NUMBER 13-26-00085-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
FELIPA RUBIO, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 335TH DISTRICT COURT
OF BURLESON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Felipa Rubio pleaded guilty to assault on
a public servant, a third-degree felony, and was sentenced to an eight-year prison term
probated for eight years. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(b)(1). The State subsequently
filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision, alleging Rubio violated numerous terms of her supervision. After a contested hearing, the trial court found some
of the State’s allegations “true,” revoked appellant’s supervision, sentenced her to a fouryear prison term, and gave her 532 days of credit toward her sentence. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.755, § (a)(2) (permitting the trial court to reduce the term of
confinement originally assessed under certain conditions).
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, but her court-appointed appellate counsel has
since filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm. 1
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel
filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record
yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.
Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,
an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds
none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set
out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510
1 This appeal was transferred to us from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to a docketequalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are bound by the transferring court’s precedent to the extent that it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),
appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no
reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court
in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion
to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant
of her rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing a response, and
to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided
appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires
appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se
access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant did
not file a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found
nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the
opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for
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reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for
permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five
days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion
and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise her of her right to file a petition for
discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at
411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JENNY CRON
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
25th day of June, 2026.
2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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