IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL No. 84466-1-I
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a regional
transit authority, dba SOUND TRANSIT, DIVISION ONE
Plaintiff,
v.
LMRK PROPCO 3 LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company,
Appellant,
CCTMO LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; T-MOBILE WEST TOWER
LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; and SPRINT SPECTRUM PUBLISHED OPINION
L.P., a Delaware limited partnership,
Respondents,
MARYMOOR STORAGE PARTNERS
LLC, a Washington limited liability
company; PUGET SOUND ENERGY,
INC., a Washington public utility
corporation; AT&T INC., a Delaware
corporation; KING COUNTY, a
Washington municipal corporation; and
ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND
UNKNOWN TENANTS,
Defendants.
BOWMAN, J. — Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound
Transit) paid $16.65 million as full and just compensation to condemn by eminent
domain property owned by Marymoor Storage Partners LLC. The property No. 84466-1-I/2
included a cell tower in which LMRK PROPCO 3 LLC (Landmark), CCTMO LLC,
T-Mobile West Tower LLC (T-Mobile Tower), Sprint Spectrum LLC, and T-Mobile
West LLC1 asserted compensable leasehold interests. Landmark appeals the
trial court’s disbursement of just compensation funds to CCTMO, T-Mobile
Tower, Sprint, and T-Mobile West. Landmark argues those entities were
judicially estopped from moving for disbursement based on an agreement that
their interests would be determined after an evidentiary hearing. It also argues
that the trial court did not follow statutory procedures before disbursing the funds
and that the disbursement was inequitable. We affirm.
FACTS
Marymoor owned 2.5 acres in Redmond. It used most of the property for
a self-storage facility. But it leased a small section on the northwest corner of the
property and several adjacent storage units to T-Mobile Tower. T-Mobile Tower
then built and operated a 100-foot-tall cell tower on the land, leasing space on
the tower for telecommunications antennae to several phone companies.
Marymoor assigned Landmark the right to collect rent from T-Mobile Tower’s
ground lease.
By 2018, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West each held leasehold interests
in the cell tower, granting the companies access and utility easements for affixing
and operating clusters of telecommunication antennae. AT&T, Sprint, and TMobile West also held leasehold interests in the storage facility, granting each
company access to and use of a storage unit for equipment. T-Mobile Tower
1
T-Mobile Tower and T-Mobile West are different entities.
2
No. 84466-1-I/3
held a leasehold interest in the cell tower, authorizing it to rent space on the
tower. T-Mobile Tower leased back its entire interest to CCTMO. And it granted
CCTMO a power of attorney to act on its behalf on matters related to the cell
tower leases. So, CCTMO held a sublease interest in the management of the
tower and the rent paid by AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West. Finally, Landmark
held the ground lease for the cell tower site and the storage units. That interest
gave Landmark the right to collect income from T-Mobile Tower for use of the site
and from AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West for rental of the storage units.
In early 2018, Sound Transit notified Marymoor that it intended to
condemn by eminent domain Marymoor’s property to construct, operate, and
maintain a portion of the “Downtown Redmond Link Extension” of its light rail
project. In preparation, Sound Transit hired property advisors to appraise
Marymoor’s property. The October 2018 appraisal valued the collective interests
in the property at $16.65 million—$15.5 million for the land and $1.15 million for
the cell tower interests.
In early 2019, Marymoor tried selling the property to Sound Transit to
avoid condemnation proceedings. But to do so, it needed to free its title from all
encumbrances. So, following mediation in June 2019, Marymoor and Landmark
executed a settlement agreement. Marymoor agreed to pay Landmark
$950,000, and Landmark agreed to secure releases of all the cell tower tenants’
leasehold interests. Marymoor then agreed to sell the property to Sound Transit
for $16.7 million. But Landmark failed to clear the title, and in September 2019,
Marymoor and Sound Transit’s purchase and sale agreement fell through. As a
3
No. 84466-1-I/4
result, Marymoor and Landmark sued each other for breach of the June 2019
settlement agreement. The case proceeded to arbitration.
In October 2019, Sound Transit petitioned to condemn by eminent domain
Marymoor’s fee simple interest in the property as well as all encumbrances on
the land. It named Marymoor, Landmark, and CCTMO as respondents.2 The
court set the matter for trial in June 2020.
In January 2020, the court entered a stipulated order granting Sound
Transit immediate use and possession of the property once it deposited $16.65
million into the court registry as just compensation for the taking. Soon after, TMobile Tower petitioned to intervene, which the court granted. After T-Mobile
Tower intervened, CCTMO’s attorneys represented its interest because their
interests were coextensive.3
In February 2020, Marymoor moved to release $15.5 million of the funds
in the court registry. CCTMO objected, arguing the motion was premature
because the parties had not yet determined their separate cell tower and land
interests. Alternatively, CCTMO requested that the court leave $2 million in the
registry to ensure compensation for the remaining interests. The court granted
Marymoor’s motion but left $2 million in the registry. It ordered the release of
$14.65 million to Marymoor.
A few weeks later, AT&T and Sprint joined as parties to the condemnation
proceeding. In April 2020, Sound Transit filed a second amended eminent
2
It also named several other entities not involved in this appeal.
3
We refer to CCTMO and T-Mobile Tower collectively as CCTMO for the
remainder of this opinion.
4
No. 84466-1-I/5
domain petition identifying the new parties’4 interests in the property. Although
the amended petition did not name T-Mobile West, it was a cell tower tenant and
became a claimant and interested party in the condemnation proceedings under
RCW 8.04.140.5
In May 2020, the court entered a “Stipulated Judgment and Decree of
Appropriation” between Sound Transit and Marymoor establishing $16.65 million
as full and just compensation for the “Condemned Property and all rights,
estates, and interests therein, and for termination of any and all leases and
easements, recorded or unrecorded, that burden the Property.” The other parties
did not sign the stipulation. But in July 2020, the remaining parties—Landmark,
CCTMO, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West—entered a stipulated order with
Marymoor to strike their June 2020 trial date and affirm the full condemnation
value of the property as $16.65 million.
The stipulated order noted that $2 million was available to be appropriated
between the remaining interests. The parties agreed to set a “post-trial briefing
schedule” and an “evidentiary hearing . . . to determine allocation of the
remaining funds” in the court registry and that the trial court could allocate the
remaining funds “via post-trial motions.” The parties agreed on a briefing
schedule that included a November 2020 deadline to exchange appraisals, a
December 2020 discovery deadline, and a March 2021 evidentiary hearing.
4
T-Mobile Tower, AT&T, and Sprint.
5
Chapter 8.04 RCW governs eminent domain actions by the State. But under RCW 8.12.120, a person or entity unnamed in a city’s eminent domain petition and claiming an interest in the subject property may also be admitted as a party to the lawsuit.
5
No. 84466-1-I/6
CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West exchanged appraisals of their
interests before the November 2020 deadline. CCTMO’s appraisal valued its
interest at $1,045,000, Sprint’s appraisal valued its interest at $68,000, and TMobile West’s appraisal valued its interest at $125,000.
Landmark also provided appraisals of AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile West’s
interests by the deadline. But Landmark’s appraisals did not estimate those
parties’ leasehold interests in the cell tower. Instead, its appraisals valued those
parties’ interests in only the storage units at $3,000 for AT&T, $23,500 for Sprint,
and $22,100 for T-Mobile West. Landmark also submitted a copy of Sound
Transit’s appraisal of the property as a whole. Landmark did not provide an
appraisal of its own interest in the cell tower.
After the exchange of appraisals,6 Landmark and CCTMO each moved for
summary judgment, seeking an order dismissing the other from the
condemnation proceeding. Both parties alleged the other had no compensable
interest in the condemned property. The court denied both motions.7
In March 2021, the arbitrator issued a ruling resolving the lawsuit between
Marymoor and Landmark. The arbitrator determined that Landmark breached its
agreement by failing to extinguish the leaseholds encumbering the property. The
arbitrator awarded Marymoor money damages and assigned to Landmark
6
AT&T did not provide its own appraisal and ultimately never sought
compensation for its interest.
7
The court denied Landmark’s motion in February 2021 and CCTMO’s motion in June 2021.
6
No. 84466-1-I/7
Marymoor’s remaining interest, “if any,” to the funds in the registry from the
condemnation action.
March 2021 passed without an evidentiary hearing despite the parties’
earlier stipulated agreement. The parties did not schedule another hearing.
On June 1, 2021, Marymoor formally assigned “any and all” of its residual
interest in the property to Landmark. Then, two days later, Landmark moved to
disburse $762,000 of the $2 million in the court registry. It argued that the
registry held $762,000 more than the appraised interests claimed by the other
parties. And it argued that it was entitled to those funds because it “not only has
a claim to the monies in the court as the easement owner,” but because it also
“now owns [Marymoor]’s claims as the owner of the property.” According to
Landmark, “no party other than [it] has a claim to the excess $762,000[ ] held in
the court registry.”
CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West objected, arguing that the court
should distribute the remaining funds only after an evidentiary hearing under
RCW 8.12.150 and that Landmark had not identified the specific interest for
which it requested disbursement. It also argued that Landmark presented no
expert opinion on the fair market value of the interest for which it sought a
disbursement of funds. The court granted Landmark’s motion, disbursing to
Landmark $762,000. $1,238,000 remained in the court registry.
The case sat dormant for a year. Then, in July 2022, Sprint and T-Mobile
West jointly moved for disbursement. Those parties requested disbursement of
$193,000 based on the appraisals of their cell tower lease interests. Landmark
7
No. 84466-1-I/8
objected, arguing that the court could allocate funds only after an evidentiary
hearing. Landmark also argued that Sprint and T-Mobile West’s cellular leases
were not compensable interests. But Landmark agreed that Sprint and T-Mobile
West had a combined $45,600 leasehold interest in the storage units. Sprint and
T-Mobile West then increased their request for disbursement from $193,000 to
$238,600 to account for their storage unit leasehold interests. On August 9,
2022, the court granted the motion and disbursed a total of $238,600 to Sprint
and T-Mobile West.
CCTMO then moved for disbursement of funds and set a hearing date of
August 31, 2022. CCTMO asked for the remaining $999,400 in the court registry
for compensation of its interest based on its appraisal of $1,045,000. Landmark
again objected. It disputed the value of CCTMO’s interest, argued that the court
should appropriate funds only after an evidentiary hearing, and asserted that it
was the only party remaining with a compensable interest in the property.
On August 25, five days before CCTMO’s hearing, Landmark cross moved
for disbursement of the remaining funds in the registry. In support of its cross
motion, Landmark submitted a declaration from its chief financial officer valuing
its “real property interests” at $1,041,985. CCTMO moved to strike Landmark’s
cross motion and declaration, arguing they were untimely under King County
Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 7(b)(4)(A).
The court granted CCTMO’s motion and ordered disbursement of the
remaining funds in the court registry to CCTMO. The court struck Landmark’s
cross motion because it was not properly noted under the local court rules. And
8
No. 84466-1-I/9
it struck Landmark’s chief financial officer’s valuation of its interest because
Landmark presented the declaration almost two years after the deadline to
exchange appraisals and the close of discovery.
Landmark appeals.
ANALYSIS
Landmark argues that CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were judicially
estopped from moving for disbursement of funds from the court registry, and that
even if they were not, the trial court did not follow the proper statutory
procedures. Landmark also asserts the court erred by striking its cross motion
for disbursement and supporting declaration. We disagree.
1. Judicial Estoppel
Landmark argues that CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were judicially
estopped from seeking disbursement of funds from the court registry without an
evidentiary hearing. It asserts it “reasonably relied” on the parties’ stipulated
order to strike the trial date and set a post-trial briefing schedule, including an
evidentiary hearing. CCTMO contends Landmark waived that argument because
it did not raise judicial estoppel before the trial court.
Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
RAP 2.5(a). This rule encourages “ ‘the efficient use of judicial resources’ . . . by
ensuring that the trial court has the opportunity to correct any errors, thereby
avoiding unnecessary appeals.” State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304-05, 253
P.3d 84 (2011) (quoting State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492
9
No. 84466-1-I/10
(1988)). Landmark did not raise judicial estoppel below, so it waived that
argument on appeal.
In any event, judicial estoppel does not apply here. Judicial estoppel is an
equitable doctrine that “ ‘precludes a party from asserting one position in a court
proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent
position.’ ” Arp v. Riley, 192 Wn. App. 85, 91, 366 P.3d 946 (2015)8 (quoting
Arkinson v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538, 160 P.3d 13 (2007)). The
doctrine’s primary purposes are to (1) preserve respect for judicial proceedings
and (2) avoid inconsistency, duplicity, and waste of time. Anfinson v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). It is
intended to protect the integrity of the courts, not the litigants. Arp, 192 Wn. App.
at 91.
In determining whether judicial estoppel applies, we look to see if (1) the
party asserts a position inconsistent with one made in an earlier proceeding, (2)
acceptance of the position would create the perception that a party misled a court
in either proceeding, and (3) the party asserting the inconsistent position would
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment. Arp, 192 Wn. App. at
92. But “judicial estoppel does not apply absent a prior judicial proceeding in
which the alleged inconsistent position was taken.”9 Kellar v. Est. of Kellar, 172
8
Internal quotation marks omitted.
An exception to this rule is when a party offers evidence that is “inconsistent
9
with ‘sworn testimony the party has given in the same or prior judicial proceedings.’ ” Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 864 (quoting King v. Clodfelter, 10 Wn. App. 514, 519 P.2d 206 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 865). Landmark does not allege that CCTMO, Sprint, or T-Mobile West offered evidence inconsistent with their prior sworn testimony.
10
No. 84466-1-I/11
Wn. App. 562, 581, 291 P.3d 906 (2012).
Landmark seeks to estop CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West from taking
a position contrary to the one they expressed in their stipulated order. But the
court entered the stipulated order in the same judicial proceeding. So, the court
was aware of the order and could assess the parties’ positions without risk of
being misled.10 As a result, the doctrine does not apply.
2. Disbursement Procedure
Landmark argues that even if CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were
not estopped from seeking disbursement of funds without a hearing, the court
used an unlawful and inequitable procedure to distribute the money. Landmark
contends that under chapter 8.12 RCW, it was entitled to “separate trials to
resolve factual disputes regarding the total value of the condemned property” and
“the value of the competing interests in the property from which that total value is
derived.”
We interpret statutes de novo. Robertson v. Wash. Parks & Recreation
Comm’n, 135 Wn. App. 1, 5, 145 P.3d 379 (2005). In interpreting a statute, we
aim to determine and carry out the legislature’s intent. Id. If the statute’s
meaning is plain on its face, we must give effect to that plain meaning. Id. We
derive a statute’s plain meaning from the language of the statute as a whole and
the related statutes that reveal legislative intent about the specific provision at
issue. Id.; Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Pac. County v. Comcast of Wash. IV, Inc., 8
10
We note that the parties did set a briefing schedule and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for March 2021 consistent with the order. But Landmark let that date pass without rescheduling the hearing.
11
No. 84466-1-I/12
Wn. App. 2d 418, 450, 438 P.3d 1212 (2019). If the plain language of the statute
is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, our inquiry ends. Cito v. Rios, 3
Wn. App. 2d 748, 759, 418 P.3d 811 (2018).
We review a trial court’s application of a statute for an abuse of discretion.
See Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007) (a court
abuses its discretion when it enters a ruling based on an erroneous view of the
law). And we review a trial court’s exercise of its broad authority to fashion an
equitable remedy for an abuse of discretion. SAC Downtown Ltd. P’ship v. Kahn,
123 Wn.2d 197, 204, 867 P.2d 605 (1994). A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or
reasons. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 183 Wn. App. 15, 21, 332 P.3d 1099
(2014). A court rests a discretionary decision on untenable grounds or bases it
on untenable reasons if it relies on unsupported facts or applies the wrong legal
standard. Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006).
The court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if “ ‘the court, despite applying
the correct legal standard to the supported facts, adopts a view that no
reasonable person would take.’ ” Id.11 (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647,
654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).
Chapter 8.12 RCW establishes the procedures for condemnation
proceedings initiated by a city.12 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County v. N. Am.
11
Internal quotation marks omitted.
12
Sprint and T-Mobile West moved for disbursement of funds under chapter 8.04 RCW, the statutes governing eminent domain actions by the State. But on appeal, the parties agree that chapter 8.12 RCW governs here.
12
No. 84466-1-I/13
Foreign Trade Zone Indus., LLC, 159 Wn.2d 555, 567, 151 P.3d 176 (2007).
After a city petitions in eminent domain and the court determines the taking is for
a public use, the court must hold a trial to determine just compensation. RCW
8.12.050. The court “shall impanel a jury to ascertain the just compensation to
be paid for the property taken or damaged” as a whole.13 RCW 8.12.100. Where
there are separate interests in the property, and “if any defendant or party in
interest shall demand,” the court may impanel separate juries “as to the
compensation or damages to be paid to any one or more of such defendants or
parties in interest,” so long as the party is “first admitted as a party defendant.”
Id.; RCW 8.12.120. The jury must then “ascertain the just compensation to be
paid to any [party] claiming an interest” in the condemned property. RCW
8.12.120.
Here, Sound Transit and Marymoor agreed in the May 2020 Stipulated
Judgment and Decree of Appropriation that Sound Transit would pay $16.65
million as just compensation for the property as a whole. Landmark did not
contest the stipulated judgment. Nor did it object to the disbursement of $14.65
million to Marymoor as just compensation for its interest. Indeed, in the July
2020 stipulated order to strike the trial date, Landmark agreed with Marymoor,
CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West that “[o]nly the allocation of the Reserved
Funds remains to [be] determined in this action.” And Landmark did not demand
a trial to determine the value of its separate interest as provided for in RCW
8.12.100 and .120. Instead, it agreed that “allocation of the [$2 million] in
13
The parties may waive a trial by jury “as in other civil cases” and have the matter heard by the court. RCW 8.12.090.
13
No. 84466-1-I/14
Reserved Funds can take place via post-trial motions . . . pursuant to an agreed
schedule.” As a result, Landmark waived its right to trials to establish just
compensation for the property as a whole and its separate interest.
Landmark argues that even if it was not entitled to a trial, the court still
should have determined by some means the extent and value of each parties’
separate interest in the property before distributing any of the funds. Citing State
v. Spencer, 90 Wn.2d 415, 583 P.2d 1201 (1978), Landmark contends that if, as
here, the funds fall short of fully compensating each parties’ appraised interest,
the court must ensure that each party receives a proportional share of the
remaining funds. According to Landmark, the trial court used an inequitable
procedure because it precluded Landmark from compensation for any of its
leasehold interests.
In Spencer, the State condemned 2.6 acres owned by Elmer and Alice
Spencer, part of which was subject to a lease held by Socony Mobil Oil
Company. 90 Wn.2d at 416. The Spencers and Socony entered a stipulated
judgment and decree of appropriation under which the State paid $393,500 as
just compensation for all interests in the property. Id. at 417. At trial, Socony
urged the court to value its and the Spencers’ interests and then equitably
apportion each a share of the condemnation award. Id. The trial court refused.
Id. Instead, it awarded Socony $75,033, the amount it found to be the fair market
value of the leasehold. Id. The court then awarded the remaining funds to the
Spencers. Id. We reversed, concluding that the trial court should have equitably
apportioned the funds. Id.; State v. Spencer, 16 Wn. App. 841, 844-45, 559 P.2d
14
No. 84466-1-I/15
1360 (1977). Our Supreme Court affirmed, holding that courts have both
statutory and equitable authority to apportion damages in condemnation
proceedings, and an equitable apportionment of the lump-sum condemnation
award was appropriate “under the applicable statute and the facts and
circumstances of [the] case.” Id. at 419.
Contrary to Landmark’s argument, Spencer does not mandate a particular
procedure trial courts must follow to disburse funds in condemnation
proceedings. Instead, it recognizes a court should use its discretion, guided by
statutory and equitable authority, to resolve conflicting claims and apportion just
compensation in a manner called for by the facts and circumstances of each
case.
Here, RCW 8.12.150 provides that “[n]o delay in ascertaining the amount
of compensation shall be occasioned by any doubt or contest which may arise
. . . as to the extent of the interest of any defendant in the property.” After the
court establishes the total value of the condemned property, it may “require
adverse claimants to interplead, so as to fully determine their rights and interests
in the compensation ascertained.”14 Id. And it “may make such order as may be
necessary in regard to the deposit or payment of such compensation.” Id. The
plain language of the statute affords the court broad equitable authority to resolve
14
Interpleading is an equitable action in which multiple claimants to the same money or property can have their claims “adjudged, determined, and adjusted” as described in RCW 4.08.160. See Smith v. Dement Bros. Co., 100 Wash. 139, 139-40, 144-45, 170 P. 555 (1918) (quoting REM. REV. STAT. § 199, recodified as RCW 4.08.160 (LAWS OF 1890, at 93, § 1)). In an interpleader action, the court may make all necessary orders “for the preservation and protection of the rights, interests, or liens of the several parties.” RCW 4.08.180.
15
No. 84466-1-I/16
disputed interests in condemned property and disburse funds accordingly. See,
e.g., City of Tacoma v. Nyman, 154 Wash. 154, 157, 281 P. 484 (1929) (holding
that the trial court properly resolved contested interests under Rem. Rev. Stat. §
9225, recodified as RCW 8.12.150 (LAWS OF 1907, ch. 153, § 11), because its
procedure “opened the way for doing justice between the contending parties”).
The procedure employed by the court to disburse funds to CCTMO,
Sprint, and T-Mobile West was tenable under the circumstances of this case.
After the court’s disbursement to Landmark, the case lay dormant for a year.
Then, in July 2022, Sprint and T-Mobile West jointly moved for disbursement.
Those parties requested disbursement of $193,000 based on the appraisals of
their cell tower lease interests. The trial court received and considered briefing
from all interested parties. In its brief, Landmark argued the other parties had no
compensable interest in the cell tower. The court rejected that argument.
Instead, the court disbursed the funds consistent with Sprint, T-Mobile West, and
eventually CCTMO’s undisputed appraised values of their respective leasehold
interests.15
Landmark also fails to show that the court’s procedure deprived it of any
compensation for its leasehold interest. Indeed, Landmark received a $762,000
disbursement for its interests. While Landmark now argues that the
15
Landmark challenges the trial court’s finding that the appraisals were undisputed. But the record shows that Landmark submitted no competing appraisals of the other parties’ interests. Landmark also complains that it had no opportunity to challenge whether the other parties’ appraisers “followed sound appraisal practices” before the court accepted their appraised values. But the record shows that Landmark received the appraisals before the November 2020 deadline and made no effort to depose the other parties’ experts over the next two years.
16
No. 84466-1-I/17
disbursement was compensation for only its ownership interest received from
Marymoor, neither its motion to disburse nor the trial court’s order of
disbursement identify those funds as such.
Under the circumstances of this case, the procedure the trial court used to
determine the value of the parties’ separate interests and disburse funds does
not amount to an abuse of discretion.
3. Cross Motion to Disburse Funds
Landmark argues that the trial court erred by striking its cross motion for
disbursement and supporting declaration. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. Farmer v. Davis, 161 Wn. App. 420,
431, 250 P.3d 138 (2011).
Under KCLCR 7(b)(4)(A), a moving party “shall serve and file all motion
documents no later than 4:30 p.m. nine judicial days before the date the party
wishes the motion to be considered.” A party can request that timing
requirement “be shortened only for good cause [and] upon written application to
the court.” KCLCR 7(b)(10)(A).
Landmark cross moved for disbursement five judicial days before the
hearing date of CCTMO’s motion to disburse. As a result, Landmark’s cross
motion was untimely under the local rules. And Landmark did not seek to show
good cause to shorten time under KCLCR 7(b)(10)(A). The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by enforcing the applicable court rules.16
16
Even if the court found good cause for the late filing of Landmark’s cross motion, Landmark submitted the supporting declaration appraising the value of its interest almost two years after the November 2020 deadline to exchange appraisals. The trial court correctly identified this as an independent basis to exclude that document.
17
No. 84466-1-I/18
In sum, CCTMO, Sprint, and T-Mobile West were not estopped from
seeking disbursement of just compensation funds from the court registry without
a hearing, and the trial court did not use an unlawful or inequitable procedure to
disburse the funds. We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
18