2026 IL App (1st) 252211
SECOND DIVISION
June 23, 2026
No. 1-25-2211
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
RAFAELA COLAIZZI, Individually and as Next Friend of )
JOSHUA COLAIZZI, a Minor, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Appeal from
) the Circuit Court
v. ) of Cook County
)
FOR EYES OPTICAL COMPANY and LUXOTTICA OF ) 24L13587 AMERICA, INC., )
) Honorable
Defendants-Appellants ) Kathy M. Flanagan,
) Judge Presiding
(ROBERT T. CARLSON, O.D., and ROBERT T. CARLSON )
& ASSOCIATES, )
)
Defendants). )
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s intrastate forum non conveniens motion.
¶2 Plaintiff Rafaela Colaizzi filed an optometric malpractice suit, individually and on behalf
of her minor son, Joshua Colaizzi, alleging that he experienced vision loss and had to undergo a
corneal transplant due to negligent medical treatment by defendant optometrist Dr. Robert T. 1-25-2211
Carlson, O.D. The additional defendant Luxottica of America, Inc., d/b/a For Eyes Optical (For
Eyes), brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its forum non conveniens motion to
transfer the action from Cook County to DuPage County, Illinois. For Eyes contends that all of the
relevant factors overwhelmingly supported the motion.
¶3 The pending complaint indicates the following. Dr. Carlson examined Joshua’s eyes on
January 22, 2021, at a For Eyes office in DuPage County, in Bloomingdale, at 357 W. Army Trail
Road, #32. Joshua was complaining about his left eye. Dr. Carlson found an ulcer and prescribed
Tobradex eyedrops, which is a combination of the antibiotic tobramycin and the steroid
dexamethasone. Although Joshua began using the eyedrops the same day as directed, he returned
to the For Eyes location on January 25, 2021, complaining that his eye had worsened. This time,
he was seen by optometrist, Dr. Sylvia Thoman, O.D., who instructed him to seek treatment from
an ophthalmologist at Suburban Associates in Ophthalmology (Suburban Associates). The other
practice was located in Cook County, in Arlington Heights, at 1100 W. Central Road, Suite #205.
Joshua went to Suburban Associates that same day, where he was treated by Dr. Cereesa Longest,
M.D. Dr. Longest diagnosed a 4 mm ulcer and diffuse conjunctival hyperemia in Joshua’s left eye;
collected a corneal culture; and prescribed tobramycin and vancomycin. The culture was positive
for the bacteria Pseudomonas aeruginosa. The bacterial infection in Joshua’s eye scarred his
cornea, which led to vision loss. On January 27, 2021, he underwent a surgical procedure in which
Dr. Naveed Ansari, M.D., removed the diseased cornea and replaced it with another cornea. The
Colaizzis’ complaint consists of three counts of optometric malpractice and includes the findings
and report of a consulting doctor of optometry. The optometrist opined that the steroid component
of Tobradex was an immunosuppressant that caused the eye infection to worsen, the antibiotic
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component of Tobradex was likely inadequate, and infectious ulcers are generally treated by
fluoroquinolone or fortified antibiotics.
¶4 Count I is directed at Dr. Carlson and includes allegations that he negligently and carelessly
failed to recognize the serious nature of Joshua’s corneal ulcer and ordered Tobradex instead of an
appropriate medication. Count II is directed at Robert T. Carlson & Associates, which is alleged
to be Dr. Carlson’s principal or employer. Count III is directed at For Eyes and Luxottica. For
Eyes was allegedly Dr. Carlson’s principal or employer in 2021. It was a Pennsylvania corporation
that engaged in the business of providing eye care services in Illinois, and its agent for service, at
the time, was CT Corporation System, whose address was 28 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 814, Chicago.
However, according to the Pennsylvania Department of State, on June 30, 2024, For Eyes became
“inactive,” “merged out,” and is survived by Luxottica. Luxottica is an Ohio corporation that
continues to do business in Illinois as and through For Eyes. Luxottica refers to itself as For Eyes
in these proceedings.
¶5 For Eyes moved to transfer venue to DuPage County. The circuit court found that all of the
relevant factors did not favor transfer or were neutral. After the circuit court denied the motion,
For Eyes petitioned for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We granted
the petition and now address the parties’ arguments.
¶6 The equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens “allows a trial court to decline jurisdiction
in the exceptional case where trial in another forum with proper jurisdiction and venue ‘would
better serve the ends of justice.’ ” First American Bank v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 515 (2002)
(quoting Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1991)). Thus, the court “ ‘may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.’ ”
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Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)). The doctrine may be asserted
when there is a choice between forums in different states or between forums within the same state.
Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 176 (2003).
¶7 The circuit court is afforded considerable discretion in ruling on a forum non conveniens
motion but its discretionary power “should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances when
the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum.” (Emphasis in original.)
Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 441-42 (2006). It is a “rare, exceptional
case” that favors transfer. Seilheimer v. Olsen, 2015 IL App (1st) 240418, ¶ 2.
¶8 Orders denying forum non conveniens motions have generally only been reversed when
“the connection between the litigation and the plaintiff’s chosen forum is ‘so slight as to be
virtually non existent,’ [citation], or when a reviewing court determines that there has been an
abuse of discretion *** [citation].” Snook v. Lake Forest Hospital, 133 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1000-01
(1985). An abuse of discretion has occurred only when no reasonable person would take the same
view of the factors as the circuit court. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. “The issue then is, not what
decision we would have reached if we were reviewing the facts on a clean slate, but whether the
trial court acted in a way that no reasonable person would.” Vivas v. Boeing Co., 392 Ill. App. 3d
644, 657 (2009)); see also Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 276 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1103
(1995). A “ ‘discretionary decision implies a range of acceptable outcomes.’ ” Schilling v. Quincy
Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C., 2026 IL 131411, ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Kimble, 2019 IL
122830, ¶ 46)).
¶9 “[T]he battle over forum begins with the plaintiff’s choice already in the lead.” Guerine,
198 Ill. 2d at 521. “ ‘In most instances, the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum will prevail, provided
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venue is proper and the inconvenience factors attached to such forum do not greatly outweigh the
plaintiff’s substantial right to try the case in the chosen forum.’ ” Id. (quoting Peile v. Skelgas, 163
Ill. 2d 323, 335-36 (1994)). See also Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 444 (the plaintiff’s forum choice
should rarely be disturbed). “Though the plaintiff’s choice is not absolute, intrastate transfer is
appropriate only when the litigation has ‘no practical connection’ (Peile, 163 Ill. 2d at 336), no
nexus, with the plaintiff’s chosen forum.” Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 521. The defendant must show
that the plaintiff’s chosen forum is inconvenient to the defendant and that another forum is more
convenient to all parties. ¶518. Although this is a difficult standard for a defendant to meet, “it
does not foreclose legitimate transfers when the balance of factors strongly favors litigation in
another forum.” Id. at 521.
¶ 10 A plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.
However, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to the same weight in all cases. “ ‘When
the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient.’ ” Id.
(quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981)). “ ‘Similarly, when the site of
the accident or injury is chosen, the choice is convenient because the litigation has the aspect of
being “decided at home.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518). In contrast, “ ‘[w]hen the
plaintiff is foreign to the forum chosen and the action that gives rise to the litigation did not occur
in the chosen forum, this assumption [of convenience] is no longer reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 189, 196
(2002)). Under those circumstances, it is “ ‘reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff engaged in
forum shopping to suit his individual interests, a strategy contrary to the purposes behind the venue
rules.’ ” Id. Plaintiffs’ zeal to litigate where judges are favorable, juries are generous, and court
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procedures are not burdensome “is matched only by defendants’ efforts in seeking to avoid such
fora.’ ” Espinosa v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 86 Ill. 2d 111, 123 (1981) (quoting Miles v. Illinois
Central R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 707 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
“ ‘The truth of the matter is that both plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ counsel are
jockeying for position by seeking a judge, jury and forum that will enable them to achieve
the best possible result for their clients. There is no doubt that in the personal injury context,
the plaintiff is seeking a forum where he can recover the most money and the defendant is
seeking a forum where it will have to pay the least. All other considerations are secondary
to both sides.’ G. Maag, Forum Non Conveniens in Illinois: A Historical Review, Critical
Analysis, and Proposal for Change, 25 So. Ill. L.J. 461, 510 (2001).” Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d
at 521.
¶ 11 Nevertheless, the deference that is afforded to the plaintiff’s choice of a foreign forum “ ‘is
only less, as opposed to none.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 518 (quoting Elling v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 311, 318 (1997)).
¶ 12 A forum non conveniens motion also requires the court to evaluate certain private and
public interests, without giving emphasis to any one of them. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. The private
interest factors concern the convenience of the litigants and the public interest factors affect the
administration of the courts. Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d 217, 223-24 (1987).
The court does not weigh the private and public interest factors against each other. Langenhorst,
219 Ill. 2d at 444. Instead, it evaluates all the circumstances to determine whether the balance of
factors strongly favors transfer. Id. “ ‘Private interest factors include (1) the convenience of the
parties; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary, and real evidence;
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and (3) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive
***.’ ” Id. (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516.) “Public interest factors include (1) the interest in
deciding controversies locally; (2) the unfairness of imposing trial expense and the burden of jury
duty on residents of a forum that has little connection to the litigation; and (3) the administrative
difficulties presented by adding litigation to already congested court dockets.” Id. at 443-44 (citing
Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516-17). Each case is to be decided on its particular facts. Id. at 443.
¶ 13 For Eyes argues that the circuit court misconstrued the record and failed to recognize that
the Colaizzis reside in West Chicago, DuPage County and that their choice of a foreign forum was
owed minimal deference.
¶ 14 The Colaizzis’ choice is entitled to less deference, but only “ ‘less, as opposed to none’ ”
(Emphases in original.) Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518 (quoting Elling, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 318).
Foreign non conveniens is an “ ‘unequal balancing test’ ” that begins with the Colaizzis’ chosen
forum in the lead. Id. at 521 (quoting Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d
101, 107 (1990)). Furthermore, For Eyes cannot rely on any inconvenience to the Colaizzis as the
basis for transfer. Id. at 518 (a defendant “cannot assert that the plaintiff’s chosen forum is
inconvenient to the plaintiff”). For Eyes must demonstrate through the factors that the proposed
alternative forum of DuPage County is substantially more appropriate than the current one.
Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 444 (the balance of factors must strongly favor the defendant’s choice
to justify disturbing the plaintiff’s choice).
¶ 15 With respect to the private interest factors, the factor of convenience of the parties does not
favor transfer. Dr. Carlson’s residence, his business, and the Bloomingdale location of For Eyes
Optical Company are all located in DuPage County. Even so, the circuit court reasoned that Cook
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County was not inconvenient for all of the parties because For Eyes Optical Company merged
with Luxottica, which is a company that maintains numerous locations in Cook County. In
addition, For Eyes’ registered agent is in Cook County. For Eyes contends this was error because
its physical presence and “doing business” in Cook County is not dispositive.
¶ 16 The fact that a defendant conducts business within a county is not the only factor that the
circuit court should consider in its analysis. Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance,
217 Ill. 2d 158, 172 (2005). “[T]he place of defendant’s residence may properly be considered
along with other connections which exist between the litigation and the chosen forum.” Id. at 173.
“It should not be inferred *** that the place of defendant’s residence, or the situs of the
tort, are of no significance. They may properly be considered, along with other connections
which exist between the litigation and chosen forum. However, all other factors relevant to
a forum non conveniens motion must also be balanced in determining whether to dismiss
an action.” Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 377 (1982).
¶ 17 The existence of a registered agent in a particular location is an insubstantial link. Hulsey
v. Scheidt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 567, 578 (1994).
¶ 18 The order on appeal does not suggest that the circuit court placed undue emphasis on For
Eyes’ location or its choice of a Cook County registered agent. The court’s four-page single-spaced
order addresses all of the relevant factors and does not treat any single fact as determinative.
¶ 19 The second factor, the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary and
real evidence works against For Eyes.
¶ 20 In Starr, the circuit court considered three categories of testimonial evidence: (1)
occurrence or “ ‘on site’ ” witnesses, (2) post-injury treating witnesses, and (3) lay or damages
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witnesses. Starr v. Presence Central & Suburban Hospitals Network, 2024 IL App (1st) 231120,
¶ 36. For Eyes has not identified any nonparty defense witnesses. It argues only generally that the
alleged malpractice occurred at the For Eyes location in DuPage County and “involve[d]
employees, managers, and witnesses who work at this location.” However, the malpractice
allegations are directed at Dr. Carlson and do not indicate that someone else contributed to or
witnessed Joshua’s injury. Furthermore, For Eyes has not specified any post-injury treating
witnesses or any person who can testify about damages. The Colaizzis identified seven post-injury
treaters and damages witnesses, all of whom practice in Cook County. These Cook County
witnesses include Dr. Careesa Longest, Dr. Naveed Ansari, and Dr. Kimberlee Curnyn, whose
practice is in Arlington Heights and Elk Grove Village; Dr. Joel Sugar and Dr. James J. Reidy,
who are in Chicago; Dr. Michael Slavik, who is in Schamburg; and Dr. Brent Ostoich, who is in
Hoffman Estates.
¶ 21 For Eyes contends that the circuit court gave undue weight to the location of the physician
witnesses. In Bland, the supreme court stated that a plaintiff can “easily frustrate the forum non
conveniens principle by selecting as a witness a treating physician or expert in *** an inconvenient
forum.” Bland, 116 Ill. 2d at 227. The plaintiff in Bland was a railway worker who sued his
employer for personal injuries and argued against transferring his case, based in part on the fact
that two of his five treating physicians were located in the county where he had filed. Id. at 221,
229. There was no indication that he had actually been strategic when choosing his treating
physicians. Nevertheless, the opinion indicates that the location of subsequent treaters is not to be
given undue weight, given the incentive it would create for an injured party to seek care in an
inconvenient forum perceived as favorable to plaintiffs. Id. at 227.
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¶ 22 In Starr, 2024 IL App (1st) 231120, ¶ 40, the court acknowledged this concern but pointed
out that the plaintiff, Karl Starr, likely did not choose his post-injury physicians outside of Will
County. Starr was suffering from sepsis shock and other serious conditions when he was
transferred by ambulance from a Will County hospital to a Cook County hospital where he
underwent a month of treatment. Id. During the course of his hospitalization, Mr. Starr developed
gangrene and both of his legs were amputated at the tibia. Id. ¶ 5. After that, he was transferred to
a rehabilitation center in Indiana. Id. ¶ 40. The court found that the “concern voiced in Bland [was]
simply not applicable ***, where nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the Starrs had any
opportunity or inclination to strategically choose the location of Mr. Starr’s post-injury care to suit
their litigation preferences.” Id.
¶ 23 Similar circumstances occurred in Giannakopoulos v. Adventist Bolingbrook Hospital,
2024 IL App (1st) 240399-U, ¶¶ 5-6, in which the plaintiff underwent surgery in a Will County
hospital and then began suffering limb necrosis purportedly because of medication errors and other
negligence. The facility made the decision to transfer him to a Cook County hospital, where both
of his legs were amputated and he was hospitalized for six months. Id. ¶ 19. After that, he suffered
two other amputations, was treated for an infection, and had dozens of post-surgery appointments
in Cook County. Id. Then there was further treatment and rehabilitative care in Cook County,
DuPage County, and Will County, followed by ongoing treatment in Cook County. Id. ¶ 20. The
reason that Giannakopoulos had so many treating physicians in Cook County was because of the
defendant hospital’s initial decision to transfer him to treatment in Cook County. Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 24 For Eyes contends that the location of Joshua’s treating physicians in Cook County was
overemphasized. However, For Eyes did not identify anyone capable of testifying to causation and
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damages other than those individuals. Any speculation about possible witnesses would not be
evidence for the circuit court to take into consideration. Boner v. Peabody Coal Co., 142 Ill. 2d
523, 533 (1991). Furthermore, like the Starr and Giannakopoulos families, Joshua’s mother did
not select his medical providers in Cook County. An optometrist in For Eyes’ Bloomingdale
location sent the Colaizzis to the Suburban Associates ophthalmologic practice in Arlington
Heights, Cook County. Although For Eyes does not dispute that Dr. Thoman’s referral is what led
to Joshua having further treatment in Cook County, it contends that the Colaizzis were “simply
directed *** to seek treatment elsewhere.” This statement is contrary to one of the complaint’s
specific allegations: “21. On January 25, 2021, JOSHUA COLAIZZI returned to FOR EYES and
was seen by another optometrist, Dr. Sylvia Thoman, and she instructed JOSHUA COLAIZZI to
seek treatment with an ophthalmologist and sent him to Suburban Associates in Ophthalmology,
located at 1100 W. Central Road, Suite 205, Arlington Heights, Cook County, Illinois 60005.” We
are not persuaded that the weight which the circuit court gave to witness location was undue
weight.
¶ 25 As part of its “ease of access to evidence” argument, For Eyes contends that it was error to
find that access to documentary evidence did not favor transfer. However, the circuit court’s
finding echoes the many, many cases that denigrate the significance of document location. See
Johnson v. Nash, 2019 IL App (1st) 180840, ¶ 51; Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 659 (“the location of
documents, records and photographs has become a less significant factor in forum non conveniens
analysis in the modern age of email, Internet, telefax, copying machines and world-wide delivery
services, since they can now be easily copied and sent”); Erwin ex rel. Erwin v. Motorola, Inc.,
408 Ill. App. 3d 261, 281 (2011) (“this factor alone would not weigh in favor of transfer ***, since
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it has become well-recognized by our courts that given our current state of technology ***
documentary evidence can be copied and transported easily and inexpensively”); Woodward v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 368 Ill. App. 3d 827, 834 (2006) (“the location of documents is not
significant because documents can be transported with ease and at little expense”); Hayes v.
Fireman’s Fund Mortgage Corp., 272 Ill. App. 3d 271, 278 (1995) (document location is
becoming an increasingly less significant factor in forum non conveniens analysis because
documents can be transported with ease and at little expense); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
627 F. Supp. 154, 165 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (the location of documents is not compelling given “the
ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively
shipped around the country”); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 254, 264
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (citing the development of photocopying as the reason that the location of
documents should not be given great weight). See 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3853 (4th ed. April 2026) (this factor tends
to be given relatively little weight because transporting copies is no longer cumbersome and
expensive). Moreover, For Eyes has not identified any particular documentary evidence that would
make DuPage County a substantially more appropriate forum.
¶ 26 The parties’ ease of access to witness, documentary and real evidence indicates that the
trial judge reasonably concluded that the second factor did not favor transfer.
¶ 27 Under the category of “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive” (Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516), the judge took into consideration the
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses. Subpoenas are
available in both counties pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). There
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was no indication that any witnesses would be reluctant to testify and For Eyes conceded that this
factor was neutral. The circuit court reasonably found that this factor was neutral and did not weigh
in favor of transfer. See Evans v. Patel, 2020 IL App (1st) 200528, ¶ 44 (affirming circuit court’s
neutral finding under the same circumstances).
¶ 28 As far as the cost of attaining the attendance of willing witnesses, For Eyes argued that the
treating physicians were likely to testify by videoconferencing, but their travel to the DuPage
County Courthouse would be less time consuming than to Cook County’s Daley Center and that
the suburban location had a “free” parking lot, unlike its urban counterpart. The court found that
the “free” claim was vague and failed to account for the fact that public transit is more frequent
and accessible in Cook than in DuPage. Furthermore, because parts of the two counties are
adjacent, transferring the Colaizzis’ suit to DuPage would be unlikely to improve convenience or
cost. See Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 113 (regarding the adjacent counties of Cook and DuPage).
¶ 29 For Eyes argues that the travel times and mileage from the physicians’ offices to Cook
County’s Daley Center would be greater than driving to the DuPage County Courthouse. It argues,
for instance, that the office of Drs. Longest, Ansari and Curnyn is 25.8 from the Daley Center but
22.9 miles from the DuPage courthouse. Also, that if one were driving at 11 a.m., the travel times
would be 40 minutes and 34 minutes, respectively. For the first time on appeal, it adds data about
Drs. Slavik and Ostrich and proposes that we take judicial notice of the distance between the
various locations. The Colaizzis respond that this argument does not acknowledge the circuit
court’s discussion of the availability and expense of public transportation.
¶ 30 Contrasting a six mile and six minute difference or speculating about the cost of using
public transportation versus a private vehicle is precisely the “frustrating litigation quagmire” and
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“ ‘battle over minutiae’ ” that the supreme court cautioned against in Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 519
(citing and quoting Peile, 163 Ill. 2d at 335). “This is especially true when adjoining counties are
involved, where the travel distances for likely witnesses are minimally different.” Wilton v. Illini
Manors, Inc., 364 Ill. App. 3d 704, 706-07 (2006). There is no appreciable difference in time or
cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses. The circuit court reasonably found that the factor
did not favor transfer.
¶ 31 For Eyes also argued that the possibility of viewing the premises was erroneously given no
weight. However, our supreme court determined that “the necessity or propriety of viewing the
scene is a decision left within the discretion of the trial court.” Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 179. In its
discretion, the trial judge addressing For Eyes’ motion found that “[t]here is no benefit of viewing
the location of where an allegedly negligent examination and treatment took place.” The court
acknowledged that it was proper to weigh a possible jury viewing, but that this factor commands
little weight and, in this instance, did not weigh in favor of transfer. See Hackl v. Advocate Health
and Hospitals Corp., 382 Ill. App. 3d 442, 452 (2008) (“a viewing of the site is rarely or never
called for in a medical negligence case” and this factor alone would be an insufficient reason to
transfer); Bruce v. Atadero, 405 Ill. App. 3d 318, 326 (2010) (following Hackl); Richardson v.
Husain, 2025 IL App (5th) 240916, ¶ 45 (“this private interest factor is relatively insignificant and
is neutral); O’Brien v. Advanced Urology Associates, S.C., 2026 IL App (1st) 250608-U, ¶ 49
(approving the circuit court’s determination that this private interest factor is of “ ‘relatively low’ ”
importance); Ceresa v. PD Derm, Ltd., 2026 IL App (1st) 250578-U, ¶ 26 (same). Neither the facts
nor law support For Eyes’ contention that this factor strongly favors transfer. We find no error in
the court’s analysis or its reasonable conclusion.
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¶ 32 Proceeding to the public interest factors, we address two of the three together: the interest
in deciding localized controversies locally and the unfairness of imposing the expense of a trial
and the burden of jury duty on residents of a county with little connection to the litigation.
¶ 33 For Eyes contends that although Joshua’s ongoing medical treatment will occur in Cook
County, this is at core a DuPage County controversy because the injury occurred there. It
emphasizes that when he was injured, For Eyes was a Pennsylvania corporation, and that Luxottica
would not acquire For Eyes until three years later.
¶ 34 The circuit court determined that these were additional factors that did not weigh in favor
of transfer. It reasoned that both counties have an interest in the matter. The alleged negligent
treatment occurred in DuPage County and DuPage County residents have a direct interest in
medical care rendered within their community. Comparatively, Cook County and its residents also
have an interest in this matter given the numerous businesses that Luxottica of America, Inc.
maintains in Cook County. Further, given Cook County’s genuine interest in this case, the county’s
residents and the greater Chicago area can reasonably be expected to bear the burden of jury duty,
particularly in light of the significant presence and saturation of Luxottica businesses in this forum.
This was a reasonable conclusion.
¶ 35 Another relevant factor was the courts’ congestion. Courts are generally concerned with
“protecting finite judicial resources” and the efficient functioning of their judicial systems.
Espinosa, 86 Ill. 2d at 121. Nevertheless, the supreme court has repeatedly indicated that the “court
congestion factor, by itself, is relatively insignificant” and is not sufficient to justify transfer of
venue alone. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181; Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 517 (“congestion is a relatively
insignificant factor, especially where the record does not show the other forum would resolve the
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case more quickly”); Kwasniewski v. Schaid, 153 Ill. 2d 550, 555 (1992) (court congestion is the
least significant of the public interest factors); Brumett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc., 111 Ill. 2d 495, 503
(1986) (“Courts should be extremely reluctant to dismiss a case from the forum rei gestae merely
because that forum’s docket has a backlog.”).
¶ 36 The annual report of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts is a proper source of
information when assessing court congestion. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181; Washington v. Illinois
Power Co., 144 Ill. 2d 395, 403 (1991).
¶ 37 The parties disagree on which year’s report, and which statistics are most relevant. For
Eyes gave the circuit court pages of the 2023 annual report that included the “Beginning Open”
and “Ending Open” case figures for the year. The Colaizzis responded with the 2023 statistics
about the number of cases filed per judge. For Eyes now contends we should consult a part of the
2024 annual report that can be found on the Administrative Office’s website. A court of review
may not consider documents that are not part of the certified record on appeal. Hartz Construction
Co., Inc. v. Village of Western Springs, 2012 IL App (1st) 103108, ¶ 50. By using new statistics,
For Eyes is essentially arguing that we should reverse the circuit court’s judgment based on
statistics that were not available when the court ruled.
¶ 38 In Evans, the court considered that Cook County was much more efficient at disposing of
cases like this one, law jury cases with a value over $50,000. Evans, 2020 IL App (1st) 200528,
¶ 22. In Seilheimer, the court reversed a transfer after criticizing the circuit court for relying on the
fact that Cook County had more cases pending than the alternate forum of Lake County.
Seilheimer, 2025 IL App (1st) 240418, ¶¶ 65-66. The proper consideration was not gross numbers
of cases alone but rather “the efficiency with which the court handles those cases.” Id. ¶ 67. See
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Brummett, 111 Ill. 2d at 503; Petrungaro v. Jayachandran, 2022 IL App (1st) 220304, ¶ 35
(evaluating congestion by looking at speed of disposition); and Prouty v. Advocate Health &
Hospitals Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d 490, 497-98 (2004) (same). Similarly, in Kashirsky, the court
said that although Cook County had significantly more total cases than the alternative forum of
Will County, it also had far more judges and consequently disposed of cases more quickly.
Kashirsky v. Presence Central & Suburban Hospitals Network, 2024 IL App (1st) 230060-U, ¶ 13.
¶ 39 This authority indicates that the circuit court relied on the relevant information. The circuit
court consulted the 2021 annual report, noting that it was the last report to provide numerical data
for Cook County. Cook County terminated 47 cases by verdict, with an average lapse time of 43.4
months, while DuPage County terminated 19 cases by verdict, with an average lapse time of 59.3
months. Thus, Cook County terminated 28 more cases by verdict in 15.9 fewer months than
DuPage County. The circuit court concluded that proceeding in Cook County was nearly a year
and a half faster and that since Cook County is less congested than DuPage County, this factor
also did not weigh in favor of transfer. This was a reasonable conclusion to make.
¶ 40 The record shows that the circuit court considered the totality of the circumstances and
carefully balanced the relevant factors. We give the decision the deference that it is owed and are
mindful that transferring a plaintiff’s action on the basis of forum non conveniens is warranted
only in “exceptional circumstances.” (Emphasis in original.) Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442. In
our opinion, a reasonable person could adopt the view of the circuit court. Accordingly, we find
that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied For Eyes’ motion to transfer. For these
reasons, we affirm the judgment.
¶ 41 Affirmed.
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