IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
In the Matter of: R.M. and A.R. (Minor Children), Jun 23 2026, 9:04 am
and M.C. (Mother),
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Appellant-Respondent Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
June 23, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JC-253
Appeal from the Decatur Circuit Court
The Honorable Timothy B. Day, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
16C01-2510-JC-232
16C01-2510-JC-233
Opinion by Judge Brown
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 1 of 18
Judge Weissmann concurs.
Judge Kenworthy dissents with separate opinion.
Brown, Judge.
[1] M.C. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating her minor
children, A.R. and R.M. (the “Children”), as children in need of services
(“CHINS”). We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and J.R. are the parents of A.R., born in January 2023. Mother and
K.M. are the parents of R.M., born in August 2025. In December 2024, the
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that alleged Mother
was using marijuana in the home and exposing A.R. to THC. Mother was
charged with possession of marijuana and, in January of 2025, A.R. tested
positive for THC. DCS filed a CHINS petition in February 2025, which was
later dismissed after A.R.’s hair follicle test came back inconclusive.
[3] When R.M. was born in August 2025, both Mother and R.M. tested positive
for THC at the hospital. Mother admitted to vaping THC while pregnant and
that she had been counseled about the potential risks of THC use during
pregnancy. Shortly thereafter, DCS visited Mother’s home and Mother
admitted to continued THC use and to breastfeeding while using THC. Mother
again tested positive for THC. DCS observed that the home had working
utilities and running water as well as ample amounts of food and baby supplies.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 2 of 18 [4] On October 27, 2025, DCS received another report of neglect due to concerns
that Mother was using THC. DCS went to Mother’s home, and she admitted
that she continued to use THC. On October 28, 2025, DCS filed petitions
alleging that the Children were CHINS due to exposure to THC. On
November 7, 2025, a hair follicle test was conducted as to A.R. and showed
positive results for THC. On November 24, 2025, DCS filed amended CHINS
petitions to include the hair follicle results. In the amended petitions, DCS
alleged that A.R. was a CHINS pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1, and that
R.M. was a CHINS pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 and Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10.
[5] The trial court held a factfinding hearing on December 16, 2025. DCS
presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Chelsea Morgan (“FCM
Morgan”), Family Case Manager Devyn Dewhurst, and Dr. Isaiah Steffen.
Mother testified on her own behalf. Thereafter, the court adjudicated Children
as CHINS based upon its finding: “1) Both [C]hildren have been exposed to
THC.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 135.
[6] The court held a dispositional hearing on December 29, 2025. On January 5,
2026, the court issued its dispositional decree. Among other things, the court
ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all
treatments and recommendations. The court also ordered that both Mother
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 3 of 18
and the Children to participate in random drug screens. Mother filed her notice
of appeal on January 30, 2026. 1
Discussion
[7] Mother asserts that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating Children as
CHINS. In reviewing a trial court’s determination that a child is in need of
services, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses
and consider only the evidence which supports the court’s decision and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287
(Ind. 2014), reh’g denied. As no statute expressly requires formal findings in a
CHINS factfinding order and because neither party requested them under Ind.
Trial Rule 52(A), we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence
supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment to any
issue covered by the findings, and we review any remaining issues under the
general judgment standard pursuant to which a judgment “will be affirmed if it
can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 1287
1
We observe that an entry in Indiana’s Odyssey Case Management System (“Odyssey”) dated March 24,
2026, indicates that a review hearing scheduled for April 2, 2026, was canceled. Odyssey also indicates that
counsel for DCS filed a Request for Wardship Termination under lower court cause number 16C01-2510-JC232 (“Cause No. 232”), which stated that: permanency for the child had been achieved through an approved
reunification; Mother had shown negative drug screens and completed all requested services; CASA/GAL
had been contacted and are in favor of wardship termination; and the case should be closed. On March 24,
2026, the trial court entered an Order on Wardship Termination under Cause No. 232 which ordered:
“Jurisdiction in this matter is hereby terminated without prejudice and this cause of action is ordered closed.
Any hearings currently scheduled in this matter are hereby vacated.” A similar order was entered in lower
court cause number 16C01-2510-JC-233 (“Cause No. 233”). Nevertheless, we decline to find this case moot
and proceed to address the merits. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014) (declining to find closed
CHINS case moot and observing that a CHINS finding may have adverse consequences, including that “a
CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for terminating parental rights”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 4 of 18
(citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if clearly
erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly
erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the
wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
[8] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 provides:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially
able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent,
guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other
reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the court.
[9] It is well-settled that “[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services,
permitting the State’s parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere
of the family.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citation omitted). Rather, a CHINS
adjudication under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 “requires three basic elements:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 5 of 18
that the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that
the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are
unlikely to be met without State coercion.” Id.
[10] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10 provides:
Except as provided in sections 12 and 13 of this chapter, a child
is a child in need of services if:
(1) the child is born with:
(A) fetal alcohol syndrome;
(B) neonatal abstinence syndrome; or
(C) any amount, including a trace amount, of a controlled
substance, a legend drug, or a metabolite of a controlled
substance or legend drug in the child’s body, including the
child’s blood, urine, umbilical cord tissue, or meconium;
and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; or
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the court.
These statutes do not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene.
In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a
CHINS when the child is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id.
[11] The trial court here made a single finding of fact in support of its CHINS
adjudications: “1) Both [C]hildren have been exposed to THC.” Appellant’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 6 of 18
Appendix Volume II at 135. Mother does not dispute this finding or the
evidence supporting it. Rather, as to the court’s CHINS adjudication of both
Children pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (the “Neglect Statute”), Mother
asserts that DCS failed to present any evidence that THC exposure has
seriously endangered the Children, that the Children’s needs are unmet, and
that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. As to the court’s
CHINS adjudication of R.M. pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10 (the
“Controlled Substance at Birth Statute”), Mother asserts that DCS failed to
present any evidence that R.M. needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she
is not receiving or is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court. We must agree.
A. The Neglect Statute
[12] First, regarding the serious endangerment requirement of the Neglect Statute,
our review of the record confirms that it is devoid of evidence in support of a
finding of serious endangerment. Although the evidence indicates that twoyear-old A.R. tested positive for THC by hair follicle screen on November 7,
2025, DCS presented no expert testimony explaining how to interpret a hair
follicle drug screen for a two-year-old child—including what window of
exposure the test reflects, what level of THC is detected, or whether the positive
result indicates extensive or minimal environmental exposure. Indeed, when
asked “[H]ow much THC would a two[-]year[-]old child have to be exposed to
in order to test positive,” Dr. Steffen responded, “I would have no idea.”
Transcript Volume II at 58. DCS also offered no testimony from any witness as
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 7 of 18
to how, specifically, the THC in A.R.’s hair endangered her or impacted her
health, development, or well-being.
[13] As for R.M., while acknowledging that R.M. tested positive for THC at birth,
when asked if R.M. was “unsafe” in Mother’s care, Dr. Steffen opined, “No, if
I had thought that I would not have let her leave the hospital.” Id. at 59. Dr.
Steffen confirmed that, based upon his observations, Mother was “doing great
with the baby,” and that R.M. “was born healthy and with no signs of
withdrawal.” Id. at 60. Dr. Steffen provided no testimony that R.M. was
seriously endangered by THC exposure. Indeed, he described the science on
prenatal and neonatal THC exposure as a developing field with studies lacking
longevity and many confounding variables.
[14] We additionally observe that there was no evidence presented that Mother was
impaired by THC use while caring for the Children. FCM Morgan testified
that, although Mother admitted to ongoing THC use, she denied using THC
“around the kids.” Id. at 46. While FCM Morgan testified that she was
“concerned” because she had been “educated” that “ongoing THC use in the
presence of children or children ingesting THC, of any sort” possibly “can”
have “long term effects,” she admitted that “we don’t know what the long-term
effects of THC exposure” are, and she further admitted that she had never
observed Mother to be “under the influence” while parenting the Children. Id.
at 34, 43. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that DCS carried its burden
to establish that Mother’s actions or inactions seriously endangered the
Children. See Matter of A.M., 277 N.E.3d 972, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026)
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 8 of 18
(confirming that a finding of serious endangerment requires more than just
admitted drug use or a positive drug screen and agreeing with mother that “the
mere fact [she] possessed marijuana when she was arrested (and presumably
used marijuana with some frequency) cannot in and of itself support a CHINS
determination”); D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 150 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020) (concluding that mother’s admitted marijuana use and the family
case manager’s concern that “[i]llegal substance use impairs your thinking, your
response, . . . your normal thought processes and action,” without more, was
not sufficient to support a CHINS determination); Ad.M v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs, 103 N.E.3d 709, 713-714 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (reversing CHINS
adjudication and holding that “evidence of one parent’s use of marijuana and
evidence that marijuana ha[d] been found in the family home, without more,
does not demonstrate that a child has been seriously endangered for purposes of
Indiana Code [s]ection 31-34-1-1”); In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252, 1256 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (reversing CHINS adjudication as to four children who were
adjudicated CHINS after the youngest child’s meconium tested positive for
marijuana as there was no evidence showing how marijuana-positive
meconium endangers a child, or any occasion the mother was impaired by
substance abuse while caring for the children).
[15] Even assuming we were to conclude that DCS presented evidence of serious
endangerment as to either of the Children, we find the record devoid of
evidence indicating that the Children’s needs are unmet, and that those needs
are unlikely to be met without State coercion. The evidence indicates that
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 9 of 18
Mother has stable long-term housing and employment. 2 Mother further stated
that she is voluntarily involved with the “Healthy Families” program through
which a service provider comes to her home “once a week” to provide
parenting education regarding “child development and safety,” and that the
provider also offered to aid her in obtaining food stamps. Transcript Volume II
at 70. 3 Mother testified that the Children have no unmet medical needs and
that each child was meeting their developmental milestones. In sum, the record
indicates that the Children’s needs are being met and DCS presented no
testimony that either child had suffered any negative consequence related to
THC exposure or Mother’s THC use. Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court clearly erred in adjudicating the Children as CHINS pursuant to the
Neglect Statute.
B. The Controlled Substances at Birth Statute
[16] Regarding the court’s adjudication of R.M. as a CHINS pursuant to the
Controlled Substances at Birth Statute, DCS correctly points out that the statute
“does not include endangerment as an element that DCS must prove where a
child is born with illegal drugs in their system.” Appellee’s Brief at 11. DCS
notes that the record shows that “R.M. was born with THC in her urine” and
2
Mother testified that she has lived in the same apartment for three years and that she is not in “any danger
at all being evicted from that residence.” Transcript Volume II at 67. Mother also testified that she is
employed as a “shift manager” at McDonald’s, and that she has been employed at McDonald’s for
approximately three years. Id. at 67-68.
3
Mother testified that the program was “offered to [her] at the hospital as an option” following the birth of
R.M. and that she “requested to be a participant in it.” Transcript Volume II at 70.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 10 of 18
therefore, “DCS only needed to show that R.M. needed care, treatment, or
rehabilitation that she was not receiving or was unlikely to be provided or
accepted without court intervention.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10).
[17] Again, we find the evidence lacking. As discussed above, the record indicates
that R.M.’s needs are being met and DCS presented no testimony that R.M.
had suffered any negative consequence related to Mother’s THC use. Dr.
Steffen opined that R.M. was safe in Mother’s care and that she was born
healthy and with no THC-related injuries or withdrawal symptoms. DCS
presented no testimony that R.M. needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that
she was not receiving or was unlikely to be provided or accepted without court
intervention. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in
adjudicating R.M. as a CHINS pursuant to the Controlled Substances at Birth
Statute.
[18] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s CHINS adjudications.
[19] Reversed.
Weissmann, J., concurs.
Kenworthy, J., dissents with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Amanda O. Blackketter
Blackketter Law, LLC
Shelbyville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 11 of 18
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Grace C. Slaney
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Kenworthy, Judge, dissenting.
[20] As the trial court acknowledged when adjudicating A.R. and R.M. CHINS,
“this is a close case legally[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 92. And in close cases—cases in
which the evidence could lead a court to grant or deny a petition—“the trial
court is the one to make that call.” S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 496 (Ind.
2023) (quoting S.D. v. G.D., 195 N.E.3d 406, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (Altice,
J., dissenting)). As an appellate court, we are not at liberty to reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses—tasks at which our trial courts
are “far better[.]” Id. Based on my review of the evidence favorable to the
judgment per our standard of review, I would affirm the trial court’s call and
therefore respectfully dissent.
[21] The evidence most favorable to the judgment reveals that a urine screen showed
both Mother and R.M. were positive for THC shortly after R.M.’s birth in
August 2025. Mother was “pretty honest” about her regular use of THC, both
during her pregnancy with R.M. and after R.M.’s birth while Mother was
breastfeeding, despite being warned of “potential consequences[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at
58. Hair follicle tests were subsequently done on Children. R.M.’s test was
inconclusive because she did not have enough hair to test, but nearly three-yearCourt of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 12 of 18
old A.R.’s test was positive for THC. And Mother testified A.R. tested positive
“one other time.” Id. at 73.
[22] When FCM Dewhurst conducted an assessment in October, Mother admitted
using THC and said she was breastfeeding R.M. Mother told FCM Dewhurst
she uses THC at work, not home, and keeps her THC vapes in her purse which
she hangs on a hook above the stairwell. But FCM Dewhurst observed
Mother’s purse on the kitchen counter and THC vapes in a kitchen drawer.
There was no child lock on the drawer, and the drawer was “[l]ikely” in reach
of A.R. Id. at 55.
[23] FCM Morgan testified DCS had educated its employees on the long-term
impact of THC exposure on children: “The ongoing long term effects can affect
[children’s] attention span, their memory, their executive functioning, their IQ,
[and] put them at an increased risk for mental health [issues], anxiety,
depression, and even psychosis.” Id. at 43. She acknowledged that
“[r]ealistically, we don’t know what the long-term effects [on] these two minor
children who are currently exposed to THC” will be, but declared their
exposure is concerning. Id.
[24] Dr. Steffen, who provided prenatal care to Mother during her pregnancy with
R.M. and cared for R.M. after her birth, testified that the “majority of data”
from “lots of new studies” in this developing field “seems to be negative . . . in
that [use of THC while pregnant] probably will have long term implications to
both parents and their children’s health.” Id. at 57. He said he had “[n]ot yet”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 13 of 18
seen negative implications in Children but explained “the reason why it’s a
developing field is because a majority of these things happen later in life. So
[researchers] needed kids who have been exposed to develop and continue on in
the studies to be able to draw those conclusions.” Id. at 61. He said there were
differing opinions about using THC while breastfeeding because the THC
concentration in breastmilk versus smoke is unknown. Regardless, he “would
not recommend utilizing marijuana around or while breastfeeding children.”
Id. at 57. He discussed this with Mother during her pregnancy, but Mother did
not abide by his recommendation and continued to use THC, both throughout
her pregnancy and while breastfeeding R.M. after her birth.
[25] Mother admitted she has used THC products throughout the entirety of
Children’s lives, most recently a week before the hearing. She said she
previously used in Children’s presence but after the CHINS petition was filed,
began to use only at work. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 69. She said she stopped
breastfeeding R.M. three weeks before the hearing. She testified to her active
and willing participation in a Healthy Families program but said that program
did not provide any services related to substance use. She does not “really like
preventative medicine” and does not feel that taking her children for routine
checkups is something she has to do because it is not required by law. Id. at 83.
But if she felt they needed a doctor, she would take them. A.R. has not been to
a pediatrician since she was a baby. R.M. was born at home; Mother took her
to the doctor after she was born and then for her one-week and six-week
checkups.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 14 of 18 [26] When asked if she could stop smoking THC, Mother replied, “If I wanted to?
Yeah. I think I could.” Id. at 81. She acknowledged she had not chosen to
stop up to this point and said she didn’t “really have an answer” for what it
would take for her to stop smoking despite the prior CHINS petition and the
current CHINS proceedings. Id. And importantly, when asked, “Do you
believe that your children need services?,” she replied, “I do.” Id. at 68.
[27] Here, as to endangerment, the trial court adjudicated Children CHINS in part
because it “heard evidence, medical evidence, that the consensus is that
exposure to marijuana by children could have long-term effects. It wasn’t
proved positive, by any means, but certainly the consensus sounds like that
marijuana exposure of a child is not good for them on a long-term basis.” Tr.
Vol. 2 at 91. 4 First, I note (as the majority does) that the trial court was not
required to find proof of endangerment for R.M., a baby born substance
exposed. See I.C. § 31-34-1-10(1)(c). As for A.R., DCS presented evidence she
tested positive for THC in November 2025 and Mother acknowledged during
the CHINS factfinding hearing A.R. had a second positive test during a
4
The majority points out the shortcomings in DCS’ evidence. See slip op. at ¶ 12 (noting there was no expert
testimony interpreting A.R.’s positive hair follicle drug screen). And our cases have similarly pointed out
since at least the late 1980s the lack of evidence of the effects of marijuana exposure on children. See White v.
State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind. 1989) (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (noting, in a criminal neglect case, that the
purpose of the statute is “protection of the physical well-being of dependents” and “there was no evidence
presented that the active ingredient in marijuana is addictive or harmful to the health”); cf. United States v.
Amalfi, 47 F.4th 114, 125 (2nd Cir. 2022) (recognizing “the continuing public health and safety issues
associated with marijuana use” in a challenge to classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled
substance) (quotation omitted). In this case, even if DCS could have provided additional evidence on the
points the majority finds lacking, I conclude, as the trial court did, that it provided enough evidence to meet
the preponderance standard for showing serious impairment or serious endangerment in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 15 of 18
previous interaction with DCS. A.R.’s father admitted at the initial hearing
that A.R. was CHINS and expressed at the factfinding hearing his concern over
Mother’s “continued and ongoing chronic use of a substance even after being
exposed to the potential ramifications of it either medically or legally.” Tr. Vol.
2 at 89. FCM Dewhurst testified there were THC vapes likely in A.R.’s reach
when she visited Mother’s home. FCM Morgan and Dr. Steffen testified to the
possible negative long-term implications of A.R.’s exposure to THC. Both said
they had not yet seen negative consequences in these Children, but because
Mother does not take them for routine check-ups, there is no medical oversight
of their condition. Although FCM Morgan testified Mother provided adequate
food, clothing, and shelter for the children, when a parent uses drugs, she
endangers her children in a variety of ways. See In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022,
1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. As the majority acknowledges, the
CHINS statutes do not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to
intervene. See slip op. at ¶ 10 (citing In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d at 306).
[28] The majority cites several cases reversing a CHINS determination because
marijuana use “without more” does not prove endangerment. See slip op. at ¶
14 (citing, e.g., D.S., 150 N.E.3d at 296). A common denominator in those
cases is lack of evidence that children were exposed to marijuana use. See D.S.,
150 N.E.3d at 296 (noting DCS did not present any evidence the mother used
marijuana while the child was in the home). But here, there is clear evidence
that A.R. and R.M. were exposed to Mother’s marijuana use, as they both
tested positive for THC and Mother admitted using in their presence. See Tr.
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Vol. 2 at 90–91 (trial court noting it was “fully aware” of Court of Appeals
decisions reversing a CHINS finding based primarily on marijuana usage,
including one of its own cases, but stating in that particular case, “the child
wasn’t exposed to marijuana, it was just the mother testing positive” and noting
“what I’ve got here is . . . not only a newborn child drug exposed, testing
positive for THC, I have a toddler . . . also drug exposed, testing positive for
THC”). I do not find those cases persuasive here.
[29] And as for the necessity of the coercive intervention of the court, the trial court
concluded that “if it is that big of a problem” that Mother continued to use
THC despite a prior DCS case and current evidence she had exposed her
toddler and newborn child, “then the course of intervention of the court is
necessary to try to . . . stop these kids from being marijuana exposed.” Id. at
91–92. Mother has physical custody of both children and is the sole caregiver
for these very young children when they are with her. 5 Mother said she had
stopped breastfeeding R.M. and now only uses THC at work, but the trial court
was not required to believe her. See S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499 (“[I]t is not our
role to question [a] credibility determination.”); see also Tr. Vol. 2 at 92 (trial
court stating that absent continued drug testing, “I don’t see that we’ll ever
know” whether Mother stopped breastfeeding and otherwise exposing Children
to THC). She has had three interactions with DCS in about a year—in late
5
Mother testified A.R. has parenting time with her father from Wednesday afternoon to Friday afternoon
every week. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 82. And R.M.’s father is in the Department of Correction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JC-253 June 23, 2026 Page 17 of 18
2024 when A.R. tested positive for THC, in August 2025 when R.M. was born
testing positive for THC, and again in October 2025 when this case began.
Mother was not cooperative with scheduling the hair follicle tests for Children;
the provider had to reach out to her five times before they were able to schedule
the tests. And during the hearing, Mother made no commitment to stop using
THC, nor could she identify a reason compelling enough for her to do so.
Despite multiple opportunities to do so, Mother has not changed her conduct
on her own.
[30] Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, the State is required to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by statute.
In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012); I.C. § 31-34-12-3. A
preponderance of the evidence is “simply . . . the greater weight of the
evidence.” In re K.Y., 145 N.E.3d 854, 859 (2020) (quotation omitted). I
believe the evidence favorable to the judgment supports the trial court’s
determination that A.R. and R.M. are CHINS by a preponderance of the
evidence. I would affirm.
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