinary matter). And, while we recently have imposed
a suspension for a Rule 7.1 violation, that case involved active
involvement by the attorney in the Rule 7.1 violation and also
included a Rule 8.4 violation. See In the Matter of Palazzola, 310 Ga.
634 (853 SE2d 99) (2020) (accepting lawyer’s petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing nunc pro tunc a suspension of indeterminate
length but not less than three nor more than six months for
violations of Rules 1.16 (d), 5.3, 7.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) in his law firm’s
advertisements and in his dealings with three clients). Ultimately,
notwithstanding her initial disengagement from the disciplinary
proceedings, we agree that a public reprimand is an appropriate
punishment under the circumstances of this case.
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Therefore, the Court hereby accepts Boyd’s petition for
voluntary discipline and directs that Tamorra A. Boyd be
administered a public reprimand in open court pursuant to Bar
Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for her admitted violations of GRPC
1.4, 1.5 (b), and 7.1.
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public Reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
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