2026 IL App (1st) 240305
No. 1-24-0305
Opinion filed June 26, 2026
Sixth Division
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 99 CR 2258 01
)
JUAN SANCHEZ, ) The Honorable
) Michael Obbish,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Gamrath dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Juan Sanchez appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his successive
postconviction petition, challenging his mandatory natural-life sentence as unconstitutional under
the proportionate penalties clause. While recent supreme court caselaw has found that petitioners
have always had the essential legal tools to raise these claims, we agree with Sanchez that the
evolving brain science on adolescent development provides him with reason to bring this claim
now, more than two decades after his sentencing hearing.
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¶2 Further, because we take his factual allegations as true at this stage, we find that Sanchez
made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. In addition to this new science, his
petition describes growing up under abuse and neglect, as well as coming of age in an environment
that normalized sexual relationships between teenagers and men. Given his young age at the time
of his offense, Sanchez was already more prone to impulsive and immature behavior, and his
chaotic and violent background furthered this risk. Sanchez’s claim should be heard in full at an
evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Juan Sanchez sought postconviction relief, attacking as unconstitutional his mandatory
natural-life sentence. The trial court had imposed that sentence under a recidivism statute (720
ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 1998)), despite asserting it was “clearly not convinced” that Sanchez,
who was 20 years old at the time of the offense, should be in prison for the rest of his life.
¶5 Many years after that sentencing hearing, the circuit court granted Sanchez leave to file a
successive postconviction petition attacking his sentence in part by citing the evolving science on
adolescent brain development and pertinent life experiences. But at the second stage of
proceedings, the court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the new science
supporting Sanchez’s claim.
¶6 A. Bench Trial
¶7 T.T. testified that she accompanied Juan Sanchez, a 20-year-old friend of the family, to run
errands when she was 13 years old. (We refer to T.T. by her initials, consistent with custom. People
v. Munoz-Salgado, 2016 IL App (2d) 140325, ¶ 1 n.1). Sanchez parked the car and tried to kiss
her, but she pushed him away. Undeterred, he continued to kiss her, undress her, and penetrate her
vagina with his fingers and penis. When he stopped, T.T. put on her clothes and jumped in the
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back seat as Sanchez drove off. When she recognized where they were, she fled from the car and
ran back to the mall where Sanchez had picked her up. A doctor testified to observing bruises on
T.T.’s nipples and around her vagina. Out of court, Sanchez admitted having sex with T.T. but
denied she had told him to stop. The court found Sanchez guilty of aggravated criminal sexual
assault.
¶8 At sentencing, Sanchez spoke about changing his life around while awaiting trial for
several years. The court considered laudatory letters from the chaplains running the life learning
program at the jail. And the presentence investigation noted, among other things, that Sanchez
suffered physical and mental abuse by his mother while a child. In aggravation, the State presented
Sanchez’s prior conviction for criminal sexual assault, which he committed three years before this
offense, at age 17.
¶9 Given that prior conviction, the sentencing court concluded that the law “mandates” a
mandatory natural-life sentence. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 1998). But the trial court stated
that, although Sanchez should receive a harsh punishment, it was “clearly not convinced” that
Sanchez should be in prison for life.
¶ 10 B. Direct Appeal
¶ 11 Sanchez contended on appeal that his sentence violated (1) the proportionate penalties
clause of our state constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.); (2) his federal constitutional
rights pursuant to the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and (3) his
right to a trial by jury under our state constitution. We affirmed. People v. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App.
3d 74, 77 (2003).
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¶ 12 C. Prior Collateral Proceedings
¶ 13 In 2004, Sanchez first petitioned for postconviction relief. The circuit court summarily
dismissed his petition as frivolous and patently without merit. This court affirmed. People v.
Sanchez, No. 1-04-2986, 365 Ill. App. 3d 1103 (2006) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 14 In 2006, Sanchez sought relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2006)). The circuit court dismissed his petition. This court
affirmed. People v. Sanchez, 384 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (2008) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 15 D. Successive Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 16 In 2019, Sanchez sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Relying in part
on evolving science on adolescent brain development, he contended that his mandatory life
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of our state constitution. He attached many
studies in support, each written by a scientist or legal scholar. He contended that his own actions
in this case “could be attributed to adolescent brain underdevelopment” and that, given his young
age during both offenses, he had a “strong potential” for rehabilitation.
¶ 17 In 2020, the circuit court advanced Sanchez’s petition to the second stage and appointed
counsel.
¶ 18 In 2023, counsel supplemented the petition by (i) cataloging recent supreme court caselaw;
(ii) appending additional material on the evolving science on adolescent brain development; and
(iii) arguing, with citation to a 13-page affidavit Sanchez wrote, how Sanchez experiences leading
up to the assault evinced his lack of maturity, his vulnerability to negative influences, and his lack
of a fixed character. Counsel contended: “Not only was recent caselaw and scientific evidence
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regarding emerging adults not available at [the] 2001 sentencing, but the sentencing court was
unable to use any individualized information it had available at the time.”
¶ 19 In 2024, the circuit court dismissed Sanchez’s petition, granting the State’s motion. The
court first found that res judicata barred Sanchez’s claim because he had challenged the sentence
as a violation of the proportionate penalties clause on direct appeal. Next, citing People v. Dorsey,
2021 IL 123010, the court found that Sanchez could not establish cause for failing to raise this
claim in his initial postconviction petition. Finally, the court found that Sanchez failed to show
how the evolving brain science he cited applied to him.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Sanchez contends that (i) res judicata does not bar his as-applied proportionate penalties
claim; (ii) he established cause and prejudice, thus permitting him to bring this claim in a
successive postconviction petition; and (iii) he made a substantial showing that a natural-life
sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him, necessitating an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 22 We find that Sanchez raised this claim on direct appeal and, thus, res judicata could bar
him from bringing it again. But we relax that bar because we find that he has established cause and
prejudice. Further, because he has made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, he may
litigate this claim at an evidentiary hearing that will test his assertions, taken as true for now, that
his brain was functionally like a juvenile’s and the sentencing court erred by imposing a mandatory
natural-life sentence.
¶ 23 A. Successive Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 24 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) contemplates the filing of one petition by right and
successive petitions with leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). This process ensures
that procedural rules do not undermine fundamental fairness. People v. Blalock, 2022 IL
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126682, ¶ 38. Petitioners litigate successive petitions by invoking the “cause and prejudice”
exception. Id.
¶ 25 Petitioners can establish “cause” by identifying an objective factor that prevented them
from raising a specific claim during the initial postconviction proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2022). The supreme court has observed “ ‘ “that a showing that the factual or legal basis for
a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” ’ ” will establish cause. People v. Pitsonbarger,
205 Ill. 2d 444, 460 (2002) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24 (1999), quoting
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). A petitioner can establish “prejudice” by showing
the claimed constitutional error so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence
violated due process. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14.
¶ 26 We review de novo whether Sanchez has established cause and prejudice, allowing him to
litigate his claim in a successive postconviction petition. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL
121450, ¶¶ 13, 26. Likewise, we review de novo whether Sanchez made a substantial showing of
a constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
¶ 27 B. Res Judicata
¶ 28 The circuit court found that res judicata barred Sanchez from litigating his claim that a
natural-life sentence is unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him.
Res judicata is a common law doctrine that operates in postconviction proceedings as it does
elsewhere. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443 (2005). Under the doctrine, petitioners generally
may not raise claims they previously litigated. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
(res judicata is an “issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision”).
¶ 29 In Dorsey, for example, the supreme court held that res judicata barred a petitioner from
litigating a proportionate penalties claim in successive postconviction proceedings because the
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petitioner had raised a proportionate penalties claim on direct appeal. Dorsey, 2021 IL
123010, ¶ 73. And here, as in Dorsey, Sanchez raised a proportionate penalties claim on direct
appeal. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 84-85 (distinguishing People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328,
340-41 (2002) (Leon Miller)). Thus, res judicata would ordinarily bar Sanchez from litigating this
claim once more. See People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 42 (“[D]efendant is asking this court for
leave to file a highly disfavored successive postconviction petition to revisit a constitutional issue
that was decided on direct appeal and, therefore, is barred by the res judicata doctrine.”).
¶ 30 But principles of fundamental fairness allow courts to relax the effect of the res judicata
doctrine. Id. ¶ 45. Under the Act, courts may do so if the petitioner satisfies the cause and prejudice
doctrine. Id.
¶ 31 C. Cause
¶ 32 Sanchez contends he has established cause because “[n]ow, with the emergence of late
adolescent brain science, Illinois courts have created a new framework” for emerging adults raising
as-applied proportionate penalties claims. And “[u]nder this framework, raising the claim that [his]
sentence shocked the moral sense of the community such that it violated the proportionate penalties
clause requires reliance on, and reference to, adolescent brain science that was not developed and
constitutionally significant until 2012.”
¶ 33 Essentially, Sanchez advances two claims about cause: (i) a new legal basis (“new
framework”) and (ii) a new factual basis (“adolescent brain science”) permit courts to relax the bar
of res judicata so petitioners like him may litigate in successive postconviction proceedings.
¶ 34 1. No Legal Basis for Cause
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¶ 35 To be sure, as Sanchez contends, courts previously held that petitioners established cause
by pointing to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and later cases. See generally People v.
Brewer, 2025 IL App (1st) 240088, ¶¶ 25-31 (discussing developing caselaw on legal cause).
¶ 36 In Dorsey and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, however, the supreme court rejected the
idea that petitioners could establish cause by showing that a new legal basis (Miller) was not
reasonably available to them during initial postconviction proceedings. In Dorsey, the supreme
court discussed how “Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of
mature age and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74.
In Moore, the supreme court pointed out that “ ‘the essential legal tools’ ” had always been
available for petitioners to use during initial postconviction proceedings. Moore, 2023 IL
126461, ¶ 42 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93); see People v. Harris, 2018 IL
121932, ¶¶ 46, 48 (directing defendant to raise similar claim in initial postconviction petition).
¶ 37 Following Dorsey and Moore, we reject Sanchez’s assertion that Miller provides him with
a new legal basis as cause to pursue his claim in successive postconviction proceedings.
¶ 38 2. Factual Basis for Cause
¶ 39 Sanchez contends that “new science creates cause *** to collaterally attack his mandatory
life sentence in a successive [postconviction] petition.” (Emphasis omitted.) Sanchez’s pro se
filing primarily attached studies in support, each written by scientists or legal scholars, but largely
neglected to apply those insights to Sanchez’s own history. But counsel supplemented that filing
with an affidavit from Sanchez and arguments applying those scientific insights to Sanchez’s own
history. Together, these filings established a new factual basis for cause.
¶ 40 Particularly helpful is a study published after the filing of Sanchez’s pro se petition, which
counsel cited in the circuit court to argue that scientific research shows that Sanchez’s brain was
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more like a juvenile’s than an adult’s. We have reviewed the study, “White Paper on the Science
of Late Adolescence: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers” (White Paper), which
summarizes “mainstream” thought in “developmental neuroscience” as of 2022, “the time it was
produced.” Catherine Insel et al., White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for
Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers, Ctr. for L., Brain & Behav. at Mass. Gen. Hosp. (2022),
https://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/white-paper-on-the-science-of-late-adolescence/ [https:
perma.cc/26HY-6Q7T].
¶ 41 In the White Paper, the authors state that “scientific research has emerged which reinforces
the reasoning of the Miller decision and, if its implications are accepted, extends much of the
science that resonated with the Miller court to late adolescents (ages 18-21).” (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 2. The authors also state in the introduction that researchers can now “identify the ‘transient
immaturity’ of youth and emerging young adults and the normal process of self-desistence from
criminal misconduct that occurs with maturation,” based on “a robust scientific basis.” Id. at 6-7.
¶ 42 Also helpful is a declaration, attached to the pro se petition, by Dr. Erin Bigler in an
unrelated case. Dr. Bigler cites her training as a neuropsychologist and discusses, in a general way,
the science underlying brain development after the teenage years. She recounts how recent studies
have demonstrated that people at age 20 are, on average, at their peak of risk-taking and sensationseeking, have low impulse control, are short-sighted, and are still developing their decision-making
processes.
¶ 43 Dr. Bigler’s declaration thus reinforces other insights appearing in the White Paper. These
characteristics of people at age 20, which are tied to brain processes are exacerbated by negative
social contexts and trauma in youth and can be reversed “after reductions of stress occur.” But the
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inability of some youth to escape environmental stresses impairs the development of their brains
beyond adolescent processes.
¶ 44 Sanchez’s use of this new science, and its connection to his sentencing claim, patterns itself
after the claim raised in Blalock. There, the Illinois Supreme Court found that “pattern and
practice” evidence provided a factual basis for litigating a second successive petition where the
police had tortured the petitioner into making an inculpatory statement. Blalock, 2022 IL
126682, ¶¶ 41-46. The petitioner attached new evidence in his petition, including printouts from
the 2012 Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission database, affidavits from other alleged victims
of abuse by the detectives involved, and complaints made to the Chicago Police Department Office
of Professional Standards. Id. ¶¶ 30, 40. The supreme court held that the petitioner had established
cause because, while Blalock knew about the torture before trial, he lacked corroborating evidence
to support his claim when filing his petition for postconviction relief. Id. ¶¶ 41-46.
¶ 45 By appending these reports, Sanchez has presented the circuit court with one of two key
factual bases for establishing cause. See id. ¶¶ 30, 40 (recounting evidence petitioner cited in
support of claim). For example, the study presents a “robust scientific basis” for applying Miller’s
insights to emerging adults. Indeed, more than 10 years ago, our supreme court declined to resolve
an emerging adult’s sentencing claim in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38, because the
record contained no “factual development on the issue of whether the rationale of Miller should
be extended beyond minors under the age of 18.”
¶ 46 That said, the law has not yet reached the juncture where neuroscience alone compels
recognition of the claims of emerging adults just like the claims of juveniles. See, e.g., Davis, 2014
IL 115595, ¶ 43 (finding Miller, 567 U.S. 460, provided cause for juvenile to file successive
petition); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 60 (noting “line drawn by the [United States] Supreme Court
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at age 18 was not based primarily on scientific research”). And counsel’s supplement to Sanchez’s
petition was likewise key to corroborating his claim and establishing cause. Blalock, 2022 IL
126682, ¶¶ 41-46; see People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304, ¶¶ 35-36 (providing example of
petitioner-specific allegations pertinent to as-applied claim for emerging adult). As counsel
summarized, the affidavit traces “the arc of [Sanchez’s] life, from an abused and neglected child
to an immature young adult, to a rehabilitated and remorseful 45-year-old man,” contributing to
society even while incarcerated. But the unavailability of this new science at sentencing in 2001
particularly hurt Sanchez, whose only sentence (absent that new science as applied to him under
the proportionate penalties clause) was mandatory life in prison.
¶ 47 Accordingly, Sanchez established cause. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460; see Williams,
2024 IL 127304, ¶¶ 35-36.
¶ 48 Prejudice
¶ 49 Sanchez contends he also established prejudice because the sentencing court’s “comments
demonstrated that it would not have sentenced Juan to life imprisonment were it not [then]
mandatory.” We agree.
¶ 50 Generally, a petitioner establishes prejudice by showing the claimed constitutional error so
infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Davis, 2014 IL
115595, ¶ 14. Here, the record demonstrates that the court sentenced Sanchez without regard to
Sanchez’s youth-attendant circumstances.
“[T]he law doesn’t give me much choice in this matter which basically ties my hands. So
it makes my decision easy and it makes it difficult. Although I believe you should receive
a harsh penalty, clearly not convinced that life without parole is the penalty. But be that as
it may, the state legislature and the populace that elects the state legislature controls what
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the laws are in this state. And I cannot sentence you to anything but life imprisonment in
Illinois. And the law mandates that I do that.”
The sentencing court imposed a mandatory natural-life sentence under section 12-14(d)(2) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 1998)) without exercising the discretion it
otherwise would have and, thus, raised a doubt about the constitutional validity of the sentence it
imposed. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72.
¶ 51 That Sanchez was sentenced for an offense he committed at 20 years old does not
undermine his claim. To be sure, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the circuit court should
find the petitioner has not established prejudice if the petitioner’s claim fails as a matter of law.
Id. ¶ 70. And, in Williams, the supreme court “cast[ ] doubt” the ability of a 22-year-old petitioner
to raise a claim like Sanchez’s. Williams, 2024 IL 127304, ¶ 29 (distinguishing Harris, 2018 IL
121932, and Thompson, 2015 IL 118151). But unlike Williams, Sanchez was 20 years old at
sentencing, which falls within Illinois’s apparent, historical cutoff of 21 years. See People ex rel.
Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 418-19 (1894) (describing historical statute for
the reformation of “minors between the ages of [10] and [21]”).
¶ 52 Accordingly, in addition to cause, Sanchez established prejudice permitting him to litigate
his claim anew in successive postconviction proceedings. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 45.
¶ 53 E. Substantial Showing
¶ 54 Sanchez contends he substantially showed that his sentence violates the Illinois
Constitution by pleading facts to establish (i) the evolving brain science of late adolescence;
(ii) details of his “abusive childhood, negative influences, and the social context surrounding his
crime”; (iii) specifics of his “stellar prison record since his arrest in 1999”; and (iv) the inability
of the sentencing court to factor in his youth when imposing a mandatory life sentence. We agree.
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¶ 55 The proportionate penalties clause to the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Our supreme court has
recognized that emerging adults may raise proportionate penalties claims based on the concerns
articulated in Miller. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87.
¶ 56 The clause’s emphasis on rehabilitative potential provides limitations on penalties beyond
those afforded by the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). People v. Clemons, 2012 IL
107821, ¶¶ 39-41. To invoke those protections, petitioners must show how their sentence is
“ ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (quoting Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338). Our supreme
court has not specified exactly which sentences meet this standard because as society evolves, so
do its concepts of decency and fairness, which shape a community’s moral sense. Id.
¶ 57 But in this context, the supreme court’s caselaw provides clear guideposts.
“[A] life sentence without parole is shocking to the moral sense of the community if it was
imposed upon an emerging adult defendant who has established that [(i)] the science
underlying Miller and its progeny applies to his or her specific facts and circumstances and
[(ii)] his or her age and youth-attendant circumstances were not considered at the original
sentencing hearing before that life sentence was imposed.” (Emphasis in original.) People
v. Green-Hosey, 2025 IL App (2d) 240284, ¶ 59, appeal allowed, No. 131560 (Ill. Sept.
24, 2025).
¶ 58 Equally clear is Sanchez’s burden at this stage of proceedings. “The substantial showing
required to avoid dismissal at the second stage is greater than the standard that must be satisfied to
obtain leave to file a successive petition.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. And “[t]he
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question raised in an appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the
allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under
the Act.” Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388.
¶ 59 Evolving Science Applies to Sanchez
¶ 60 Contrary to the circuit court’s finding, the detail in Sanchez’s affidavit about his childhood
and teenage years, along with the scientific evidence on childhood trauma, substantially
demonstrates that evolving adolescent brain science applies to him. Liberally construed and taken
as true, Sanchez’s statements connects this science to his (i) general decision-making, (ii) his
actions during the offense, and (iii) his rehabilitative potential.
¶ 61 F. Decision-making Generally
¶ 62 As the White Paper explains, exposure to threats in childhood impacts emotional regulation
neuro-processes: “Exposure to threat has the greatest impact on the brain processes that are
involved in detecting threats, learning from emotional information, and regulating emotions.”
Insel, supra at 19. Moreover, being deprived of basic needs, such as food and sleep, “most often
influences the development of brain systems important for language development and executive
function.” Id.
¶ 63 Sanchez detailed the ways in which he was trapped in a home environment of threats,
abuse, stress, and trauma and a social environment, throughout his youth, that normalized
inappropriate sexual behavior. He described how living in this environment impacted his cognitive
function early on, citing an inability to stay awake in school and comprehend his school materials,
symptoms of dyslexia and attention deficit disorder, a lack of social skills, anger, and fighting. The
chronic abuse of his mother in their home, with a frequently absent father who only brought more
violence when he came home, falls into the category of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs)
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that have been found to have “profound long-term deleterious effects on the physical and mental
health of adults.” So does his mother’s substance abuse and his father’s incarceration.
¶ 64 Further, Sanchez was especially vulnerable to a disrupted psychological and sexual
development. Early on, he would hear his mother having sex with men she brought home from
bars. Moreover, his mother accused his father of sexually assaulting his sister. Then, his
stepmother sexually assaulted him twice when he was 15 years old and living in his father’s home.
That his father ultimately kicked him out of the house deprived him of the limited stability he had.
Indeed, moving homes frequently and changing schools further added to an already unstable dayto-day life.
¶ 65 Finally, as Sanchez avers, all these incidents occurred within a larger social-cultural
context where adults were often engaged in sexual relationships with teenagers, including his
father and stepmother.
¶ 66 Accordingly, liberally construed and taken as true, Sanchez substantially showed that his
normal psychological, emotional, and sexual development was likely hindered, keeping him in the
tumultuous stage of psychological adolescence longer than the typical young person.
¶ 67 G. Decision-making During Offense
¶ 68 Moreover, the undisputed facts of the offense arguably reveal Sanchez’s underdeveloped
responsibility and impulsiveness, as well as sexually inappropriate behavior that was apparently
common. That Sanchez drove T.T. back toward the mall after the assault, knowing that she would
go right back to her family, indicates a complete misunderstanding of her experience of the
encounter, and a total lack of calculation of what might happen next.
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¶ 69 H. Rehabilitation
¶ 70 Finally, mitigation at sentencing and Sanchez’s personal growth since then suggest that his
character was not fully formed at the time of the offense. People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st)
191743, ¶ 34 (postsentencing conduct relevant to whether 19-year-old possessed rehabilitative
potential incompatible with the imposition of a life sentence). He has no criminal record from his
time in prison. In fact, he was moved from maximum security to medium security. And as averred,
his spiritual leadership, academic progress, and artistic growth further demonstrate his
rehabilitation and personal development, as does his relatively new relationship and regular contact
with his son, who was an infant when he was arrested. See People v. Wilson, 2022 IL App (1st)
192048, ¶ 92 (noting petitioner’s personal growth during incarceration, as reported in affidavit,
including regular contact with 16-year-old daughter, indicates prior criminal conduct at 19
reflected the transient characteristics of youth).
¶ 71 Sentencing Law Barred Court from Considering Sanchez’s Youth
¶ 72 The circuit court erred by concluding that the sentencing court factored Sanchez’s past into
its sentencing decision. As the sentencing court noted, the legislature’s mandate that Sanchez
receive a natural life sentence precluded it from considering anything in mitigation. Sanchez made
a substantial showing that the sentencing court imposed a mandatory natural-life sentence under
section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 1998)) without
exercising the discretion it otherwise would have and thus raised a doubt about the constitutional
validity of the sentence it imposed. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72.
¶ 73 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 74 For the reasons stated, we reverse the second-stage dismissal of defendant’s successive
postconviction petition and remand for a full evidentiary hearing.
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¶ 75 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 76 JUSTICE GAMRATH, dissenting:
¶ 77 Sanchez previously raised and lost a proportionate penalties challenge to his sentence on
direct appeal. People v. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App. 3d 74, 77 (2003). He offers no valid reason to bypass
res judicata, attaching only generalized, untested “scientific” literature and his own affidavit to his
petition, which he could have presented earlier. Sympathy for Sanchez’s natural life sentence
cannot justify compromising legal consistency or lowering the bar for establishing cause. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 78 While I agree with my esteemed colleagues that Miller does not supply a new legal basis
for cause, I disagree that Sanchez has shown any new factual basis sufficient to show cause to
pursue his claim. This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that recent neuroscientific
research can provide the necessary cause to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a successive
postconviction petition. See, e.g., People v. Ascencio, 2026 IL App (1st) 241534-U, ¶ 36; People
v. Lowe, 2026 IL App (1st) 241544-U, ¶ 49; People v. Ross, 2026 IL App (1st) 232431-U, ¶ 22;
People v. Minniefield, 2025 IL App (1st) 240463-U, ¶¶ 66-67; People v. Scaggs, 2025 IL App (1st)
240953-U, ¶¶ 46, 49-51; People v. Robinson, 2025 IL App (1st) 231419-U, ¶¶ 59, 62-64; People
v. Boclair, 2025 IL App (1st) 240911-U, ¶¶ 43-44; People v. Malone, 2025 IL App (1st) 231881-U, ¶ 18; People v. Searles, 2024 IL App (1st) 210043-U, ¶¶ 13-17. Nothing here justifies departing
from that sound and consistent line of authority.
¶ 79 The “new science” Sanchez cites consists of the White Paper published in 2022, a
declaration by Dr. Erin Bigler prepared for a wholly unrelated case, and other generalized reports
and opinions, none of which pertain specifically to Sanchez. This is insufficient to establish cause.
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¶ 80 As Searles explained, research predating Sanchez’s direct appeal and initial postconviction
petition already recognized that brain development continues into the twenties. Searles, 2024 IL
App (1st) 210043-U, ¶ 14 (citing Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 Nature Neuroscience 861 (1999),
https://cs.brown.edu/people/tdean/projects/cortex/course/suggested_reading_list/supplements/do
cuments/GieddetalNN-99.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UBH-Y8HA]). Legal scholars have likewise
relied on such research for decades to argue that young adults and adolescents are less culpable
than fully mature adults. Id. (citing, e.g., Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of Developmental
Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decency” and the Imposition of the Death Penalty
on Juveniles, 54 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 441 (2004)). Although newer studies might strengthen
Sanchez’s argument, they do not constitute new evidence that he was previously unable to present.
Id. Sanchez had ample opportunity to gather evidence for his claim, and “if the caselaw
underpinning [his] claim does not provide cause, then [his] delayed investigation of the claim
based on the lack of the caselaw cannot provide cause either.” People v. French, 2022 IL App (1st)
220122, ¶ 33.
¶ 81 Even if scientists had only recently “discovered” the continuation of brain development
into young adulthood, such information would merely confirm what courts have long recognized.
Illinois courts have consistently acknowledged “the differences between persons of mature age
and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing” (People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74),
emphasizing the need for sentences to reflect the realities of human development. See, e.g., People
v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47 (“Illinois courts *** have long been aware that less
than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted that sentences take into
account that reality of human development.”); People v. Maldonado, 240 Ill. App. 3d 470, 485-86
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(1992) (sentencing requires careful consideration of the defendant’s personal history, including
age, mentality, habits, and social environment); People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State
Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 422-23 (1894) (recognizing sentencing distinctions between “persons
of mature age” and minors ages 16 to 21).
¶ 82 To constitute cause, new evidence must be of such character that its prior absence
effectively prevented the defendant from raising the claim earlier. See People v. LaPointe, 2018
IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59 (“If the acquisition of new scientific knowledge to support an already
viable claim were all that a defendant needed to show in order to raise the claim years late, then
the ‘cause’ requirement of section 122-1(f) would be a weak threshold indeed.”). Sanchez’s
inability to point to more current research did not prevent him from raising this argument in his
direct appeal, initial postconviction petition, or section 2-1401 petition. People v. Jones, 2025 IL
App (5th) 230511-U, ¶ 41.
¶ 83 This case bears no resemblance to People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682, where newly
surfaced pattern and practice evidence, which was uniquely difficult to obtain and controlled by
the State, established cause for a coerced confession claim. There, without such evidence, the
defendant was effectively barred from raising the claim at all. Id. ¶ 44.
¶ 84 No comparable barrier exists here. Sanchez could always recount his childhood, cite
existing developmental research, and attempt to apply it to his circumstances. This is not a situation
like Blalock and other cases, where cause existed because external, previously inaccessible
evidence surfaced later. See People v. Weathers, 2015 IL App (1st) 133264, ¶ 36 (cause established
where an Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission report issued after defendant’s initial
postconviction petition was resolved); People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶¶ 41, 49 (accepting the
State’s concession that cause existed where a government report was released after defendant filed
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his initial postconviction petition). Sanchez had full ability to make his arguments earlier; he
simply did not. He thus has not shown fundamental fairness requires relaxing the res judicata bar.
¶ 85 When this court affirmed Sanchez’s conviction and natural life sentence, it recognized that
the recidivist sentencing provision under which he was sentenced aims to deter repeat offenders
and impose stricter penalties on those resistant to correction. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 82. The
legislature intended mandatory life sentences for repeat sexual assault offenders to address harm
to victims and protect the public by curbing sexually harmful conduct. Id. at 83, 85. This purpose
should not be undermined for a repeat offender whose claim fails the cause and prejudice test or
is barred by res judicata, having already raised a proportionate penalties issue on direct appeal.
¶ 86 Because Sanchez has not established legal or factual cause, entitling him to further litigate
a successive postconviction petition, I would affirm the circuit court’s dismissal. For these reasons,
I respectfully dissent.
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People v. Sanchez, 2026 IL App (1st) 240305
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 99-CR2258-01; the Hon. Michael Obbish, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Emelia H. Carroll, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, David H. Iskowich, and Amy McGowan, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
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