[Cite as State ex rel. King Rd. Holdings, Ltd. v. Lucas Cty. Engineer, 2026-Ohio-2437.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO EX. REL. KING COURT OF APPEALS NO. {48}L-25-00249
ROAD HOLDINGS, LTD
TRIAL COURT NO. CI0202404821
APPELLANT
V.
LUCAS COUNTY ENGINEER, ET
AL.
APPELLEE
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: June 26, 2026
*****
Kent D. Riesen, for appellant.
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, John A. Borell,
Kevin A. Pituch, and Elaine B. Szuch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys,
for appellee.
*****
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Relator-appellant, State of Ohio ex rel. King Road Holdings, Ltd., appeals
the October 13, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, granting
judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondents-appellees, the Lucas County Engineer and the Lucas County Board of Commissioners (collectively, “the county”). For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
{¶ 2} King Road Holdings, Ltd. owns property at 3611 King Road in Sylvania
Township. This property is situated at the intersection of King Road and University
Parks Trail, a pedestrian and bicycle path maintained by Metroparks Toledo. At some
point—KRH does not allege when—the Lucas County Engineer installed a traffic light at
the intersection of King and the trail and placed a stop bar immediately in front of KRH’s
driveway, the only entrance to the property. There is no sign instructing motorists to
avoid blocking the driveway, thus when the stoplight is activated, traffic stops in front of
the driveway, preventing ingress and egress to KRH’s property for anywhere between 30
seconds and three-and-a-half minutes.
{¶ 3} KRH claims that the installation of the traffic light and placement of the stop
bar have substantially disrupted its business operations,1 caused a safety threat to its
employees, customers, and tenants, affected its ability to rent, lease, or develop the
property in the future, and negatively affected the fair market value of the property. It
filed this action in mandamus seeking an order from the common-pleas court directing
the county to institute an appropriation hearing to take the property and compensate it for
damages, “and/or” install a second entrance to the property. Alternatively, KRH sought
1
The nature of KRH’s business is not specified.
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damages for the county’s interference with its right of access to the property, which, it
alleged, has created circuity of travel within its property.
{¶ 4} The county filed an answer, admitting that it installed the traffic signal to
allow pedestrians and bicyclists to safely cross King Road, but denying that the
installation of the traffic signal constituted a compensable taking of KRH’s property. It
also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C).
A. The Parties’ Arguments on the County’s Civ.R. 12(C) Motion
{¶ 5} The county argued that no compensable taking occurred when it installed the
traffic signal and stop bar. First, it maintained that there had been no physical taking of
the property, but it also claimed that there had been no substantial or unreasonable
interference with KRH’s property rights because (1) the traffic signal is not located on
KRH’s property; (2) although access to the property may be temporarily blocked for
approximately 30 seconds each time the traffic signal is activated, the traffic signal does
not deny motorists access to KRH’s place of business; and (3) the traffic signal only
occasionally stops traffic on King Road and only during daylight when the trail is open.
It likened the circumstances of the case to other cases where courts have held that
changes in the directional flow of traffic making access to relators’ properties less direct
were not compensable takings.
{¶ 6} The county insisted that KRH’s assertion that the blockage of its driveway
creates circuity of travel within one’s property is a legal conclusion that the trial court
should ignore. It claimed that as a matter of law, the occasional use of the King Road
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traffic signal does not create a denial of access rising to the level of an unconstitutional
taking, nor does it constitute a substantial, material, or unreasonable interference with
ingress and egress to the property. The county contended that “mere circuity of travel”
does not itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress where any
resulting interference is shared with the general public and is necessary in the public
interest to make travel safer and more efficient. It argued that here, the “denial of access”
is an inconvenience shared with the general public and is needed to make travel safer.
Finally, the county urged that there had been no breach of any mandatory obligation
under the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“OMUTCD”). It reiterated
that the traffic signal only temporarily delays ingress and egress to KRH’s property, but
does not deny ingress and egress as would, for instance, a median strip preventing left
turns.
{¶ 7} KRH responded that to establish a taking, it need only prove that the county
substantially or unreasonably interfered with a property right—it need not prove an actual
physical taking of the property. It emphasized that it possesses a private right of ingress
and egress to and from its property, and the impairment of its use is a taking. KRH
denied that it shares this inconvenience with the general public because the placement of
the stop bar is in front of its property and access to only its property is impeded. It
insisted that a total deprival of access is not needed to constitute a taking. KRH
maintained that the blockage of its driveway is not a mere inconvenience of travel, but
rather a direct impairment of access. It disagreed with the county that this is an
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occasional or temporary taking because there is no finite start and end to the taking. In
any event, KRH asserted, a temporary taking can still constitute a compensable taking—
that it is temporary simply impacts the measure of damages.
{¶ 8} KRH clarified that it had alleged a circuity of travel within its property—not
a circuity of travel to and from its property; the former is compensable, while the latter is
not. KRH explained that circuity of travel within one’s property occurs when an entrance
or exit is removed and another is not created. KRH distinguished cases cited by the
county involving circuity of travel to and from the relators’ properties. Finally, KRH
pointed out that under the OMUTCD, there were other ways for the county to accomplish
its goals without impeding access to KRH’s property, such as by moving the stop bar or
erecting a sign cautioning motorists not to block the driveway.
{¶ 9} The county replied by pointing out that there exist no cases where an Ohio
court has held that the placement of a traffic signal near a relator’s real property
constitutes a substantial or unreasonable interference with a property right. It warned that
countless claims would be filed if a property owner is permitted compensation based on
the placement of a traffic light. The county contended that the placement of a traffic
signal—particularly one that stops traffic only when a pedestrian asks it to do so—“can
never be such a permanent interference so as to be classified as either substantial and/or
unreasonable.”
{¶ 10} Finally, the county disputed that the traffic signal created circuity of travel
within KRH’s property given that no entrance to or exit from KRH’s property had been
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removed. It maintained that the situation here is more akin to circuity of travel to and
from real property, such as where a median has been installed preventing direct access
and making travel to and from the property more difficult. It emphasized that the traffic
signal only occasionally stops traffic and only when a pedestrian or bicyclist pushes the
button; motorists are not permanently denied access to the driveway—they experience a
delay of 30 seconds or so based on the timing of the signal and the existence of stopped
traffic on King; and delay is reduced in the wintertime, when there is decreased
pedestrian and bicycle traffic, and at night when the trail is closed.
B. The Trial Court’s Decision on the Civ.R. 12(C) Motion
{¶ 11} The trial court granted the county’s motion and dismissed KRH’s petition.
It concluded that despite construing the factual allegations in KRH’s favor, KRH failed to
show that the installation of the stoplight constituted a compensable taking.
{¶ 12} The court recognized that an elemental right of real property is the right to
access public roadways from the property, and a taking occurs when access to an abutting
public roadway has been eliminated. It clarified that this right to access public roadways
“does not expand to the maintenance of traffic past the property.” The court
acknowledged that KRH’s complaint alleged that the installation of the pedestrianactivated stoplight had caused substantial interference to enjoyment of the property by
eliminating access to the only means of ingress and egress. But it determined that
“[d]enial of access alone is only sufficient to show a taking ‘[w]hen a state action
completely deprives a property owner of all access to an abutting roadway.’” And here, it
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found, there had been no complete deprival of access to the property, nor could KRH
show that “the property has been deprived of all economically viable use due to
occasional 30-second delays to ingress/egress.”
{¶ 13} The court cited Ohio Supreme Court case law recognizing that “[m]ere
circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created, to and from real property does not of
itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress to and from such
property, where any resulting interference is but an inconvenience shared in common
with the general public and is necessary in the public interest to make travel safer and
more efficient.” It found that the potential traffic delays amount to nothing more than a
mere inconvenience; the entrance was not removed; the traffic signal alters traffic on
King Road as a whole, burdening not just KRH, but also the general public; and a review
of Ohio case law reveals that more substantial interferences have been found not to
warrant mandamus relief. The court concluded that “[t]here is no fact pattern in which
this Court can find Relator’s property has been taken and therefore Respondents have no
legal duty to institute appropriation proceedings.” It found that “[a]t worst, Relator has
suffered from a minor inconvenience of access to/from the property.” As such, the court
held that KRH failed to establish a clear legal right requiring the county to commence
appropriation proceedings.
{¶ 14} KRH appealed. It assigns the following errors for our review:
1. The trial court erred granting Appellees’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings as there is (sic) genuine issues of fact that a partial taking had
occurred as circuity of travel within one’s property was created with the
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burden substantially impacting only Appellant and there is a substantial
interference with the Appellant’s right to access the roadway.
2. The trial court erred by failed (sic) to follow the standard for
judgment on the pleadings and by not allowing the case to be decided on its
merits.
3. The trial court erred by failing to use the Penn Central factors if its
decision was based on financial deprivation.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} KRH’s assignments of error all pertain to its position that the trial court
erred when it granted the county’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. In
its first assignment of error, it claims that there were genuine issues of fact that circuity of
travel within KRH’s property was created, substantially interfering with its right to access
the roadway, and KRH bore the sole burden of this interference. In its second assignment
of error, KRH argues that the trial court failed to follow the Civ.R. 12(C) standard. And
in its third assignment of error it contends that the trial court failed to employ the proper
test applicable to general regulatory takings.
{¶ 16} The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the county. A
motion for judgment on the pleadings does not permit merit determinations of the claims
asserted but is limited to resolving questions of law. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc.
v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570 (1996), citing Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio
St.2d 161, 166 1973). Under Civ.R. 12(C), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
In considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the trial court may review only “the complaint and
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the answer as well as any material incorporated by reference or attached as exhibits to
those pleadings.” Walker v. City of Toledo, 2017-Ohio-416, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). Employing
the same standard as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the trial court must construe as true the material allegations in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at ¶
18, citing McMullian v. Borean, 2006-Ohio-3867, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.); Ohio Manufacturers’
Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, 2016-Ohio-3038, ¶ 10, citing Rayess v.
Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18. If it appears
from the pleadings and the materials incorporated by reference or attached as exhibits
that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief, the trial court may
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under Civ.R. 12(C). Ohio Manufacturers’ Assn. at ¶ 10. We
review the trial court’s judgment de novo. Reister v. Gardner, 2020-Ohio-5484, ¶ 17.
A. Circuity of Travel and Substantial Interference
{¶ 17} KRH argues that as an owner of property abutting a public road, it has a
right to a private easement for ingress and egress. It maintains that the county may not
substantially impair that right without compensation. KRH claims that a taking can occur
where roadway access rights have been impaired, and it insists that a taking need not be
total—it can occur where there has been substantial or unreasonable interference with
access rights. It contends that the creation of circuity of travel within one’s own property
is compensable and argues that Ohio courts have held that the removal or shortening of
entrances creates circuity of travel within the property and constitutes a taking even
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where some access remains. Here, KRH claims, the stop bar eliminates the existing
access point to its property for significant periods with no alternate entrance, thereby
creating compensable circuity within the parcel. It recounts that there had been
pre-installation discussions about moving the stop bar or adding “do not block driveway”
signage, but the county rejected these options, concluding that it would be “cheaper” to
allow KRH’s driveway to be blocked.
{¶ 18} KRH contends that the trial court incorrectly held that total denial of access
is required to constitute a taking. It emphasizes that contrary to the court’s opinion, the
public does not share the burden here, as the stop bar affects only traffic trying to access
KRH’s property and no other landowner’s driveway is blocked. KRH maintains that the
obstruction uniquely burdens its property because right turns can be made into the
property on the other side of the road even when the traffic light is activated. It disputes
that delays are only 30 seconds long. KRH explains that times of peak trail use, school
traffic, repeated activations, and unsynchronized lights create longer denials of ingress
and egress. It argues that the taking is not “temporary” in the finite sense—it is
permanent insofar as the signal is ongoing and open-ended. Alternatively, KRH notes
that even a temporary taking is compensable, and appropriation is the remedy.
{¶ 19} The county responds that no physical taking occurred because the traffic
signal is not on KRH’s property, and it argues that no regulatory taking occurred given
that the signal causes only brief, occasional delays, does not completely deny access to
KRH’s property, and is at most a minor inconvenience. The county maintains that KRH
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admitted that access is only “limited”—not denied—thereby undermining its claim of
complete deprivation of access. It relies on Ohio Supreme Court authority that mere
circuity of travel or less convenient access is noncompensable, and abutting property
owners have no property right to traffic flow. The county analogizes the circumstances of
this case to cases involving the placement of medians and dividers, where courts have
found that such traffic-control measures are police-power regulations, not takings. It
argues that any burden here is shared with the public and nearby properties.
{¶ 20} We begin by recognizing that mandamus is the proper procedure for
resolving this conflict. Specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that
“[u]nder Ohio law, ‘[m]andamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is
alleged.’” State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, L.L.C. v. Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-7640,
¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 53. To be entitled to
extraordinary relief in mandamus, the relator must prove by clear and convincing
evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) a clear legal duty on the part of
the respondent to provide it; and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. Id. at ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 2012-Ohio-69, ¶ 6.
{¶ 21} Under Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, “[p]rivate property
shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. . . . [W]here private
property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made in
money . . . and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for
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benefits to any property of the owner.” Likewise, the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits the taking of private property “for public use, without just
compensation.”
{¶ 22} “[T]o establish a taking, a landowner must demonstrate a substantial or
unreasonable interference with a property right.” State ex rel. OTR v. Columbus, 76 Ohio
St.3d 203, 206 (1996). “Such an interference may involve the actual physical taking of
real property, or it may include the deprivation of an intangible interest in the premises.”
Id., citing Smith v. Erie RR. Co., 134 Ohio St. 135 (1938), paragraph one of the syllabus.
A taking may occur even where the owner is only partially deprived of the uses of his
land. Id. at 207, quoting Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 471 (1902).
{¶ 23} It is well-established that “[o]ne of the elemental rights growing out of the
ownership of a parcel of real property is the right to access abutting public roadways.”
Id., citing State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97 (1955), paragraph one of the
syllabus. In Linzell, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that “[a]n owner of property
abutting on a public highway possesses, as a matter of law, not only the right to the use of
the highway in common with other members of the public, but also a private right or
easement for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from his property, which latter right
may not be taken away or destroyed or substantially impaired without compensation
therefor.” Linzell at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 24} Respecting the right to ingress and egress to and from one’s property, a
government “may, in the lawful exercise of police power, regulate a property owner’s
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easement of access without compensation so long as there is no denial of ingress and
egress.” State ex rel. Habash v. Middletown, 2005-Ohio-6688, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). To that
end, courts recognize a distinction between the regulation of public roadways in such a
manner as to cause circuity of travel to and from the property—which is not
compensable—and circuity of travel within the property—which may be compensable.
Id.
{¶ 25} Circuity of travel to and from one’s property occurs when a street or
highway project causes access to the property to be less direct. In Richley v. Jones, 38
Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1974), for example, a median was constructed, which prevented left
turns into or out of the property. In State ex rel. Noga v. Masheter, 42 Ohio St.2d 471
(1975), a highway was widened, a curb barricade was installed, and a service road was
constructed, all of which prevented access to the relator’s property straight from the
highway, instead creating a less direct route to the property via the service road. Those
cases recognize the well-established rule that “[m]ere circuity of travel, necessarily and
newly created, to and from real property does not of itself result in legal impairment of
the right of ingress and egress to and from such property, where any resulting interference
is but an inconvenience shared in common with the general public and is necessary in the
public interest to make travel safer and more efficient.” Linzell at 102.
{¶ 26} “Circuity of travel within one’s own property occurs when one entrance or
exit way is removed and another is not created.” (Emphasis added.) Habash at ¶ 16.
Circuity of travel created within one’s property “is compensable where the burden is
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placed solely on the owner’s property and not on the general public.” Id. at ¶ 16. As
alluded to above, “the state may, in the lawful exercise of police power, regulate a
property owner’s easement of access without compensation so long as there is no denial
of ingress and egress.” (Emphasis in original.) Castrataro v. City of Lyndhurst, 1992 WL
209578, *3 (8th Dist. Aug. 27, 1992). Such regulation “must be consistent with and
promote the safety, comfort, health and general welfare of the public.” Id. “The critical
issue . . . is whether the action taken by the state amounts to a mere regulation to promote
the public safety, comfort, health and welfare or whether such action amounts to a
compensable taking.” Id. To constitute a taking, the property owner must show “a
substantial, material or unreasonable interference with the physical access to or from the
property.” Id. The question in these cases is “whether a regulation becomes so
substantial as to amount to a taking.” Id.
{¶ 27} In Castrataro, the relators maintained two easements of access to and from
their property via driveways located on the eastern and western sides of the property. The
respondent erected a barrier completely blocking the westerly driveway. The Eighth
District found that by destroying relators’ easement of access via the westerly driveway,
the respondent “effectuated a taking of [relators’] property rights which so substantially
hinder[ed relators’] access to and from Mayfield Road as to constitute a compensable
taking pursuant to the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” Id. at * 4.
{¶ 28} In State of Ohio ex rel. Thieken v. Proctor, 2006-Ohio-4596, ¶ 14 (10th
Dist.), relator owned property at the corner of State Routes 7 and 775, which was being
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operated as a gas station. The Ohio Department of Transportation undertook a curbing
project that reduced access to the gas station via S.R. 7 from 116 feet to a single ingressegress of only 30 feet in width. Relator sought an order requiring ODOT to initiate
appropriation proceedings and compensate him for the substantial or unreasonable
interference with access to his property. He argued that the curbing unreasonably and
substantially interfered with access to his property, made it impossible to maintain the
property as a gas station—which experts agreed was the highest and best use of the
property—and amounted to a compensable taking. Relator maintained that it was
essential to have two curb cuts along S.R. 7 to maintain the property as a gas station. He
presented evidence that customers who drive large trucks must stop traffic on S.R. 7 and
back out of the property onto the roadway, causing a safety hazard. ODOT argued that
access had merely been regulated, not denied, and the burden was shared by the general
public—a contention that relator disputed. The Tenth District found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact preventing summary judgment in favor of ODOT.
{¶ 29} In Hilliard v. First Indus., L.P., 2004-Ohio-5836, ¶ 2 (10th Dist.), the city
undertook a project that eliminated a full-access point to relator’s property, created only a
limited-access point approximately 1,500 feet away from the original access point, and
destroyed an internal service road leading to relator’s loading dock. Only relator’s
property was affected by this project. The court explained that the project had caused
circuity of travel within relator’s property because it had taken away a point of ingress
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and egress without creating another point of ingress and egress, and it was not an
inconvenience shared with the general public.
{¶ 30} In State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks, 2023-Ohio-2517, ODOT destroyed
the driveways that connected the property to East 93rd Street, eliminated the property’s
easement access to Woodland Avenue, and did not replace the driveways or provide
alternative curb-cut access. This construction rendered the property inaccessible to
lawful vehicular traffic. To obtain access, the property owner would need to obtain a
permit from the city of Cleveland and rebuild the driveways himself. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that “ODOT’s construction project has deprived the property of all access to
an abutting roadway and thus constitutes a taking.” Id. at ¶ 12.
On the other hand, in City of Steubenville v. Schmidt, 2002-Ohio-6894, ¶ 20 (7th
Dist.), the relator owned land on which a Burger King was operated; a McDonald’s was
located just west of relator’s property. Burger King and McDonald’s shared an entrance
to their parking lots. Because of heavy traffic in the area, the city moved a stoplight,
widened a road, and repaved and widened a rear entrance to relator’s parking lot. The
stoplight was originally positioned in a manner that allowed a left-hand turn directly into
the Burger King and McDonald’s parking lot. Movement of the stoplight made left-hand
turns into and out of the parking lot more difficult. The court found that there had been
no compensable taking arising from the movement of the traffic light because all
entrances and exits remained intact, the rear entrance was greatly improved, and relator’s
property was not the only property affected—the McDonald’s property was affected too.
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The court opined that movement of the stoplight and widening of the road was more akin
to the placement of a median strip, the addition of which would constitute a proper
exercise of police power, create circuity of access to the property, and be deemed
noncompensable.
{¶ 31} No Ohio case has directly addressed the precise issue raised by KRH, but a
Georgia court considered a similar issue in Eastside Properties v. Dept. of Transp., 498
S.E.2d 769 (Ga.App. 1998). There, the plaintiff had one driveway abutting the public
road. To improve the flow of traffic and increase safety, DOT constructed traffic control
devices and repositioned stop bars in order to prevent unsafe and uncontrolled
movements of traffic across and along the subject street. The project did not physically
alter the plaintiff’s driveway, but the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the repositioning of
the stop bar resulted in its entrance being blocked more than 50 percent of the time each
business day. Plaintiff argued that the repositioning of the stop bar constituted a
compensable taking.
{¶ 32} Under Georgia law, the court first considered whether the inconvenience
caused by the repositioning of the stop bar was shared by the public in general, which
was not compensable, or whether it was special to the landowner, which may be
compensable. The court observed that “‘if [a landowner] has the same access to the
highway as he did before the closing, his damage is not special, . . . although it may be
greater in degree, as that of the general public, and he has lost no property right for which
he is entitled to compensation.’” (Empasis in original.) Id. at 772, quoting Dougherty
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County v. Snelling, 208 S.E.2d 362 (Ga.App.1974).2 The court noted that the Georgia
Supreme Court had recognized that inconvenience caused by traffic flow and traffic
volume is an inconvenience shared by the public in general. Moreover, the court
concluded that while inconvenient to the plaintiff, the repositioning of the stop bar did
not give rise to a compensable taking because the plaintiff’s driveway had not been
altered.
{¶ 33} Here, we find that installation of the traffic signal and placement of the stop
bar created neither circuity of travel to and from KRH’s property nor circuity of travel
within KRH’s property. It did not reroute access to the property, nor did it eliminate an
access point. The light and the stop bar merely regulate traffic—a proper exercise of
police power—creating brief, intermittent impediments to access lasting between 30
seconds to three-and-a-half minutes each time the signal is activated. The length and
frequency of the blockage vary depending on the amount of pedestrian and motor-vehicle
traffic. The inconvenience caused by the traffic signal is shared with the general public
insofar as motorists, too, are unable to pass the intersection when the traffic signal is
activated. All persons stopped by the light experience a delay in getting to their
destinations—not just motorists who are seeking to turn in or out of KRH’s parking lot.
As such, we conclude that as a matter of law, the delays caused by the installation of the
stoplight and placement of the stop bar do not constitute a substantial, material, or
2
The quote attributed to Snelling is not contained in that decision. The quoted language does appear in other cases that predate Snelling, including Tift Cnty. v. Smith, 131 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Ga. 1963).
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unreasonable interference with the physical access to or from or within KRH’s property,
KRH has no clear legal right to the relief requested, and the county has no clear legal
duty to provide the relief requested.
{¶ 34} We find KRH’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
B. The Standard for Granting Judgment on the Pleadings
{¶ 35} KRH argues that the court improperly resolved disputed facts when it
concluded that the traffic signal caused only 30-second delays, rather than the variable
delays alleged by KRH. It complains that no discovery occurred to determine the total
time that access to its property was blocked.
{¶ 36} The county responds that discovery would not change the undisputed fact
that any delays caused by the installation of the traffic signal and stop bar are brief and
occasional. It insists that no Ohio appellate court has found a traffic signal like this to be
a compensable taking.
{¶ 37} It does appear that the trial court assumed that the activation of the light
causes only 30-second delays even though KRH alleged that the delays could be longer
and were variable. In considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the trial court must construe as
true the material allegations in the complaint. Walker, 2017-Ohio-416, at ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).
Here, given our conclusions that (1) the installation of the light and placement of the stop
bar did not eliminate ingress and egress, and (2) inconvenience caused by the light was
shared with the general public, we cannot say that the allegations concerning the length
or frequency of the delays caused by the stoplight were material. See, e.g., State ex rel.
19.
Midwest Pride IV, Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d at 570 (finding that the one fact the court failed to
construe in appellant’s favor was not material).
{¶ 38} As explained earlier in this decision, we perform a de novo review of a trial
court judgment granting a Civ.R. 12(C) motion. Reister, 2020-Ohio-5484, at ¶ 17. “De
novo review means that this court conducts an ‘independent review of the trial court’s
decision without any deference to the trial court’s determination.’” (Citation omitted.)
Hoeflinger v. AM Mart, LLC, 2017-Ohio 7530, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.). In our de-novo review of
the trial court’s decision, we have accepted as true KRH’s assertion that delays may be as
long as three-and-a-half minutes and vary in frequency. We have concluded that
regardless of the frequency or length of the delays caused by the stoplight, installation of
the stoplight and placement of the stop bar did not give rise to a compensable taking. As
such, any claim that the trial court erred by resolving disputed facts against KRH has
been subsumed by our appellate review.
{¶ 39} We find KRH’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
C. Failure to Apply the Penn Central Test
{¶ 40} KRH argues that despite the trial court’s statement to the contrary, in cases
involving the denial or impairment of access to abutting roads, the landowner need not
establish the deprivation of all economically viable uses of the land. It maintains that this
“is the standard for a complete regulatory taking, but not for partial takings.” KRH
maintains that this case involves a right of access and not a general regulatory taking,
thus it was not required to show the loss of all economically viable uses of the property.
20.
It insists that even if this case involved a general regulatory taking, the trial court erred by
failing to apply the factors set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) for determining “when ‘justice
and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”
Those factors include (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations, and
(3) the character of the governmental action.
{¶ 41} The trial court’s decision suggests that it believed that KRH was required to
establish the deprivation of all economically viable uses of the land (“Relator [cannot]
show the property has been deprived of all economically viable use due to occasional 30-second delays to ingress/egress. . . . [N]owhere has Relator alleged a deprivation of all
economically viable use of the property or having to shut down the business.”)
{¶ 42} We agree with KRH that it was not required to establish the loss of all
economically viable uses of the property—it was required to show only that the county’s
action substantially or unreasonably interfered with its right of access to the abutting
roadway. OTR, 76 Ohio St.3d at 207; Balunek, 2023-Ohio-2517, at ¶ 10. But as for the
trial court’s failure to apply the Penn Central factors, Ohio courts do not apply Penn
Central to claims involving interference with the right of access to an abutting roadway.
They apply the test we applied above—whether the government’s action substantially or
unreasonably interfered with the landowner’s right of access to the abutting roadway.
21.
Because the Penn Central factors are not applicable, the trial court did not err in failing to
apply them.
{¶ 43} We find KRH’s third assignment of error not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 44} Installation of the traffic signal and accompanying stop bar created neither
circuity of travel to and from KRH’s property nor circuity of travel within KRH’s
property. The light and the stop bar merely regulate traffic, creating brief, intermittent
impediments to access lasting between 30 seconds to three-and-a-half minutes. The
inconvenience caused by the traffic signal is shared with the general public because all
motorists stopped by the light experience a delay in getting to their destinations—not just
motorists who are seeking to turn in or out of KRH’s parking lot. As a matter of law, the
delays caused by the installation of the stoplight and placement of the stop bar do not
constitute a substantial, material, or unreasonable interference with the physical access to
or from KRH’s property. We find KRH’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 45} Although the trial court appears to have assumed that the activation of the
light caused 30-second delays when KRH had alleged that the delays were longer and
were variable, allegations concerning the length or frequency of the delays caused by the
stoplight were not material. We find KRH’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 46} The Penn Central factors are not applicable to claims involving
interference with the right of access to an abutting roadway, thus the trial court did not err
in failing to apply these factors. We find KRH’s third assignment of error not well-taken.
22.
{¶ 47} We affirm the October 13, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas. KRH is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
23.