UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FHAZZ LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 25-cv-2219 (DLF)
JOSEPH B. EDLOW, et al.,
Defendants. 1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Fhazz LLC and Asad Ali bring this action against the Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), the Secretary of Homeland Security, the USCIS Deputy Associate
Director of Adjudications, and the Attorney General of the United States, to set aside the denial of
their I-129 petition for E-2 visa status. Before the Court is the defendants’ Motion to Transfer and
Dismiss, Dkt. 10, and the parties’ supplemental briefing on that motion, see June 11, 2026 Minute
Order; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 17. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion to transfer
the case to the Western District of North Carolina and deny without prejudice the motion to dismiss
with leave to refile. 2
1
Consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Director’s name has been substituted.
2
The defendants filed a combined motion to transfer and dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. 10. “[W]hen courts adjudicate combined motions to transfer and motions to dismiss in applicationspecific immigration cases . . . they routinely address only the motion to transfer and deny without prejudice the motion to dismiss so that the defendants may refile it, if appropriate, after the approved transfer has occurred.” Roh v. USCIS, No. 21-cv-1291, 2021 WL 5050071, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2021). The defendants ask the Court to consider the transfer motion first. See Defs.’ Mot. 10. The Court will therefore consider only the motion to transfer and will deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to refile a Rule 12 motion in the transferee court as appropriate.
I. BACKGROUND 3
Asad Ali, a Pakistani national, originally entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa.
Compl. ¶ 14, Dkt. 1. 4 Ali’s visitor visa status was valid through December 10, 2023. Id. ¶ 15.
Prior to the expiration of his visitor visa, Ali and Fhazz LLC contracted with someone they
believed to be an attorney to file an I-129 Petition for a Nonimmigrant E-2 visa. Id. ¶ 16. The
plaintiffs allege that they later discovered that this individual was not actually an attorney and had
provided false information about the status of their petition. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. The plaintiffs, through
a legitimate attorney, filed an I-129 petition on March 24, 2025, id. ¶ 18, which was untimely
because it was submitted after Ali’s B-2 visa had expired, id. ¶¶ 15, 19–22. USCIS sent the
plaintiffs a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) in April 2025 requesting evidence concerning this
delay in filing the petition. Id. ¶ 19. The plaintiffs responded to the NOID providing information
about the purported fraud. Id. ¶ 20. On May 20, 2025, USCIS denied the plaintiffs’ I-129 petition
because an unreasonable amount of time had passed between their discovery of the fraudulent
activity and the filing of the petition. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.
The plaintiffs reside in Asheville, North Carolina, located in the Western District of North
Carolina. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3; Defs.’ Mot. 1; Pls.’ Opp’n 3, Dkt. 11. The Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General of the United States are residents of the District of Columbia
for official capacity purposes. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Defs.’ Mot. 1. USCIS’s headquarters and
3
These facts are drawn from the complaint and certain materials outside the pleadings. See Chauhan v. Napolitano, 746 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (courts may consider materials outside the pleadings when considering a motion to transfer) (citing Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 933–34 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
4
The plaintiffs’ complaint duplicates paragraph numbers 11–15. The Court here refers to the paragraphs as they are numbered in that document, but notes that it is referencing allegations under “Statement of Case.” See Compl. 6.
2
leadership are in Camp Springs, Maryland, in the District of Maryland. Defs.’ Mot. 2. It is unclear
from the complaint where USCIS Deputy Associate Director of Adjudications John M. Allen is
located, Compl. ¶ 6, and the plaintiffs “studiously avoid[] mentioning where [their] petition was
processed,” Melnattur v. USCIS, No. 20-cv-3013, 2021 WL 3722732, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 23,
2021); see Compl. ¶¶ 14–23. But it is clear from the defendants’ motion briefing, see Defs.’ Mot.
1; Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1–2, Dkt. 17, which the plaintiffs did not contest, see Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2–3, Dkt.
16, that the plaintiffs’ petition was adjudicated and denied at the California Service Center in
Tustin, California, in the Central District of California. 5
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court may transfer a case to another venue where it may have been brought “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). When
considering a motion to transfer under § 1404, the Court considers two questions: Could the
plaintiff have sued in the transferee court? And, if so, should the suit have been brought in that
court? See McAfee, LLC v. USCIS, No. 19-cv-2981, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 15,
2019) (citing Gyau v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-407, 2018 WL 4964502, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018)).
“If the Court answers yes to both, transfer is proper.” Id. 6 The movant bears the burden of
justifying transfer. Bourdon v. DHS, 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 303 (D.D.C. 2017).
5
The plaintiffs assert that “Service Center Decisions are national and not local, [and] there is no California specific factual investigation and the relevant decision makers are not physically in California,” Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 3, but the defendants disagree, see Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1–2. The Court need not resolve this dispute for this motion.
6
There is some disagreement among judges in this district about whether a court must first address the propriety of venue in the District of Columbia when considering a § 1404 motion. Compare Liu v. Mayorkas, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3–5 (D.D.C. 2024) (concluding that the court must first assess propriety of the venue in the transferor district before evaluating § 1404 factors), with Claros v. Cowan, No. 21-cv-609, 2021 WL 1820209, at *1 (D.D.C. May 6, 2021) (“Although Plaintiffs and
3
If venue is proper in another district under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the
first question is answered in the affirmative. In answering the second question, the Court must
balance a set of public and private interests and decide whether they favor transfer, and, if so, to
which district. See Gyau, 2018 WL 4964502, at *1. Public interest factors include: (1) “each
court’s relative congestion”; (2) “the transferee court’s familiarity with the governing laws”; and
(3) “the local interest in resolving the controversy.” Id. (citation modified). Private interest factors
include: (1) “the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor
of the defendants”; (2) “the defendants’ choice of forum”; (3) “whether the claim arose elsewhere”;
(4) “the convenience of the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendant, but only to the extent that the
witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora”; (5) “the ease of access to sources
of proof”; and (6) “the convenience of the parties.” Roh v. USCIS, No. 21-cv-1291, 2021 WL
5050071, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2021) (citation modified) (quoting Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at
305).
III. ANALYSIS
Although the defendants initially requested transfer to the Western District of North
Carolina, the plaintiffs’ home district, to “maintain[] important consistency [with] materially
identical cases,” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *9 n.7, the Court requested supplemental
briefing to determine whether a transfer to the Central District of California, where the plaintiffs’
Defendants disagree about whether venue is proper in this District, the Court need not wade into that controversy today.”). The Court need not resolve this dispute. Venue in the District of Columbia appears to be facially proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A). See Mahmoud v. DHS, No. 25-cv-4454, 2026 WL 1431107, at *2 n.4 (D.D.C. May 21, 2026) (concluding the same given DHS Secretary named as defendant). And, in any event, the § 1406 inquiry would be “essentially identical to that under § 1404(a),” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *3 n.4, and under that analysis the Court would transfer to the Western District of North Carolina for the same reasons stated in this opinion.
4
petition was adjudicated, would be appropriate. See June 11, 2026 Minute Order. In their
supplemental briefing, the plaintiffs opposed transfer to the Central District of California, Pls.’
Suppl. Br. 1, while the defendants supported transfer to either the Central District of California or
the Western District of North Carolina, Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1. Accordingly, the Court will consider
the interests served by a transfer from the District of Columbia and whether those interests weigh
in favor of transferring this case to the Central District of California or the Western District of
North Carolina.
A. This Case Could Have Been Brought in the Central District of California or
the Western District of North Carolina
The plaintiffs’ claims could have been brought either in the Central District of California
or the Western District of North Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). See Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1.
Because the plaintiffs bring suit against federal employees acting in their official capacities, venue
is proper in any district where “a defendant in the action resides”; “a substantial part of the
events . . . giving rise to the claim occurred”; or where the plaintiffs reside if no real property is
involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Venue would therefore be proper in the Western District of
North Carolina because the plaintiffs reside in that district. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3. Venue would also be
proper in the Central District of California because a substantial part of the events giving rise to
the claim—i.e., the adjudication and denial of the petition—occurred at the USCIS California
Service Center in that district. Defs.’ Mot. 1; Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1–2; Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2–3.
B. The Public and Private Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer to the
Western District of North Carolina
1. Public Interest Factors
Two of the public interest factors are neutral, and one favors transfer.
First, the District of Columbia, the Western District of North Carolina, and the Central
District of California all face congested dockets. See U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil and
5
Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. Cts., at “California Central,” “District of
Columbia,” and “North Carolina Western” (Mar. 31, 2026), https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/caseload-statistics-data-tables. While the Central District of California has the highest
number of cases pending per judge (590), both the District of Columbia and the Western District
of North Carolina also have significant caseloads—476 and 381 on average per judge, respectively.
See id. The plaintiffs correctly point out that the District of Columbia has a lower number of total
pending cases (7,138) compared to the Central District of California (16,531), though the Western
District of North Carolina has a significantly lower amount (1,904). See id. But the Central
District of California has the lowest median time from filing to disposition in civil cases—3.8
months compared to 5.8 months in Western District of North Carolina and 7.3 months in the
District of Columbia—suggesting a lack of congestion. See id. “[W]hen statistics regarding
relative congestion are mixed, this factor should be deemed as neutral.” Wolfram Alpha LLC v.
Cuccinelli, 490 F. Supp. 3d 324, 336 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing McAfee, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1).
Second, because federal law governs this case and federal district courts are “equally
familiar” with applying it, that factor is also neutral. McAfee, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1 (citing
Gyau, 2018 WL 4964502, at *2).
But the third factor, the local interest, weighs strongly in favor of transfer. This factor is
“perhaps most important amongst the public factors,” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 338,
because “courts have a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, including
even controversies requiring judicial review of an administrative decision,” McAfee, 2019 WL
6051559, at *1 (citation modified) (quoting Gyau, 2018 WL 4964502, at *2). In assessing this
factor, courts look to “where the challenged decision was made; whether the decision directly
affected the citizens of the transferee state; the location of the controversy; whether the controversy
6
has some national significance; and whether there was personal involvement by a District of
Columbia official.” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *8 (citation modified) (quoting Bourdon,
235 F. Supp. 3d at 308).
At its core, this case is a localized dispute challenging the results of an individual
adjudication of an immigration visa conducted by a USCIS Service Center, not a challenge against
some broad federal policy set by agency leadership. The plaintiffs ultimately ask this Court to
order USCIS officials to reconsider the timeliness of their I-129 petition given the plaintiffs’
unique circumstances of being the victims of a fraudulent attorney. Compl. ¶¶ 14–31. The
requested relief here will not, as the plaintiffs contend, “affect how federal officers carry out duties
nationally.” Pls.’ Opp’n 5. The mere involvement of a federal agency “overseeing the
administrative process,” Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 307 (citation modified), that is implemented
by a service center does not create a controversy of “national significance,” id. at 308; see Wolfram
Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 339 n.11 (finding no national significance where the “[p]laintiff’s
allegations on the merits of the case revolve around review of his petition specifically and the
administrative record addressing the particular facts raised therein, not a broader policy or mass
review of agency decisions”). And the plaintiffs do not allege any direct “personal involvement
by a District of Columbia official,” id. at 338 (quoting Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 84
(D.D.C. 2009)), beyond general agency management and administrative oversight, see Compl. ¶¶
4–7, 14–23. That allegation alone is not enough to generate local interest in the District of
Columbia. See MVP Sports, Inc. v. Cissna, 19-cv-742, 2020 WL 5816239, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 30,
2020) (citation modified) (“[I]t is well settled that naming the director of an agency headquartered
in this district does not alone anchor venue in the District of Columbia.”). Furthermore, the District
7
of Columbia is neither the plaintiffs’ home district, nor is it the district where the challenged
actions occurred. Compl. ¶¶ 4–7.
The Central District of California is the “location of the controversy.” Melnattur, 2021
WL 3722732, at *8; see Defs.’ Mot. 1; Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1–2. The plaintiffs’ complaint focuses
on the legality of the processing, adjudication, and denial of their I-129 petition by USCIS Service
Center employees. See Compl. ¶¶ 4–7, 14–23; Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1–2. This connection to
California is “particularly clear by the relief plaintiff seeks: an order declaring events occurring in
[California] unlawful and compelling USCIS employees in [California] to take new actions in
[California].” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *8; see Ghaleb, 2025 WL 2255083, at *2
(transferring to Central District of California rather than plaintiffs’ home district where plaintiffs’
complaint “focuse[d] on the legality of processing and adjudication by USCIS employees” in a
Service Center). While the plaintiffs note that the digital agency record can be reviewed anywhere,
Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2–3, “[s]imply because the review of an administrative record can take place
anywhere (including here) does not mean that the local district does not have an interest in the
controversy,” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 339.
The Western District of North Carolina also has a compelling local interest in this case as
the plaintiffs’ home district and because the challenged action “directly affect[s]” a resident of and
business in the district. Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 308; see Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at
*8; Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 339 (transferring to plaintiff’s home forum because “nearly
all the impacts of [the USCIS action] and the outcome of [the] action will be felt most strongly in
[plaintiff’s home district]”).
8
While the Central District of California and Western District of North Carolina have a clear
local interest, the District of Columbia has no significant local interest in this case other than the
plaintiffs’ suing agency leaders who reside here.
2. Private Interest Factors
The private interest factors also weigh in favor of transfer.
The plaintiffs maintain that the District of Columbia is their preferred forum. See Pls.’
Suppl. Br. 1–3. The defendants originally requested transfer to the Western District of North
Carolina, Defs.’ Mot. 1, but agree that the Central District of California would also be a proper
transferee forum, Defs.’ Suppl. Br. 1. Considering the weight of the private interests, the Court
finds that transfer to the Western District of North Carolina is most appropriate because the private
interest factors weigh in favor of transfer and the plaintiffs certainly “cannot object to venue in
[their] home forum.” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 340.
First, parties’ respective forum choices weigh in favor of transfer. While the plaintiffs’
choice of forum is ordinarily entitled to significant deference, that deference is at its “nadir when
the plaintiff[s’] forum choice lacks meaningful ties to the controversy and has no particular interest
in the parties or subject matter.” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *4 (citation modified). Though
the plaintiffs reside in North Carolina, they chose to bring this suit several hundred miles away in
a district where their I-129 petition was neither handled nor adjudicated. The District of Columbia,
however, “lacks meaningful ties” to this controversy between North Carolina plaintiffs and the
agency officials at the California Service Center who adjudicated and denied the plaintiffs’
petition. Id. The defendants’ choice of forum is given deference when they can “establish that the
added convenience and justice of litigating in their chosen forum overcomes any deference” owed
to plaintiffs’ choice of venue. Id. at *5. Because the plaintiffs’ choice of forum is given minimal
9
deference here, and the defendants have selected the plaintiffs’ home forum as one of their
preferred transferee districts, these two factors lean in favor of transfer to the Western District of
North Carolina. See Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 332–33.
Second, the location where the claim arose counsels in favor of transfer. This factor is
“first among equals when weighing the private interest factors,” and is of “predominant
importance.” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *5 (citation modified) (citing Bourdon, 235 F.
Supp. 3d at 305). “Transfer is favored when the material events that form the factual predicate of
[the plaintiffs’] claim did not occur in [their] chosen forum.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting
Aishat v. DHS, 288 F. Supp. 3d 261, 269 (D.D.C. 2018)). In APA cases, the underlying claim
generally arises “where the decisionmaking process occurred.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting
McAfee, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1). The decisionmaking process for “adjudicating visa
applications occurs in USCIS service centers around the country.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting
Pasem v. USCIS, No. 20-cv-344, 2020 WL 2514749, at *3 (D.D.C. May 15, 2020). When a suit
“challenges only the handling, adjudication, and denial of [the plaintiffs’] petition,” id., the claims
generally arise in the district of the service center that handled, adjudicated, and denied that
petition, id.
The plaintiffs argue in their opposition that their claims arose in the District of Columbia
because of the “oversight roles in federal immigration administration” of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General and assert that this controversy “potentially
implicate[s] broader policy considerations, even if [the] underlying file was handled elsewhere.”
Pls.’ Opp’n 5. “[C]onclusory assertions that appear for the first time in an opposition to a motion
to transfer” will not be credited. Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *5. Moreover, the plaintiffs’
only allegations in the complaint that connect their claims to this district are their descriptions of
10
the parties, which allege that the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General have
general oversight over the agencies charged with processing their petition and administering
immigration laws. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7. There are no allegations in the complaint that otherwise
connect their claim to this district. See id. ¶¶ 14–23, 24–30. “In the absence of any actual
allegations of case-specific direction by D.C.-based officials in the complaint,” the claims at issue
here simply did not arise in the District of Columbia. Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *5 (citation
modified).
While the plaintiffs cite the USCIS policy manual, see Compl. ¶¶ 28–30, they allege only
that this policy was improperly applied by the USCIS staff who adjudicated and denied their
petition, id. ¶ 30, and do not challenge an “agency polic[y], practice[], or oversight by D.C. resident
officials,” Pls.’ Opp’n 8. The plaintiffs do not challenge “the validity or existence of any USCIS
rule” promulgated in the District of Columbia. Wei Lai Dev. LLC v. USCIS, No. 21-cv-887, 2021
WL 2073403, at *4 (D.D.C. May 24, 2021). Instead, they merely “challeng[e] the decision
rendered by the [California Service Center] to deny their petition.” Id. The plaintiffs’ efforts to
keep this case in the District of Columbia by “recasting local determinations as broad policy
directives” and “naming high government officials as defendants” with “no allegations . . . that
anyone in the District of Columbia even knew about, let alone participated in, the adjudication of
[their] petition” is a clear attempt to “manufacture venue.” Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *5
(citation modified). Compare id., with Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2 (“Plaintiffs’ selection of this District is
entitled to weight, particularly where the suit includes high-ranking federal officials and implicates
broader federal administration and policy interests centered in or tied to Washington, D.C.”).
Third, on the location of witnesses and access to proof, the plaintiffs state that they do not
seek discovery outside the administrative record, nor do they intend to call witnesses. Pls.’ Suppl.
11
Br. 3. In addition, USCIS has digitized its filing system, meaning that any administrative record
is easily transferable. See Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 3; Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 333–34 (citing
Taylor v. Shinseki, 13 F. Supp. 3d 81, 90 (D.D.C. 2014)). Because this administrative review case
will be decided on an easily transferable administrative record, “the weight of [the location of
evidence and witnesses] is light.” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 334.
Finally, considering the convenience of the parties, the Western District of North Carolina,
the plaintiffs’ home district, is the most convenient district for the plaintiffs. See Wolfram Alpha,
490 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (“Venue is convenient where parties are located.”); Sandvik Mining &
Constr. USA, LLC v. Garland, No. 21-cv-992, 2021 WL 4775209, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2021)
(“[W]here plaintiffs challenge immigration decisions by bringing suit against federal officials in
the District of Columbia, transfer to plaintiffs’ home forum is generally warranted, unless the case
poses a factual connection to this district.”). The defendants seek transfer of this case to the
Western District of North Carolina, and the same government defendants have been granted such
a transfer in many similar cases in this district. See, e.g., McAfee, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1; Gyau,
2018 WL 4964502, at *1; Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d. at 303–04. The mere fact that plaintiffs’
counsel is not licensed to practice in North Carolina, 7 Pls.’ Opp’n 6, has “little significance in the
venue transfer analysis,” Doe v. Dep’t of Army, 99 F. Supp. 3d 159, 162 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation
modified); see Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (“The location of counsel is not a
consideration under [convenience of the parties].”).
But, unlike many of the cases on which the parties rely, the plaintiffs’ home district and
the service center district differ. This distinction is important because it could mean that the factors
7
The plaintiffs’ counsel—a Texas-barred attorney—does not appear to be licensed to practice in the District of Columbia but is admitted to practice before this Court.
12
of convenience and where the claim arose point to different fora. Courts considering transfer in
similar cases have found the location of the USCIS Service Center to be significant. See, e.g.,
McAfee, 2019 WL 6051559, at *2 (“[T]his controversy centers almost entirely on events that
happened in the Central District of California.”); Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 305 (“Cases
challenging the actions of local USCIS offices are frequently, and appropriately, transferred to the
venue encompassing those local offices [because they arise there].”). And in cases where the
plaintiffs’ home district and the USCIS service center district are different, courts have generally
transferred to the service center district, not the plaintiffs’ home district. See, e.g., Ghaleb, 2025
WL 2255083, at *1; Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *1; Wei Lai, 2021 WL 2073403, at *1;
Pengbo Li v. Miller, No. 20-cv-1122, 2021 WL 1124541, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2021); Ike v.
USCIS, No. 20-cv-1744, 2020 WL 7360214, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2020); EfficientIP, Inc. v.
Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-1455, 2020 WL 6683068, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2020). But see Patel v.
Mayorkas, No. 23-cv-1522, 2024 WL 1344451, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2024); Wolfram Alpha,
490 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (D.D.C. 2020) (transferring to plaintiff’s home forum because plaintiff
“cannot object to venue in [their] home forum” and “nearly all the impacts of [the USCIS action]
and the outcome of [the] action will be felt most strongly in [plaintiff’s home district]”). But this
case is distinguishable from such cases because the plaintiffs were not interviewed in the Central
District of California, nor is there much, if any, discovery in the Central District of California. See
Pls.’ Suppl. Br. 2–3.
The facts of this case are more closely aligned with those in Wolfram Alpha LLC v.
Cuccinelli, 490 F. Supp. 3d 324 (D.D.C. 2020). There, a technology company filed an I-129
petition supporting a worker’s H-1B visa. Id. at 329. The plaintiff company and the worker resided
in Illinois, while the USCIS California Service Center adjudicated and denied the petition. Id. The
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court transferred the action to the plaintiffs’ home district, rather than to the Central District of
California, because the impact of the USCIS decision and the outcome of the action “[would] be
felt most strongly [in the plaintiff’s home district] and because the events giving rise to [p]laintiff’s
Petition and this action emerged from that district.” Id. at 339. The court concluded that the
private and public factors, along with the undeniable convenience for the plaintiffs to litigate in
their home district, warranted transfer to that district. Id. at 340–41.
Here, too, a consideration of all the private factors supports transferring this case to the
plaintiffs’ home district, the Western District of North Carolina. “A plaintiff cannot reasonably
claim to be inconvenienced by litigating in his home forum.” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at
333 (citation modified) (quoting Aishat, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 269). Because the Western District of
North Carolina best accomplishes the goal of convenience for the parties after giving due
consideration to the parties’ forum preferences, the Court concludes that the private factors weigh
in favor of transfer to the Western District of North Carolina. See id.
* * *
In sum, the private and public interest factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer. This
Court has a responsibility to “guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in
the District of Columbia . . . [b]y naming high government officials as defendants” to bring a suit
here “that properly should be pursued elsewhere.” Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256
(D.C. Cir. 1993). The Western District of North Carolina “is the most appropriate venue for this
action.” Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 340.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the defendants’ motion to transfer this case to
the Western District of North Carolina and denies, without prejudice, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
June 26, 2026
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