NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 1, 2024
S24A0834. REDDING v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Following a 2018 jury trial, Appellant Merrick Redding was
found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection
with the death of Joseph Davis. This is Redding’s fourth appeal to
this Court. In his first three appeals, we vacated the trial court’s
judgment and remanded for the trial court to apply the correct facts
and legal analysis to Redding’s allegation of a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. 1 See Redding v. State, 309 Ga.
124 (844 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Redding I”); Redding v. State, 313 Ga.
730 (873 SE2d 158) (2022) (“Redding II”); Redding v. State, 318 Ga.
1 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
225 (897 SE2d 801) (2024) (“Redding III”).2
On remand after Redding III, the trial court denied Redding’s
2 The crimes occurred on September 5, 2016. Redding was arrested for
Davis’s killing on September 12, 2016. On September 28, 2017, Redding filed
a “Motion to Dismiss Charge Based on Violation of Constitutional Right to
Speedy Trial.” On April 24, 2018, a Muscogee County grand jury indicted
Redding for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a
“closed fist.” He was reindicted on the same charges on May 22, 2018. At a trial
from October 24 to November 5, 2018, the jury found Redding not guilty of
malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court orally denied
the speedy-trial motion at the pretrial conference and ultimately sentenced
Redding to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder and
a concurrent term of 20 years to serve in prison for aggravated assault.
Redding filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on
June 4, 2019. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and in Redding I, this
Court held that the evidence presented at Redding’s trial was legally sufficient
to support his murder conviction but otherwise vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for the trial court to make factual findings and legal
conclusions regarding Redding’s speedy-trial motion. 309 Ga. at 129-130 (3).
On remand, the trial court merged the aggravated assault count into the felony
murder conviction, resentenced Redding to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for felony murder, and entered its first written order
denying Redding’s speedy-trial motion. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal.
In Redding II, this Court again vacated the judgment and remanded for further
proceedings on the speedy-trial motion “because the trial court misstated and
misapplied the law regarding the prejudice factor, failed to weigh each Barker
factor, and conflated its consideration of some of the factors.” 313 Ga. at 736
(2). On remand, the trial court entered a second written order denying the
speedy-trial motion on March 6, 2023. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal.
In Redding III, this Court a third time vacated the judgment and remanded
because the trial court “erred factually and legally and should have weighed
factors one and two against the State.” 318 Ga. at 232 (2) (e). On remand, the
trial court entered a third written order denying the speedy-trial motion on
February 29, 2024. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
2
speedy-trial motion a fourth time. Redding then filed this appeal,
raising his constitutional speedy-trial claim again along with claims
that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with
prior convictions under OCGA § 24-6-609 (“Rule 609”) and that the
trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior acts under OCGA §
24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”). 3 We affirm.
As recited in Redding I, the evidence presented at trial showed
the following:
On September 5, 2016, Jason Bellamy hosted a
barbeque at his house for his family. During the
barbeque, Davis came over to visit. Redding also came to
the house with his young grandchildren, though Redding
had not been invited. Around the time of the incident,
Bellamy was preparing to grill meat in an area adjacent
to the house that witnesses characterized as an outdoor
patio or carport. Davis was leaning against a truck in the
driveway, “talking to friends” and “taking it easy.”
Another resident of the house, Debbie Render, also was
sitting outside. Bellamy’s stepfather, Jerry Ferrell, was in
the washroom vacuuming up water, but he came out to
the patio periodically.
While standing at the grill, Bellamy saw Redding
approach Davis and start talking to him. Bellamy could
3 Redding raised his Rule 609 and Rule 404 (b) claims in his previous
appeals, but we declined to address them given our remand on the speedy-trial
claim.
3
not hear what Redding was saying, but he heard Davis
repeatedly tell Redding, “Leave me alone.” Both Bellamy
and Render testified that they heard Davis ask something
like, “Why do you think I’m a p***y motherf****r?” They
also heard Redding call to Ferrell to “come get” Davis.
Bellamy further testified that Davis said to Redding, “Go
get a job . . . I work hard for my money, why won’t you get
a job,” and turning to Bellamy, Davis said, “What’s wrong
with him, Jason?” Bellamy did not think much of this
confrontation and went inside the house laughing, but he
kept looking through the screen door to see “what’s going
on,” and he saw Redding move closer to Davis.
As Bellamy went back outside through the kitchen
door, he saw Redding hit Davis once in the head. Bellamy
testified that, just before the hit, Redding “looked back
because I was in the house. You know, he looked back and
he said something to [Ferrell], you know, while he was
looking back, and when he turned around, he turned
around and just swung like this. You know, and when he
swung, it was like he was walking away at the same
time.”
Demonstrating the hit in front of the jury, Bellamy
described it as a “swing” with his right hand (rather than
a “forward punch”), and he testified that Redding hit
Davis with a “closed” fist. Render, who also observed the
incident, similarly testified that Redding “just hit [Davis]
’side the head with his fist . . . . It was loud.” Both Bellamy
and Render testified that Redding hit Davis with his right
hand and that the blow landed somewhere on the left side
of Davis’s head. Both also testified that Davis did not
provoke Redding before being hit.
As soon as Davis was hit, Bellamy testified, “it just
4
looked like all life left out of him. . . . He fell straight down.
He never moved from the position he had been in all day.
He fell straight down and he slumped up against my tire
on my truck.” Bellamy explained that Davis did not fall
over and hit his head on something, but rather “went
straight down. And when I got there, he was sitting up on
the side of my truck just like I’m sitting in this chair, and
it sounded like he was snoring. . . . [H]e hadn’t hit his
head.” Render also testified that Davis did not hit his
head while falling: “He just went around like that and he
just like slid down beside the truck.”
Davis was taken to the hospital, but he never
regained consciousness and was taken off life support the
next day. Dr. Steven Atkinson, the medical examiner who
conducted an autopsy on Davis, testified that there was a
“large abrasion in the back of the head on the left side,”
as well as a fracture on the back right side of the skull.
Dr. Atkinson explained that the fracture “was more
centered on the back right, but . . . it crossed the midline
and went into the back left, but it also wrapped around
and went into the base of the skull.” Dr. Atkinson
concluded that the cause of death was blunt force head
trauma, and that the head injury could have resulted
from any blunt object, including a fist strike to the head
or the head hitting the ground.
Redding testified in his own defense. He said that he
came to Bellamy’s house at the request of Ferrell, who had
asked him to help with a washing machine. After doing
some work inside the washroom, Redding sat on the patio
and had a beer. Sometime later, Redding testified, Davis
came to the carport area from a shed nearby where people
were known to take drugs. According to Redding, Davis
then purchased some crack cocaine from Bellamy, and
5
this transaction occurred near the truck. Redding
testified that he then came up to Davis to trade beers, but
after a verbal exchange, Davis pushed him twice and
“poked” him. This prompted Redding to hit Davis with an
“open hand slap.” Redding testified that Davis stumbled
back a little, slid down the side of the truck, and fell to the
ground, hitting his head on the concrete “lip.”
Redding I, 309 Ga. at 125-126 (2).
1. Redding contends that the trial court again erred by denying
his speedy-trial motion. We see no abuse of discretion.
As we have explained, “[a] constitutional speedy-trial claim is
evaluated under the two-part framework set out in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520)
(1992).” Redding III, 318 Ga. at 226 (1). Part one asks whether the
delay in bringing the defendant to trial was presumptively
prejudicial. Id. Generally, a delay of a year or more between a
defendant’s arrest and trial is long enough to be considered
presumptively prejudicial, and we held in Redding I that the
threshold was crossed here. Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (2). “This
appeal concerns part two, where the trial court “appl[ies] a context6
focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the
defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding III, 318
Ga. at 226 (1). These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2)
the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to
a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant from the delay.
Id.
When reviewing the trial court’s application of the balancing
test, this Court “must accept the factual findings of the trial court
unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate
conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of
discretion. . . .” Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2) (850 SE2d
152) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). But,
if the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or
the trial court significantly misapplies the law, then the
trial court’s exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if
the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court
used the correct factual and legal analysis, it would have
had no discretion to reach a different judgment. If the
trial court would still have discretion to reach a different
judgment, we remand for the trial court to reweigh the
factors and exercise its discretion using the correct factual
and legal analysis.
7
Redding III, 318 Ga. at 227 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted);
see also State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 678-780 (2) (d) (706 SE2d 561
(2011). In Redding III, we held that the trial court’s order denying
Redding’s speedy-trial motion contained factual and legal errors in
its analysis of the length-of-delay and reasons-for-delay factors and
that the trial court should have weighed those two factors against
the State rather than neutrally. Id. at 232 (2) (e). Although we
explained that “the trial court may be authorized to deny Redding’s
speedy-trial motion after assigning weight and balancing anew the
four factors in accordance with the applicable law and directions
outlined in this opinion,” we also explained that, in Redding’s case,
“the trial court is [not] necessarily compelled to do so.” Id. Therefore,
we remanded “for the entry of an order containing appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the speedy-trial claim.” Id.
at 233 (2) (e).
In its new order, the trial court weighed the length-of-delay
and reasons-for-delay factors slightly against the State in
accordance with Redding III and weighed the assertion-of-right
8
factor slightly against Redding. Redding does not dispute these
three factors. We see no factual or legal errors, and we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing these three
factors as it did.
Redding disputes only the prejudice factor, which the trial
court weighed heavily against Redding. “The prejudice associated
with unreasonable delay before trial includes oppressive pretrial
incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the
possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired by dimming
memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” Henderson, 310 Ga. at
239 (2) (d) (citation and punctuation omitted). Redding’s arguments
here fail because he merely repeats the arguments that we rejected
in Redding III. Redding again claims that a potential witness died
during the pretrial delay, but the trial court found — just as it did
before — that the witness’s death did not prejudice Redding’s
defense. The trial court also again found that Redding did not suffer
any kind of pretrial oppressiveness or anxiety due to the delay. In
Redding III, we already held that the trial court did not abuse its
9
discretion in weighing this factor heavily against Redding for these
same reasons. See Redding III, 318 Ga. at 231-232 (2) (d). Under the
law-of-the-case rule, that holding is binding here. See OCGA § 9-11-60 (h).
The trial court ultimately weighed the four Barker-Doggett
factors together and found that Redding’s Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial was not violated. The trial court did not misapply
the law or make erroneous factual findings. We hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in its ultimate decision to deny
Redding’s speedy-trial motion. See Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 515-520 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 280) (2019) (holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying speedy-trial claim after weighing
factors one and two “benignly” and not “too heavily” and against the
State but factors three and four against the defendant).
2. Redding contends that the trial court failed to comply with
Rule 609 when it allowed the State to impeach Redding with three
prior convictions – from 2015, 2009, and 2007 respectively – without
specifying how the court weighed the convictions’ probative value
10
against their prejudicial effect. We review this question of law de
novo. See, e.g., Wilder v. State, 290 Ga. 13, 15 (717 SE2d 457) (2011)
(holding that on a motion to suppress, the trial court’s “application
of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review”) (citation
omitted).
We conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting
Redding’s 2015 and 2009 convictions without listing on the record
the factors supporting its finding that the probative value of the
convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. We further conclude
that any assumed error in the admission of the 2007 conviction was
harmless.
(a) The Evidence Admitted Under Rule 609
Rule 609 applies when a witness’s character for truthfulness
can be impeached with a prior criminal conviction. Subpart (a)
provides the general rule: certain prior convictions “shall be
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused.” Rule 609 (a) (1). But subpart (b) lays out different
11
requirements for convictions where more than ten years have
elapsed since “the date of the conviction or the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for such conviction, whichever is the
later date[.]” Rule 609 (b). Such convictions are admissible only if
“the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. (emphasis
supplied).
At trial, after Redding announced that he was going to testify,
the State sought permission to impeach Redding with evidence of
three felony convictions: (1) a 2015 Habitual Violator Conviction; (2)
a 2009 Obstruction of an Officer Conviction; and (3) a 2007
Obstruction of an Officer Conviction. The trial court expressly ruled
that the probative value of these three convictions outweighed their
prejudicial effect and admitted them under Rule 609 (a) (1). While
cross-examining Redding, the State questioned him regarding these
three past convictions, which Redding admitted, further testifying
that he had pleaded guilty and “served [his] time, [his] punishment”
12
for them. Records of the convictions were admitted as exhibits over
defense counsel’s objection.
Redding argues that the trial court erred by failing to identify
on the record the specific factors that formed the basis of its
conclusion that the probative value of the three prior convictions
outweighed their prejudicial effect. 4 Redding was tried pursuant to
the current Evidence Code, and the trial court admitted the prior
convictions under Rule 609 (a) (1). Since the adoption of the current
4 Again, Redding does not argue that the trial court’s ultimate conclusion
was an abuse of discretion or that the trial court was wrong to weigh the
probative value against the prejudicial effect as it did. He merely argues that
the trial court erred by making an express conclusion about probative value
and prejudicial effect without also putting on the record the factors it
considered to reach that conclusion. In support of this contention, Redding cites
Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 428-429 (4) (662 SE2d 235) (2008), a decision
concerning Rule 609 (a) (1)’s predecessor in the old Evidence Code, OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2). In Quiroz, the Court of Appeals listed factors for trial courts to consider when balancing the probative value of a prior conviction against its
prejudicial effect. Id. However, in Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822 (725 SE2d 260)
(2012), this Court addressed Quiroz and held that OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) did
not require a trial court to list the specific factors it considered in ruling on the probative value of convictions not more than ten years old. Id. at 836-837 (3)
(b). Having said that, because Georgia’s Rule 609 is “materially identical to
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of evidence, we look to federal case law with
respect to the interpretation and application of the rule.” Brown v. State, 307
Ga. 24, 36 (6) n.2 (834 SE2d 40) (2019) (citation and quotes omitted). See also
Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 84 (3) (b) n.14 (834 SE2d 830) (2019) (citing to
Brown), infra. Thus, Quiroz and Clay no longer control this issue.
13
Evidence Code, we have not yet addressed whether Rule 609 (a) (1)
requires a trial court to explain on the record what factors it
considered when concluding that the probative value of a prior
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. We hold that it does not.
“Rule 609 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code is materially
identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and, as such,
we look to federal case law with respect to the interpretation and
application of [Rule 609].” Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 84 (3) (b)
n.14 (834 SE2d 830) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
United States v. Preston, 608 F2d 626 (5th Cir. 1979)5 is a leading
case on this question. There the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that
a Trial Judge must make an on-the-record finding that
the probative value of admitting a prior conviction
outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting a non609 (a) (2) prior conviction for impeachment purposes
under [Federal] Rule 609 (a) (1). . . . Although the Rule
does not on its face mandate, we think it useful for Trial
Judges to conduct a hearing on-the-record at which the
pertinent factors are explicitly identified and weighed.
5 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent decisions made
by the Fifth Circuit handed down on or before September 30, 1981. See Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
14
Id. at 639 (citations and punctuation omitted). Other federal courts
have interpreted Rule 609 (a) (1) the same way. See, e.g., United
States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F3d 1076, 1088 (II) (E) (9th Cir.
2004) (“While a trial court need not analyze each of the five factors
explicitly, the record should reveal, at a minimum, that the trial
judge was aware of the requirements of Rule 609 (a) (1).” (citation
and punctuation omitted)); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F2d 1049,
1064 (III) (A) (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“A comparison of Rule 609 (a) (1) with
Rule 609 (b) strongly suggests that Rule 609 (a) (1) does not require
the district court always to inquire into the facts and circumstances
underlying a prior felony conviction”).
We adopt Preston’s holding that Rule 609 (a) (1) does not
mandate an explicit analysis of factors; we also reiterate Preston’s
observation about the usefulness of an explicit analysis of factors.
Here, the trial court made an on-the-record finding that the
probative value of Redding’s three prior convictions outweighed
their prejudicial effect. For the 2015 and 2009 convictions, that was
15
sufficient to admit them under Rule 609 (a) (1). Contrary to
Redding’s argument, Rule 609 (a) (1) did not require the trial court
to put on the record the specific factors supporting that finding. See
Preston, 608 F2d at 639. Thus, the trial court did not legally err
when it admitted Redding’s 2015 and 2009 convictions without
expressly stating any specific factors regarding probative value and
prejudicial effect. With respect to the 2007 conviction, the record is
unclear about whether Redding was released more than 10 years
before his trial. If so, the trial court should have analyzed that
conviction under Rule 609 (b), which imposes a stricter standard for
admission than Rule 609 (a). 6 However, assuming without deciding
that Rule 609 (b)’s more stringent standard applies, and that the
trial court erred by admitting the 2007 conviction, we conclude that
any such error was harmless.
6 Rule 609 (b) prohibits the admission of a conviction more than ten years
old unless the trial court “determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” OCGA § 24-6-609 (b) (emphasis
added).
16
(b) Harmless Error Analysis
“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.” Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 293 (2) (835 SE2d 610) (2019)
(citation omitted). In making our determination, “we review the
record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done[.]” Id. “In the context of Rule 609,
error is harmless if the witness’ credibility was sufficiently
impeached by other evidence, or if the State’s case was strong
enough to support a conviction even apart from the witness’
testimony.” Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 179 (2) (h) (875 SE2d
771) (2022).Here, eyewitnesses Bellamy and Render “sufficiently
impeached” Redding’s credibility. Patterson, 314 Ga. at 179 (2) (h).
Both witnesses testified that Redding struck Davis in the head with
a closed fist, without any provocation. Bellamy characterized
Redding’s behavior as “bullying,” and testified that, after Redding
hit Davis, blood started “trickling” from Davis’s ear. Render testified
that the strike was “loud” enough for her to hear it from where she
17
was sitting. We conclude that it is highly improbable that evidence
of Redding’s 2007 conviction for obstruction of a police officer,
discussed in further detail in Division 3 (a) below, contributed to the
jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Denard v. State, 305 Ga. 463, 466 (2) (826
SE2d 61) (2019) (holding that any error in the admission of felony
convictions over ten years old without making on-the-record
findings that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial
effect was harmless because “the evidence of murder was
overwhelming, while the evidence of provocation was scant at best”).
3. In a related enumeration of error, Redding contends that
the trial court erred in admitting other-acts evidence under Rule 404
(b). We review the trial court’s ruling admitting such evidence under
Rule 404 (b) for abuse of discretion, see Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga.
767, 774 (2) (a) (879 SE2d 436) (2022), and conclude that any abuse
of discretion was harmless.
(a) The Evidence Admitted Under Rule 404 (b)
Rule 404 (b) concerns the admissibility of a defendant’s
“crimes, wrongs, or acts” other than the crime charged. The Rule
18
provides that these other acts are not admissible “to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). But other acts are admissible for
certain other purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id.
Prior to trial, the State gave notice pursuant to Rule 404 (b)
that it intended to offer evidence of two other acts involving
obstruction of a law enforcement officer (resulting in the 2007 and
2009 obstruction convictions referenced above). The trial court
admitted the other-acts evidence for purposes of intent, plan, and to
disprove mistake, accident, and self-defense.
During trial, the State presented evidence of the two other acts.
Regarding the first incident, a law enforcement officer testified that
in 2006 he attempted a traffic stop of Redding’s vehicle due to
outstanding warrants. Redding stopped his vehicle, exited, and fled.
The officer pursued Redding and was attempting to arrest him when
they began to engage in “close quarters combat.” The officer testified
19
that he “could smell the alcohol on [Redding’s] breath,” and that
Redding “attempted several times to try to gain control” of the
officer’s weapon. The officer testified that he thought Redding was
attempting to harm him, and he was concerned for his own safety
during the encounter.
Regarding the second incident, a law enforcement officer
testified that in 2008 he conducted a traffic stop of Redding’s vehicle.
Redding exited his vehicle and “was kind of unsteady on his feet.”
The officer smelled alcohol and attempted to “grab [Redding’s] wrist”
when Redding “swung back, not swinging at [the officer] but just —
he just didn’t want [the officer] to grab his hand.” Another law
enforcement officer “tried to grab [Redding’s] hand . . . and [Redding]
just swung away.” Then, Redding “pulled back” and “t[ook] an
aggressive stance.” The law enforcement officer used his TASER on
Redding who grabbed it but “never once swung at [the officer] or
tried to hit [him].”
(b) Harmless Error Analysis
Many on this Court have serious doubts that this other-acts
20
evidence should have been admitted. However, assuming without
deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence, we conclude that any such error was harmless and thus
does not require reversal.
As we stated above, nonconstitutional error is harmless where
“it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
Moore v. State, 307 Ga. at 293. Again, “we review the record de novo
and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done[.]” Id. “Generally, we have found Rule 404 (b) errors harmless
where the properly admitted evidence was so strong that the
prejudicial effect of the other-acts evidence had no significant
influence on the guilty verdicts.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 6 (2)
(885 SE2d 790) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the evidence against Redding was strong. Bellamy and
Render testified that Redding and Davis were engaged in an
argument when Redding hit Davis. During the argument, Bellamy
heard Davis tell Redding to “leave me alone,” and both witnesses
heard Davis ask Redding something similar to “do you think I’m a
21
p***y?” Bellamy saw Davis wave his hand in the air as if to tell
Redding to leave, but neither Bellamy nor Render saw Davis
physically provoke Redding or touch him in any manner. Both
witnesses testified that Redding then used his right hand to hit
Davis on the left side of his head in a swinging motion with a closed
fist. Both also testified that Davis fell down after the hit, his body
slumping against a truck and blood coming out from his ear. Medical
evidence showed that Davis died from the injury to his head.
On the stand, Redding similarly testified that Davis repeatedly
asked him, “Do y’all think I’m a p***y?”, but, in contrast to Bellamy
and Render, Redding claimed that Davis pushed and poked him as
well. Redding nonetheless did not dispute that he hit Davis and
caused him to fall, but Redding claimed he did so only with an open
hand and only after that physical provocation.
Based on our review, it is clear that Redding’s claim of selfdefense was weak, relying only on his self-serving testimony. In
contrast, evidence of Redding’s guilt was strong, having been
corroborated by the testimony of two eyewitnesses and the physical
22
evidence showing that Davis died of blunt force head trauma causing
“severe” brain injury and hemorrhage. See Johnson v. State, 301 Ga.
277, 279 (2) (800 SE2d 545) (2017) (holding that even if erroneously
admitted, other-acts evidence was harmless where Appellant
testified that he accidentally stabbed the victim in self-defense, in
part because other testimony instead detailed “Appellant’s lengthy
and persistent attack upon the unarmed victim”). See also
Mondragon v. State, 304 Ga. 843, 844-845 (2) (823 SE2d 276) (2019)
(holding that any error in sequencing Rule 404 (a) (2) evidence was
harmless because other evidence showed that the shooting victims
did not provoke Appellant, were unarmed, and were shot from
several feet away, which contrasted with Appellant’s testimony that
the victims were pushing him when he fired at them).
Indeed, it is difficult to see how the other-acts evidence here
would have had a “significant influence” on the jury. See Nundra,
316 Ga at 6. Both incidents occurred over eight years prior to the
murder and were not materially similar to Redding’s charges in this
case. Redding was accused of felony murder predicated on
23
aggravated assault after an argument at a friend’s barbeque, while
the other-acts evidence detailed belligerent (and possibly drunken)
behavior at two traffic stops — behavior that did not result in any
injuries to others. To the extent that the other-acts evidence still
painted Redding as an aggressive and agitable person, such
evidence painted that picture no clearer than Redding himself, who
admitted that he hit Davis after minimal provocation with enough
force to knock him to the ground.
Moreover, Redding testified that he pleaded guilty to the
offenses and that he “served [his] time, [his] punishment” for them.
This “reduces the risk that the jury convicted [Redding] to punish
him for his other crimes,” because the jury heard that Redding “had
already been punished for those crimes.” Nundra, 316 Ga at 8.
Further, the State did not mention the other-acts evidence in its
opening statement, and only briefly referenced it in closing
argument, which minimized the prejudicial effect. Finally, the trial
court provided limiting instructions regarding the other-acts
evidence, both after the law enforcement officers testified about the
24
traffic stops,7 and again in the court’s charge of law to the jury. See,
7 The court instructed the jury that:
In order to prove its case – and that’s the case that you’re
hearing – on this indictment on Counts 1, 2 and 3, the State of
Georgia, once again, must prove each and every element of each
charge in that indictment, and they must show in order to do that
the elements of intent or a plan, or must negate or disprove
mistake, an accident, or self-defense in this case.
To do so, the State has offered evidence of other crimes
allegedly committed by the accused. You are permitted to consider
that evidence only insofar as it may relate to those issues of intent,
plan or disprove mistake, accident, or self-defense, and not for any
other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the
defendant is of a character that would commit such crimes in this
indictment.
The evidence may be considered only to the extent that it
may show the intent element or issues that the State is required
or authorized to prove in the crimes charged in this case now on
trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be considered for you – by you
for any other purpose.
The defendant is on trial for the offenses charged in this bill
of indictment only, and not for any other acts, even though such
acts may incidentally be criminal and may have results [sic] in a
conviction.
Before you consider any other alleged acts for the limited
purposes stated here, you must first determine whether it is more
likely than not that the accused did commit the alleged act. If so,
you must then determine whether those alleged acts shed any light
on the elements of the offenses or issues for which the act was
admitted and the crimes charged in the indictment in this trial.
Remember to keep in mind the limited use and the
prohibited use of this evidence about other acts of the defendant.
By giving this instruction, the Court in no way suggests to
you the defendant has or has not committed any other acts, nor
whether such act, if committed, prove anything. That is a matter
totally within the province of the jury and for your determination.
25
e.g., Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875 (3) (838 SE2d 839) (2020)
(holding that any error in the admission of other-acts evidence was
harmless in light of the other strong evidence of guilt and the trial
court’s limiting instructions, and noting that “[w]e ordinarily
presume that jurors follow their instructions”); Taylor v. State, 306
Ga. 277, 283 (2) (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (holding that any error in the
admission of other-acts evidence was harmless, noting that “the
State spent a minimal amount of time eliciting evidence concerning
the [other act], presenting just two witnesses who took the stand
briefly, and there is no contention that the State mentioned or relied
upon the incident during its closing argument to the jury”). We
therefore conclude that it is highly improbable that any error in
admitting the other-acts evidence contributed to the verdict.
4. Although Redding does not argue that we should conduct a
cumulative error review, we conclude that the record does not reflect
cumulative error.
To establish cumulative error necessitating a new trial, “an
appellant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in
26
the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the
entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation
that they denied the appellant a fundamentally fair trial.” Greene v.
State, 316 Ga. 584, 607-08 (7) (889 SE2d 864) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14-18 (1)
(383 SE2d 808) (2020). Considering the strength of the evidence (as
already discussed) and the harmlessness of any individual errors,
we conclude that the presumed errors at issue here did not “so
infect[] the jury’s deliberation” that combined they denied Redding
a fundamentally fair trial. Greene, 316 Ga. at 608 (7). See also
Kirkland v. State, 318 Ga. 639, 664 (11) (898 SE2d 536) (2024)
(identifying no cumulative error from erroneously admitted otheracts evidence and improper jury instructions considering the strong
evidence of guilt). Therefore, the trial court’s errors, if any, do not
merit reversal.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
27