[Cite as UNIFUND CCR, L.L.C. v. House, 2026-Ohio-2388.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
Unifund CCR, LLC Court of Appeals No. L-25-00271
Appellee
Trial Court No. CI0202002479
v.
Preston House DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 23, 2026
*****
Yehudah A. Witkes, for appellee
Preston House, Pro Se Appellant
*****
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Preston House, appeals the November 4, 2025 judgment of the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas that denied his motion to quash a non-wage
garnishment filed by appellee, UNIFUND CCR, LLC. For the following reasons, the
trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} UNIFUND, a debt collector, filed the underlying case against House in
2020, seeking repayment of a defaulted credit card account. After House failed to
respond to the complaint, UNIFUND moved for default judgment, which the trial court granted in November 2020. The court awarded UNIFUND judgment in the amount of
$17,321.18, plus interest at five percent per annum and costs.
{¶ 3} In August 2025, UNIFUND filed an order and notice of garnishment of
property other than personal earnings. The clerk of court served the notice of
garnishment and a request for hearing form on House.
{¶ 4} In response to the garnishment, House filed a motion to quash. In his
motion, he argued that he did not receive notice from UNIFUND or have an opportunity
to contest the garnishment before UNIFUND garnished his bank account, so the
garnishment should be quashed. Essentially, he argued that, because he was denied
statutory notice, he was denied due process, and the failure to provide proper notice
rendered the garnishment void. Over the next two months, House filed four supplements
to his motion to quash, each arguing that he was not given sufficient notice of the
garnishment, which violated due process. House also requested a hearing on the
garnishment.
{¶ 5} In its response to House’s motion to quash, UNIFUND argued that the
purpose of the notice provided for by R.C. 2716.13(C)(1) was to give the debtor an
opportunity to request a hearing, not to delay execution of a valid judgment or invalidate
a garnishment that otherwise complies with the statutes. It maintained that House
receiving notice of the garnishment the same day the money was removed from his bank
account was not a legal defect. It also contended that any technical defect in notice does
not invalidate the garnishment when the debtor receives the opportunity for a hearing,
which House had in this case.
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{¶ 6} After holding a garnishment hearing, the trial court issued its decision on
November 4, 2025. In its judgment entry, the court found that UNIFUND filed and
mailed its notice of intent to garnish funds from House’s bank account on August 15,
2025. The notice advised House of his right to request a hearing under R.C. 2716.13 and
the procedure for doing so. Service of the notice was completed on the bank on August
22, 2025, and on House on August 26, 2025. After receiving the notice, House filed a
motion to quash, request for a hearing, and a motion to compel an accounting of the
judgment balance from UNIFUND. UNIFUND filed an opposition to the motion to
quash. The trial court held a hearing where both parties appeared and presented their
arguments.
{¶ 7} The court stated that R.C. 2716.11 controls garnishment of property other
than personal earnings (i.e., non-wage garnishments), and a judgment creditor may
commence a non-wage garnishment proceeding in the common pleas court after
obtaining a judgment against another person. It went on to note that garnishment
hearings under R.C. 2716.13 are limited in scope to the “‘consideration of the amount of
money, property, or credits, other than personal earnings, of the judgment debtor in the
hands of the garnishee, if any, that can be used to satisfy all or part of the debt owned
[sic] by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor.’” Certain benefit payments are
exempt from garnishment under the statute and cannot be taken from the debtor.
Therefore, the purpose of the hearing is for the debtor to identify exempt funds to ensure
that they are not withdrawn from the garnished account. But it also found that issues of
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procedural defects and due process can be raised at garnishment hearings if they relate to
the garnishment itself and not to the underlying judgment.
{¶ 8} The court first considered House’s argument that UNIFUND violated his
due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice of its intent to garnish his bank
account. It found no support for House’s contention that the garnishee bank holding the
funds was prohibited from releasing the funds to the creditor during the five-day period
during which the debtor could request a hearing. Instead, it found that service of the
garnishment order on the garnishee attaches the debtor’s property in the garnishee’s
possession and creates a lien in favor of the creditor. The debtor then bears the burden to
show at the hearing that exemptions apply or that the garnishment is otherwise improper.
{¶ 9} The court went on to find that cases where the debtor claims lack of notice
but receives a hearing require a showing of prejudice to have the garnishment quashed.
Here, House received a hearing but did not demonstrate any prejudice. Moreover, House
was not claiming that he did not receive the notice, so there was no deficiency.
Therefore, the court found, House was not entitled to have the garnishment quashed.
{¶ 10} House filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, this court
remanded the case for the trial court to decide a pending motion for attorney fees filed by
UNIFUND. The trial court issued its decision on UNIFUND’s fees motion on November
21, 2025. On January 13, 2026, House filed a motion to amend his notice of appeal to
include the November 21 judgment entry. This court denied his motion to amend on
February 18, 2026, because House sought to amend his notice of appeal more than 30
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days after the order was entered and the trial court denied UNIFUND’s motion, not
House’s motion.
{¶ 11} In his brief, House raises four assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred by entering judgment without requiring
Appellee to meet its evidentiary and statutory burden of proof.
II. The trial court abused its discretion by issuing an unreasoned
judgment unsupported by competent, credible evidence.
III. The trial court violated Appellant’s due-process rights by
granting relief without proof or meaningful procedural safeguards.
IV. The trial court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees
without findings or legal analysis.
II. Law and Analysis
A. House cannot relitigate the underlying debt in the garnishment proceedings.
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, House argues that the trial court erred by
entering judgment for UNIFUND because it failed to produce proof of standing,
ownership of the underlying debt, and the amount owed. In his third assignment of error,
he argues that a court granting default judgment without proper evidence violates
fundamental fairness, and that a plaintiff must prove their entitlement to judgment, even
if the defendant does not appear in the case.
{¶ 13} The scope of a garnishment hearing is limited to the judgment debtor’s
claims of exemption or a defense to the garnishment itself. E. Liverpool v. Buckeye
Water Dist., 2012-Ohio-2821, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.), citing Ashtabula Cty. Med. Ctr. v.
Douglass, 1988 WL 59836, *1 (11th Dist. June 3, 1988). Thus, a judgment debtor may
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not use garnishment proceedings to relitigate the underlying debt. Id., citing Rak-Ree
Ents., Inc. v. Timmons, 2011-Ohio-1090, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 14} House’s arguments in these assignments of error relate to UNIFUND’s
failure to prove the underlying debt, not to House’s claims of exemption or a defense to
the garnishment. Because House may not relitigate these issues in garnishment
proceedings, his first and third assignments of error are not well-taken.
B. The trial court did not err by denying House’s motion to quash.
{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, House argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by issuing a decision that is not supported by competent, credible evidence
or that failed to include reasoning. He contends that “[a]bsent findings or analysis,
meaningful appellate review is impossible.” It is unclear from the barebones argument in
his brief whether House is referring to the trial court’s decision on the underlying
judgment or its decision on the motion to quash the garnishment.
{¶ 16} To the extent that House is arguing that the trial court’s decision on the
underlying default judgment is improper, he may not relitigate that issue in garnishment
proceedings. E. Liverpool at ¶ 34.
{¶ 17} If instead he is arguing that the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash is
improper, that conclusion is unsupported by the record. “Garnishments are purely
statutory proceedings, and a court can grant garnishment relief only in accordance with
the terms and upon the grounds set forth in the garnishment statutes.” Doss v. Thomas,
2009-Ohio-2275, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 163
Ohio St. 606 (1955). An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s interpretation of
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the garnishment statutes. See Dyer v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 2017-Ohio-4139, ¶ 9
(10th Dist.).
{¶ 18} Under R.C. 2716.13(C)(1), at the time of filing a non-wage garnishment, a
judgment creditor is required to file with the clerk of court a praecipe instructing the clerk
to issue the judgment debtor “a notice to the judgment debtor form and a request for
hearing form” that are substantially in the forms in R.C. 2716.13(C)(1)(a) and (b). Upon
receipt of the praecipe, the clerk shall “immediately” serve the debtor with two copies of
the notice form and the request for hearing form. Id. The notice and hearing forms shall
be served not later than seven days prior to the date on which the garnishment hearing is
scheduled. Id.
{¶ 19} Here, House’s complaint is not with any of the statutory notice steps.
Instead, he contends that the garnishee should not be able to take money from his bank
account during the period in which he is allowed to request a garnishment hearing.
However, there is nothing in the plain language of the statute that prevents the garnishee
from taking money from a debtor’s accounts immediately. “A court’s duty is to give
effect to the words used in a statute, not to delete or insert words.” Broadmoor Ctr., LLC
v. Dallin, 2016-Ohio-8541, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). This court will not read requirements that
do not exist into the statute.
{¶ 20} Because House received proper notice of the garnishment, and there is no
requirement in R.C. 2716.13(C)(1) that the garnishee wait to remove money from the
debtor’s account, House’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
C. House did not appeal the trial court’s November 21, 2025 decision.
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{¶ 21} In his fourth assignment of error, House argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his request for attorney fees without making findings of fact or
applying governing law.
{¶ 22} Under App.R. 4(A)(1), “a party who wishes to appeal from an order that is
final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of
that entry.” There are certain exceptions to the 30-day time limit in App.R. 4(B)(2),
which states,
If a party files a notice of appeal from an otherwise final judgment
but before the trial court has resolved one or more of the filings listed in
this division, then the court of appeals, upon suggestion of any of the
parties, shall remand the matter to the trial court to resolve the postjudgment filings in question and shall stay appellate proceedings until the
trial court has done so. After the trial court has ruled on the post-judgment
filing on remand, any party who wishes to appeal from the trial court’s
orders or judgments on remand shall do so in the following manner: (i) by
moving to amend a previously filed notice of appeal or cross-appeal under
App.R. 3(F), for which leave shall be granted if sought within thirty days of
the entry of the last of the trial court’s judgments or orders on remand and
if sought after thirty days of the entry, the motion may be granted at the
discretion of the appellate court; or (ii) by filing a new notice of appeal in
the trial court in accordance with App.R. 3 and 4(A). In the latter case, any
new appeal shall be consolidated with the original appeal under App.R.
3(B).
A motion for attorney fees is one of the filings listed in App.R. 4(B)(2). See App.R.
4(B)(2)(e).
{¶ 23} Here, House filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision on
attorney fees well after the 30-day limit for appealing expired. Under App.R. 4(B)(2),
this court had discretion to grant or deny House leave to amend his notice of appeal to
include the trial court’s decision on attorney fees, which this court ultimately denied
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because the trial court’s decision denied UNIFUND’s—not House’s—motion. Absent a
properly filed notice of appeal, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
State v. Taft, 2019-Ohio-1565, ¶ 58 (6th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams Cty.
Bd. of Elections, 40 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1988).
{¶ 24} Because this court denied House’s request for leave to amend his notice of
appeal to include the trial court’s November 21, 2025 decision, that decision is not
properly before the court and cannot be considered in this appeal. Therefore, House’s
fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, the November 4, 2025 judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. House is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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