FILED
Jun 26 2026, 8:59 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Judith A. Dasilva,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
Lisa Grahovac, Personal Representative for the Estate of James
R. Morken, deceased,
Appellee-Plaintiff
June 26, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-ES-12
Appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court
The Honorable Jeremy T. Musser, Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 76C01-2507-ES-55
Opinion by Judge Foley
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 1 of 8
Foley, Judge.
[1] Judith A. Dasilva (“Dasilva”) appeals the order granting judgment on the
pleadings and denying her Petition to Determine Heirship in the Estate of
James R. Morken (“the Estate”). Dasilva presents a single issue, which we
restate as whether the trial court erred in interpreting Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8, the intestate succession statute regarding adopted children. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] James R. Morken (“the Decedent”) is the biological father of Dasilva, who was
born in 1983 during his marriage to Laure Hall (“Mother”). The marriage was
dissolved in 1989. Mother subsequently married William Hall (“Stepfather”),
and when Dasilva was approximately twelve years old, Stepfather petitioned a
Florida court to adopt Dasilva. Mother and the Decedent consented to the
adoption, and the Florida court granted the petition to adopt Dasilva in 1995.
[3] The Decedent died intestate on May 21, 2025, as a resident of Steuben County.
The Decedent was unmarried at the time of his death and was survived by his
mother, Phyllis A. Morken (“Phyllis”), and ten siblings. Phyllis died later that
year. Following the Decedent’s death, one of his siblings filed a Petition for
Supervised Administration and was appointed Personal Representative.
[4] On October 7, 2025, Dasilva filed a Petition to Determine Heirship and an
affidavit in support, asserting her right to inherit from the Decedent under
Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8. This statute provides as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 2 of 8
For all purposes of intestate succession, including succession by,
through, or from a person, both lineal and collateral, an adopted
child shall be treated as a natural child of the child’s adopting
parents, and the child shall cease to be treated as a child of the
natural parents and of any previous adopting parents. However,
if a natural parent of a child born in or out of wedlock marries the
adopting parent, the adopted child shall inherit from the child’s natural
parent as though the child had not been adopted, and from the child’s
adoptive parent as though the child were the natural child. In
addition, if a person who is related to a child within the sixth
degree adopts such child, such child shall upon the occasion of
each death in the child’s family have the right of inheritance
through the child’s natural parents or adopting parents,
whichever is greater in value in each case.
Ind. Code § 29-1-2-8 (emphasis added). Dasilva interpreted the italicized
language to mean that because her natural parent—Mother—married her
adopting parent—Stepfather—she remained entitled to inherit from both of her
natural parents, Decedent and Mother, as though she had not been adopted.
Michael Morken (“Movant”), a sibling of the Decedent, appeared in his
capacity as the personal representative of Phyllis’s estate and moved for
judgment on the pleadings, claiming Dasilva was not Decedent’s heir at law.
[5] Movant offered a competing interpretation of the statute, claiming that both
references to the child’s “natural parent” were references to the same natural
parent, in this instance Mother. Id. Movant argued that the statute contained
clear and unambiguous language demonstrating the legislative intent that, in
the instance of a stepparent adoption, the adopted child would be treated as the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 3 of 8
natural child of both the adoptive stepparent and the natural parent married to
the adoptive stepparent.
[6] The trial court held a hearing on December 4, 2025, where the parties agreed
that no material facts were in dispute and that the matter presented a pure
question of statutory interpretation, i.e., whether Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8
recognized Dasilva as the Decedent’s heir where, although Dasilva was the
Decedent’s biological child, she had subsequently been adopted by Stepfather.
[7] On December 10, 2025, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, thereby denying Dasilva’s petition. The court disagreed with
Dasilva’s reading of the statute and found In re Paternity of Duran, 900 N.E.2d
454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), 1 persuasive in support of its reading. Dasilva now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Dasilva claims the trial court erred in denying her Petition to Determine
Heirship where the trial court applied Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8 and
concluded that Movant was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
[9] A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C) tests
the legal sufficiency of the claim as pleaded and should be granted only where it
is clear from the face of the pleadings that under no circumstances could relief
1
The parties refer to the case as Duran v. Duran.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 4 of 8
be granted. KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017). We review
judgment on the pleadings de novo. Id. The same standard governs questions
of statutory interpretation. Id. Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect
to the plain meaning of the language used in the statute, “mindful of both what
it does say and what it does not say.” Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094
(Ind. 2018) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d
1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)). So long as the statute is clear and unambiguous, we
apply the words and phrases in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id. A
statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Loomis v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 244 N.E.3d 908, 915 (Ind. 2024).
Moreover, we consider the structure of the statute as a whole, avoiding
interpretations that would (1) render part of the statute meaningless or
superfluous or (2) bring about an unjust, absurd, or illogical result. ESPN, Inc.,
62 N.E.3d at 1195, 1199; Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1269 (Ind. 2024).
[10] Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8 addresses the effect of adoption on intestate
succession rights. It provides in full:
For all purposes of intestate succession, including succession by,
through, or from a person, both lineal and collateral, an adopted
child shall be treated as a natural child of the child’s adopting
parents, and the child shall cease to be treated as a child of the
natural parents and of any previous adopting parents. However,
if a natural parent of a child born in or out of wedlock marries the
adopting parent, the adopted child shall inherit from the child’s natural
parent as though the child had not been adopted, and from the child’s
adoptive parent as though the child were the natural child. In
addition, if a person who is related to a child within the sixth
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 5 of 8
degree adopts such child, such child shall upon the occasion of
each death in the child’s family have the right of inheritance
through the child’s natural parents or adopting parents,
whichever is greater in value in each case.
I.C. § 29-1-2-8 (emphasis added). Dasilva focuses her argument on the
italicized language, arguing the statute creates (1) a condition—“if a natural
parent of a child born in or out of wedlock marries the adopting parent”—and
(2) a consequence—“the adopted child shall inherit from the child’s natural
parent as though the child had not been adopted . . . .” Id. Dasilva argues that,
here, the condition is satisfied because Mother married Stepfather. She claims
that, consequently, the statute directs that she “shall inherit from [her] natural
parent”—the Decedent—“as though [she] had not been adopted . . . .” Id.
[11] Dasilva offers a strained reading of Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8, where the
first reference to “a natural parent of a child” would refer to one natural parent
while the second reference to “the child’s natural parent” would refer to a
different natural parent. Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the word “the”
precedes the second reference, indicative of an intent to refer to the child’s
natural parent identified in the preceding conditional clause, i.e., the “natural
parent . . . [who] marrie[d] the adopting parent”—not to both natural parents of
the child. Id. This reading is reinforced by the legislature’s use of plural
language when—in two other places in the same statute—it intended to refer to
both natural parents. See id. (specifying that a child generally “shall cease to be
treated as a child of the natural parents” and, later, referring to “the right of
inheritance through the child’s natural parents” (emphases added)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 6 of 8 [12] Furthermore, Dasilva’s reading leads to an illogical result. The general rule
under Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8 is that “an adopted child shall be treated as
a natural child of the child’s adopting parents, and the child shall cease to be treated
as a child of the natural parents and of any previous adopting parents” for all purposes
of intestate succession. (emphasis added). Under Dasilva’s proffered reading,
the statute creates an exception for an adopted child that allows the child to
inherit from three parents—both biological parents and the adoptive parent.
And yet, the statute lacks a reciprocal exception for a natural parent like the
Decedent, who would not have been treated as an heir in the event Dasilva
predeceased him. This is not the natural reading of the statute, nor a reasonable
reading of the statute, which we conclude is unambiguous. This clause of the
statute allows for stepparent adoptions, a common occurrence, such that the
natural parent who marries the adoptive stepparent is exempted from the
general rule that an adoption severs the intestate rights between the child and
the natural parents. Put differently, the statute is not designed to resurrect
inheritance rights from the natural parent whose legal responsibility for the
child was extinguished by the stepparent adoption; rather, the statute is most
naturally read to preserve the inheritance relationship between the adopted
child and the natural parent who married the adoptive stepparent. See I.C. § 31-19-15-1 (relieving the parent of “all legal duties and obligations” to the child).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 7 of 8 [13] For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the
plain language of Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8, which supports its decision to
grant judgment on the pleadings and deny the Petition to Determine Heirship. 2
[14] Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Nathan S.J. Williams
Shambaugh Kast Beck & Williams, LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Thomas A. Hardin
Fort Wayne, Indiana
2
Having resolved this case based on the plain language of the statute, we need not address Dasilva’s reliance
on the legislative history of Indiana Code section 29-1-2-8 or the applicability of passing language in In re
Paternity of Duran, which involved a different clause concerning adoption by a grandparent or other relative.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-ES-12 June 26, 2026 Page 8 of 8