NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 20, 2024
S24A1065. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
In 1999, Appellant Matthew Taylor was convicted of felony
murder and related crimes in connection with the death of Terry
Hall and was sentenced to life in prison. This Court affirmed
Taylor’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal in Rittenhouse v.
State, 272 Ga. 78 (526 SE2d 342) (2000). 1 More than 23 years later,
on December 7, 2023, Taylor returned to the trial court pro se and
filed an “Extraordinary Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Criminal
Trial Ending in ‘Mutually Exclusive Jury Verdict,’” raising state and
federal constitutional claims of trial court error and ineffective
assistance of counsel arising from his 1999 criminal trial. The trial
court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and Taylor now appeals. For the
1 Taylor’s direct appeal was consolidated with the direct appeal of his codefendant Jerry Rittenhouse. See Rittenhouse, 272 Ga. at 78 n.1.
reasons explained herein, we affirm the trial court’s order of
dismissal on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court.
Taylor’s extraordinary motion maintained that the trial court
erred by accepting jury verdicts which he argued were mutually
exclusive, that the trial court erred at sentencing by imposing a
sentence based on those verdicts, and that his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to object to a sentence predicated on those
verdicts. Taylor contends that these alleged errors, along with the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, deprived him of his rights to due
process, equal protection, and to a jury trial under the Georgia
Constitution, along with rights afforded to him under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
The problem for Taylor is that constitutional claims cannot be
raised in an extraordinary motion for new trial. Instead, the
exclusive post-appeal procedure for constitutional claims – like
those raised by Taylor here – lies in habeas corpus. See Smith v.
State, 276 Ga. 14, 15 (1) (573 SE2d 64) (2002) (“Habeas corpus is the
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exclusive post-appeal procedure available to a criminal defendant
who asserts the denial of a constitutional right”) (citations omitted)),
disapproved on other grounds by Wilkes v. Terry, 290 Ga. 54 (717
SE2d 644) (2011); Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878, 884-885 (1) (c) (834
SE2d 65) (2019) (explaining post-appeal constitutional claims are
“not properly raised” in an extraordinary motion for new trial and
reaffirming that “constitutional matters that are exclusively
governed by the adequate remedy of habeas corpus cannot be
pursued through [an extraordinary motion for new trial]”) (footnote
omitted)). Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the viability of
Taylor’s claims because he has used the wrong vehicle to pursue
them. And, when such claims are improperly raised in an
extraordinary motion for new trial, the only appropriate action is to
dismiss the motion. See e.g. Chaney v. State, 317 Ga. 181 (1) (81
SE2d 775) (2023) (affirming dismissal of extraordinary motion for
new trial where defendant raised only ineffective assistance of
counsel claims because an adequate alternative remedy existed in
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the form of habeas corpus) (citing Mitchum, 306 Ga. at 887 (2))).2 In
sum, because Taylor’s direct appeal has concluded, see Rittenhouse,
272 Ga. at 78 (1), the constitutional claims that he seeks to raise
here are governed exclusively by habeas corpus and are not properly
presented in an extraordinary motion for new trial. See Mitchum,
306 Ga. at 884-885 (1) (c); Smith, 276 Ga. at 15 (1).
While the trial court should have dismissed on this basis, we
do not fault its attempt to construe Taylor’s unclear filing by
“look[ing] to substance over form.” Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871, 875
(238 SE2d 923) (1977). Notwithstanding any error in the trial court’s
construction of Taylor’s extraordinary motion, the correct outcome
was reached by dismissing it. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
order dismissing Taylor’s extraordinary motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
2 That Taylor may face steep procedural hurdles in a habeas proceeding
does not mean his claims can properly be raised in an extraordinary motion for
new trial.
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