NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 18, 2025
S25Y0264. IN THE MATTER OF CHADRICK A. MANCE.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Chadrick A. Mance (State Bar No.
703877) prior to the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). In his petition, which concerns State Disciplinary Board
Docket No. 7938, Mance, who has been a member of the State Bar
of Georgia since 2013, admits that he violated Rule 1.1 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), see Bar Rule 4-102
(d), and requests that this Court impose a public reprimand for his
conduct. The State Bar has responded to Mance’s petition,
recommending that the Court accept the proposed discipline, and we
agree to do so.
In his petition, Mance admits the following. On January 22,
2024, at 11:11 a.m., he filed a “56 (f) Motion to Stay Summary
Judgment Ruling” pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) in a case he was
handling for the plaintiff, requesting the trial court to stay a ruling
on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment until certain
discovery issues were resolved. Mance attached Exhibits A and B to
the motion. Exhibit A was his affidavit, and Exhibit B was a
proposed order. The cover page for Exhibit B labeled the document
to follow as a “Proposed Order.” However, the document itself did
not contain the word “Proposed” and included a cut-and-pasted
signature of the judge assigned to the case and contained the
language “Prepared by: Chadrick Mance (with significant revisions
by the Court).”
Five minutes after filing the motion, Mance emailed a copy of
the motion and proposed order to the judge’s staff attorney as well
as to opposing counsel. In the subject line and body of the email,
Mance informed the recipients that he had included a copy of “our
Proposed Order.” Later that day, defense counsel sent an email to
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Mance and the judge’s staff attorney stating, “[t]hese Proposed
Orders have the Judge’s signature on them. Has he signed one? We
obviously would like the opportunity to respond to the Motion.”
Mance promptly replied to confirm that the judge had not signed
anything.
Two days later, the trial court held a hearing to address
Mance’s unauthorized use of the judge’s signature. Mance explained
to the trial court that, by including a pre-executed order for the trial
court’s consideration, he believed he was “increasing the efficiency”
of his filings. Mance further explained his understanding that there
would be no enforceable order unless and until it was adopted by the
trial court.1 Mance apologized to the trial court and opposing counsel
and accepted responsibility for his actions. The trial court accepted
Mance’s apology but stated that it would inform the State Bar.
1 Mance explained at the hearing that his “intention . . . was to prepare
an order that was so well drafted, that the Court could look at it quickly and
say this the type of order that I would draft, and that it’s the type of order that is a balanced order, and it is an honest order . . . .” We note, however, that a
lawyer who submits a proposed order should not include language indicating
that “significant revisions by the Court” were made.
3
Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered its own order granting the
requested relief.
By his conduct, Mance admits that he did not provide
competent representation and that he violated Rule 1.12 of the
GRPC. Mance maintains that he did not violate Rule 8.4 (a) (4)3 of
the GRPC, given that it was never his intent to deceive the Court or
opposing counsel. See In the Matter of Woodham, 296 Ga. 618, 625
(769 SE2d 353) (2015) (“Rule 8.4 (a) (4) prohibits ‘professional
conduct involving dishonest[]y, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,’
that is, conduct that is intended or likely to mislead another.”
(emphasis supplied). Mance also asserts that his conduct was not
likely to mislead the recipients. Mance contends that, despite the
2 Rule 1.1 provides, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer
shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond
the lawyer’s level of competence without associating another lawyer who the
original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in
question.” Comment 5 to Rule 1.1 provides that “[c]ompetent handling of a
particular matter includes . . . use of methods and procedures meeting the
standards of competent practitioners.”
3 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that it is a violation of the GRPC “for a lawyer
to . . . engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.” As discussed later, the State Bar decided not to charge
Mance with a Rule 8.4 (a) violation.
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absence of any improper motive, he now realizes that he acted in
“extremely poor form” and that he should never include the
purported signature of a judge, attorney, or other individual without
their prior express approval.
Although Mance acknowledges that the maximum punishment
for a violation of Rule 1.1 is disbarment, he requests that this Court
impose a public reprimand for his violation of the Rule, noting that
the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions state that a
reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer “demonstrates
failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures and
causes injury or potential injury to a client.” ABA Standard 4.53 (a).4
Mance contends that he acted negligently and that there was no
actual injury to the client because the trial court ultimately entered
its own order granting Mance’s requested relief. In mitigation of his
conduct, Mance asserts that he made a timely good faith effort to
4 This Court generally looks to the ABA Standards for guidance in
determining the appropriate sanction to impose, and in doing so, we may
consider the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the actual or potential
injury, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See In
the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996).
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rectify the consequences of his conduct when he promptly replied to
the inquiry regarding whether the trial court had signed the order,
see ABA Standard 9.32 (d); he has shown full and free disclosure to
both the trial court and the State Bar and displayed a cooperative
attitude throughout the disciplinary proceedings, see ABA Standard
9.32 (e); he has exhibited good moral character and reputation as
demonstrated by the letters attesting to his good character that he
attached to his petition,5 see ABA Standard 9.32 (g); and he is
remorseful and has acknowledged the nature of his wrongdoing, see
ABA Standard 9.32 (l). Mance conceded the following aggravating
factors: he previously received a confidential letter of admonition in
March 2019, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a),6 and he has substantial
5 These letters, from lawyers and a retired judge, detail Mance’s remorse,
his extensive community service, his work ethic, his commitment to, and
compassion for, his clients, and the positive reputation he enjoys among the
legal profession in his community.
6 See Bar Rule 4-208 (waiving the confidentiality of confidential
discipline in the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding and allowing
that information to be used in aggravation of discipline). The letter of
admonition cited Mance’s actions in agreeing “to represent [a client] in
litigating a personal injury case in which you had no experience and when you
failed to maintain an association with an attorney who did have such
experience,” which violated Rule 1.1. According to the letter of admonition,
Mance, who was not aware of alternatives that would protect his client’s
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experience in the practice of law, having been admitted to the State
Bar in 2013, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i).
In response, the State Bar agrees that Mance’s petition
contains admissions of fact and conduct sufficient to authorize the
imposition of the discipline he has requested, given that Mance
violated the duty of competence by cutting and pasting the signature
of the judge onto the proposed order he attached as an exhibit to his
motion. The State Bar does not oppose Mance’s requested sanction
of a public reprimand; states that the imposition of the discipline
sought by Mance meets the objectives to serve as “a penalty to the
offender, a deterrent to others, and as an indication to laymen that
the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession,” In the Matter
privileged information, also filed into the record a transcript of a conversation
with the plaintiff’s treating physician that contained confidential information
harmful to the plaintiff’s case. See Rule 1.6 (lawyer “shall maintain in
confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client,
including information . . . the disclosure of which . . . would likely be
detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent”). Finally,
the letter of admonition cited Mance’s behavior, including having filed last
minute requests for a continuance, that resulted in the disruption of the
proceedings. See Rule 3.5 (d) (lawyer shall not “engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal”).
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of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981); and explains its
decision not to charge Mance with violating Rule 8.4 (a) (4), stating
that it “does not believe the evidence in this case would allow the
State Bar to carry its burden” of showing that Mance engaged in
conduct involving fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation evidencing
either moral turpitude or an intention to mislead. . The State Bar
also agrees with Mance that a reprimand is generally appropriate
where, as here, a lawyer fails “to understand relevant legal doctrines
or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” ABA
Standard 4.53 (a). Although the State Bar contends that Mance
acted knowingly rather than negligently, it nevertheless states that
its disagreement about Mance’s mental state does not change the
presumptive level of discipline under ABA Standard 4.53 (a) because
that Standard does not impose any mens rea requirement. The State
Bar accepts all the mitigating and aggravating factors identified by
Mance and adds that an additional mitigating factor is present in
that there appears to be no evidence that would support a finding
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that Mance possessed a dishonest or selfish motive. See ABA
Standard 9.32 (b).
The State Bar agrees with Mance that a public reprimand is
consistent with prior discipline imposed in cases alleging violations
of Rule 1.1, citing In the Matter of Detling, 289 Ga. 256 (710 SE2d
566) (2011) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing
a review panel reprimand for a violation of Rule 1.1 where an
attorney negligently issued an opinion letter attesting that he
possessed no knowledge that might materially affect the business’s
right to carry on business or its financial condition despite
knowledge that the business’s principal faced federal criminal
charges, where attorney lacked dishonest motive and had a good
reputation, and where no actual injury occurred, and where
attorney had no prior disciplinary history); In the Matter of Smart,
303 Ga. 156 (810 SE2d 475) (2018) (imposing a review panel
reprimand where attorney defaulted under a notice of discipline
seeking review panel reprimand and alleging violations of Rules 1.1,
1.2 (a), 1.3, and 1.4, and where attorney, who had no prior
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disciplinary history, was not diligent in representation of client and
client’s son before Georgia Department of Education, selfishly
misled client about his lack of diligence, and hearing officer
dismissed proceeding with prejudice as a result of attorney’s
misconduct).7
The State Bar contends that the facts of this case are unlike
the cases involving violations of Rule 1.1 that resulted in
suspension, citing In the Matter of Whiteside, 316 Ga. 468 (888 SE2d
7 Although the lawyers in Detling and Smart had no prior disciplinary
history when a review panel reprimand was imposed for their Rule 1.1
violations, and Mance does have a prior confidential disciplinary infraction, we
nonetheless conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate discipline
given the unique facts and circumstances in this case. See In the Matter of
Vincent, 320 Ga. 1 (907 SE2d 590) (2024) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing public reprimand where attorney on three occasions
failed to deposit, in his trust account, advance payments of recording fees and
fees for publication notices and where he had prior 12-month suspension 10
years earlier, but several mitigating factors were present); In the Matter of
Boyd, 317 Ga. 669, 673 (895 SE2d 308) (2023) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing public reprimand based on attorney’s actions in
essentially allowing out-of-state law firm to “‘rent’ her law license to market
its mortgage modification services in Georgia” and her misleading
communications with clients, where she had one prior disciplinary sanction,
and there were several mitigating factors); In the Matter of Gantt, 305 Ga. 722
(827 SE2d 683) (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing
review panel reprimand where lawyer neglected client matter, causing
significant delay in proceedings, and where lawyer had prior instance of public
disciplinary sanction and there were several mitigating factors).
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541) (2023) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing
a three-month suspension for an experienced attorney with no prior
disciplinary history who violated several rules, including Rules 1.1
and 8.4 (a) (4), where attorney who lacked relevant experience
should have declined to represent a client in a medical malpractice
case, allowed the statute of limitation to run due to his
incompetence, attempted to cover up his mistakes, misled his client,
failed to consult with client in the malpractice action, represented
the same client in a divorce case but failed to consult with the client
about that case and neglected the divorce case). The State Bar also
contends that this case differs from instances where an attorney
forged a judge’s signature and actually tendered a document into the
record as the official ruling of the court, seeking to utilize the
document that the judge never signed as the actual expression of the
judge’s decision, citing In the Matter of York, 318 Ga. 784 (900 SE2d
614) (2024) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline seeking threeyear suspension nunc pro tunc to the date that lawyer voluntarily
ceased practicing law where lawyer was charged with felony forgery
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based on forging signatures of judge and district attorney and where
lawyer entered 36-month pretrial diversion program that was not
yet completed); In the Matter of Rogan, 309 Ga. 583 (847 SE2d 308)
(2020) (accepting voluntary surrender of license for lawyer who
knowingly signed a judge’s initials to an order without obtaining the
judge’s permission, was indicted for forgery in the first degree, and
later entered a First Offender plea of nolo contendere to obstruction
of officers). Thus, the State Bar recommends that the Court accept
Mance’s petition for voluntary discipline and impose as discipline a
public reprimand.
We have reviewed the record and agree with the State Bar that
the imposition of a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction in
this matter for Mance’s admitted violation of Rule 1.1, as the facts
of this matter show that Mance immediately corrected any
misapprehension caused by including the trial judge’s signature on
the “proposed order” and apologized to the trial court and opposing
counsel. We also note that Mance’s actions did not cause any actual
harm to his client. Finally, we note that Mance’s prior disciplinary
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history stemmed from conduct from fairly early in his career, that
he has not had any disciplinary infractions until the conduct
underlying this matter, and that he has been cooperative in these
proceedings.8
Accordingly, the Court accepts Mance’s petition for voluntary
discipline and hereby orders that Chadrick A. Mance receive a public
reprimand in accordance with Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for
his admitted violation of Rule 1.1.
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public Reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
8 However, we note that another disciplinary infraction may subject
Mance to enhanced punishment under Rule 4-103 (“A finding of a third or
subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself,
constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment.”).
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