FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
DECEMBER 21, 2023
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 21, 2023
ERIN L. LENNON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED )
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ) No. 101786-3
THE NINTH DISTRICT IN ) (certified No. 21-36024 (consol.
) with No. 21-36025))
UGOCHUKWU GOODLUCK NWAUZOR, )
FERNANDO AGUIRRE-URBINA, ) En Banc
individually and on behalf of all those )
similarly situated, )
Filed: December 21, 2023
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
THE GEO GROUP, INC., a Florida )
corporation, )
)
Defendant. )
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
THE GEO GROUP, INC., a Florida )
corporation, )
)
Defendant. )
Nwauzor v. The GEO Group, Inc., No 101786-3
JOHNSON, J.—The certified questions in this case concern a challenge to a
private, for-profit corporation’s practice of paying civil immigration detainees less
than Washington’s minimum wage to work in its private detention center. We are
asked to determine whether Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (MWA), ch. 49.46
RCW, applies to detained workers in a privately owned and operated detention
facility. We conclude that it does. We are also asked to decide whether a legal
remedy to one plaintiff forecloses the availability of equitable relief to a different
plaintiff. It does not.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 1
1. Whether detained workers at the NWIPC, a private detention center, are
“employees” within the meaning of the MWA?
2. Whether RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), the MWA’s government-institutions
exemption, applies to work performed by detainees confined in a private
detention facility operating under a contract with the State?
3. Whether the damages award to the class forecloses equitable relief to the
State in the form of an unjust enrichment award?
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The GEO Group Inc. is a private, for-profit corporation that owns and
operates the Northwest ICE Processing Center (NWIPC), 2 a private immigration
detention center in Tacoma, Washington, pursuant to a contract with the federal
1
We exercise our discretion to reformulate the certified questions. See, e.g., Nelson v. P.S.C., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 227, 233 n.2, 535 P.3d 418 (2023).
2
Formerly named the Northwest Detention Center.
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government. GEO contracts with the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to confine up to 1,575 noncitizen adults in administrative civil
custody as they await review and determination of their immigration status.
Immigration detainees, as a group, “have not been found to have committed any
crime, but are awaiting civil procedures that may lead ultimately to U.S. residence
and citizenship.” Excerpts of Record (ER) at 29; see Ord. Certifying Questions to
Wash. Sup. Ct., No. 21-36024, at 6 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023) (stating they are not
confined based on criminal convictions or pending criminal matters nor as a
penalty for immigration status violations). Immigration detainees are held until
they are removed (“deported”) or released. ER at 111.
GEO has owned and operated the NWIPC and has contracted with ICE since
2005. The corporation contracts with ICE to provide “civil immigration detention
management services.” ER at 68. These services include “the building,
management and administration, security, clean and vermin free facilities, food
service with three nutritious meals per day, clean uniforms and bedding, and
barbershop/grooming services.” ER at 68. They also include “detention officers,
management personnel, supervision, manpower, training certificates, licenses and
supplies.” ER at 19.
Under the ICE contract, GEO is required to “develop and manage a VWP
[Voluntary Work Program],” the purpose of which “is to provide detainees
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opportunities to work and earn money while confined.” ER at 109, 19-20. The
NWIPC detainees worked in the facility under the VWP.
As the manager of the VWP, GEO sets the pay rate, drafts job descriptions,
assigns detained workers to work assignments, sets the work schedule, provides
detained workers with “orientation, training, uniforms, equipment,” and
“supervises and directs the detainees in their duties.” ER at 110. Pursuant to the
ICE contract, GEO is required to provide detainees certain core services, including
food, laundry, cleaning, and barber services. The detained workers “were not to be
used to perform” the “core obligations” that, under the ICE contract, were the
responsibilities and duties of GEO. ER at 22. However, GEO relied on the detained
workers to perform “substantially the core work required of GEO under the
contract.” ER at 22; see also ER at 69.
GEO paid its detained workers $1 per day to perform these essential tasks.
Pursuant to ICE’s Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), 3
GEO is required to compensate its detained workers at least $1 per day but has
discretion to pay more than that amount. Further, the ICE contract expressly states
that GEO is required to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws
3
GEO is required to comply with ICE’s PBNDS, “which are a set of national detention standards to ensure all entities that ICE contracts with meet baseline requirements.” ER at 108.
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and codes. Nevertheless, GEO has never paid its detained workers the state
minimum wage.
The State of Washington and a class of NWIPC detainees (Class) brought
two separate actions against GEO in September 2017, alleging that GEO’s practice
of paying detainees less than Washington’s minimum wage to work in the
detention center violates Washington’s MWA. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington consolidated the two actions on the MWA
liability issue only, leaving the issue of damages to be considered separately.
After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the State and the Class
(collectively Plaintiffs) on the MWA issue. The jury found that GEO permitted the
detainees to work and paid less than the MWA required. In separate proceedings,
the Class was awarded $17,287,063.05 in back pay damages. The State was
awarded $5,950,340.00 in equitable relief for unjust enrichment, and GEO was
enjoined from continuing operation of the VWP without complying with the
MWA.
GEO appealed the judgments to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit consolidated the matters and certified three questions to this court.
The first certified question asks us to determine the threshold issue of whether
detained workers at the NWIPC, a private detention center, are “employees” within
the meaning of the MWA. Our answer is yes. The second question is whether the
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MWA’s government-institutions exemption applies to work performed by
detainees confined in a private detention facility operating under a contract with
the State. Our answer is no. And finally, we are asked to determine whether a legal
remedy to one party forecloses the availability of equitable relief to a separate
party. Our answer is no.
Amici briefs in support of the Plaintiffs on the MWA issue were filed by the
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, the American Civil
Liberties Union of Washington Foundation, and La Resistencia, Fair Work Center,
and Professor Angelina Snodgrass Godoy.
ANALYSIS
I. Washington’s Minimum Wage Act.
We are asked to interpret the MWA and determine whether the detained
workers at the NWIPC are “employees” under the act. We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. When interpreting a statute, our primary objective
is to “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent as manifested by the
statute’s language.” Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, 197 Wn.2d 231,
238, 481 P.3d 1060 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1094 (2022). To determine the
meaning of a statute’s language, “we look to the text, the context of the statute,
related statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v.
Valdiglesias LaValle, 2 Wn.3d ___, 535 P.3d 856, 861 (2023) (citing State v.
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Haggard, 195 Wn.2d 544, 548, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020)). If the statute is susceptible
to more than one reasonable interpretation, then it is ambiguous and we may resort
to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to discern
legislative intent. Valdiglesias LaValle, 535 P.3d at 861.
Washington has a “‘long and proud history of being a pioneer in the
protection of employee rights.’” Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 191 Wn.2d 751,
760, 426 P.3d 703 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of
Fire Fighters, Loc. 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 29, 35, 42 P.3d 1265 (2002)).
The Washington Legislature enacted the MWA “for the purpose of protecting the
immediate and future health, safety[,] and welfare of the people of this state.”
RCW 49.46.005(1). In doing so, it recognized that “the establishment of a
minimum wage for employees is a subject of vital and imminent concern to the
people of this state and requires appropriate action by the legislature to establish
minimum standards of employment within . . . Washington.” RCW 49.46.005(1).
Consistent with Washington’s priority of protecting employee rights, courts must
liberally construe the MWA “‘[in favor of the employee].’” See, e.g., Hill, 191
Wn.2d at 762 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 34); see also RCW 49.46.820 (requiring
that the MWA “be liberally construed to effectuate the intent, policies, and
purposes”).
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The MWA provides that employers shall pay their employees not less than
the statutory minimum wage. RCW 49.46.020. The MWA defines “employee” as
“any individual employed by an employer but shall not include” the statutory
exemptions listed in subsections (a) through (p). RCW 49.46.010(3). “Employ”
means “to permit to work.” RCW 49.46.010(2). Thus, “employee” generally means
“any individual permitted to work by an employer.” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 867, 281 P.3d 289 (2012).
Recognizing that this definition of “employee” is broad, we have stated that
“[i]nstead of being primarily defined by employments included, the MWA carves
out from the definition of ‘employee’ more narrow provisions that operate as
exemptions.” Rocha v. King County, 195 Wn.2d 412, 420-21, 460 P.3d 624 (2020).
These statutory exemptions are necessary to determine whether a worker falls
within the MWA’s definition of “employee.” When interpreting these exemptions,
we are required to construe them narrowly and apply them only to situations that
are “plainly and unmistakably consistent with the terms and spirit of the
legislation.” Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 421 (citing Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc., 140 Wash.2d 291, 301, 996 P.2d 582 (2000)).
Relevant to this case is the government-institutions exemption, RCW
49.46.010, which states, “(3) ‘Employee’ includes any individual employed by an
employer but shall not include: . . . (k) Any resident, inmate, or patient of a state,
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county, or municipal correctional, detention, treatment or rehabilitative
institution.” (Emphasis added.) GEO argues the MWA does not cover workers who
are detained. The Plaintiffs argue that the subsection (k) exemption indicates the
Washington Legislature contemplated the MWA’s application to individuals in
detention or custody who are permitted to work. And, they argue, the exemption
unambiguously applies only to individuals detained in public, government-run
institutions. Therefore, the subsection (k) exemption does not apply to the detained
workers at the NWIPC, which is a privately owned and operated facility. We agree
with the Plaintiffs.
The subsection (k) exemption applies to persons detained in a “state, county,
or municipal” institution. The terms “state, county, [and] municipal” plainly refer
to government divisions within the state. And they modify the terms “correctional,
detention, treatment or rehabilitative institution.” The only reasonable
interpretation of the subsection (k) exemption is that it applies to any resident,
inmate, or patient of a government institution.
GEO argues the subsection (k) exemption’s language does not distinguish
between publicly and privately operated facilities. And if the legislature intended
to create such a distinction, it would do so explicitly. However, GEO’s argument
undercuts its own position because the legislature, by specifying that the
exemption applies to persons detained in “state, county, or municipal” institutions,
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distinguished public institutions from private institutions. And, as GEO states, if
the legislature intended to also exclude persons detained in private institutions, it
would have done so explicitly.
Because the subsection (k) exemption is unambiguous, we need not resort to
additional aids of statutory interpretation to decipher the legislature’s intent. Based
on the language of the statute, we conclude the detained workers at the NWIPC are
“employees” under the MWA. The only relevant exemption—the subsection (k) or
government-institutions exemption—does not “plainly and unmistakably” apply to
detainees held in a private detention center. See Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 421. This
interpretation is consistent with the requirements to liberally construe the MWA in
favor of the employee and to narrowly construe the MWA’s exemptions.
The second certified question is also resolved by our interpretation of the
subsection (k) exemption. We are asked to determine whether the subsection (k)
exemption applies to detained workers in a private detention facility that operates
under a contract with the state government rather than with the federal government.
We conclude the government-institutions exemption, RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), does
not apply to detained workers in private detention facilities regardless of whether
the private entity that owns and operates the facility contracts with the state or
federal government.
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As explained above, the subsection (k) exemption unambiguously applies
only to workers detained in a government institution. The exemption, which we
construe narrowly, would not apply to a detainee held in a private institution that is
owned and operated by a private entity even where that entity operates the facility
pursuant to a contract with the State.4
GEO points to the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries’
(L&I) guidance to support its conclusion that the subsection (k) exemption applies
to private detention facilities that operate under contract with the State. However,
the guidance does not support GEO’s position. The L&I’s guidance states:
Residents, inmates or patients of state, county or municipal
correctional, detention, treatment or rehabilitative institution are
exempt from all MWA protections and are not required to be paid
minimum wage if they perform work directly for, and at, the
institution’s premises where they are incarcerated, and remain under
the direct supervision and control of the institution. Residents,
inmates or patients of state, county or municipal correctional,
detention, treatment or rehabilitative institution assigned by facility
officials to work on facility premises for a private corporation at rates
established and paid for by public funds are not employees of the
private corporation and would not be subject to the MWA.
ER at 496 (emphasis added). Importantly, the guidance follows the language of the
statute by specifying that the exemption applies to individuals held in a state,
4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ certification order does not ask us to resolve any federal constitutional arguments raised by GEO. And we need not reach the constitutional arguments as a tool of statutory interpretation because there exists only one reasonable interpretation of RCW 49.46.010(3)(k).
11
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county, or municipal institution, i.e., a government institution. It does not apply to
individuals held in a private institution regardless of whether that institution is
operated pursuant to a contract with the federal or state government. Therefore, in
response to the second certified question, we conclude the MWA’s governmentinstitutions exemption, RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), does not apply to work performed
by detainees confined in a private detention facility that operates under a contract
with the State.
Turning back to the first certified question, GEO argues that the “reside or
sleep” exemption, RCW 49.46.010(3)(j), to the definition of “employee” applies. It
does not.
RCW 49.46.010 states:
(3) “Employee” includes any individual employed by an
employer but shall not include:
(j) Any individual whose duties require that he or she reside or
sleep at the place of his or her employment or who otherwise spends a
substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and not
engaged in the performance of active duties.
(Emphasis added.) According to GEO, the detained workers “plainly fit within this
exception” because they “resided and slept at the [NWIPC], which was their place
of work.” Opening Br. of Def.-Appellant on Certified Questions (GEO Opening
Br.) at 44. And, GEO argues, the subsection (j) exemption categorically excludes
any worker who resides or sleeps at their place of employment. In response, the
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Plaintiffs highlight that the subsection (j) exemption specifically excludes those
“whose duties require” that they sleep or reside at their place of employment. In
emphasizing this key language, the Plaintiffs argue that the exemption does not
broadly apply to anyone who resides at their place of work, as GEO suggests. We
agree with the Plaintiffs.
GEO’s interpretation of RCW 49.46.010(3)(j) ignores the statute’s “whose
duties require” language. When interpreting statutes, we presume that the
legislature “‘says what it means and means what it says.’” Portugal v. Franklin
County, 1 Wn.3d 629, 650, 530 P.3d 994 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 149, 493 P.3d 94 (2021)). And
we will not “‘rewrite unambiguous statutory language under the guise of
interpretation.’” Portugal, 1 Wn.3d at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 492, 519 P.3d 182 (2022)). GEO does
not argue that the exemption is ambiguous nor can it. The subsection (j) exemption
applies to individuals who sleep or reside at their place of employment because
their work duties, not some other reason, require it. And, while we are not bound
by L&I’s interpretation of the statute, we note that the agency’s interpretation of
the reside or sleep exemption is consistent. It provides that
[m]erely residing or sleeping at the place of employment does not
exempt individuals from the MWA. In order for individuals to be
exempt, their duties must require that they sleep or reside at the place
of their employment. An agreement between the employee and
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employer for the employee to reside or sleep at the place of
employment for convenience, or merely because housing is available
at the place of their employment, would not meet the exemption.
ER at 495 (emphasis added) (L&I, Admin. Pol’y ES.A.1 (revised Dec. 29, 2020)
(MWA Applicability)). Because a person detained in a facility, as here, does not
sleep or reside in the detention facility because of their job responsibilities, the
subsection (j) exemption is not applicable.
Finally, to support its interpretation of the subsection (j) exemption, GEO
cites to Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wn.2d 585, 121 P.3d 82 (2005). GEO alleges
this court has previously interpreted the “reside or sleep” exception to
“‘categorically exclude[] from the MWA definition of “employee” those workers
who are required to “reside or sleep” at their workplace.’” GEO Opening Br. at 45
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Berrocal, 155 Wn.2d at 588 (quoting former RCW
49.46.010(5)(j) (2002) 5). In doing so, GEO misreads this court’s holding in
Berrocal.
In Berrocal, there was no dispute that the plaintiffs’ duties required them to
reside at their workplace. The issue was whether the subsection (j) exemption’s
final modifying phrase—“not engaged in the performance of active duties”—also
applied to the “sleep or reside” language in the first clause. The employer argued
the exemption excluded two distinct categories of workers: (1) those whose duties
5
RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) was renumbered to (3)(j) by the code reviser in 2012.
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require them to sleep or reside at work and (2) those who otherwise spend a
substantial portion of their work time subject to call and not engaged in the
performance of active duties. The plaintiffs argued that the first clause of RCW
49.46.010(3)(j) excluded any individual whose duties require that they reside or
sleep at their place of work and is not engaged in the performance of active duties.
A majority of the court agreed with the employer’s reading. We held that the
[subsection (j) exemption] excludes two categories of workers from
the MWA’s definition of “employee”: (1) those individuals who
reside or sleep at their place of employment and (2) those individuals
who otherwise spend a substantial portion of work time subject to call,
and not engaged in the performance of active duties.
Berrocal, 155 Wn.2d at 598. In our holding, we paraphrased the exemption as
covering “individuals who reside or sleep at their place of employment” and, in so
doing, omitted the phrase “whose duties require.” However, this paraphrase cannot
be read as a holding that we eliminated RCW 49.46.010(3)(j)’s express language.
Our analysis and conclusion in Berrocal have no relevance to the interpretation of
the subsection (j) exemption’s phrase “whose duties require,” and we reject GEO’s
argument to the contrary.
Accordingly, we conclude the reside or sleep exemption, RCW
49.46.010(3)(j), does not apply to persons who work in the facility in which they
are detained because their duties do not require them to sleep or reside in the
facility. Here, the detained workers are in the custody of ICE and are not permitted
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to leave the detention facility until ordered released or removed. It is their
detention that requires them to sleep or reside at the NWIPC, not their participation
in the work program.
GEO further asserts that the court should not look solely at the statutory
exemptions to the MWA’s definition of “employee” to determine whether the
detained workers fall within that definition. Instead, GEO argues, the first step in
the analysis is to determine whether the workers fall within the definition of
employee in the first instance. If the answer is no, then—according to GEO—we
do not take the next step of looking at the statutory exemptions to the “employee”
definition.
This approach is inconsistent with how we interpret the MWA’s definition
of “employee” where we carve out “narrow provisions that operate as exemptions”
from the broad definition of employee. Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 421. Also, this
proposed analytical approach contravenes our rules of statutory interpretation,
under which statutory language must be interpreted in “the context of the statute,
related statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Valdiglesias
LaValle, 535 P.3d at 861 (citing Haggard, 195 Wn.2d at 548). By its very
definition, “employee” is defined by its exemptions. RCW 49.46.010(3) (defining
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer but shall not include” the
statutory exemptions listed in subsections (a) through (p) (emphasis added)).
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Therefore, we reject an analytical approach where we first ask whether the
detained workers fall within the MWA’s definition of “employee” without looking
at the related statutory exemptions. However, even if we agreed with taking this
approach, GEO’s arguments are unpersuasive.
GEO argues the MWA’s definition of “employee” categorically excludes
detainee labor. GEO first points to the “ordinary meaning” of the word “employee”
and argues that it would “rightly strike people as odd” to describe a federal
immigration detainee “as an ‘employee’ of the facility detaining [them].” GEO
Opening Br. at 20, 49 (“[T]he definition of ‘employee’ must be given its commonsense meaning and exclude detainee labor.”). Though GEO argues for us to
interpret “employee” consistent with its ordinary meaning, it provides no
dictionary definitions for support. See In re Det. of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 731, 750, 533
P.3d 81 (2023) (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting) (“Absent a specific statutory
definition, words in a statute are given their ordinary meaning and we may discern
that meaning from the dictionary.”). The Class, however, cites to several
definitions of “employee” from various dictionaries, showing that none
contemplate the exclusion of detained individuals. Nwauzor Appellees’ Br. at 28
n.11 (“Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language 476 (1959)
(defining employee as ‘a person hired by another, or by a business, firm, etc. to
work for wages or salary’); American College Dictionary 394 (1959) (defining
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employee as ‘a person working for another person or a business firm for pay’);
Oxford Universal Dictionary 602 (1955) (defining employee as ‘one who is
employed, esp[ecially] one employed for wages or a salary’); Black’s Law
Dictionary 617 (4th ed. 1968) (‘[o]ne who works for an employer; a person
working for salary or wages’); The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 235 (2016) (‘a
person who works for another’); Collins English Dictionary 295 (2015) (‘a person
who is hired to work for someone in return for payment’); Employee, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (‘Someone who works in the service of another person
(the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the
employer has the right to control the details of work performance.’).”).
The only support GEO points to is a Washington Court of Appeals case that
considered whether a pretrial detainee held in a civil commitment facility was an
“employee” under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch.
49.60 RCW. See Calhoun v. State, 146 Wn. App. 877, 886, 193 P.3d 188 (2008).
Quoting Calhoun, GEO argues detainee-workers are not employees in the ordinary
sense of the word because the work they perform does not provide sufficient
“indices of employment.” 146 Wn. App. at 886. Calhoun is unhelpful here. There,
the court considered whether the pretrial detainee, who was in custody at a civil
commitment center operated by the State, was an employee for purposes of the
WLAD. The court specifically noted that the detainee would not be an employee
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under the MWA because he fell within the government-institutions exemption,
RCW 49.46.010(3)(k). Thus, while the court considered factors such as the
primary goal of the work the detainee performed to decide whether the detainee
was an employee, that analysis does not aid the argument that the ordinary
meaning or the MWA’s definition of “employee” excludes detained workers.
Additionally, an interpretation that “employee” excludes all detained
workers would render other portions of the MWA superfluous. And “it is a basic
rule of construction that, whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no
portion is superfluous.” Sim v. Wash. State Parks & Recreation Comm’n, 90
Wn.2d 378, 383, 583 P.2d 1193 (1978). RCW 49.46.010(3)(k) specifies that
“employee” does not include “[a]ny resident, inmate, or patient of a state, county,
or municipal correctional, detention, treatment or rehabilitative institution.” If the
term “employee” excludes persons who perform labor while in detention or
custody, then the subsection (k) exemption would be wholly unnecessary.
Still within its proposed analytical framework, GEO next argues that the
detained workers are not “employees” because no employee-employer relationship
exists under the economic-dependence test we adopted in Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d
851. GEO argues the economic-dependence test is a necessary step in determining
whether a worker falls within the MWA’s definition of “employee” in the first
instance, i.e., before looking to the exemptions. We reject this argument.
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In Anfinson, we considered the appropriate test for determining whether a
worker is an independent contractor or an “employee” under the MWA. We
adopted the economic-dependence or economic realities analysis to resolve that
issue. We have since applied this test in two relevant circumstances: (1) to
determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an “employee” for
purposes of the MWA and (2) to determine whether a joint employment
relationship exists under the MWA. 6 We have not adopted the economicdependence analysis as a generally applicable test to determine whether a worker
falls within the MWA’s definition of “employee.” And we decline to apply that
approach in this case.
First, none of the MWA’s statutory exemptions to the definition of
“employee” were relevant or at issue in Anfinson. The MWA was silent as to how
it applied to independent contractors. Here, the MWA’s definition of “employee”
contains the government-institutions exemption, RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), which is
relevant to work performed by individuals in custody or detention. And because
the MWA defines “employee” by carving out narrow provisions from its
definition, we need not look beyond the relevant exemption.
6
Becerra Becerra v. Expert Janitorial, LLC, 181 Wn.2d 186, 196, 332 P.3d 415 (2014). Outside the context of the MWA, we have applied the economic realities test to determine, in the joint employment context, the liability of an employer under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act, ch. 49.17 RCW. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Tradesmen Int’l, LLC, 198 Wn.2d 524, 497 P.3d 353 (2021).
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Second, we adopted the economic-dependence test because a liberal
construction of the MWA favored it within the context presented in Anfinson. In
Anfinson, this court considered whether the right-to-control test, which is a test set
forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958), was the proper
standard to apply to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an
employee under the MWA. We rejected the application of the right-to-control test
and instead adopted the economic-dependence test because it favors classification
as an “employee” under the MWA and thus provides broader coverage. Anfinson,
174 Wn.2d at 870 (“The economic-dependence test provides broader coverage than
does the right-to-control test. Liberal construction favors the economic-dependence
test.” (citation omitted)).
Here, a liberal construction of the MWA disfavors the application of the
economic-dependence test to determine whether the detained workers are
“employees.” The MWA contains a relevant exemption for detained workers, and
imposing an additional test to determine whether the workers are employees in the
first instance before reaching the exemptions is unnecessary and would only
function to limit MWA coverage. We decline to apply the economic-dependence
test under these circumstances.
Finally, GEO suggests we follow federal courts that have concluded
detainees who work in the “custodial context” are not employees under the Fair
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Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. GEO Opening Br. at
23 n.4. GEO argues the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case Ndambi is especially
persuasive because the court considered whether immigration detainees in a
privately owned and operated detention center are “employees” under the FLSA.
Ndambi v. CoreCivic, Inc., 990 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2021). The Ndambi court
concluded the detained workers are not employees under the FLSA, reasoning that
“[p]ersons in custodial detention . . . are not in an employer-employee relationship
but in a detainer-detainee relationship that falls outside that paradigm.” Ndambi,
990 F.3d at 372. GEO urges us to adopt a similar categorical exclusion from MWA
coverage for persons who perform work while in custody. Because that case
interpreted federal law, it is not relevant nor helpful to the certified questions
specifically asking us to answer Washington state law.
While we have stated that federal authority under the FLSA may provide
helpful guidance in interpreting the MWA, we have also recognized that these two
statutory schemes “are not identical and we are not bound by such authority.”
Drinkwitz, 140 Wn.2d at 298. We will not rely on a federal court’s interpretation of
the FLSA where, like here, the relevant portions of the statutes are distinct. The
MWA contains a government-institutions exemption to its definition of
“employee” that is relevant to detained workers. The FLSA’s definition of
“employee” contains no similar exemption. See 29 U.S.C. ch. 8, § 203(e).
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II. Unjust Enrichment.
The district court granted equitable relief to the State in the form of an unjust
enrichment award. The Ninth Circuit’s third and final question asks us to decide
whether the damage award to the Class forecloses equitable relief to the State. It
does not.
The equitable theory of unjust enrichment is rooted in notions of fairness
and justice. It is “the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained
absent any contractual relationship.” Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484, 191
P.3d 1258 (2008). This equitable relief is generally available where a benefit was
unjustly received and the law does not authorize or recognize a legal remedy to
redress the harm. It is a form of relief intended to undo an inequity, such as the
receipt of ill-gotten gains, and to “force the defendant to give up a gain that had
been acquired wrongfully or that would be wrongful to be kept without payment.”
HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15:4 (2023) (Concepts of
Public Law and Justice, Unjust Enrichment, and Receipt of Benefit).
To sustain an unjust enrichment claim, the State must establish
“‘[1] a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff; [2] an appreciation or knowledge by the
defendant of the benefit; and [3] the acceptance or
retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant
to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.’”
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Young, 164 Wn.2d at 484 (quoting Bailie Commc’ns, Ltd. v. Trend Bus. Sys., Inc.,
61 Wn. App. 151, 159-60, 810 P.2d 12 (1991) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1535-36 (6th ed. 1990))). The district court concluded that the State satisfied these
requirements. GEO challenges this conclusion and argues the State is not entitled
to this relief because the Class’s award of damages forecloses the availability of
equitable relief to the State. See Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 252, 692
P.2d 793 (1984) (providing that a plaintiff generally is not entitled to equitable
relief, such as relief based on unjust enrichment, where an adequate legal remedy is
available to them). We disagree.
The Class and the State are separate parties that brought separate causes of
action against GEO. GEO does not cite to any authority in which we have held the
award of a legal remedy to one party forecloses the availability of an equitable
remedy to a separate party. And we decline to so hold now. Accordingly, the
MWA damages award to the Class does not bar equitable relief on the basis of
unjust enrichment to the State.
Finally, GEO argues the State’s unjust enrichment claim must fail because it
was the detained workers, not the State, that conferred the benefit on GEO.
However, the State represents the rights and interests of those harmed by GEO’s
failure to pay the minimum wage from 2005 to 2021 (when final judgment was
entered). ER at 22-23. This includes the rights and interests of the NWIPC’s
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detained workers from that time period. The State’s unjust enrichment claim does
not fail on this basis, and the award of equitable relief to the State is consistent
with Washington law.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that detained workers at a private detention facility are
“employees” within the meaning of the MWA. We also conclude the MWA’s
government-institutions exemption, RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), does not apply to work
performed by detainees confined in a private detention facility that operates under
a contract with the State. Finally, we conclude that a legal remedy to one party
does not foreclose the availability of equitable relief to a separate party.
Accordingly, we answer the certified questions as follows:
1. Whether detained workers at the NWIPC, a private detention center, are
“employees” within the meaning of the MWA? Yes.
2. Whether RCW 49.46.010(3)(k), the MWA’s government-institutions
exemption, applies to work performed by detainees confined in a private
detention facility operating under a contract with the State? No.
3. Whether the damages award to the Class forecloses equitable relief to
the State in the form of an unjust enrichment award? No.
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