NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 17, 2022
S22A0564. HOUNKPATIN v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Bertrand Hounkpatin was convicted of felony murder for the
death of his two-year old stepson, Noel Johnson. 1 On appeal,
Hounkpatin argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by (1) admitting other-acts evidence
under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) that he physically
1The crimes occurred on January 25, 2014. In June 2019, a Gwinnett
County grand jury indicted Hounkpatin on three counts of felony murder
(predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 1), aggravated
battery (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3)). At a jury trial in August
2019, Hounkpatin was found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
him to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1 and,
although the trial court purported to merge the other counts, they were vacated
by operation of law. See Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 523-524 (7) (769 SE2d 296)
(2015). Hounkpatin moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied
following a hearing. Hounkpatin filed a timely notice of appeal. His case was
docketed to this Court’s April 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
assaulted his stepchildren and (2) preventing him from presenting
Rule 404 (b) evidence that two of his stepchildren, who were State’s
witnesses, had been violent towards Noel and each other. We
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Hounkpatin’s
conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
other-acts evidence showing that Hounkpatin squeezed Noel and
one of his siblings around their ribs; that evidence was relevant to
whether Hounkpatin had the intent to commit the predicate felony
of cruelty to children in the first degree and otherwise met the
requirements of Rule 404 (b). Any error in admitting other evidence
that Hounkpatin slapped or hit the children was harmless. And the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about
the witnesses’ conduct that did not bear on whether they were
responsible for Noel’s death. We therefore affirm.
The trial evidence showed that Hounkpatin and Donique
Howell met in early 2012 and married less than two years later. By
January 2014, the couple had a child, E. H., together and lived with
2
Howell’s minor children from prior relationships ⸺ K. H., C. H., R.
H., A. H., and Noel, who was two years and nine months old.
On the morning of January 25, Howell left the children in
Hounkpatin’s care when she went to work. Before leaving, Howell
said goodbye to the older children, checked on the younger ones who
were still sleeping, and gave a kiss to Noel, who moved but did not
get out of bed.
After the children ate breakfast, Hounkpatin took E. H., a
baby, into his room while the rest of the children watched a movie
in their room. Hounkpatin then called A. H., who was three years
old, and Noel into his bedroom. Soon after, K. H., who was 11 years
old, heard hitting noises and crying; R. H., who was 7 years old,
heard beating or slapping and crying; and C. H., who was 9 years
old, heard crying and two hitting sounds. Once the crying stopped,
Hounkpatin returned to the children’s bedroom, carrying Noel, who
appeared to be asleep, and placing him on a bed.
Hounkpatin left the room but returned later in what K. H.
described as a “very short time . . . so there wasn’t any time for us to
3
move about anything much.” Hounkpatin appeared to wake Noel by
shaking him and putting him in the shower. Noel was unresponsive,
and Hounkpatin called 911. Paramedics arrived, found Noel to have
no pulse or respiration, and performed CPR continuously while
transporting him to a hospital. When Howell arrived at the hospital
a short time later, she was informed that Noel had died.
Medical examiner Dr. Carol Terry, who performed an autopsy,
concluded that Noel’s manner of death was homicide and the cause
of his death was asphyxia from chest compression that fractured his
ribs. Dr. Terry concluded that severe compression deprived Noel’s
brain of oxygen for a significant period of time. Another doctor who
was qualified as an expert in child-abuse pediatrics testified that
Noel’s autopsy revealed several fractures of consecutive ribs ⸺ some
that were healing and some that had healed and were re-fractured
⸺ and the fractures were posterior and lateral. This pediatrician
testified that posterior and lateral fractures of consecutive ribs were
indicative of “an adult” placing “their hands around” a young child’s
chest and squeezing with a “significant” or “violent” force. The
4
pediatrician also testified that it is “exceedingly rare” for children to
suffer rib fractures from having CPR performed on them; fractures
caused by CPR are usually anterior and not posterior; and, based on
the degree to which some of Noel’s fractures were healing, any CPR
causing them would have to have been performed 10 to 14 days
before his death.
R. H., C. H., and K. H. testified at Hounkpatin’s trial about
what they overheard on the morning of Noel’s death. Under Rule
404 (b), the children were also allowed to testify about prior
occasions on which Hounkpatin had hit them or their siblings. R. H.
testified that she had seen Hounkpatin hit Noel once, and had heard
slapping noises similar to those she heard on the day of Noel’s death
“a good amount” of the time when Noel or A. H. were in another room
with Hounkpatin. C. H. testified that Hounkpatin had hit him
previously, and that he saw Hounkpatin hit other siblings, including
Noel, a “few times.” K. H. said she saw Hounkpatin hit C. H., A. H.,
and Noel “a couple of times” and saw Hounkpatin squeeze Noel and
A. H. around the rib cage, causing them to cry or strain to speak.
5
Hounkpatin testified in his own defense at trial. He denied ever
squeezing Noel or harming Noel or the other children, and said that
K. H. would beat the other children. Hounkpatin also mentioned an
incident when he noticed that Noel was not walking properly and
asked C. H. and R. H. if anything had happened. According to
Hounkpatin, C. H. reported that K. H. “threw” Noel into his crib and
Noel’s leg got caught, while R. H. said that it was C. H. who
“push[ed]” Noel into the crib. Hounkpatin also testified that Howell
had reported to him about a month before Noel’s death that Noel
had fallen down the stairs at his grandmother’s house, but that
other than a bump on Noel’s head and his having a fever,
Hounkpatin could not tell if Noel was hurt or acted any differently.
Hounkpatin also called a forensic expert, Dr. Kris Sperry, who
testified that the autopsy report showed that Noel had only rib
fractures and no other signs of an acute injury indicative of being
squeezed strongly, such as skin bruising or hemorrhaging of the
eyes, the surface of the lungs, or other body parts. Dr. Sperry also
testified that the rib fractures that occurred at the time of Noel’s
6
death could have occurred from forceful CPR and that prior
fractures could have occurred from a fall or some other abuse. Dr.
Sperry opined that, based on a review of Noel’s autopsy and medical
records, he died as a result of a seizure based on a preexisting brain
injury, without any contribution from the rib fractures.
The State then recalled Dr. Terry, who testified that, upon
receiving the defense expert’s report, she questioned whether Dr.
Sperry had actually reviewed slides containing samples of Noel’s
brain because his opinion was so inconsistent with her observations
and Dr. Sperry did not include the slides in listing the items he
reviewed. Dr. Terry explained that she later confirmed that Dr.
Sperry had not reviewed the slides, as she received his request for
them after he prepared his report. 2
1. Hounkpatin argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his felony murder conviction because the
evidence was purely circumstantial and there was evidence ⸺
adduced at trial and proffered in support of his denied Rule 404 (b)
2 Dr. Sperry testified that he received the slides prior to his testimony.
7
motion ⸺ that others had both the opportunity and propensity to
commit the charged acts. 3 We disagree.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
constitutional due process, we must determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In doing so, “we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions
about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight
of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the
discretion of the [jury].” Wilkerson v. State, 307 Ga. 574, 574 (837
SE2d 300) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
As a matter of Georgia statutory law, to convict a defendant
based on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and exclude every reasonable
3Hounkpatin also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding
Counts 2 and 3, but his challenges to these counts are moot because they were
vacated by operation of law. See Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 473 (1) n.5 (831
SE2d 761) (2019).
8
hypothesis save that of guilt. See OCGA § 24-14-6. “Not every
hypothesis is reasonable, and the evidence does not have to exclude
every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those
that are reasonable.” Cochran v. State, 305 Ga. 827, 829 (1) (828
SE2d 338) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). It is for the
jury to determine whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable,
and we will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it is unsupportable
as a matter of law. See Outler v. State, 305 Ga. 701, 703 (1) (a) (827
SE2d 659) (2019).
The felony murder count of which Hounkpatin was convicted
charged him with the predicate offense of cruelty to children in the
first degree — causing Noel’s death “by unlawfully and maliciously
causing him cruel and excessive physical pain through
asphyxiation[.]” The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support a conviction on this count. Although there was conflicting
opinion testimony regarding Noel’s cause of death, the jury was
entitled to credit the State’s two experts’ testimony that Noel died
from an acute injury ⸺ asphyxia from a chest compression that
9
fractured Noel’s ribs ⸺ and that a significant amount of force was
necessary to fracture Noel’s ribs and cause his death. We defer to
the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence, the credibility of the
expert witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. See Wilkerson, 307
Ga. at 574.
In the same way, the jury was authorized to conclude that, due
to the severe force used to compress his chest and the fact that he
could not breathe as a result, Noel experienced cruel and excessive
physical pain. The jury was also authorized to conclude that
Hounkpatin inflicted these injuries. Hounkpatin was the only adult
taking care of Noel and the other children at the time Noel suffered
his injuries. Several of the other children testified that when Noel
went to Hounkpatin’s room, they heard noises consistent with
physical abuse. The children also testified that, soon after they
heard those noises, Hounkpatin carried Noel back into the room
where they were and that Noel was unresponsive a short time later.
Although Hounkpatin suggests that one of his stepchildren
could have killed Noel, and that the rib fractures were not evidence
10
of violence but only of CPR, the jury was entitled to reject that
hypothesis as unreasonable. The child-abuse pediatrician testified
that Noel’s consecutive rib fractures were indicative of “an adult”
placing “hands around” his chest and squeezing with a “significant”
or “violent” force; it was “exceedingly rare” that a young child’s rib
would fracture as a result of CPR; any fractures would be anterior
fractures, not the posterior and lateral ones seen in Noel’s ribs; and
Noel had older rib fractures that were in various states of healing,
meaning that CPR would have had to be performed before the day
of Noel’s death and there was no evidence that CPR had been
performed on Noel before the day of his death. Viewed as a whole,
this evidence was sufficient to support Hounkpatin’s convictions as
a matter of due process and under OCGA § 24-14-6.
2. Hounkpatin next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence that he had physically assaulted
Noel and the other children prior to Noel’s death. The trial court
admitted the evidence under Rule 404 (b) for the purposes of
showing intent, motive, and opportunity. We review the trial court’s
11
decision to admit Rule 404 (b) evidence for an abuse of discretion,
see Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 479 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018), and
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
some of the evidence for the purpose of showing intent. 4
Under Rule 404 (b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith[,]” but such evidence may be
admissible for other purposes, including to prove intent, motive, and
opportunity. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (containing non-exhaustive
list of permissible purposes); State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (2) (773
SE2d 170) (2015) (Rule 404 (b) “is, on its face, an evidentiary rule of
inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other
than bad character for which other acts evidence is deemed relevant
and may be properly offered into evidence”). When the State seeks
to introduce other-acts evidence under Rule 404 (b), it must show
4 Because we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted for the
purpose of intent and Hounkpatin raises no claim regarding jury instructions,
we need not address his argument that the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence for the purposes of showing motive and opportunity. See Naples v.
State, 308 Ga. 43, 52 (2) n.9 (838 SE2d 780) (2020).
12
that (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than
the defendant’s character; (2) the probative value of the evidence is
not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice under OCGA
§ 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”); and (3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the other act. See Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 545 (802
SE2d 234) (2017).
(a) Evidence Hounkpatin squeezed children around the rib cage
on prior occasions.
We conclude that the other-acts evidence that Hounkpatin had
squeezed Noel and A. H. around the rib cage was admissible, at least
as to Hounkpatin’s intent. As to the first prong of the Rule 404 (b)
test, Hounkpatin made intent a material issue in the case by
pleading not guilty and not taking affirmative steps to remove intent
as an issue. See Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656-657 (3) (769
SE2d 892) (2015). The evidence that Hounkpatin squeezed Noel and
A. H. around the rib cage, causing them to cry, was relevant to that
issue, as it evinced his intent unlawfully to cause them “cruel and
13
excessive physical pain.” As discussed above, that same intent was
at issue here. The State predicated the felony murder count on
cruelty to children in the first degree, so it was required to prove
that Hounkpatin intended to inflict “cruel and excessive pain” and
as a result caused Noel’s death. The other-acts evidence was
therefore relevant to prove Hounkpatin’s intent to cause Noel’s fatal
injury. See Naples v. State, 308 Ga. 43, 51-52 (2) (838 SE2d 780)
(2020) (defendant’s prior acts of swinging one child “upside down
and shaking her” and grabbing another “by the neck and throat”
were admissible as other-acts evidence because the prior acts met
statutory elements for cruelty to children in the first degree, the
same offense underlying the defendant’s felony murder charge based
on either slamming the victim’s head against a hard object or
throwing her down the stairs).
As to the second Rule 404 (b) prong, in evaluating the probative
value of other-acts evidence offered to prove intent, we consider the
overall similarity between the other acts and the charged crimes,
the acts’ temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for them.
14
See Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 501 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020).
Hounkpatin argues that the other-acts evidence had no probative
value on the issue of intent because he “either intentionally
squeezed Noel to death, or he did not.” But the required intent was
whether Hounkpatin intended “unlawfully and maliciously” to cause
Noel “cruel and excessive physical pain,” and the prior acts were
highly probative on that point given the overall similarities between
the offenses, their temporal proximity, and the prosecution’s need
for them. As discussed previously, Hounkpatin’s squeezing of Noel
and A. H. around the rib cage is the same type of act alleged to have
caused Noel’s death ⸺ chest compression causing asphyxiation. And
these acts occurred within two years of Noel’s death. 5 See, e.g.,
Fleming v. State, 306 Ga. 240, 248 (3) (b) (830 SE2d 129) (2019) (the
other-acts evidence had a high probative value where the similar
incident occurred less than one year after the charged crimes); see
5 The exact timing of the other acts is unclear from the record, but the
evidence shows that Hounkpatin arrived in the United States in January 2012,
he met Howell soon thereafter, and Noel was two years and nine months old
when he died in January 2014.
15
also United States v. Ramirez, 426 F3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005)
(other acts were probative where they occurred three years prior to
charged crimes). 6
Hounkpatin argues that the prosecution’s need for the otheracts evidence was minimal because he did not claim mistake or
accident as a defense. The State responds that the prosecution’s
need was high because the other-acts evidence negated
Hounkpatin’s defense that he never hurt the children, someone else
committed the injurious act, and performing CPR on Noel
contributed to his rib fractures. Even if not critical to the State’s
prosecution, the other-acts evidence helped rebut Hounkpatin’s
defenses and proved that he acted with malicious intent to cause
Noel “cruel and excessive pain.” 7 Moreover, given the substantial
6Because Rules 403 and 404 (b), the evidentiary provisions at issue here,
“largely track their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence,” we look “to
the decisions of the federal appellate courts, particularly the Eleventh Circuit,
for guidance in construing and applying these provisions.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at
480 (4) n.5.
7 The prosecution’s need for the other-acts evidence was not minimal
when Hounkpatin claimed that he never squeezed the children and that
someone else must have been responsible for Noel’s death, and the only
eyewitnesses present in the room when the injury occurred were E. H., who
16
similarities between the other acts and the charged crime, the twoyear gap between the offenses did not diminish the probative value
of the other-acts evidence. See Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 55-56 (3)
(d) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (the seven-year gap between the prior
crimes and the charged offenses “diminished somewhat” the
probative value of the other-acts evidence, but that probative value
was still “significant” where the prior crimes shared many
similarities to the charged crimes and the prosecution had a need
for the evidence); see also United States v. Ellisor, 522 F3d 1255,
1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (given the “striking” similarities between the
incidents, the four-year separation between the other acts and the
charged crimes did not “significantly depreciate” the probative value
of the other-acts evidence); United States v. Cardenas, 895 F2d 1338,
1344 (11th Cir. 1990) (providing that “[t]the probative value of the
was just a baby, and A. H., who was just three years old. The other-acts
evidence that Hounkpatin previously compressed young children’s chests was
substantially probative of whether he squeezed Noel’s chest on this occasion
with “malicious” intent to cause Noel “cruel and excessive pain.”
But the prosecution’s need for the evidence was not high, either, because
intent was not a critical issue. Hounkpatin either squeezed Noel forcefully, in
which case intent was almost certainly present, or he did not. Hounkpatin did
not argue that he inflicted the injuries but without the requisite intent.
17
extrinsic offense correlates positively with its likeness to the offense
charged” and an extrinsic offense carries more probative value
where less time separates it from the charged offense) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
In arguing that he suffered prejudice from the admission of the
other-acts evidence, Hounkpatin relies solely on his arguments that
the evidence was not relevant for a proper purpose and lacked
probative value. But we have rejected these arguments. The
evidence was, of course, prejudicial to Hounkpatin, but Rule 403’s
exclusionary force is meant to be applied “sparingly” ⸺ primarily
when the other-acts evidence has “scant or cumulative probative
force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”
Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 102-103 (4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted); see also Anglin v. State, 302 Ga.
333, 337 (3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017) (“[I]n a criminal trial, inculpatory
evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value that [Rule 403] permits
exclusion.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
18
original)). Given the substantial probative value of the evidence in
proving Hounkpatin’s intent, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that unfair prejudice to Hounkpatin did
not substantially outweigh it.
With respect to the remaining prong of Rule 404 (b),
Hounkpatin argues that the State did not submit sufficient proof for
the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he
committed the other acts. In challenging the admission of the otheracts evidence below, Hounkpatin argued that the incidents were
based on statements from Howell’s children, the children never
previously reported the incidents, and their statements were not
corroborated. But we have concluded that testimony about prior acts
of violence committed against the witness or that the witness
observed firsthand is sufficient to meet the third prong of Rule 404
(b). See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 308 Ga. 854, 860 (2) (843 SE2d 794)
(2020); Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 419 (2) (c) (788 SE2d 442) (2016).
And here, K. H. testified that she saw Hounkpatin squeeze Noel and
A. H. around the rib cage. Because the State met its burden of
19
meeting the Rule 404 (b) test, at least with respect to the issue of
intent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
other-acts evidence of Hounkpatin’s squeezing Noel and A. H. for
this purpose.
(b) Other-acts evidence of purported child abuse.
Some of Hounkpatin’s other acts towards the children, such as
slapping or hitting them, may have been less violent and may not
have involved the same intent as the predicate offense of cruelty to
children in the first degree. But even if those acts were inadmissible,
their admission was harmless error. “The test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Smith v. State, 299
Ga. 424, 432 (2) (d) (788 SE2d 433) (2016) (citations and punctuation
omitted). Here, the evidence pointed to an adult causing Noel’s
injuries, Hounkpatin being the only adult present when the injuries
occurred, the injuries being caused by a forceful squeezing around
the rib cage, and Hounkpatin having previously squeezed Noel in
this manner. Given this evidence, it is highly probable that the
20
admission of evidence that Hounkpatin also hit his stepchildren on
several occasions did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Therefore,
the admission of this evidence was harmless. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at
487 (4) (c) (concluding that improper admission of one prior violent
act was harmless where other Rule 404 (b) evidence of violent crimes
was admitted along with compelling evidence of defendant’s guilt).
3. Hounkpatin next argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to present Rule 404 (b) evidence of alleged violent acts by
K. H. and C. H. that would have shown that these witnesses had the
opportunity to commit the crimes against Noel. We disagree.
Before trial, Hounkpatin filed a notice of intent to present Rule
404 (b) evidence that K. H. and C. H. had been violent to Noel, each
other, and others, saying records from the Division of Family and
Children Services (“DFCS”) indicated as much. At a pretrial hearing
on his motion, Hounkpatin confirmed that the DFCS records did not
show any violence directed at Noel and, in fact, occurred years after
Noel’s death. According to the records, a November 2017 report
indicated that C. H. was acting violently and aggressively as a result
21
of not taking mental health medication, and there was an incident
in November 2018 in which K. H. tried to jump out of a moving car
and C. H. grabbed K. H. around the waist to force K. H. back inside
the car.
The State objected on relevance grounds to the admission of
any acts of violence occurring after Noel’s death, but did not object
to any acts that occurred at or before such time. The trial court took
the matter under advisement, denied Hounkpatin’s Rule 404 (b)
motion at the start of his trial on relevance grounds, and allowed
Hounkpatin to proffer the DFCS records. Although the trial court
did not allow Hounkpatin to introduce records showing incidents
occurring after Noel’s death, it did not prevent him from testifying
about incidents in which C. H. or K. H. hurt Noel or the other
children prior to Noel’s death, which he did as recounted above.
On appeal, Hounkpatin argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his Rule 404 (b) motion because his proposed
evidence showed C. H.’s and K. H.’s motive for accusing him of
killing Noel, their opportunity to commit the charged crimes against
22
Noel, and their intent in doing so.
To introduce evidence implicating another person in the
commission of the crimes with which a defendant is charged, the
defendant must show that it
raise[s] a reasonable inference of the defendant’s
innocence, and [either] directly connect[s] the other
person with the corpus delicti, or show[s] that the other
person has recently committed a crime of the same or
similar nature. Evidence that merely casts a bare
suspicion on another or raises a conjectural inference as
to the commission of the crime by another is not
admissible.
Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 358 (2) (b) (830 SE2d 217) (2019)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
To the extent that Hounkpatin argues on appeal that he was
prevented from presenting any evidence that C. H. and K. H. were
violent towards the victim or each other, that claim is meritless. The
trial court allowed him to present his testimony concerning
incidents that occurred prior to Noel’s death.
To the extent that Hounkpatin complains about evidence
contained in the DFCS records, that claim is also meritless.
23
Hounkpatin points to no evidence in the DFCS records directly
connecting C. H. or K. H. to Noel’s death, no incidents that were the
same or similar in nature to the charged offenses, and no incidents
that occurred near in time to Noel’s death. In fact, the DFCS records
show that the incidents in question occurred three to four years after
Noel’s death. The proffered evidence does not support even a bare
suspicion that C. H. or K. H. killed Noel. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence from the DFCS
records.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
24