NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 17, 2022
S22A0124. REDDING v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Following a jury trial, Appellant Merrick Redding was found
guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with
the death of Joseph Davis, and the trial court denied his motion for
new trial. In a prior appeal, this Court held that the evidence
presented at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to support his
murder conviction, but we otherwise vacated the trial court’s order
and remanded the case for the court to make factual findings and
legal conclusions regarding Appellant’s claim that his constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated; we did not address his other
claims. See Redding v. State, 309 Ga. 124, 129-130 (2) (844 SE2d
725) (2020) (“Redding I”).
On remand, the trial court issued an order rejecting the
speedy-trial claim, merging the aggravated assault count into the
felony murder count, and resentencing Appellant to serve life in
prison without the possibility of parole. Appellant then filed this
second appeal, raising his constitutional speedy-trial claim again
along with other claims. We conclude that the trial court misstated
the law and failed to weigh all of the Barker1 factors in its postremand order denying Appellant’s speedy-trial claim. For these
reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for
the court to again resolve the speedy-trial claim; therefore, we will
not address the remaining claims of error. 2
1 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101)
(1972). See also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (112 SCt 2686, 120
LE2d 520) (1992).
2 Davis died on September 6, 2016. On May 22, 2018, a Muscogee County
grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, and
aggravated assault with a “closed fist.” At a trial from October 24 to November
5, 2018, the jury found Appellant not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the
remaining counts. After Appellant was sentenced, he filed a timely motion for
new trial. On May 17, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for
new trial. On June 4, 2019, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On June 16, 2020, this Court issued
its opinion in Redding I. After the trial court resentenced Appellant and
rejected his speedy-trial claim, he filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case
was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2021 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
2
1. As we explained in Redding I,
[t]he record shows that [Appellant] was arrested on
September 12, 2016, one week after the [murder].
[Appellant] was granted a bond on March 2, 2017, but he
apparently was unable to post the bond amount and so
remained in jail. On September 28, 2017, [Appellant] filed
a “Motion to Dismiss Charge Based on Violation of
Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial.” At that point,
[Appellant] had not yet been indicted, and he noted in his
motion that he had repeatedly asked for his case to be
presented to a grand jury and that one of the few
witnesses to the incident had died. The trial court
scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 30, 2017,
but, as the State concedes, there is no record that a
hearing was held that day. On April 17, 2018, [Appellant]
filed a request for a hearing on his speedy[-]trial motion.
The trial court held a hearing—apparently on May 9,
2018—but did not make any ruling at the time of the
hearing. [Appellant] was indicted on May 22, 2018, and
his trial began on October 29, 2018.
309 Ga. at 128 (2). Several days before trial, the court verbally
denied Appellant’s speedy-trial motion, but never issued a written
order. We note that Appellant also filed a post-indictment statutory
speedy-trial demand, and he was tried within the statutory time
frame. See OCGA § 17-7-171. After we held in Appellant’s first
appeal that the trial court had not made the necessary findings and
conclusions in the pretrial verbal ruling and remanded the case for
3
that to be done, see Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129-130 (2), the court held
an evidentiary hearing on October 5, 2020, to reconsider Appellant’s
speedy-trial motion and later entered a five-page order denying the
motion. 3
2. The Barker framework
A constitutional speedy-trial claim is evaluated under the twopart framework set out in Barker. See Redding I, 309 Ga. at 128 (2).
First, the trial court must consider “whether the length of time
between the defendant’s arrest and trial is sufficiently long to be
considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If not, the speedy-trial claim
fails at the threshold.” Id. at 129 (2) (citation omitted). A delay of
one year or more is typically presumed to be prejudicial. See id. In
3We note that the transcripts of the May 2018 and October 2020 hearings on
the speedy-trial motion were not included in the appellate record. And we
remind litigants that
[w]here the appealing party is the defendant in a felony case, and
where the defendant states in his notice of appeal that a transcript
is to be transmitted as part of the appellate record, it is the
defendant’s statutorily mandated duty [under OCGA § 5-6-42] to
cause the court reporter to prepare and file an original and one
copy of the transcript with the clerk of the trial court within 30
days after the filing of the notice of appeal unless an extension of
time is obtained.
Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435-436 (11) (349 SE2d 717) (1986).
4
Redding I, we concluded that the presumptive-prejudice threshold
was crossed in this case. See id.
When that threshold is crossed, the trial court “proceeds to the
second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, fourfactor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was
denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (2)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “These four factors are (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s
assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “This second part
of the speedy[-]trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult
and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to
approach speedy[-]trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted).
“This task is committed principally to the discretion of the trial
court, and this Court has a limited role in reviewing the trial court’s
decision.” Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2) (850 SE2d 152)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
5
We must accept the factual findings of the trial court
unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the
ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to
an abuse of discretion, even though we might have
reached a different conclusion were the issue committed
to our discretion.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). However,
[i]f the trial court significantly misapplies the law or
clearly errs in a material factual finding, the trial court’s
exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if the appellate
court can conclude that, had the trial court used the
correct facts and legal analysis, it would have had no
discretion to reach a different judgment.
State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (4) (d) (706 SE2d 561) (2011).
In its order on remand, the trial court acknowledged that
Barker frames the analysis of a constitutional speedy-trial claim and
that the presumptive-prejudice threshold was crossed, and the court
considered the relevant factors. However, the court began its
analysis by stating that a defendant cannot prevail on his speedytrial claim where no prejudice has been shown. Specifically, the trial
court stated:
Appellant is asking the court to dismiss a serious murder
case based on the longevity of the case, where no prejudice
has been shown. That is not the purpose of the [Sixth]
6
Amendment[;] therefore, because [Appellant] cannot rely
on the age of the case alone, yet attempts to do so, his
argument in that regard fails.
This is not the law. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655
(III) (A) (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992) (“[A]ffirmative proof of
particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy[-]trial
claim.”); Pickett, 288 Ga. at 677 (2) (4) (“A defendant need not show
demonstrable prejudice to prevail on a speedy[-]trial claim.”).
In addition to misstating the law, the trial court failed to
explicitly or clearly weigh each Barker factor—e.g., against the
State, neutrally, or against Appellant, and lightly or heavily. See
Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 513 (2) (c) (755 SE2d 138) (2014) (“This
test compels the examining court to consider and weigh all four
factors in the context of the particular circumstances of the case at
issue.”); State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863, 865-866 (2) (b) (734 SE2d 12)
(2012) (regarding weights, “[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial
in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against
the government, whereas an unintentional delay, such as that
occasioned by the mere negligence of the prosecuting attorney or the
7
overcrowded docket of the trial court, should be weighted less
heavily” (citation and punctuation omitted)); State v. Alexander, 295
Ga. 154, 158-159 (2) (c) (758 SE2d 289) (2014) (regarding weights, a
defendant “must assert [his right to a speedy trial] with reasonable
promptness” and the failure to do so “ordinarily weighs heavily
against the defendant,” but “the weight to be attributed to [the
assertion-of-the-right] factor may be mitigated in some cases”).
While it is clear from the trial court’s order on remand that it
implicitly weighed the prejudice factor heavily against Appellant,
the court’s factual findings and legal conclusions as to the other
three factors are unclear. For example, in one of the introductory
paragraphs of the order, the court found that “[t]estimony and
evidence were presented at hearings held on May 9, 201[8][4],
4 The trial court’s order stated the hearing occurred on May 9, 2017. This
is likely a typographical error as Appellant filed his speedy-trial motion in
September 2017, and in Redding I, we acknowledged that “[t]he trial court held
a hearing—apparently on May 9, 2018—but did not make any ruling at the
time of the hearing.” 309 Ga. at 128 (2).
8
November 30, 2017[5], October [24], 2018[6] and October 5, 2020,” and
that “[e]ach time after said hearing, either one or both sides
requested more time to research issues which were discussed at said
hearing.” This statement lacks clarity as to whether Appellant or
the State or both requested more time to research issues, and to the
extent that only the State requested more time, the resulting delay
would not weigh against Appellant. See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 236
(2) (b) (“Whether the defendant or the State bears the primary
responsibility for delay in reaching trial is pivotal in evaluating the
strength of a constitutional speedy[-]trial claim, as it can color the
consideration of all other factors.” (citation omitted)). Additionally,
the trial court failed to address the amount of time involved in each
delay, i.e., whether Appellant or the State or both requested a oneday delay or a two-month delay to “research issues.”
Similarly, in the portion of the order addressing the length-of5 In Redding I, we noted that “[t]he trial court scheduled a hearing on
the motion for November 30, 2017, but, as the State concedes, there is no record
that a hearing was held that day.” 309 Ga. at 128 (2).
6 Although the trial court said only that a hearing took place in October
2018, the record shows that the hearing occurred on October 24.
9
the-delay factor, the trial court stated that “[m]any times,
[Appellant] requested delays.”7 This statement lacks clarity as to
when Appellant requested delays and the amount of time involved
in each resulting delay. And, in this same portion of the order, the
trial court did not indicate the amount of time caused by the State’s
delay in “gather[ing] autopsy reports, drug and alcohol reports,
witness statements, phone records, and computer records.” 8
Further, in the portion of the order addressing the assertionof-the right factor, the trial court found that “[Appellant] asserted
his right to a speedy trial for the first time after about one year after
arrest,” which was when he filed his speedy-trial motion. Appellant
contends that the trial court erroneously ruled that he delayed in
asserting his right to a speedy trial. However, it is not clear what
this finding meant or how the court weighed this factor—i.e.,
7 We address the trial court’s conflation of the Barker factors further
below.
8 We note that the evidence at trial showed that the witness statements
of Jason Bellamy, Debbie Render, and LaKendra Davis, including their
identifications of Appellant in photographic lineups, were completed in
September 2016; Davis’s autopsy report was completed in December 2016.
Thus, they were both completed within three months of Appellant’s arrest.
10
whether the phrase “for the first time” was simply a reference to
Appellant first filing his constitutional speedy-trial motion or an
emphasis on Appellant’s purported delay in asserting his right to a
speedy trial. 9
It is not the role of an appellate court to weigh the Barker
factors in the first instance. See Pickett, 288 Ga. at 679-680. Cf.
Johnson, 291 Ga. at 865 (2) (a) (when the trial court failed to
explicitly weigh a factor, this Court may interpret the weight
assigned when the trial court was clear in its findings). Based on the
discussion above, we are unable to ascertain how the trial court
weighed three of the Barker factors, i.e., the length of the delay, the
reason for the delay, and the assertion of the right.
Further, as we observed above, the trial court conflated the
Barker factors when it considered them. In the portion of the order
considering the length-of-the-delay factor, the court made some
9 We note that in the last sentence of the order, the trial court ruled
“there is no deprivation of [Appellant’s] speedy[-]trial rights” based on “each
inquiry standing alone,” which may mean the court erroneously weighed this
factor against Appellant. But, again, the court’s order is unclear.
11
statements regarding the reasons for the delay; we also note that
the trial court did not explicitly calculate the length of the delay.
And, in the portion of the order considering the assertion-of-theright factor, the trial court made some statements regarding
prejudice and the reason for the delay. We remind litigants and trial
courts that each Barker factor should be considered separately even
though they may sometimes be intertwined. See State v. Porter, 288
Ga. 524, 532 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011) (courts should not conflate
the Barker factors).
Finally, we note that in addressing the prejudice factor, the
trial court found that when Appellant was arrested in this case, he
was “also arrested and incarcerated during the entire period on a
violation of probation case” and “the hold for violation of probation
prevented him from making bond.” 10 The court then ruled that due
10 As quoted above, in Redding I, we stated that Appellant “was granted
a bond on March 2, 2017, but he apparently was unable to post the bond
amount and so remained in jail.” 309 Ga. at 128 (2). However, the record
supports the trial court’s finding that a probation hold also prevented
Appellant from making bond because his counsel stated at the October 24, 2018
hearing that he remained in custody during the pendency of his case due to a
“[v]iolation of probation.”
12
to this probation hold, Appellant “would have been incarcerated . . .
regardless of the new charge of murder and [oppressive pretrial]
incarceration was not a significant factor in assessing prejudice to
[Appellant].” Appellant, citing Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895
(723 SE2d 100) (2012), contends the trial court erred in considering
his probation hold in its examination of the prejudice factor. We
agree. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals held
With regard to a defendant incarcerated on other charges,
the Supreme Court of the United States has opined that
a delay in bringing such a person to trial could aggravate
and compound the three concerns of prejudice.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has suggested that “the
possibility that the defendant already in prison might
receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the
one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending
charge is postponed.” Additionally, “the duration of his
present imprisonment may be increased, and the
conditions under which he must serve his sentence
greatly worsened, by the pendency of another criminal
charge outstanding against him.” Accordingly, the trial
court erred by weighing this factor in favor of the State
because Johnson was incarcerated on other charges, and
the court must reevaluate this factor on remand.
313 Ga. App. at 904 (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (89
SCt 575, 21 LE2d 607) (1969)). We agree with the reasoning of the
13
Court of Appeals in Johnson. See Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 58 (2)
(b) (i) n.25 (663 SE2d 189) (2008) (citing Hooey, 393 U.S. at 378). We
conclude the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant’s probation
hold precluded the need to assess prejudice associated with
oppressive pretrial incarceration.
As we stated in Redding I, Appellant’s “speedy[-]trial claim
does not strike us as so patently meritless that its denial is certain
and that a remand for consideration of this issue would be a waste
of judicial resources.” 309 Ga. at 129 (2). Accordingly, because the
trial court misstated and misapplied the law regarding the prejudice
factor, failed to weigh each Barker factor, and conflated its
consideration of some of the factors, we vacate the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s constitutional speedy-trial motion, and we
remand this case again for the entry of an order containing
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law on the speedytrial claim. See id. at 129-130 (2). 11
11 If the trial court denies Appellant’s speedy-trial motion, Appellant may
file a notice of appeal, and in his new appeal, he may raise again the issues
raised in his current appeal that we do not address today, as well as any issue
14
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.
arising from the proceedings on remand.
15