[Cite as Webb v. Morning View Delaware, Inc., 2026-Ohio-2441.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
PHILLIP WEBB, INDIVIDUALLY Case No. 25 CAE 11 0107
AND ON BEHALF OF ROXIE WEBB
Opinion and Judgment Entry
Plaintiff - Appellant
Appeal from the Delaware County Court of
-vs- Common Pleas, Case No. 24-CV-G-07-0697
MORNING VIEW DELAWARE, INC., Judgment: Reversed and Remanded
ET AL.,
Date of Judgment Entry: June 25, 2026
Defendants - Appellees
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges
APPEARANCES: Louis E. Grube, Esq., Michael J. Factor, Esq., Flowers & Grube, for Plaintiff-Appellant; Joseph F. Petros, III, Brendan M. Richard, Rolf Martin Lang, LLP, David J. Hudak, Esq., Brianna M. Prislipsky, Esq., Reminger Co., LPA for DefendantsAppellants.
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Phillip Webb appeals the July 29, 2025, and October 31,
2025 Judgment Entries entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Morning View Delaware,
Inc. d/b/a Country View of Sunbury; Foundations Health, Inc.; Foundations Health
Solutions, LLC; Adam/Anne Doe, the Facility Administrator of Country View of Sunbury;
David/Diane Doe, the Director of Nursing at Country View of Sunbury; and John/Jane
Doe, Registered Nurses 1-10.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellees Foundations Health, Inc., and Foundations Health Solutions,
LLC, own and operate Appellee Morning View Delaware, Inc. d/b/a Country View of
Sunbury (“Country View”), a healthcare facility and/or nursing home located at 14961 N.
Old 3C Highway, Sunbury, Ohio. On October 9, 2020, Roxie Webb (“Decedent”) was
admitted to Country View due to ongoing health issues including chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, osteoarthritis, chronic ischemic heart disease, hyperlipidemia,
dementia, and extrapyramidal and movement disorder.
{¶3} On July 22, 2024, Appellant, individually and on behalf of the Estate of
Roxie Webb, filed a complaint, naming Appellees Morning View Delaware, Inc. d/b/a
Country View of Sunbury; Foundations Health, Inc.; Foundations Health Solutions, LLC;
Adam/Anne Doe, the Facility Administrator of Country View of Sunbury; David/Diane
Doe, the Director of Nursing at Country View of Sunbury; and John/Jane Doe, Registered
Nurses 1-10, as defendants. The complaint asserted causes of action for negligence,
medical negligence, corporate negligence, and wrongful death.
{¶4} Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on August 21, 2024. Appellees argued
Appellant’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because Appellant did not have
standing to file the action as he had not been appointed Decedent’s personal
representative. Appellees alternatively maintained Appellant’s survivorship claims were
time barred as the complaint was filed more than one year after Decedent’s death. Via
Judgment Entry filed September 25, 2024, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to
dismiss as to Appellant’s wrongful death and survivorship claims. However, the trial
court denied, in part, Appellees’ motion as to Appellant’s three negligence claims.
{¶5} On October 4, 2024, Appellant, individually and on behalf of the Estate of
Decedent, filed an amended complaint, asserting claims for negligence, medical
negligence, and corporate negligence and adding allegations the statute of limitations on
his survivorship claim had been extended by the sending of 3 notice-of-claim letters to
Appellees. Appellees filed a timely answer and asserted over 35 affirmative defenses
including, inter alia, the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and
the statute of repose, and Appellant lacked standing.
{¶6} On June 20, 2025, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
Therein, Appellees asserted Appellant’s survivorship claim was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations for medical negligence claims pursuant to R.C. 2305.113(A) and the
notice-of-claim letters did not extend the statute of limitations as said letters were never
served as required by R.C. 2305.113(B). Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on July 18, 2025. Appellees filed a reply in
support on July 23, 2025.
{¶7} Via Judgment Entry filed July 29, 2025, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees. The trial court found Appellant’s survivorship claim was
based upon medical care and treatment; therefore, a medical claim subject to the oneyear statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.113(A). The trial court further found the
3 notice-of-claim letters counsel for Appellant sent pursuant to R.C. 2305.113(B)(1) were
ineffective and did not extend the statute of limitations. The trial court concluded
Appellant’s negligence and wrongful death claims were barred by the one-year statute of
limitations for medicals claims, and Appellant’s survivorship and wrongful death claims
were time-barred.
{¶8} On July 29, 2025, Appellees filed a motion for clarification of the July 29,
2025 Judgment Entry relative to the trial court’s finding, “[o]nly the negligence claims
alleged by [Appellant] in his individual capacity for loss of consortium remain.” July 29,
2025 Judgment Entry at p. 11. On July 31, 2025, Appellant filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the July 29, 2025 Judgment Entry, explaining Appellees did not move
for summary judgment on his wrongful death claim and requesting the trial court
reconsider its grant of summary judgment on said claim. Appellees filed a brief in
opposition to Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
{¶9} Via Judgment Entry filed September 9, 2025, the trial court granted both
Appellees’ motion for clarification and Appellant’s motion for partial reconsideration.
The trial court found, because Appellant clarified he did not intend to plead a loss of
consortium, no loss of consortium claim remained. The trial court also found, because
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment did not contain adequate notice the wrongful
death claim was at issue, the trial court reversed its decision granting summary judgment
on that claim.
{¶10} Based upon the trial court’s September 9, 2025 Judgment Entry, Appellees
filed a motion for summary judgment on Appellant’s wrongful death claim on September
23, 2025. Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. Appellees filed a reply
in support on October 28, 2025.
{¶11} Via Judgment Entry filed October 31, 2025, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellant’s wrongful death claim. The trial court noted
it had “already determined that the facts established a medical claim under the statutory
definition * * * and [Appellant’s] survivorship claims are barred by the statute of limitations for medical claims.” (Internal citations omitted.) October 31, 2025 Judgment
Entry at p. 3.
{¶12} It is from the July 29, 2025 and October 31, 2025 Judgment Entries
Appellant appeals, raising the following assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JULY 29, 2025, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ORDER BY HOLDING THAT R.C. 2305.113(B)’S 180-DAY
EXTENSION PERIOD DOES NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE DEFENDANT
ACTUALLY RECEIVES THE NOTICE-OF-CLAIM LETTER.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS OCTOBER 31, 2025,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER BY HOLDING THAT WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIMS INVOLVING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ARE SUBJECT
TO THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IN R.C. 2305.113(A) INSTEAD
OF THE TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IN R.C. 2125.02(F)(1).
Standard of Review
{¶13} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the
unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court.
Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). As such, this Court
reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio
St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
{¶14} Civ.R. 56 provides summary judgment may be granted only after the trial
court determines: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2)
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such
evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,
50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977).
{¶15} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material facts concerning the essential
elements of the nonmoving party's case. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996).
The moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of
the type listed in Civil Rule 56(C). Id. at 292-293. However, the moving party need not
support its motion for summary judgment with evidence negating his opponent's claim,
but may simply point out that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also R & R Plastics,
Inc. v. F.E. Myers Co., 92 Ohio App.3d 789, 807 (6th Dist. 1993).
{¶16} If the moving party satisfies this burden, then the non-moving party has the
reciprocal burden to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial remains. Dresher, 75 Ohio
St.3d at 293. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in
her pleadings but must point to or submit evidence of the type specified in Civ.R. 56(C).
Id.; Civ.R. 56(E). Types of evidence specified in Civ.R. 56 (C) are "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and
written stipulations of fact." Civ.R. 56(C).
I
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in
finding the 180-day extension period did not begin until Appellees received the notice-ofclaim letter. We agree.
Statutory Interpretation
{¶18} This case requires interpretation of R.C 2305.113. "[T]he interpretation and
application of a statute is a matter of law that an appellate court * * * reviews de novo."
State v. Schneider, 2021-Ohio-653, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.). Thus, we give no deference to the trial
court's interpretation of the statute.
{¶19} “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied without interpretation.”
(Internal quotations omitted.) Wilson v. Lawrence, 2017-Ohio-1410, ¶ 11, quoting
Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58 (1979), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio
St.2d 101 (1973). The “first step is always to determine whether the statute is ‘plain and
unambiguous.’” Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hurd, 89
Ohio St.3d 616, 618 (2000). “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous
and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of
statutory interpretation, because an unambiguous statute is to be applied, not
interpreted.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State ex rel. Beard v. Hardin, 2018-Ohio1286, ¶ 27, quoting Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, paragraph 5 of syllabus (1944).
{¶20} However, a statute is ambiguous if it is “capable of bearing more than one
meaning.” In addressing an ambiguous statute, courts “invoke rules of statutory
construction in order to arrive at the legislative intent.” Christe v. Gms Mgmt. Co., 88
Ohio St.3d 376, 377, 2000-Ohio-351, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth,
2000- Ohio 470. It is also well-settled “the General Assembly is fully aware of any prior
judicial interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an amendment.” (Internal
quotations omitted.) Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, quoting State ex rel.
Board of Education v. Howard, 167 Ohio St. 93, 96 (1957). Finally, courts must “give effect to the words the General Assembly has chosen, and we may neither add to nor delete
from the statutory language.” Gabbard v. Madison Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2021-Ohio-2067, ¶ 13, citing Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-511, ¶ 19.
Legislative History
{¶21} The following review of the legislative history of R.C. 2305.11 and R.C.
2305.113 was undertaken by the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Estate of Altizer v.
Arbors at Gallipolis, 2026-Ohio-369 (4th Dist.):
Effective October 20, 1987, former R.C. 2305.11(A), provided the
statute of limitations for a "medical claim" was one year. Former R.C.
2305.11(B)(1) provided:
an action upon a medical . . . claim . . . shall be commenced within
one year after the action accrued, except that, if prior to the expiration of
that one-year period, a claimant . . . who allegedly possessed a medical . . .
claim gives to the person who is the subject of that claim written notice that
the claimant is considering bringing an action upon that claim, that action
may be commenced against the person notified at any time within one
hundred eighty days after the notice is so given.
See Am. Sub. H.B. 327, 3322, 3323. This written notice to extend the
limitation period by 180 days has become known colloquially as the 180-day letter. See Crookston v. Lykins, 2024-Ohio-5131, ¶ 4 (5th Dist.). * * *
R.C. 2305.11 has been amended over the years, but it consistently
maintained a one-year statute of limitations that permitted potential
claimants to extend the limitation period by sending a 180-day letter to a
potential defendant before the one-year statute of limitation expired. * * *
Effective April 10, 2003, the General Assembly amended R.C.
2305.11(B), removing the one-year statute of limitation for medical claims
along with the 180-day letter provision. S.B. 281, 2002 Ohio Laws File 250.
In that same bill, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.113 and in
division B of that section it inserted the one-year statute of limitations for
medical claims, including the 180-day letter provision that was written
verbatim to the language in R.C. 2305.11(B).
Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37.
{¶22} R.C. 2305.113 was amended in 2019. “R.C. 2305.113(A) and (B)(1)
remained substantively unchanged by the amendment.” Id. at ¶ 38. R.C. 2305.113(A)
continued to provide a one-year statute of limitations for a medical claim, and (B)(1)
continued to permit a claimant to give written notice to the person, who was subject to a
medical claim, the claimant may commence an action within 180 days after the notice is
given. Id. However, R.C. 2305.113(B)(2) added the following new language:
A claimant who allegedly possesses a medical claim and who intends
to give to the person who is the subject of that claim the written notice
described in division (B)(1) of this section shall give that notice by sending
it by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to any of the
following:
(a) The person's residence;
(b) The person's professional practice;
(c) The person's employer;
(d) The business address of the person on file with the state medical
board or other appropriate agency that issued the person's professional
license.
Analysis
{¶23} In its July 29, 2025 Judgment Entry, the trial court concluded Appellant
failed to comply with R.C. 2305.113(B) to extend the statute of limitations by 180 days.
The trial court found:
The 180-day extension runs from the date that the notice is received
and not the date it is mailed. Smith v. Gill, 2010-Ohio-4012, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
See also Edens v. Barberton Area Family Practice Ctr., 43 Ohio St.3d 176
(1989), paragraph one of the syllabus (interpreting R.C. 2305.11(B),
predecessor to R.C. 2305.113(B), and holding that the notice must actually
be received and that the 180-day period commences when the notice is
received).
July 29, 2025 Judgment Entry at p. 8.
{¶24} In Edens v. Barberton Area Family Practice Ctr., 43 Ohio St.3d 176 (1989),
the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether, under former R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), notice was
effective when the 180-day letter was mailed or when it was received. The Court stated,
“[t]he purpose of this statute is to decrease the likelihood of frivolous medical malpractice claims by allowing parties and their attorneys additional time to investigate a potential
claim which is brought to their attention shortly before the one-year statute of limitations
expires.” Id. at pp. 177-178. The Court explained:
There are strong policy reasons behind designating the date of
mailing as the effective notice date. If the mail date is chosen, it is a date
certain since it would be the date plaintiff mails the notice, and not the
receipt date, over which the plaintiff has no control. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, by choosing the mail date as the effective date “* * *
abnormalities and variances in postal delivery will not normally be
permitted to extinguish a plaintiff's claim or unnecessarily extend it.”
(Citation omitted.) It can also be argued that if the General Assembly
intended the statute to mean notice is effective on the receipt date, it would
have used “receive” instead of “give.”
Id. at p. 178.
{¶25} The Edens Court focused its analysis on whether the statute provided the
manner in which notice was to be given, noting “in R.C. 2305.11, the General Assembly
does not prescribe the manner or form of giving notice but instead simply states that a
claimant should give written notice.” Id. at p. 179. Reaffirming its holding in Moore v.
Given, 39 Ohio St. 661, paragraph two of the syllabus (1884), “[w]here a statute requires
notice of a proceeding, but is silent concerning its form or manner of service, actual notice
will alone satisfy such requirement,” the Court held:
Where a statute such as R.C. 2305.11(B) is silent as to how notice is
to be effectuated, written notice will be deemed to have been given when
received. Therefore, under R.C. 2305.11(B), the one-hundred-eighty-day
period commences to run from the date the notice is received and not the
date it is mailed.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at syllabus.
{¶26} With the 2019 amendment, R.C. 2305.113 is no longer silent regarding the
manner of providing notice. Accordingly, we find Edens no longer dictates the 180-letter
is effective upon receipt. Consequently, we must look to the new language in R.C.
2305.113(B)(2) to determine when the 180-day notice becomes effective.
{¶27} Pursuant to R.C. 2305.113(B)(2), as set forth, supra, “[a] claimant who
allegedly possesses a medical claim and who intends to give to the person who is the
subject of that claim the written notice described in division (B)(1) of this section shall
give that notice by sending it by certified mail, return receipt requested, * * *.” (Emphasis
added.). Thus, we conclude notice of the 180-day letter is no longer effective upon receipt,
but rather when that notice is given “by certified mail, return receipt requested.” Had the
legislature intended the 180-day period to commence on the date of receipt of the notice,
it would have said so explicitly. See Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d at 278. (“It is
presumed that the General Assembly is fully aware of any prior judicial interpretation of
an existing statute when enacting an amendment.”).
{¶28} As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Edens, former R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) was
enacted in order “to decrease the likelihood of frivolous medical malpractice claims by
allowing parties and their attorneys additional time to investigate a potential claim which is brought to their attention shortly before the one-year statute of limitations expires.”
Edens, 43 Ohio St.3d at 177-78. The notice provision extending the statute of limitations
is remedial. Marshall v. Ortega, 1998 WL 702369, *10 (8th Dist.), aff'd, Marshall v.
Ortega, 87 Ohio St.3d 522 (2000). When a statute is remedial in nature, the statute must
be given a liberal construction to permit cases to be decided upon their merits, after a
court indulges every reasonable presumption and resolves all doubts in favor of giving,
rather than denying, the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate. Lewis v. Medcentral Health
Sys., 2024-Ohio-533, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), citing Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union's
Mtge. Co., 2011-Ohio-1961, ¶ 7, citing Draher v. Walters, 130 Ohio St. 92 (1935).
{¶29} Because R.C. 2305.113 is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed
in favor of giving the plaintiff, Appellant herein, an opportunity to litigate his case on the
merits, we find the trial court erred in finding the 180-day extension period did not begin
until Appellees received the notice-of-claim letter.
{¶30} Appellant’s first assignment of error is sustained.
II
{¶31} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees based upon a finding a wrongful
death claim which involved medical negligence was subject to the one-year statute of
limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.113(A) rather than the two-year statute of limitations
prescribed in R.C. 2125.02(F)(1).
{¶32} In light of our disposition of Appellant’s first assignment of error and for
the same reasons discussed therein, we, likewise, sustain this assignment of error.
{¶33} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is reversed
and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the
law.
{¶34} Costs assessed to Appellees.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.