UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND )
ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Case No. 26-1789 (RJL)
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_ ___ ___ ___ )
.-d
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(June 2."3, 2026) [Dkt. # 1O]
On May 18, 2026, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") announced the creation of a
$1.776 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund ("the Fund") to compensate individuals who were
subjected to improper government targeting or "weaponization." Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington ("CREW" or "plaintiff'), a non-profit
government watchdog group, quickly filed suit to halt the Fund. After CREW sued,
however, Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche informed Congress that the DOJ would
not proceed with the Fund, a position defendants have since reiterated in both court filings
and open court. Plaintiff has provided no clear evidence to the contrary.
Applying our Circuit's presumption-of-regularity precedent to these statements by
Government officials, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I must take the
Government at its word and thus find this case is likely moot. CREW is not suffering any
1
injuries from the Fund, and there is no longer any effective relief I can provide. As such,
and for the reasons set forth below, I will DENY plaintiffs motion for a stay under 5 U.S.C.
§ 705 and for a preliminary injunction because the case is moot or, in the alternative,
not ripe.
BACKGROUND
I. Establishment of the Anti-Weaponization Fund
On January 29, 2026, Donald J. Trump, together with Donald Trump Jr., Eric
Trump, and the Trump Organization (collectively, the "Trump plaintiffs"), initiated a civil
action against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Department of the Treasury
("Treasury"). See Mem. in Supp. of Pl. 's Mot. for TRO or Prelim. Inj. ("Pl. 's Br.") [Dkt.
#10-1] at 4. The Trump plaintiffs sought damages related to the alleged unlawful
disclosure of President Trump's tax returns by a government contractor in 2019. See
Trump v. IRS, No. 26-cv-20609 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026).
On May 18, 2026, the DOJ entered into a settlement agreement with the Trump
plaintiffs. See Ex. E to Pl.' s Mot. for TRO or Prelim. Inj. ("Settlement Agreement") [Dkt.
# 10-7]. In addition to settling the claims between the parties, the Settlement Agreement
established the Anti-Weaponization Fund to "provide a systemic process to hear and
redress claims of others who, like Plaintiffs, state that they incurred harm from similar
Lawfare and Weaponization." Id. at 2. The Settlement Agreement "may be modified only
with the written agreement of the Parties." Id. at 4. On the same date, Acting Attorney
General Todd Blanche issued an order "establishing funding and any other relevant
requirements for the Fund." See Ex. F to Pl.'s Mot. for TRO or Prelim. lnj. ("'May 18,
2
2026 Order") [Dkt. # 10-8] at 1.
II. CREW's Lawsuit
On May 22, 2026, CREW filed a complaint against the DOJ, Acting Attorney
General Todd Blanche, Treasury, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the IRS, IRS Chief
Executive Officer Frank Bisignano, the Fund, and J. Does 1-5 (together, "defendants" or
"the Government"). See Compl. [Dkt. #1]. CREW asserts numerous claims against
defendants, including that the May 18, 2026 Order violates separation of powers, fails to
follow the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") procedural requirements, exceeds
statutory authority, contravenes First Amendment rights, and is arbitrary and capricious.
See id.
Citing defendants' inability to provide any "assurances that would mitigate the
threat of irreparable harm," CREW filed a motion for a TRO, or in the alternative, a stay
under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and a preliminary injunction on May 28, 2026. See Pl.'s Mot. for
TRO or Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s Mot.") [Dkt. #10] at 2.
III. Remarks by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche
While CREW's motion was pending, on June 2, 2026, Acting Attorney General
Todd Blanche appeared before the House Appropriations Committee for an oversight
hearing. See Defs.' Response to Pl.'s Mot. for TRO or Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Opp'n") [Dkt.
#15] at 9. During the hearing, representatives questioned Blanche on the status of the Fund.
Id. Blanche stated: "We are not moving forward with the Fund, period." Id. When asked
to clarify whether the Fund was "not moving forward ever," Blanche responded,
"correct." Id.
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A representative then asked Blanche whether he would "sign and release documents
reversing the DOJ's position on the Fund," to which Blanche responded, "I'm not sure
what that means to sign documents reversing. There's nothing to reverse." Reply in Supp.
of Pl.'s Mot. for TRO or Prelim. Inj. ("Pl. 's Reply") [Dkt. #16] at 3-4. In a later exchange,
when asked whether he would "issue a new memo in writing rescinding that May 18th
memo," Blanche stated, "I'm not committing to putting anything in writing." Id. at 4. The
following day, on June 3, 2026, a reporter asked President Trump if he had "dropped" the
Fund, to which he responded, "[n]o. A court ruled against it." 1 Id.
IV. TRO Hearing
On June 5, 2026, the Government filed its opposition to CREW's motion, arguing
that in light of the Acting Attorney General's remarks, CREW' s claims are no longer
justiciable. See Defs.' Opp'n at 10-18. CREW filed its reply on June 9, 2026. See Pl.'s
Reply.
On June 10, 2026, I held a hearing on the TRO. See Tr. ofTRO Hr'g ("Hr'g Tr.")
[Dkt. #17]. "[E]xpressly relying on [the Government's] representations" that the Fund is
not moving forward, id. at 20:8-9, I denied the motion for a TRO because "the case appears
to be moot," id. at 19:17-18. CREW's request for a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and
preliminary injunction remains outstanding and is now ripe for decision.
1
President Trump was referring to Judge Leonie Brinkema's order in Floyd v. DOJ, 1:26-cv-1399-LMB/IDD (E.D. Va.), a case similarly addressing the legality of the Anti-Weaponization Fund. In that case, Judge Brinkema enjoined the Fund from operating while plaintiffs' motion for a TRO was pending. See Minute Order, Floyd v. DOJ, 1:26-cv-1399-LMB/IDD (E.D. Va. May 29, 2026).
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LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant "must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20. If the government is the opposing
party, "[t]he balance-of-equities and public-interest factors merge." Global Health Council
v. Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
Section 705 of the AP A authorizes a reviewing court to stay "the effective date of
an agency action" pending judicial review "to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable
injury." 5 U.S.C. § 705. The factors governing the issuance of a stay are the same as those
that govern the grant of a preliminary injunction, and as such the court may evaluate the
two under the same framework. See Dist. ofColumbia v. US. Dep 't ofAgric., 444 F. Supp.
3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2020).
ANALYSIS
Before I consider the merits of CREW's request, however, I have an independent
obligation to ensure this case falls within the bounds of Article III of the Constitution. See
TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 122 F.4th 930, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2024). To give meaning to Article
Ill's case-or-controversy requirement, "the courts have developed a series of principles
termed 'justiciability doctrines,"' among which are "mootness" and "ripeness." Nat 'I Pub.
Radio, Inc. v. Trump, 2026 WL 877434, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (quoting Nat'/
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Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
In this case, I find CREW's motion can be resolved under either doctrine. The
Government's decision not to proceed with the challenged Fund "leav[es] nothing for the
Court to remedy (mootness)," and to the extent CREW's claims depend on the highly
uncertain implementation of the Fund, they "are premised on future contingencies and thus
unfit for judicial review (ripeness)." United Motorcoach Ass 'n, Inc. v. Welbes, 614 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009). I will address each doctrine in tum.
I. Mootness
"[T]he initial burden of proving mootness lies with the party claiming it, whereas
the opposing party bears the burden of showing that an exception to mootness applies."
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Azar, 942 F.3d. 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Generally,
"a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "[ c]hanging circumstances can moot a
previously valid claim." Mejia-Mejia v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 2019 WL 4707150,
at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2019).
a. Voluntary Cessation
Once a party has satisfied the "initial burden of proving mootness," Planned
Parenthood, 942 F .3d at 516, exceptions to mootness may mean the case is still justiciable.
Here, because the Government has "voluntarily cease[ d] the challenged activity," Pub.
Citizen v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm 'n, 92 F.4th 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2024), the
Government must show that it is "absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could
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not reasonably be expected to recur" for the case to be moot. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env 't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).
Specifically, the party asserting mootness bears the burden of showing that "(i) there
is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (ii) interim relief or
events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation."
Citizens/or Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Wheeler, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2019). This
is a "heavy" burden, though courts in this Circuit have "consistently recognized that where
the defendant is a government actor - and not a private litigant - there is less concern
about the recurrence of objectionable behavior." Id. For the following reasons, I find that
the Government has satisfied its burden on both fronts.
i. No Reasonable Expectation of Recurrence
First, I find that the Government has satisfied its "heavy" burden of making it
"absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur." Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. Indeed, the Acting Attorney General's
statements to Congress and the Government's representations on the record in this case
have been unequivocal.
During the June 2, 2026 congressional hearing, Acting Attorney General Todd
Blanche stated: "We are not moving forward with the Fund, period." Defs.' Opp'n at 9.
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The Government has repeated those assurances in court filings, 2 and at the TRO hearing,
where counsel reiterated, "the Acting Attorney General and the Associate Attorney General
have stated in ... official statements that the [F]und is not moving forward." Hr'g Tr. at
14:24-25, 15:1-2. When asked why the DOJ would not rescind the Fund in writing,
counsel for the Government responded, "[b]ecause it's the department's position that we
don't need to do that when there's not a live or justiciable controversy." Id. at 19:4-6; see
Porup v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 997 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (collecting
cases that show the court may credit "representations of counsel" at "oral argument" when
assessing mootness).
"Although mere profession that defendants have no intention to revive challenged
practices is not alone sufficient to moot a case, it is an important factor to be considered in
determining whether a live controversy exists." Am. Fed 'n of Gov 't Emp. 's, AFL-CIO v.
Brown, 866 F. Supp 16, 19 (D.D.C. 1994). Indeed, the Government's representations here
are "unambiguous." Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives, 436 F. Supp. 3d 186,
192-193 (D.D.C. 2019). They are far removed from the more circumspect or conditional
assurances in cases where courts have declined to find mootness based on Government
declarations. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 242 (2024)
(finding the Government's "sparse declaration" that it would not target plaintiff based on
2
In its opposition, the Government repeatedly assures this Court that there are no plans to move forward with the Fund. See Defs.' Opp'n at 1 (noting the Fund is "now not going forward" and "it will not" continue); id. at 11 (claiming the "Acting Attorney General's statements to Congress make it absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 14 (noting that information about the Fund's procedures "indisputably does not (and now will not) exist"); id. at 16 (stating that "[t]here are, and will not be, any such records" related to the Fund's operation).
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the "currently available information" to be insufficient to meet the voluntary cessation
threshold). In any event, the defendants here were duly warned at the TRO hearing not to
"play possum" with this Court! Hr'g Tr. at 20:11-12.
Ultimately, I consider the Government's representations in light of the "presumption
of regularity" that attaches to the official acts of public officers, which requires courts to
presume, "in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary . . . that they have properly
discharged their official duties." People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals v. US. Dep 't
of Agric., 918 F.3d 151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2019). That presumption applies here, where
counsel for the Government has repeatedly made clear, unconditional representations in its
filings and before the Court regarding Government policy. See id. ("Without evidence to
the contrary, we assume that formally announced changes to official governmental policy
are not mere litigation posturing." (quoting Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d
316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009))). CREW has not presented any clear evidence that the Fund is
proceeding despite the Acting Attorney General's statements, or that the Government has
misrepresented the status of the Fund. Under these circumstances, I must "take the
government at its word and will hold it to it." Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551,
552 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
CREW contends that President Trump's June 3, 2026 statements "create a
substantial risk" that the Administration "has not abandoned the Fund." Pl.'s Reply at 7.
Indeed, the President remained supportive of the Fund after the Acting Attorney General's
remarks to Congress, noting he still believes individuals "should be reimbursed for a
crooked government." Id. at 4. While I acknowledge the possible inconsistency, I do not
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find that the President's off-hand remarks to the media undercut the weighty and
unequivocal statements that the Government has made to this Court-as officers of the
Court and under threat of contempt-and before Congress.
ii. Complete and Irrevocable Eradication of Effects
CREW also argues that Acting Attorney General Blanche's "non-binding remarks"
do not constitute a "legally valid rescission of the Fund's charter documents," Pl. 's Reply
at 6, and thus fail to "completely and irrevocably eradicat[e] the effects of the Fund's
creation," id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to CREW, because the
Settlement Agreement and the May 18, 2026 Order are an "integrated legal instrument"
that may only be modified through "written agreement of the parties," the case remains
live because the documents continue to exist. Id. at 6.
CREW's focus on the Settlement Agreement and the May 18, 2026 Order is
misplaced. CREW insists that "[t]he continued existence of this injury-causing agreement
is sufficient reason to reject Defendants' mootness claim." Id. at 8 (emphasis added). But
CREW has not shown how the continued existence of the Settlement Agreement and the
May 18, 2026 Order in the abstract cause it any ongoing injury for this Court to "eradicate."
See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 352 F. Supp. 3d at 14 ("In the cases in which the
effects of an injury were not eradicated, and thus kept the controversy alive, 'some tangible,
concrete effect, traceable to the injury, and curable by the relief demanded, clearly
remained."' (quoting Penthouse Int'!, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011, 1019 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
Here, CREW' s asserted informational injury is prospective, and depends on the
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creation (and alleged withholding) of records subject to the Judgment Fund statute, the
Federal Records Act ("FRA"), and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 3 See Pl. 's
Br. at 10-14. Where the Government has clearly represented that "[t]here are, and will not
be, any such records," that prospective injury dissipates. Defs.' Opp'n at 16; see Chang,
2023 WL 8697831, at *16 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2023) (holding plaintiffs claims for
prospective injunctive relief under a discontinued policy were moot, while analyzing
claims for retrospective relief on the merits).
Relatedly, there is no longer any effective relief the Court may provide. Mootness
arises when, among other circumstances, "the court can provide no effective remedy
because a party has already obtained all the relief that [it has] has sought." Schmidt v.
United States, 749 F.3d 1064, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ordering the Government to preserve or produce records that it represents are not being
created would be an injunction without practical effect. See, e.g., Mass. Coal. for Immigr.
Reform v. US. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 800 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding
that although plaintiffs "victory came through political channels rather than the judiciary,
3
CREW also asserts injuries based on the loss of notice-and-comment opportunities and alleged First Amendment harms. See Pl.'s Br. at 42-44. Neither satisfies the requirement that a plaintiff seeking prospective relief must demonstrate that it is "immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct." Chang v. United States, 2023 WL 8697831, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2023) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101---02 (1983)). On the notice-and-comment theory, CREW asserts a "right to have its comments on the May 18 Order considered before its concrete interests are irreparably harmed by Defendants' impending transfer of nearly $1.8 billion to the Fund." Pl. 's Br. at 42. Without a live, imminent action to which such procedures would attach, the asserted procedural injury is, at this point, hypothetical. The First Amendment injury fares no better. CREW claims that "[b]y channeling unpopular settlements through their shadowy Fund, Defendants preclude CREW and others from engaging in timely criticism." Id. at 43. Yet CREW is not suffering from a present or imminent restraint on its speech, and there is no cognizable chilling effect stemming from a now defunct program.
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[he] has won," and now "has the outcome he wanted all along").
The "effects" analysis might differ if this case involved a regulatory scheme that,
by its mere existence, chilled conduct through the threat of enforcement. Cf Nat' I Council
ofNonprofits v. Off ofMgmt. & Budget, 775 F. Supp. 3d 100, 120 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding
the rescission of a policy memorandum insufficient where, among other factors, there was
a "mountain of evidence ... that even the threat of [the challenged conduct] was enough
to send countless organizations into complete disarray"). Here, however, CREW is not
subject to any ongoing legal obligations created by the Settlement Agreement and the May
18, 2026 Order. That distinction undercuts CREW's contention that the mere existence of
the documents, without more, is sufficient to defeat mootness.
II. Ripeness
In the alternative, this dispute is not ripe for judicial review. The ripeness doctrine
is "designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies." Nat 'I Ass 'n
of Home Builders v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 459, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To assess whether a case is ripe, I must consider "(l)
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision" and "(2) the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F. 3d 12, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
a. Fitness for Judicial Decision
The "fitness" inquiry evaluates "whether the issue is purely legal, whether
consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the
agency's decision is sufficiently final." Nat'! Ass 'n of Home Builders, 440 F.3d at 463-12
64. However, "[e]ven if a challenged action is final and the issues purely legal, a case is
not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated or may not occur at all." Isenbarger v. Farmer, 463 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C.
2006).
CREW characterizes this case as a "concrete legal dispute," alleging that "the
Fund's charter documents are facially inconsistent with the Constitution and multiple
federal statutes." Pl.'s Reply at 11-12. But the record here confirms that, at present, the
Fund is at most a prospective, undefined framework. Courts in this Circuit routinely hold
that such forward-looking challenges to tentative policies are unfit for review, particularly
where the alleged harms depend on future discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Friends of
Animals v. Pendley, 523 F. Supp. 3d 39, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding challenges to an
agency's "Gather Plan" were likely unripe where the alleged harms had not "yet [been]
carried out" or "even scheduled," and depended on uncertain implementation decisions);
Friends of Animals v. US. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 514 F. Supp. 3d 290, 305 (D.D.C.
2021) (same).
Prudential considerations counsel against adjudication where a plaintiff seeks
review of an order that leaves "significant uncertainty about how, and to what extent, the
articulated policy would be implemented." League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec.
Off. of the President, 818 F. Supp. 3d 34, 79 (D.D.C. 2026) (citing Trump v. New York,
592 U.S. 125, 132 (2020)); Common Cause v. Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d 39, 47-53 (D.D.C.
2020)). To say the least, this case presents the paradigmatic example of a dispute with
"significant uncertainty" about whether the challenged framework will be implemented at
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all, and if so, in what form, on what timeline, and with what concrete consequences to the
parties!
b. Hardship to the Parties
Finally, under the hardship prong, I must determine whether the challenged
administrative action is likely to have a "direct and immediate effect" on the "primary
conduct" of the plaintiff. Pendley, 523 F. Supp. at 63. "The focus of this hardship inquiry,
however, 'is not whether [the parties] have suffered any direct hardship, but rather whether
postponing judicial review would impose an undue burden on them or would benefit the
court." Id. (quoting Harris v. F.A.A., 353 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
Here, postponing review imposes no cognizable hardship on CREW. While CREW
may theoretically challenge "unlawful[] limit[s]" on its "access to statutorily required
information in the future," Pl.'s Reply at 12, that prospective harm is by no means
"immediate, direct, and significant," Friends ofAnimals v. Haugrud, 236 F. Supp. 3d 131,
135 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Cronin v. FAA, 73 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Indeed,
as courts in this Circuit have made clear, "[t]he hardship must be such that without judicial
review, a party would have to make significant changes in its everyday business
practices-such as costly changes to comply with a regulation-or face the imposition of
strong sanctions." Asante v. Azar, 436 F. Supp. 3d 215, 226 (D.D.C. 2020). No such
circumstances are present here.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the Government's considered representations to this Court, I find the
case is likely no longer justiciable. For all the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that CREW's Motion for a Stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and Preliminary
Injunction [Dkt. #10] is DENIED. An accompanying Order will issue contemporaneously
with this opinion.
R~ LEON
United States District Judge
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