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Georgia Department of Public Safety v. Justice

2024-10-22

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 22, 2024

S23G1170. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v.

JUSTICE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Richard Andrew Justice brought a claim against the Georgia

Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) for breach of an employment

contract by failing to pay him for overtime hours under provisions of

the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 USC § 201 et seq.,

that allegedly were incorporated into the employment contract. The

narrow question before us in this case is whether Justice has shown

the existence of a written contract such that his complaint survives

DPS’s motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) on sovereign

immunity grounds. We conclude that Justice has shown the

existence of a written contract with DPS on which his action is

based, thereby establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity under

the ex contractu clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.

See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (c) (“The state’s defense

of sovereign immunity is hereby waived as to any action ex contractu

for the breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter

entered into by the state or its departments and agencies.”). We also

conclude that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were

part of that written contract is not a sovereign immunity question,

but is a merits question that was not properly before the trial court

on DPS’s motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part,

specifically to the extent it determined that sovereign immunity was

waived, and we vacate that judgment in part, to the extent it

determined – prematurely in the context of a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction – that the FLSA obligations were

part of the written contract. The case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

Justice’s amended complaint alleged that from 2014 to 2020,

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he and 400 similarly situated putative class members were hired as

state troopers with the Georgia State Patrol, were required to attend

trooper school, and collectively were underpaid approximately

$4,782,848 in wages for overtime hours worked during trooper

school. The complaint alleged that DPS sent Justice a “written offer

of employment” containing the terms of employment including

salary and start date; that the written offer was “signed by an agent

of the State of Georgia who had sufficient authority to make written

offers of employment”; that Justice accepted the written offer “in

writing” and signed more documentation that was “incorporated

into his employment agreement”; that the agreement “included all

of the necessary terms of a written contract, including offer,

acceptance, and consideration”; that pursuant to the agreement,

Justice was to receive overtime compensation, which was

“contractually referred to as ‘FLSA Time’”; that DPS “breached its

written contract with Justice by failing to compensate him for the

. . . FLSA Time he accrued”; and that the “claims of the individual

class members are similar to” Justice’s claim. DPS moved to dismiss

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pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) due to lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, based solely on sovereign immunity and the alleged

failure of Justice to meet his burden of establishing a waiver of

sovereign immunity. Justice responded that the offer of

employment, his acceptance, and certain contemporaneously

executed documents constituted a written contract such that the

State waived its sovereign immunity.

The trial court allowed limited discovery, and Justice

submitted the documents that he claimed constituted a written

contract between DPS and himself. Specifically, a December 12,

2018, e-mail from Diana Stephens, the Human Resources

Employment Manager for DPS, stated, “Please see the attached

PDF File for your final offer of employment for the Trooper position

in the 106th Trooper school. Please e-mail me back as receipt and

confirmation of your acceptance of this final offer.” The attachment

was a letter signed on behalf of DPS by the Director of its Human

Resources Division, which read as follows:

Congratulations! This letter serves as a final offer of

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employment as a Trooper Cadet, and is your invitation to

participate in the Georgia State Patrol (GSP) 106th

Trooper School effective January 6, 2019. Your salary will

be $36,110.00 annually.

You will receive follow up information within the

next few weeks regarding report time and new hire

information.

Again, you are congratulated for being selected to

begin the final phase of becoming a [GSP] Trooper. Your

successful completion of all the requirements of the Cadet

Training Program is essential to continuing in Trooper

School and ultimately graduating as a [GSP] Trooper.

This offer is contingent upon POST approval of your law

enforcement application.

As a reminder, you will be given a PT test on the

beginning date of the GSP 106th Trooper School. Your

failure to pass this PT test will result in your immediate

dismissal from the GSP 106th Trooper School.

If you have questions regarding this correspondence,

please call Diana Stephens at [a redacted phone number].

I thank you for your continued interest in employment

with [DPS] and wish you well as you begin Trooper

School.

(Emphasis in original.) Justice replied to Stephens’s e-mail the

same day, stating “I accept this offer. Thanks so much[.]” And

Stephens replied, “Thank you and good luck with all, Diana.”

Justice also filed an affidavit attesting that he subsequently

received “‘new hire information’” from DPS, including a “Policy

Acknowledgment Form” and two documents denominated

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“Understanding Use of FLSA Compensatory Time.” Those

documents contained blanks for the employee’s signature, and

Justice signed the documents on December 16, 2018.1 By e-mail

dated December 31, 2018, DPS acknowledged receipt of the

1 In the policy acknowledgment form, Justice “acknowledge[d]” his

“responsibility to read and understand” all departmental policies within his

first sixty days of employment and several of those departmental policies

within his first seven days – specifically, policies entitled “Mission and Core

Beliefs,” “Code of Conduct,” “Oath of Office,” “Code of Ethics,” “Unlawful

Harassment and Prohibited Workplace Behavior,” “Equal Employment

Opportunity,” “Leave,” and, finally, Policy Number 5.13 entitled “Work HoursOvertime,” which included both FLSA regulations and State policies unique to

Georgia. One of the FLSA compensatory time forms added the word “(Sworn)”

to the title and stated the following:

I, Richard A. Justice, do hereby acknowledge that as part of the

terms and conditions of my employment with [DPS], I understand

that I may be required to work more than one hundred seventy one

(171) hours in a 28 day work period. I further understand that, in

lieu of overtime compensation, I will receive compensatory time off

at the rate of one and one-half hours for each hour of employment

for which the [FLSA] requires overtime compensation.

The other similar document added “(Non Sworn)” to the title and contained

identical language, except that, instead of addressing work exceeding 171

hours in a 28-day period, it specified that Justice “may be required to work

more than forty (40) hours in a work week.” Justice has alleged that he was a

“non-sworn employee” during trooper school and that DPS failed to compensate

him according to the terms to which the parties agreed in the FLSA

compensatory time form for non-sworn employees. DPS has disputed this

allegation, insisting that Justice “was classified as a sworn member of law

enforcement for the purpose of calculating work hours and overtime” and was

properly compensated under the FLSA. This issue of whether Justice was a

“sworn” or “non-sworn” employee was not resolved by the trial court or the

Court of Appeals and is not properly before this Court.

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completed “New Hire packet.”

After a hearing, the trial court granted DPS’s motion to dismiss

Justice’s amended complaint, finding that the documents submitted

by Justice were not sufficient to waive sovereign immunity because

they did not constitute a valid written contract and, even if they did,

the agreement was only to begin employment at the stated salary

and did not involve a meeting of the minds to include FLSA overtime

compensation provisions.

In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the lead opinion of the

Court of Appeals, relying on State of Ga. v. Fed. Defender Program,

315 Ga. 319, 329-333 (3) (a) (882 SE2d 257) (2022), concluded that,

“[b]ased on the contemporaneously executed documents exchanged

between Justice and DPS, both physical and electronic, . . . the

parties entered into a contract for at-will employment that included

certain FLSA provisions” and, thus, that “DPS waived sovereign

immunity for Justice’s breach of contract claim related to those

agreements, and the trial court erred by finding otherwise.” Justice

v. Dept. of Public Safety, 368 Ga. App. 593, 599 (3) (b) (890 SE2d

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486) (2023) (Doyle, P.J.). Two members of the Court of Appeals panel

concurred specially as to that subdivision of the lead opinion

“because as written, it might be construed to waive sovereign

immunity more broadly than . . . permitted under existing law.”

Justice, 368 Ga. App. at 600 (Gobeil, J., joined by Judge Phipps). But

the special concurrence agreed that “Justice proved the existence of

a written contract (incorporating the applicable FLSA provisions)

sufficient to waive DPS’s sovereign immunity for Justice’s breach of

contract claim.”2 Id. at 600. DPS petitioned this Court for a writ of

certiorari, and we granted the petition.

2 The special concurrence further stated that the FLSA compensatory

time forms were contemporaneously signed and incorporated, explicitly

required Justice’s compliance with FLSA policies as part of the terms and

conditions of his employment, and, combined with DPS’s provision of the

documents and Justice’s signature, demonstrated an intent to be bound by both

parties. Id. at 601 & n.18. However, in the absence of any such express

language in the “Policy Acknowledgment Form,” the special concurrence

considered that form a mere acknowledgment of Justice’s responsibility to read

certain departmental policies in a timely manner, which did not, alone, amount

to a written contract sufficient to waive sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the

special concurrence concluded that “DPS made a conscious decision to

explicitly incorporate certain FLSA policies with respect to work hours

(contained in the two Compensatory Time forms) into the terms and conditions

of Justice’s employment,” and the special concurrence therefore agreed “that

DPS waived sovereign immunity related to the content of those documents.”

Id. at 602.

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2. Legal Background

“[S]overeign immunity of a State agency is not an affirmative

defense, going to the merits of the case; instead it raises the issue of

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to try the case.” Fed.

Defender, 315 Ga. at 343 (3) (f) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“[S]overeign immunity . . . like various other rules of jurisdiction

and justiciability . . . is concerned with the extent to which a case

properly may come before a court at all.” McConnell v. Dept. of

Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Therefore, the applicability of sovereign

immunity cannot be pretermitted, but “is a threshold determination,

and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and,

concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is

barred.” Id. at 19. More specifically, “[s]overeign immunity is a

threshold issue that must be addressed prior to resolving the merits

of [Justice’s] breach of contract claim.” Worth County School Dist. v.

Tibbetts, 319 Ga. 103, 107 (2) (902 SE2d 558) (2024).

“Because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, it requires the

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plaintiff to prove any waiver thereto and is properly raised as a

defense under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1).” Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at

327 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

When considering a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity

grounds under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), “a trial court is not confined

to the allegations of the complaint but is authorized to ‘hear the

matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, [or to]

direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony

or depositions.’ OCGA § 9-11-43 (b).” Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 327

(3).

The Georgia Constitution provides in Article I, Section II,

Paragraph IX (e), that the State’s sovereign immunity extends to “all

of its departments and agencies” and can only be waived by a

constitutional provision or an act of the General Assembly

specifically providing for such a waiver and the extent thereof. See

Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 326-327 (3). Because Justice brought his

lawsuit against DPS, an agency of the State, sovereign immunity

bars the action unless it comes within some waiver. See OCGA § 35-10

2-2 (“There is created a Department of Public Safety.”). Justice

contends that sovereign immunity for the specific type of claim he is

making has been waived under the ex contractu clause. Indeed,

“[o]ne of the exceptions to the defense of sovereign immunity is for

‘any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract . . .

entered into by the state or its departments and agencies.’ Ga.

Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (c).” Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at

327 (3). See also OCGA § 50-21-1 (a) (“The defense of sovereign

immunity is waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of

any written contract . . . entered into by the state, departments and

agencies of the state, and state authorities.”).

To meet his burden of proving a waiver of sovereign immunity,

Justice was required to “show that the contract sought to be enforced

is in writing and contains all of the terms necessary to constitute a

valid contract.” Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 327 (3) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And “general provisions of contract law

cannot be applied by the courts to create a waiver of sovereign

immunity by means other than by written contract.” Ga. Dept. of

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Labor v. RTT Assoc., 299 Ga. 78, 86 (3) (786 SE2d 840) (2016).

3. Analysis

The alleged waiver of sovereign immunity at issue applies to

“any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract[.]”

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (c). And the only question

properly before us is whether there existed a written contract

between the parties sufficient to waive sovereign immunity. “To

constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a

consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the

terms of the contract, and a subject matter upon which the contract

can operate.” OCGA § 13-3-1. “Unless all of these essential terms are

in writing, there is no enforceable written contract for sovereign

immunity purposes.” Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 333 (3) (c).

Each of the essential elements of a contract is present in

writing in this case. The parties’ employment contract had a definite

written subject matter on which it could operate, specifically

Justice’s employment as a state trooper. Both parties were able to

contract. The written offer letter was signed by the Director of DPS’s

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Human Resources Division. 3 The amended complaint alleges that

the letter was signed by an agent with sufficient authority to make

the offer, and DPS has not denied that allegation or offered evidence

to the contrary. And Justice certainly was able to contract on his

own behalf, absent any evidence to the contrary. Both parties gave

their written assent to the terms of the contract. The offer letter was

transmitted with a written request for Justice to e-mail “back as

receipt and confirmation of your acceptance of this final offer.” On

the same day, Justice sent a written reply – “I accept this offer” – in

an e-mail with his name and e-mail address appearing at the top.

The offer letter’s inclusion of a stated salary in return for Justice’s

training and service as a state trooper was sufficient consideration,

as the only consideration required to support an at-will employment

agreement is “provi[sion] for the payment of wages in exchange for

3 Because the employment agreement contained an authorized signature

on the part of DPS, and because DPS accepts for purposes of this appeal the

existence of a signed employment agreement between the parties, we

pretermit, as we did in Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 334 (3) (c) & n. 12, the issue

of whether a writing must be signed by an agent of the State in order to waive

sovereign immunity.

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the satisfactory performance of job duties.” Balmer v. Elan Corp.,

278 Ga. 227, 228 (2) (599 SE2d 158) (2004).

The parties’ written employment contract was valid and

enforceable even though it was formed through electronic means

and was terminable at will. Because neither the e-mail exchanges

between DPS and Justice nor anything else specified a definite

length of employment, despite the offer letter’s reference to an

annual salary, it is true that their employment agreement was

terminable at-will. See Parker v. Crider Poultry, 275 Ga. 361, 362

(1) (565 SE2d 797) (2002) (“An employment contract containing no

definite term of employment is terminable at the will of either

party.”); Ikemiya v. Shibamoto America, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273

(1) (444 SE2d 351) (1994) (“[D]ocuments referring to an annual

salary merely establish the total amount payable during a twelvemonth period and not the duration thereof. The computation of the

salaries on an annualized basis does not turn this compensation

term into a duration term.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Even so, “an at-will employment relationship can give rise to certain

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contractual rights,” and “a promise of future compensation made at

the beginning of the employment relationship” may be enforceable.

O’Connor v. Fulton County, 302 Ga. 70, 71 (1) (805 SE2d 56) (2017)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, under general

principles of contract law, a contract can be “memorialized in an email for purposes of determining whether the State has waived its

sovereign immunity,” and the Georgia Uniform Electronic

Transactions Act, OCGA § 10-12-1 et seq., applies to a State agency

where, as here, “the context and surrounding circumstances,

including the parties’ conduct, demonstrate that the parties agreed

to conduct the particular transaction at issue by electronic means.”

Fed. Defender, 315 Ga. at 330-333 (3) (a), (b) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ lead

opinion and the special concurrence in this case correctly agreed

that the e-mail exchanges between DPS and Justice on December

12, 2018, including the offer letter from DPS, showed the existence

of a written at-will employment contract that included Justice’s

start date and salary. See Justice, 368 Ga. App. at 598-599 (3) (a),

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(b); id. at 600 (Gobeil, J., concurring specially).

Because Justice’s claim arises from his employment contract,

and that contract is written, sovereign immunity is waived for his

action based on the breach of the written employment contract.

Although the Court of Appeals correctly held that DPS waived

sovereign immunity for the breach of the written at-will employment

contract that DPS and Justice entered on December 12, 2018, the

Court of Appeals improperly considered whether DPS was

contractually obligated to comply with the FLSA. And the trial court

improperly determined whether, assuming the existence of a valid

written contract, it included FLSA overtime compensation

provisions. The latter question goes to the merits of Justice’s action

and thus was not relevant to sovereign immunity and was not

appropriate to consider on a motion to dismiss based on an asserted

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On remand, however, the trial

court will be authorized to address the merits of the case in response

to the pleadings and motions other than the motion to dismiss on

the ground of sovereign immunity. Those merits issues may include,

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but are not limited to, whether the FLSA obligations became part of

Justice’s written employment contract and whether DPS breached

contractual terms that Justice alleges are part of the written

contract.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case

remanded. All the Justices concur.

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