UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEVEN QUINN SINGLETON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 26-00606 (UNA)
)
DONALD JOHN TRUMP, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action brought pro se is before the court on review of Plaintiff’s complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the following reasons, the court grants the IFP
motion and dismisses the complaint.
Plaintiff, a resident of Merced, California, sues President Donald J. Trump based on the
President’s “responsibility to appoint” six members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4; see 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (establishing Commission composed of, among
others, “6 members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”).
Plaintiff posits that “[w]ith fewer than 6 [voting] members, the Commission is not composed,”
which “denies the People access to rights related to the Manner in which Elections should be
conducted.” Id. He seeks a declaratory judgment “clarifying that the President of the United States
of America has an unflagging obligation to ensure the FEC’s composition” and an order
compelling “the President [to] present qualified nominations to the Commission[.]” Id.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A party seeking relief in the district court must plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), or suffer dismissal of the case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The U.S. Constitution “limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to the resolution of
‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’ ” Gettman v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 290 F.3d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. III, sec. 2, clause 1). “[S]tanding to invoke the authority of a
federal court ‘is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III.’ ” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has “the burden of
establishing” his “standing under Article III,” id., by pleading “(1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 157-58 (2014) (cleaned up). Federal courts lack “power to order relief to any uninjured
plaintiff[.]” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021) (quoting Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 466 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
Plaintiff has satisfied none of the requirements of standing. His complaint raising “only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, of which standing is a “core component,” id. at 560.
Because the “defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction,” Haase v. Sessions, 835
F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987), this case will be dismissed by separate order.
_________/s/______________
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
Date: June 29, 2026 United States District Judge