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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4033
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER KENJI BENDANN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
James K. Bredar, Senior District Judge. (1:23−cr−00278−JKB−1)
Argued: May 8, 2026 Decided: June 25, 2026
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and AGEE and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee
and Judge Quattlebaum joined.
ARGUED: Allen Howard Orenberg, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, LLC, Rockville,
Maryland, for Appellant. Mary Jessica Kirsch Munoz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly O. Hayes,
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
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DIAZ, Chief Judge:
This case arises from a teacher grooming, exploiting, and stalking a minor student.
After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Christopher Kenji Bendann of child exploitation,
possessing child sexual abuse material 1, and cyberstalking.
Bendann challenges his convictions on three grounds. First, he argues the district
court abused its discretion by declining to order a competency evaluation when Bendann
experienced suicidal ideation leading up to trial. Next, he says the court should have
suppressed evidence obtained from his iPhone because the government discovered the
phone’s passcode through an unlawful interrogation. And third, he insists that the
government didn’t hand over a witness’s Jencks statement. 2 He also attacks his thirty-fiveyear sentence on one ground: the emotionally charged victim-impact testimony permitted
at sentencing.
We find no error in the district court’s careful handling of this case. So we affirm.
1
We use “child sexual abuse material” rather than “child pornography” “to reflect
more accurately [its] abusive and exploitative nature.” United States v. Kuehner, 126 F.4th
319, 322 n.1 (4th Cir. 2025).
2
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957) (government must allow
defendants to review its witnesses’ pretrial reports); 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (codifying this
requirement, and clarifying that it applies solely to written statements the witness adopted
and approved, reliable transcripts of statements, or statements made to a grand jury); Fed.
R. Crim. P. 26.2 (making this obligation reciprocal).
2
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I.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the government. United States
v. Jackson, 126 F.4th 847, 852 n.1 (4th Cir. 2025).
A.
Bendann was a middle-school teacher, advisor, and coach at an all-boys prep school
in Baltimore. The victim was his eighth-grade student and advisee. The advising
relationship was no doubt close: Bendann frequently interacted with the student’s parents,
drove the student and his friends around, and communicated with him in person and
through social media.
The sexual abuse at issue here began the student’s sophomore year of high school.
The student testified that he and his friends (other students) were “scared to tell [their]
parents” they’d been drinking, so they’d ask Bendann, whom they knew well and trusted,
to drive them home from parties. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 1913. After Bendann picked up
the students, he would “make [them] run a naked lap” while he watched. J.A. 1909–11. A
classmate recalled that Bendann made them run naked “in exchange for something” like
fast food or a ride home. J.A. 2629.
From there, the abuse escalated. Bendann started to pick up the student alone and
to require that he strip naked in the car. Bendann eventually coerced the student into
engaging in sexually explicit conduct in the car, which Bendann filmed. The abuse
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continued in homes where Bendann was housesitting, often during house parties. Bendann
would summon the student upstairs at these parties and sexually assault him while filming. 3
When the student resisted these interactions, Bendann threatened to expose explicit
images of him. The student tried repeatedly to block Bendann and end contact, but
Bendann threatened him with exposure. Bendann also coerced the student into sending
explicit photos and videos over Snapchat.
Even after the student graduated, Bendann “forced” him to stay in regular contact.
J.A. 1930. Bendann made a private Instagram account and uploaded explicit images of the
student to it. If the student didn’t answer Bendann’s messages promptly, Bendann would
either make the account public or request to follow the student’s girlfriend and close
friends. E.g., J.A. 3251 (“Answer. Answer. Answer. Fuck you. Answer. Answer me
now. I’m exposing you. I’m turning it public.”)
B.
After other students reported Bendann’s grooming behaviors (including naked
runs), the school suspended him and reported him to the Department of Social Services.
The Department referred the case to the police. The student came forward shortly after
learning of Bendann’s suspension.
Detective Shannon Markel, the lead investigator, interviewed the student and
obtained his cell phone and iPad. Based on Markel’s review of those devices, she obtained
3
Forensic evidence corroborates that Bendann created the five videos
corresponding to the five child-exploitation charges in this case when the student was
underage.
4
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a search warrant for Bendann’s person, home, and car. The warrant authorized officers to
search and seize Bendann’s electronic devices and any biometric data necessary to unlock
them. J.A. 1516.
C.
A joint state-federal task force executed the warrant at Bendann’s home. Markel
advised Bendann of his Miranda rights. She told him that a sealed warrant authorized her
to seize his biometric data, specifically his face and hands, to unlock electronic devices.
She asked Bendann if he wanted to talk, and he replied “Can I do it with my attorney? She
said not to say anything to anyone.” S.A. at 8:45–50. Markel didn’t question him further.
Investigators seized several laptops and cellphones. Detective Markel placed an
iPhone up to Bendann’s face to unlock it with Face ID. When the phone didn’t recognize
Bendann’s face, it automatically switched to the passcode screen, and Bendann entered his
six-digit passcode. Markel said nothing and made no demands during the very brief
interaction. But she could see the first four digits he’d entered: 0701, the month and day
of his birthday.
Markel handed the unlocked phone to an FBI agent and verified Bendann’s birthdate
out loud with her colleague. Bendann confirmed the code out loud—this time, responding
to Markel—but only after Markel and her colleague had deduced it.
5
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D.
Bendann was arrested and a federal grand jury indicted him. 4
Bendann moved to suppress evidence obtained from his iPhone. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion from the bench. As the court
explained, the circumstances under which law enforcement obtained Bendann’s passcode
were “concerning” but Markel didn’t cross the line because she didn’t direct Bendann to
provide any information. J.A. 1608–09. So the court concluded that Bendann provided
his passcode “voluntarily.” J.A. 1609.
The district court memorialized its ruling in a written order. There, the court noted
that Markel “did not lie or mislead” Bendann, she didn’t “say anything to” him when the
phone prompted him to enter his passcode, and Bendann “unprompted, entered the sixdigit passcode into the cellphone.” J.A. 28. So the court concluded that Bendann’s “choice
to enter his passcode was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” J.A.
30 (citation omitted).
Although the district court posited that Markel’s subsequent confirmation of the
passcode with Bendann “likely was not” lawful, it declined to decide that issue because
Markel obtained the passcode lawfully. J.A. 28 n.2.
4
The grand jury later superseded the indictment, charging Bendann with five counts
of sexual exploitation of a child, three counts of possessing child sexual abuse material,
and one count of cyberstalking. J.A. 32–42.
6
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E.
Bendann proceeded to trial. But on the morning of jury selection, he refused to
leave his cell. His counsel represented that they’d asked the jail to screen Bendann for
suicidal ideation a week before, but that they didn’t “have a basis to raise” his competency.
J.A. 1754–55. The district court ordered Bendann to appear.
Bendann’s counsel changed their tune by the time Bendann arrived in court. During
the recess for Bendann’s transport, the government gave his counsel a recording of a jail
call between Bendann and his father in which Bendann expressed suicidal thoughts. That
call prompted counsel to move for a psychiatric evaluation (and full competency hearing),
based on their view that Bendann’s suicidal ideation rendered him unable to assist in his
defense.
In response to the district court’s questions, Bendann said he was “frustrated with
the judicial system as a whole,” but described himself as “mentally [and] emotionally
stable.” J.A. 1762. Bendann confirmed that he understood where he was, the charges
against him, and the role of his counsel. He also cogently expressed his grievances with
the legal system and how pretrial incarceration stands juxtaposed to the presumption of
innocence.
The district court concluded that Bendann hadn’t “created a colorable indication”
that he suffered “a mental disease or defense rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he’s unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding against
him or to assist properly in his defense.” J.A. 1778.
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The court then questioned Bendann about his desire to waive his right to be present
for trial. Bendann expressed that his objection to attending court was largely rooted in “the
indignity of coming over from [jail]” and the food available in the holding cell. J.A. 1782.
The court told the Marshals to provide Bendann with a lunch offering consistent with his
medical diet, and Bendann ended up attending his trial.
F.
Over six trial days, the government introduced two-hundred-plus exhibits and called
seventeen witnesses. Bendann conceded that he was guilty of cyberstalking, but contested
the child-exploitation and abuse-material charges.
After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury found Bendann guilty on all nine
counts.
G.
The district court held a sentencing hearing. The court calculated Bendann’s offense
level as 48 and criminal history as category I. Because the guidelines only go to level 43,
the court adjusted downward. Those levels correspond with a guideline range starting and
ending with life imprisonment.
The student’s parents gave victim impact statements. Bendann restated his written
motion to strike their testimony, which the district court rejected both times. The court
noted that Bendann could “be sure that I understand how proof works and that [] which is
submitted to the Court with less corroboration, not in person, not subject to crossexamination, will be accorded appropriately less weight.” J.A. 3235.
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Bendann’s father provided a brief statement of support. Bendann’s counsel read
letters from former students about his positive impact as an educator. And Bendann, who
maintained his innocence, spoke directly to the court.
After considering the 3553(a) factors, the court sentenced Bendann to 35 years in
prison. And it also imposed lifetime supervised release.
This appeal followed.
II.
First up, competency.
We review a district court’s decision not to order a full competency hearing for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Council, 77 F.4th 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2023). In
evaluating whether a court abused its discretion, we “may not substitute [our] judgment for
that of the district court.” United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2007).
Rather, our job is to “determine whether the court’s exercise of discretion . . . was arbitrary
or capricious.” Id. at 743.
A.
A person is competent to stand trial if he “has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Put differently, we require that the defendant exhibit
“the capacity to understand, the capacity to assist, and the capacity to communicate with
his counsel.” United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, 142 F.4th 199, 210 (4th Cir. 2025) (emphasis
omitted).
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A court must order a competency evaluation and full hearing “if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
But “there are no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir. 2003)). And because a paper record rarely
reflects the nuance of a person’s mental state, we show our highest deference to the district
court’s first-hand interactions with a defendant and observations of his demeanor. See
United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2013). For us to disrupt those
findings, “the defendant must establish that the trial court ignored facts raising a bona fide
doubt regarding [his] competency to stand trial.” Walton, 321 F.3d at 459.
B.
We have no trouble finding the district court’s handling of Bendann’s competency
proceedings sufficient. In our view, the court was exceptionally cautious and thorough.
Bendann argues that his suicidal ideation created reasonable cause to believe he was
incapable of assisting his counsel. But as the district court explained, there’s a fine line
between “the effects of a mental disease or defect and . . . understandable distress, even
resistance to the circumstances a person is in when they are the subject of a federal grand
jury indictment on serious charges and are proceeding to trial.” J.A. 1763. And not all
distress that warrants mental healthcare compels a competency inquiry.
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Bendann was frustrated with the legal system and anxious about the severe penalties
he faced. But he never expressed or displayed any difficulty understanding the proceeding
or engaging with his lawyers. Nor did Bendann offer evidence that he lacked the capacity
to consult with and assist his lawyers. If anything, Bendann’s critiques and occasional
snark “demonstrat[ed] a mind that [was] razor sharp,” and showed that he was “quite aware
of the circumstances and issues” in his case. J.A. 1778.
Accepting that Bendann experienced suicidal thoughts leading up to trial, every
other record fact militates against incompetency. Without more, suicide attempts and
ideation aren’t enough to require a competency evaluation. E.g., United States v.
Rakestraw, No. 21-4436, 2023 WL 1519518, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023). 5 There’s not
more here.
As the district court found, Bendann (1) had no record of mental instability, (2)
behaved appropriately in court, and (3) expressed nuanced grievances with the legal
system. And although Bendann was often demanding and sometimes flippant, he was
never irrational.
We defer to the district court’s first-hand experiences, but we can also see for
ourselves in the record that while Bendann was frustrated with his lot, and experiencing
understandable distress, he wasn’t incapable of assisting in his defense.
5
Three of our sister circuits agree (and none disagrees). See Butko v. Budge, 378
F.3d 880, 892 (9th Cir. 2004); Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Collins, 834 F. App’x 537, 541 (11th Cir. 2020).
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So we find no error in the district court’s decision to forgo a full competency
evaluation. 6
III.
Next, we tackle Bendann’s motion to suppress evidence the police obtained from
his iPhone. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009).
A.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from compelling a person in
custody to testify. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Before any
interrogation, officers must inform the person of their rights to remain silent and to an
attorney. Id. And if the person unambiguously invokes those rights, law enforcement can’t
continue questioning. Id. at 444–45.
We enforce this prohibition through the exclusionary rule, which bars admission of
the fruits of any involuntary statement “obtained in violation of Miranda.” United States
v. Alston, 941 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2019).
6
Before oral argument, Bendann moved to supplement the record. He asked that
we consider two medical records that the district court never saw. Alternatively, Bendann
sought a limited remand. We denied the motion.
At argument, Bendann’s counsel rehashed the motion. We declined to consider
Bendann’s medical records before argument, and do so again, because our job is to review
the record as it existed in the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10. In any event, the
records don’t support Bendann’s competency arguments: they largely recount gripes with
pretrial detention and the legal system, like those Bendann expressed in court. Since the
records would not alter the outcome, a limited remand would not be in the interests of
justice.
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Where, as here, a defendant seeks to exclude evidence because the government
violated his Miranda right against compelled testimony, we ask five questions. First,
whether he was in custody, i.e., he wasn’t free to leave. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Next, whether he unambiguously invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel. See
id. Third, whether the police officer’s conduct amounts to the functional equivalent of an
interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).
And because Miranda’s protections apply only to compelled testimony, we also ask
whether the defendant gave his statement voluntarily. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307
(1985). Finally, even if the defendant prevails on each of the above inquiries, we won’t
apply the exclusionary rule if the government “can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
B.
We needn’t reach all five inquiries; we must affirm if the government prevails on
any one of them. We take the most straightforward path: voluntariness. We also consider
the intertwined matter of whether Markel’s conduct amounted to an interrogation.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court made detailed factual findings to
support its conclusion that Bendann entered his iPhone’s passcode voluntarily. While we
review its legal conclusion de novo, that conclusion stood on careful findings, particularly
about the circumstances surrounding the statement, which we defer to absent clear error.
See United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1992).
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A statement is voluntary if it was “the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
But even statements that appear voluntary might not be if the defendant’s “will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” Id. We look to the
totality of the circumstances to make that call. Id. at 226.
Bendann fairly emphasizes the intimidating nature of the early-morning search: as
the district court found, a weapon-bearing SWAT team entered Bendann’s home around 5
a.m. and handcuffed him undressed in his living room. Detective Markel told Bendann
about the search warrant but wouldn’t show it to him. And she told Bendann the warrant
authorized her to use his “face and hands to unlock his electronic devices.” J.A. 28.
But by the time Markel approached Bendann with the iPhone, Bendann was
uncuffed, clothed, and had been chatting politely with her. Markel didn’t hold the phone
up for long, she didn’t say anything, and Bendann entered his passcode within seconds.
On these facts, we can’t find that Bendann’s will was so overborne that he would
have felt compelled to enter his passcode. We thus agree with the district court’s
assessment that Bendann “voluntarily, perhaps even reflexively, enter[ed] the passcode.”
J.A. 30.
While it’s not always the case, here, the interrogation and voluntariness questions
are two sides of the same coin. It wasn’t an interrogation because Markel didn’t prompt
Bendann to do anything. And the statement was voluntary because Bendann made it
unprompted.
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IV.
Next, Jencks. We assess the district court’s decision not to review interview notes
in camera for clear error. United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 220 (4th Cir. 2018).
Bendann insists that the government didn’t produce Jencks material for Wallace
Halpert, one of several of the student’s classmates who testified. At trial, Halpert said that
he gave a statement to law enforcement, but he wasn’t sure whether his interviewers took
notes. The government, for its part, said it produced all the Jencks material it had.
Interview notes count as Jencks material—which a party must produce to the other
side—only if “the witness has reviewed them in their entirety” and “formally and
unambiguously approved them . . . as an accurate record of what he said during the
interview.” United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1301 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R.
Crim. P. 26.2. For a court to compel the government to produce purported Jencks material,
the defendant must “make a sufficiently specific request and provide some indication” that
a Jencks statement exists. United States v. Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1996). To
lay a foundation that the statement exists, the defendant must show (usually through crossexamination) that the witness reviewed and formally approved the notes of his interview.
See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 634 (4th Cir. 1995).
The district court found, and we agree, that Bendann didn’t lay such a foundation.
It’s exceedingly unlikely that a witness who’s unsure if interview notes existed would have
reviewed and formally adopted those notes as his own. And Bendann’s counsel didn’t ask
whether Halpert had reviewed and approved any notes.
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Bendann strains to suggest that because the government produced a Jencks
statement from Halpert’s mother, it necessarily created (and failed to produce) a statement
from her son. But that’s speculation, not evidence.
We find no error here, much less a clear one.
V.
We end with sentencing. We review evidentiary rulings—at sentencing and
otherwise—for abuse of discretion. United States v. Stitt, 564 F.3d 878, 896 (4th Cir.
2001); United States v. Myers, 402 F. App’x 844, 845 (4th Cir. 2010).
Bendann insists the district court abused its discretion by allowing emotionally
charged testimony from the student’s parents at his sentencing. He primarily objects to the
parents’ testimony about Bendann’s choice to exercise his trial right and the student’s
mother’s testimony that she couldn’t return to work after learning of the abuse. But
Bendann ignores the breadth of information courts can properly consider at sentencing.
Congress granted crime victims—defined broadly to include any person directly or
proximately harmed by the defendant’s conduct—“the right to be reasonably heard at any
public proceeding in the district court involving . . . sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(a)(4),
3771(e). Bendann doesn’t contest that the student’s parents count as victims, or at least
victim representatives.
Moreover, there’s “no limitation . . . on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person . . . which a court . . . may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Harm to the student’s
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immediate family—like the mother’s harms here—fits comfortably within the capacious
bucket of information relating to Bendann’s conduct. And family and societal harms are
probative of the seriousness of Bendann’s offense, which the district court had to consider
under § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Bendann’s behavior during the case is relevant to Bendann’s conduct and the
victims’ harms too. As the government clarified, the parents’ commentary on Bendann’s
choice to go to trial was within the context of Bendann’s continuing efforts to exercise
control over the student.
For example, the mother said Bendann’s “choice to hold press conferences in order
to proclaim his innocence” was “a calculated assertion of power” to make “sure our son
felt powerless and vulnerable.” JA 1624. In those conferences, Bendann referred to the
student as a “whining anonymous victim.” J.A. 1624. And the student’s father testified
that by maintaining his innocence, Bendann inflicted “further pain from public scrutiny”
on the family and “chose to maintain control just as he always had.” J.A. 1629. They said
the trial highlighted Bendann’s “complete lack of remorse.” J.A. 1624.
We agree with the government that the remarks were not critiques of Bendann’s
choice to exercise his constitutional rights, but observations about Bendann’s lack of
remorse and continuing manipulation. Those concerns are relevant to Bendann’s conduct
and character.
Even so, the district court touched on family harms only briefly—a passing
reference to “collateral harms on a nuclear family” within its discussion of the seriousness
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of Bendann’s offense. J.A. 3282. The court didn’t refer to Bendann’s choice to go to trial
or even to his conduct during the trial.
There are few limits on the evidence a district court can receive at sentencing. 7
That’s because we trust district court judges to weigh evidence appropriately based on their
experience and training.
As the district court said it would, it weighed only the portions of the parents’
testimony relevant to its 3553(a) analysis. We’re satisfied that the court appropriately
protected both the victims’ rights to be heard and Bendann’s right to a fair sentence.
AFFIRMED
7
There are, of course, some limits. But Bendann didn’t argue (for example) that
the parents’ testimony was unreliable, or that he was denied an opportunity to respond.
Nor did he argue that his sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
18