(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–112. Argued April 27, 2026—Decided June 29, 2026
On May 20, 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. Local police officers learned from witness interviews and surveillance footage that the robber had approached the credit union from a corner of an adjacent church while appearing to talk on a cell phone, but they could not find out anything more, and the robber remained at large. On June 14, the police officers applied to a Virginia magistrate for a geofence warrant directed to Google, which would require Google to hand over data about the cell phones located within a 150-meter radius of the credit union—the so-called “geofence”—near the time of the crime. The application described the cell-phone location data Google collects through a service called Location History, which records the location of a user’s cell phone every two minutes or so. The application also explained how that cell-phone location data could help identify the robber, possible accomplices, or additional witnesses. The warrant described a three-step process that the police would follow: at step one, Google would produce anonymized location data for all cell phones within the geofence 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the robbery; at step two, officers would attempt to narrow the list, and Google would provide additional anonymized data for that narrowed list, consisting of cell-phone locations both inside and outside the geofence during a two-hour period surrounding the robbery; and at step three, officers would further narrow the list, and Google would turn over identifying information, including names and phone numbers, for users on the final list. The magistrate issued the warrant, and through this process, Google ultimately produced three cell-phone users’ identifying information, including petitioner Okello Chatrie, whose location data showed that he entered the geofence about ten minutes before the robbery and headed toward a residential area immediately after leaving 2 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
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the bank.
Following further police work, a federal grand jury charged Chatrie
with robbery and related firearms offenses, and he moved to suppress
the information the police obtained from Google. According to Chatrie,
the officers had acquired that data through a Fourth Amendment
search, and the warrant ostensibly authorizing that search was invalid. The District Court found that the geofence warrant “plainly violates the rights enshrined in [the Fourth] Amendment” but denied the
motion based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 590
F. Supp. 3d 901, 905, 937–938. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed on different reasoning, holding that no search occurred because Chatrie “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two
hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google.”
107 F. 4th 319, 325. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc
and affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam, with the court dividing
evenly on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. This
Court granted certiorari solely on the question whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data. Held: Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Pp. 10–33.
(a) The Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy, and governmental “intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 304. The Amendment’s “basic purpose” is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” id., at 303, and it was designed “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance,” United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595. Pp. 10–29.
(1) In Carpenter, this Court held that accessing cell-site location information (CSLI) constitutes a Fourth Amendment search because “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements,” 585 U. S., at 310. The Court reasoned that CSLI provides a “detailed” and “encyclopedic” portrait of a person’s whereabouts, id., at 309, and, with that, “an intimate window into a person’s life,” id., at 311. Because people “compulsively carry” their cell phones “all the time,” the Court explained, a cell phone “tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner,” and thus “faithfully follows” him not only through “public thoroughfares [but] into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” Ibid. The Court further observed that the “newfound tracking capacity” that CSLI gives the police “runs against everyone”—not just those “under investigation”—and “travel[s] back
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in time,” making possible a form of surveillance that would have been unknown prior to the digital age, id., at 311–312. Carpenter accordingly held that “[a]llowing government access to cell-site records contravenes” expectations of privacy. Id., at 311. Pp. 13–15.
(2) Everything Carpenter relied on to find that law enforcement officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they accessed CSLI records applies as well or better to the police’s accessing of Location History data. First, Location History provides an even more finetuned picture of a person’s movements, pinpointing location within around twenty meters rather than within sectors of one-eighth to four square miles; it records location every two minutes or so for a daily average of 720 chartings rather than 101; and it can estimate elevation to reveal which floor of a building a phone is on. Second, Location History allows police to reconstruct “retrospective[ly],” and with no real effort, people’s comings and goings in any area, enabling “tireless and absolute surveillance” of any number of people in any number of places. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 312. And third, Location History implicates personal privacy interests even more than CSLI, because Location History is more the cell-phone user’s own. Most cell-phone users have no awareness of CSLI records, and would never try to retrieve them; by contrast, Google users regularly employ Location History as a personal journal. In that way, Location History resembles other private materials—e.g., emails, documents, photographs, or calendars— that even if stored on Google’s servers, a user reasonably views as his own and expects to be shielded from the “inquisitive eyes” of the government. Id., at 305. Pp. 16–18.
(3) The Government’s argument that accessing only a short
amount of cell-phone location information does not count as a Fourth Amendment search fails. “[E]ven short-term monitoring” can provide “a wealth of detail about [a person’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 415, and this Court has never understood Fourth Amendment protections as kicking in only once an intrusion “goes too far,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415. Where the Fourth
Amendment applies, it applies regardless of “the quality or quantity of information” the government obtains. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 37. That approach makes all the more sense when, as with Location History, law enforcement officials can select the time-limited set of materials they want from an all-encompassing database. Pp. 18–23.
(4) The Government argues that the so-called third-party doctrine precludes Chatrie from invoking the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The idea is that in “authoriz[ing] Google to collect, retain, and use” his location information, Chatrie lost his legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore his right to complain of a search. Brief for United States 4 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
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15. But Carpenter refused to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI,
and no good reason exists to reach a different result for Location History. In Carpenter, the Court rejected application of the third-party
doctrine to CSLI because such information is “qualitatively different”
from “telephone numbers and bank records,” 585 U. S., at 309—it is
incomparably “revealing” and is “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” given that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in modern society,” id., at 315. Both differentiating features
apply equally or better to Location History, which is even more “revealing” than CSLI and is “not truly shared” in the normal sense of
wanting a third party to see or use it. Id., at 315. The exposure of that
information to Google is merely what happens when a user avails himself of one of the services on his cell phone. The Government’s argument that generating Location History, unlike producing CSLI, is a
voluntary choice is meritless. That argument ignores how and why
Google users turn on Location History: Google repeatedly prompts users to turn on the service, often warning that devices will not “work
correctly” otherwise, 2 App. 140–141, while not disclosing in that
prompt how frequently users’ location information would be recorded,
how precise it would be, or how it might be given to the government.
More generally, an app-by-app, feature-by-feature method of granting
Fourth Amendment protection misapprehends the nature of modern
cell-phone use, where nearly everything requires some kind of “affirmative act” beyond “powering up” a given app or service. The Government wishes to disconnect the activities people do on their cell phones
from the mere act of carrying a turned-on cell phone (the thing that
generates CSLI), with only the latter receiving assured Fourth Amendment protection. But the point of carrying smartphones is to use what
is on them—as Carpenter said, to use the apps and “services they provide.” 585 U. S., at 315. Accordingly, a cell-phone user is not to be
viewed as sharing private information with third parties—which then
can be freely passed on to the government—just by doing the ordinary
things cell-phone users do. Pp. 24–29.
(b) The conclusion that a Fourth Amendment search occurred does
not resolve this case, because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
searches that are “unreasonable.” When law enforcement officials undertake a search to discover evidence of a crime, the reasonableness
standard generally requires that they seek a warrant from “a neutral
and detached magistrate,” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14,
who may issue a warrant only when “probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity,” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 459. The warrant issued here,
as described earlier, was an uncommon, multi-step one, and the parties have contested the legality of each stage of the search process it
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authorized. The Fourth Circuit did not address the questions that unusual warrant raises. Because this is “a court of review, not of first
view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7, the Court leaves it
up to the Court of Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search
process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements
of particularity and probable cause. Pp. 29–32.
136 F. 4th 100, vacated and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part I, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Parts II–B, II–C–1, and II–C–2. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–112
OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In recent years, law enforcement officers have employed
so-called geofence warrants to obtain information that technology companies collect about their users’ cell-phone locations. Suppose that investigators know a crime was committed at a particular place and time, but do not have a
suspect. They may draw a “geofence”—a virtual perimeter—around the crime scene and get a warrant compelling
a company to hand over data about the cell phones located
in that area near the time of the crime. Following a process
specified in the warrant, the company will turn over the
cell-phone data and eventually identify by name one or
more of the users thus disclosed.
The geofence warrant at issue here was directed to
Google, and used to solve a bank robbery. Hundreds of millions of Google users have activated a service called Location History, which records the location of a user’s cell
phone every two minutes or so. Through a geofence warrant, police officers required Google to turn over Location
History data revealing cell phones within the vicinity of a
bank at around the time it was robbed. At the end of the
multi-step process described in the warrant, Google gave
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the police three names. The Federal Government soon
charged one of the individuals thus identified, petitioner
Okello Chatrie, with committing the crime.
Today, we consider how the Fourth Amendment applies
to that use of a geofence warrant. Answering that question
in full would mean deciding whether the police conducted a
Fourth Amendment “search” when they acquired the cellphone data leading to Chatrie’s arrest and, if so, whether
that search was reasonable given the features of the warrant they employed. We decide the first part of that inquiry
today, concluding that the police conducted a search when
they gained access to Location History data. An individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his
cell phone’s location, and police intrude on that constitutionally protected interest when they demand the information—even though for only a limited time, and from a
third-party tech company. We leave to the Court of Appeals
the further question whether, given the warrant issued, the
search here was reasonable, meaning that each of its steps
was properly described with particularity and found to be
supported by probable cause.
I
A
Modern cell phones, we observed a dozen years ago, are
“such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v. California,
573 U. S. 373, 385 (2014). Since then, the percentage of
Americans who own smartphones has only increased. Today, more than nine in ten Americans own a smartphone.
See W. Bishop, Pew Research Center, Mobile Fact Sheet
(Nov. 20, 2025) (91%); compare A. Smith, Pew Research
Center, Smartphone Ownership—2013 Update (June 5,
2013) (56%). That means they are likely addicted to apps
and other services, many of which collect and store
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“detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life.”
Riley, 573 U. S., at 396.
Among that information is a single fact most pertinent
here: where the user’s cell phone is located at a given time.
Apps of many kinds rely on that datum. Your maps app
wants to help you navigate from Point A (where you are) to
Point B (where you are going). Ride-sharing apps of course
track your location when you are using them, and often do
so even when you are not. Weather apps want to tell you
about local conditions. Fast-food apps want to identify the
closest burger and pizza joints. Fitness apps want to track
your running routes. And so on.
This case concerns a form of cell-phone location data
called “Location History,” which Google apps collect and
store.1 Location History is what it sounds like—a timestamped record of every place a cell phone has been. Every
two minutes or so, Location History draws from an array of
sources to log a cell phone’s location. Those sources include
nearby Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth beacons, and cell sites,
as well as GPS and IP address information. When combined, the signals tracked can determine a cell phone’s location within 20 meters. They can also ascertain a phone’s
elevation, and thus reveal which floor within a building the
phone is on. By all accounts, those features make Location
History “the most sweeping, granular, and comprehensive
tool” existing today for collecting and storing location data. 590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 907 (ED Va. 2022).
Google repeatedly prompts users to enable Location History, and over 500 million users worldwide have done so.
The first prompt comes when a user initially establishes a
Google account. If that spur is ignored, another will arrive
when a user sets up a Google app—like Google Assistant,
1 Throughout this opinion, we describe how Location History worked at
the time the warrant at issue was executed. As noted below, Google has since then instituted a significant change, which apparently insulates Location History data from geofence warrants. See infra, at 4, n. 2. 4 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
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Google Maps, or Google Photos—on his phone or other device. Android (though not iPhone) users are specifically
warned that their devices will not “work correctly” unless
they turn on Location History. 2 App. 140–141. And once
a user does so, the service runs—and runs constantly—in
the background. Regardless whether the user has a Google
app open—or whether he is using his phone at all—Location History remains active. Indeed, it continues to work
even if the user deletes the app through which he first
turned it on. Location History stops only if a user affirmatively stops it. Sans that intervention, it tracks and tracks
and tracks a user’s cell phone (and other devices).
Google stores all Location History data in the cloud, rather than on a user’s device—though that choice makes no
real difference to the user. “Cloud computing” refers to “the
capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data
stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”
Riley, 573 U. S., at 397. Because it exists, Google can store
information on its own servers, while the user can view it
as if stored on his cell phone. Such remote storage, we have
explained, is common: “Cell phone users often may not
know whether particular information is stored on the device
or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”
Ibid. So, for example, Google usually stores users’ emails,
documents, and photographs on company servers instead of
on individual devices. See Brief for Google LLC as Amicus
Curiae 3, 37–38. And the same is true of the information
generated by Location History, which is stored in a single
central repository on Google’s servers.2 That data exists
someplace remote, but a user sees it—and the content
2 Except that in July 2025, years after the geofence warrant used in
this case, Google made a change: It now stores Location History data on individual users’ devices rather than on its own servers. See Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae 2. Google represents that, as a result, it is no longer capable of responding to geofence warrants that seek Location History data. See ibid.
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Google creates from it—in the palm of his hand. The user
thus can access a “Timeline” showing where he has traveled
when; receive real-time updates about his daily commute;
and take advantage of maps and recommendations based
on his usual movements.
B
In the last decade, Google’s Location History data has
also served another function, though this one unknown to
most users: That data, as obtained through a geofence warrant, can enable law enforcement officers to solve hard-tosolve crimes. Such a warrant, as earlier described, seeks
information about the cell phones located in the vicinity of
a crime scene at around the time the crime was committed.
See supra, at 1. The goal, put simply, is to find out who was
there and so who might have done it. (There are usually
better ways to investigate an already-known suspect—like
seeking only his location data.) And the mechanism is to
use the offender’s cell phone as an identifying device. The
warrant specifies a timeframe and maps an area (with the
geofence as its perimeter), and demands information about
the cell phones—and their users—present within it. There
is some uncertainty about how often the technique in fact
works. See Brief for Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae 14 (Kerr
Brief ). But its use among law enforcement officers has
flourished. Google received its first geofence warrant in
2016. See 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 914. Two years later, it received 982; and two years after that, more than 11,000. See
Google, Supplemental Information on Geofence Warrants
in The United States (Aug. 2021), https://services.google.
com/fh/files/misc/supplemental_information_geofence_warrants_united_states.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/
LN4P-KQJA). Though the details vary, each has made the
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same essential demand: Tell us, through cell-phone location
data, who was there when a crime happened.3
As those demands began to proliferate, Google worked
with law enforcement officials to develop a three-step protocol to govern geofence warrants. At the first step, Google
produces anonymized (i.e., no names attached) location
data for all cell phones (or other devices) within the
geofence—typically, a circle with a designated radius surrounding a latitude/longitude coordinate—during a specified timeframe. That data generally includes each phone’s
latitude/longitude coordinate and corresponding
timestamp; an estimate of that information’s accuracy; and
a description of the information’s source (e.g., a Wi-Fi network, a cell site, or some other). The data at this stage
shows each user’s location, every two minutes or so, within
the geofence. At the second step of the process, officials review the data produced and typically ask Google to provide
additional information for a subset of still-anonymized users. That new data is usually for a longer timeframe than
first specified; it also shows the user’s location outside, as well as inside, the geofence. Finally, at the third step, officials demand the identities of a further subset of users—
their names, email addresses, and phone numbers. Thus,
the geofence warrant is designed to eventually produce a
select number of identified users suspected of committing
the crime under investigation.
C
On May 20, 2019, at about 4:50 p.m., a man robbed a
credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. The robber presented
a teller with a handwritten note demanding $100,000,
3 Google is not the only tech company that has received geofence warrants; so have Apple, Lyft, Snapchat, and Uber, among others. See 136 F. 4th 100, 102, n. 1 (CA4 2025) (en banc) (Diaz, C. J., concurring). But Google is the “most common recipient and the only one known to respond.” Ibid.
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threatening to hurt her and her family if she did not comply, and warning her that he had “boys on the lookout out
side.” 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 905–906. When the teller replied
that she did not have access to that amount of money, the
robber brandished a firearm. He ordered everyone in the
bank to the ground, and forced the bank’s manager to open
a safe and put $195,000 into a bag. The robber then left on
foot with the money.
Local police officers responded to the scene and began an
investigation. They learned, from witness interviews and
surveillance-camera footage, that the robber had approached the credit union from a corner of an adjacent
church, while appearing to talk on a cell phone. But they
could not find out anything more, and the robber remained
at large.
On June 14, the police officers thus applied to a Virginia
magistrate for a geofence warrant directed to Google. The
application described the cell-phone location data Google
collects, and explained how that data could lead to identifying the robber, his possible accomplices, or additional witnesses to the crime. Success was particularly likely here,
the application stated, because the robber appeared to be
using his phone when he entered the credit union, and may
even have been speaking with an accomplice. The officers’
proposed geofence was a circle with a radius of 150 meters
surrounding the credit union.
The warrant application went on to describe the threestep process that the police would follow to obtain the location information sought. At step one, Google would produce
anonymized location data for all cell phones within the
geofence in the hour between 4:20 and 5:20 p.m. (30
minutes before to 30 minutes after the robbery). At step
two, police officers would “attempt to narrow down the list
[of devices] by reviewing the time stamped location coordinates for each [device] and comparing that against the
known time and location information that is specific to this
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crime.” 2 App. 136. For that narrowed list, Google would
provide additional (but still anonymized) data—cell-phone
locations both inside and outside the geofence during a twohour period (so now from 3:50 to 5:50 p.m.). Finally, at step
three, police would again “attempt to narrow down the list
by comparing this additional information regarding travel
and time against the known time and location information
that is specific to this crime.” Id., at 137. And Google would then turn over identifying information for each user on the
final list, including his name and phone number.
The magistrate issued the warrant, and officers executed
it in the manner prescribed. At the first stage of the process, Google gave up anonymized data for 19 users found
within the geofence during the hour within which the robbery occurred. At the second stage, the officers winnowed
the list to nine users. And Google produced anonymized
data showing their movements both inside and outside the
geofence for the extended two-hour period. At the third and
last step, the police again narrowed the list, this time to
three users. Google responded with their identifying information. One of the three was Chatrie. The location data
showed that he entered the geofenced area about ten
minutes before the robbery, and headed toward a residential area of town immediately after leaving the bank.
Following further police work, a federal grand jury
charged Chatrie with robbery and related firearms offenses. He moved to suppress the information that the police had obtained from Google. According to Chatrie, the
officers had acquired that data through a Fourth Amendment search, and the warrant ostensibly authorizing that
search was invalid.
The District Court mainly agreed with Chatrie’s Fourth
Amendment analysis, but still denied the motion to exclude
the Location History evidence. Even though “this particular geofence warrant plainly violates the rights enshrined
in [the Fourth] Amendment,” the court stated, the officers’
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reliance on it was not “objectively unreasonable.” 590
F. Supp. 3d, at 905, 938. And because that was so, the court
concluded, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
permitted admission of the location data. See id., at 937–
938; United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922–923 (1984)
(establishing good-faith exception).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but on different reasoning. The majority held
that the government did not conduct a search and therefore
did not need a warrant. That was so, the majority reasoned,
because Chatrie “did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google.” 107 F. 4th 319, 325 (2024). Judge
Wynn dissented, arguing that “the police intrusion into
Chatrie’s Location History data” was “a search that triggered the Fourth Amendment’s protections,” and that the
warrant issued was “so lacking in particularity and probable cause that it was invalid.” Id., at 339, 362, and n. 12.
After granting rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam. See 136 F. 4th 100,
101 (2025) (“The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED”). In multiple accompanying writings, the
court divided evenly (7 to 7) on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. Of the seven judges who thought
it had, most believed the geofence warrant defective. But
most also thought the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception applied, so ruled against Chatrie anyway.
We granted certiorari solely on the question whether the
police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data, thus declining to consider the exclusionary rule issue. See 607 U. S. 1148 (2026). The disputed
Fourth Amendment question divides into two parts. First,
did law enforcement officials conduct a search under the
Fourth Amendment when they acquired Chatrie’s location
data from Google? We hold that they did because an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell10 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
phone location data. Second, did the multi-step geofence
warrant issued here make that search reasonable? We
leave that question—which requires deciding whether the
warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
and particularity requirements at each stage of the search
process—to the Court of Appeals to address in the first instance.4
II
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “basic
purpose” of that Amendment, our precedents say, is “to
4 In line with our grant of certiorari, we do not address whether the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule still allows the admission of the Location History data in this case. That question remains for the Fourth Circuit to consider anew, gleaning anything it thinks relevant from our decision on the substantive Fourth Amendment issues.
The principal dissent seeks to rehash our limited grant of certiorari, but we see no reason to doubt it. We have Article III jurisdiction in this case, as even the dissent concedes. See post, at 4, n. 2 (ALITO, J.). That is because the Fourth Circuit is free to revisit the exclusionary rule issue in light of our opinion and to provide Chatrie with relief. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (Article III jurisdiction disappears only when it becomes “impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party”). So what does the dissent mean when it continually labels this opinion “advisory” (post, at 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7)—a term customarily used to describe opinions lacking a jurisdictional basis? Apparently, the dissent’s objection is that we today decide a question involving the Fourth Amendment when the odds are strong (so says the dissent) that the Fourth Circuit will eventually, as it did before, resolve this case on exclusionary rule grounds. But to repeat, the Fourth Circuit may now consider anew, after review of our opinion, how the good-faith exception applies here. And the very decision establishing that exception held that courts should feel free to “resolv[e] the Fourth Amendment issue” before the good-faith issue, either to better assess good faith or “to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 925 (1984). So contra the dissent, there is nothing advisory (or otherwise improper) in today deciding the Fourth Amendment issue on which we previously granted certiorari.
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safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 303 (2018) (quoting Camara
v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387
U. S. 523, 528 (1967)).
That purpose is central to decisions about whether a
Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred. Our early
search doctrine focused on whether law enforcement officials “obtain[ed] information by physically intruding”—that
is, trespassing—on private property. United States v.
Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 406–407, n. 3 (2012); see id., at 404–
405. But the Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,
351 (1967), recognized that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” And so we have long held that
“property rights are not the sole measure” of a constitutional violation; the Fourth Amendment “protect[s] certain
expectations of privacy as well.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U. S. 56, 64 (1992); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 304. “When an
individual seeks to preserve something as private and his
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” then governmental “intrusion into
that private sphere generally qualifies as a search.” Ibid.5
5 The dissent suggests that this Court has tried to curtail Katz ever
since deciding it, see post, at 10–11 (ALITO, J.); more energetically, the concurrence advocates overthrowing Katz and reverting to a solely property-based approach, see post, at 1–2, 4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). But this Court has faithfully applied Katz for some 60 years. Our decision in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296 (2018), responded to the same arguments made today (see, e.g., id., at 391–397 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting)) by reaffirming that Katz had “discredited the premise that property interests control” and that “privacy interests do not rise or fall with property rights.” 585 U. S., at 304, n. 1. And in saying as much, Carpenter had plenty of other decisions to cite. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 411 (2012) (refusing to “make trespass the exclusive test”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 32 (2001) (stating that the Court has “decoupled violation[s] of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property”). Of course, sometimes the privacy and property approaches will “align,” and an opinion 12 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Whether an expectation of privacy counts as legitimate is
less the result of any fixed set of rules than of “guideposts” stretching back to the Fourth Amendment’s beginnings.
Id., at 305. From the founding onward, we have explained,
the Fourth Amendment has sought to secure the “privacies
of life” against the exercise of “arbitrary power.” Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886); see Carpenter, 585
U. S., at 305. So too we have recognized, and repeatedly,
that the Amendment was designed “to place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.” United States
v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at
305. Whatever the form of an attempted incursion, the
Fourth Amendment protects Americans’ long-held conviction that no government official should have free access to
the most closely kept aspects of their lives.
In recent decades, this Court has often confronted the
challenge of adhering to those principles in the face of new
technologies. “[I]nnovations in surveillance tools” have “enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes.” Ibid. The Court,
in response, has sought to “assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States,
533 U. S. 27, 34 (2001). So in one decision, we rejected a
“mechanical interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment to
hold that the use of a thermal imager to detect heat coming
adopting the one will resemble, in whole or part, an opinion adopting the other. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 13 (2013) (KAGAN, J., concurring). That is not because the privacy-based approach is groping toward the more “coheren[t]” property-based one, as the concurrence suggests. Post, at 8 (GORSUCH, J.). It is simply because property law “naturally enough influence[s]” our “shared societal expectations” of what places and things count as private and should be free from governmental intrusion. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 111 (2006); see Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 304, n. 1 (“[P]roperty rights are often informative” in “determining which expectations of privacy are legitimate”). And when such an alignment of the two approaches occurs, then all the better.
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from a person’s home was a search in the constitutional
sense. Id., at 35. And in another, we held that the search
of a cell phone incident to arrest could not proceed without
a warrant (even though the search of a handbag could) because of the phone’s “vast quantities of personal information.” Riley, 573 U. S., at 386. Most recently, in Carpenter v. United States, this Court held that accessing a form
of cell-phone location information other than Location History is a Fourth Amendment search given individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy. See 585 U. S., at 310–313.
We begin with Carpenter in considering the Government’s front-line position here: that no warrant was needed
to get Location History data from Google (although the police “prophylactically secured” one) because no Fourth
Amendment search ever took place. See Brief for United
States 14. We then explain why the result we reached in
Carpenter once again follows. Contrary to the Government’s view, an individual has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information Location History collects about
his cell phone’s—meaning his own—movements. The police
invade that expectation, and thus conduct a search, when
they acquire that information, even though for only a limited period of time and even though via a third-party tech
company.
A
The question presented in Carpenter was “whether the
Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” 585 U. S., at 300. The cell-phone records at issue
were what is known as cell-site location information (CSLI).
As we explained, CSLI is a “time-stamped record” generated each time a cell phone connects to a cell site. Id., at
301. Wireless carriers collect and store that information for
their own business purposes (such as finding weak spots in
14 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
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their networks). But CSLI can also benefit law enforcement, because it identifies an individual’s approximate location every time his phone makes a connection. In Carpenter, police officers investigating a string of Radio Shack
robberies ordered a wireless carrier of a known suspect to
turn over his CSLI records for a seven-day period (without
first getting a warrant). Those records showed, as the Government later put it, that the suspect, Timothy Carpenter,
was “right where the . . . robbery was at the exact time of
the robbery.” Id., at 303. Carpenter moved to exclude the
CSLI records, arguing that the Government acquired them
through an unconstitutional search.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing what it had
said about a different way of tracking “physical location and
movements”: the use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle.
Id., at 306. In United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, five
Justices had agreed that such tracking counts as a Fourth
Amendment search because “individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.” Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 310; see Jones, 565 U. S.,
at 430 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415
(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring).6 That made sense, the Carpenter Court thought, even though the movements occurred
in public. Prior to the digital age, pursuing a suspect “for
any extended period of time was difficult and costly and
therefore rarely undertaken.” 585 U. S., at 310 (quoting
Jones, 565 U. S., at 429 (opinion of ALITO, J.)). As a result, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents
and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply
could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car.” Carpenter, 585 U. S., at
310 (quoting Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.)).
6 An overlapping set of five Justices decided the case on a different
ground, based on the Government’s physical trespass of the vehicle. See Jones, 565 U. S., at 404–405.
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A new technology should not transform what individuals
had reasonably thought they could withhold from the Government.
It followed a fortiori, Carpenter held, that “[a]llowing government access to cell-site records contravenes” expectations of privacy. 585 U. S., at 311. To an even greater degree than GPS monitoring, CSLI can provide a full “record
of the holder’s whereabouts” and, with that, “an intimate
window into a person’s life.” Ibid. People, after all, “regularly leave their vehicles,” but they “compulsively carry”
their cell phones “all the time.” Ibid. A cell phone thus
“tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner”: It
“faithfully follows” him not only through “public thoroughfares [but] into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”
Ibid. What is more, the “newfound tracking capacity” that
CSLI gives the police “runs against everyone”—not just
those “under investigation”—and “travel[s] back in time.”
Id., at 312. Police officers need not decide in advance (as
they do with GPS devices) who they want to follow and
when. Instead, they can easily and cheaply—with “just the
click of a button”—reconstruct any person’s movements
“retrospective[ly].” Id., at 311–312. What in the past was
“unknowable” suddenly becomes open to view, presenting
formerly unimaginable “privacy concerns.” Ibid. The Court
thus concluded: “[W]hen the Government accessed CSLI
from the wireless carriers”—thereby obtaining a “detailed
log” of where Carpenter had gone for seven days—“it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
whole of his physical movements.” Id., at 312–313.7
7 A significant fraction of the dissent is devoted to relitigating Carpenter, from which its author dissented. See post, at 1, 8–10, 13–14, 19–21 (ALITO, J.). Carpenter, the dissent complains today, “extended the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to encompass a category of government investigations that it had never previously covered”: The decision “thus reflected a stark departure from both traditional Fourth 16 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
B
The resemblances between CSLI and Location History, in
their relationship to personal privacy, practically leap off
the page. Everything Carpenter relied on to find that law
enforcement officers conducted a Fourth Amendment
search when they accessed wireless carriers’ CSLI records
applies as well or better to the police’s accessing of Google’s Location History data.
First, Location History provides an even more fine-tuned
picture of a person’s movements than CSLI. Carpenter
noted that through CSLI records, police could “achieve[ ]
near perfect surveillance” of an individual holding a cell
phone. Id., at 311–312. But Location History is nearer perfect still. Here is one way of comparing the two: At any
given time, CSLI placed Carpenter within a “sector ranging
from one-eighth to four square miles,” whereas Location
History pinpointed Chatrie’s location within around twenty
meters, which is less than two percent of a mile. Id., at 312; see 1 App. 45, 3 id., at 173–174. Or here is another
Amendment principles and this Court’s 20th-century doctrine.” Post, at 13. In leveling that charge, the dissent re-ups arguments, point-forpoint, that Carpenter specifically rejected. Compare post, at 8, 13 (maintaining that compelled document-production orders are never searches), with 585 U. S., at 317–318 (rejecting that view); compare also post, at 9, 13 (contending that the Fourth Amendment never protects documents held by third parties), with 585 U. S., at 313–316 (likewise rejecting that view). In light of that outlook, it is perhaps not so surprising that the dissent criticizes today’s decision as “rely[ing] primarily” on Carpenter, rather than on earlier Fourth Amendment decisions. Post, at 13. But on that supposed offense, we plead guilty as charged. Carpenter is the most recent decision of this Court to consider the Fourth Amendment’s application to new surveillance technologies—indeed, to law enforcement’s use of those technologies to create a “chronicle of [a cell-phone] user’s past movements.” 585 U. S., at 300. What would be grounds for complaint is if this decision did not “rely primarily” on Carpenter. Post, at 13. And as the next section of this opinion shows, the more one delves into the technologies at issue, the closer the parallels become. See infra this page and 17–18.
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measure: CSLI logged Carpenter’s location an average of
101 times a day, whereas Location History commonly records a person’s location every two minutes, for a daily average of 720 chartings. See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 302; 136
F. 4th, at 151 (Berner, J., concurring). Or finally, a third:
Unlike CSLI, Location History can estimate a phone’s elevation—so, for example, can tell whether someone has gone
into a doctor’s office on the first floor of a multi-story building, or a private apartment on the tenth. Of course, the
accuracy of each of the two techniques may vary in different
places and at different times. But across the board Location
History is the far more precise measure. When the Carpenter Court said that CSLI provides a “detailed” and “encyclopedic” portrait of a person’s whereabouts, it did not know
what further technology was on the horizon. 585 U. S., at
309.
And next, Location History also allows police officers to
reconstruct “retrospective[ly],” and with no real effort, people’s comings and goings in any area. Id., at 312. As with
CSLI, the Government need not decide in advance the kind
of surveillance it should undertake, whether of a person or
a site. “Whoever the suspect turns out to be,” Carpenter
said of CSLI, “he has effectively been tailed every moment
of every day.” Ibid. Likewise, as this case shows, wherever
a location of interest turns out to be (whether a crime scene
or a protest march or even a private home), it has effectively been surveilled for the same boundless time. Google’s Location History will be available to chart the movements of
many individuals—or a few or one—within the vicinity,
again at the “click of a button.” Id., at 311. Recall that in
Jones, it was thought notable that law enforcement officials
of an earlier age usually could not monitor every movement
of an individual’s car, as a GPS device does. See supra, at
14–15; 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.); see also Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 312 (“In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s [prior] movements were limited”). Far less
18 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
could those officials ever perform the “tireless and absolute
surveillance” of any number of people in any number of
places, public and private, that Location History can accomplish. Ibid. If the one kind of intrusion clashes with “society’s expectation[s]” of what counts as private, so must the
other. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
Indeed, Location History records implicate those privacy
interests still more than CSLI data because the former is
more the individual’s own. Most cell-phone users have no
awareness of CSLI records, and anyway would never try to
retrieve them. The records are instead the province of wireless carriers, which maintain them for an array of business
functions. See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 301; supra, at 13–
14. Location History information is different. No doubt,
Google itself uses those records to improve the quality of its apps. But Google users, too, regularly employ Location History—for example, “to remind themselves of a restaurant
they ate at two weeks ago, the time they were last at a
friend’s home, the sites they saw on vacation, or the distance they walked on a particular day.” Brief for Google
LLC as Amicus Curiae 8. The records thus serve as a personal journal of a user’s movements, which that user consults (and even can edit) for his own purposes. See id., at
10. In that way, Location History resembles other private
materials—think of emails, documents, photographs, or
calendars—that even if stored on Google’s servers, a user
reasonably views as his own. And as a result, that he reasonably expects to be shielded from the “inquisitive eyes” of
the government. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 305.
C
The Government, not much contesting any of the above,
principally argues on a different ground: that accessing
only a short amount of cell-phone location information
(whether Location History or CSLI) does not count as a
Fourth Amendment search. (The dissent likewise contends
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that the “duration” of data obtained here is too brief for a
search to have happened. Post, at 14 (ALITO, J.); see post,
at 15–16.) Recall that Carpenter involved seven days’ worth
of location data. See supra, at 14–15. And in deciding that
case, this Court reserved the issue whether there was a
more “limited period for which the Government may obtain”
such data “free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” 585
U. S., at 310, n. 3.8 The Government now claims that the
answer is yes, and that the two hours’ worth of Location
History acquired here falls within the Constitution-free
zone. In the Government’s view, a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in “that short a time window” of location data, because his “short-term” movements will “reveal[ ] little about the details of [his] personal life.” Brief for United States 12, 20; see id., at 20 (“A single stop at a doctor’s office, for example, does not in itself identify the reason for the visit”). The Government cites in support United
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 282 (1983), in which the
Court held that police officers’ use of a beeper to assist an
hours-long tail of a car did not bring the Fourth Amendment into play. The lesson the Government draws is that
law enforcement officials accessing Location History should
receive a Fourth Amendment grace period of some number
of hours.
8 In comparing Carpenter and this case, the dissent sometimes treats
the former as involving not 7 days but instead 127 days of location data. See post, at 13, 14, 15 (ALITO, J.). But there is no basis for doing so. To be sure, one of the two wireless carriers involved in the case had turned over 127 days of data, as the Court noted. See 585 U. S., at 302. But the other was ordered to turn over only 7 days, and the Court could not have been clearer that its holding applied whenever the Government accessed a week or more of CSLI data (with everything below that amount reserved). See id., at 310, n. 3 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search”). The dissent acknowledges that fact (post, at 15, n. 4), even as it repeatedly invokes the 127-day figure to make its comparative argument sound stronger.
20 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
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But to begin, the Government is wrong about the incapacity of short-term location information to reveal private
matters. “[R]epeated patterns,” in the Government’s phrasing, are not all that individuals wish to, and reasonably expect to, keep to themselves. Brief for United States 20. Return here to another of Jones’s insights: “[E]ven short-term
monitoring” of a person’s physical movements can provide
“a wealth of detail about [his] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” 565 U. S., at 415 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Consider just a few trips that
a person is apt to think “indisputably private”: to “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, [or] the by-the-hour motel.” Ibid. And unlike a GPS
device, Location History enables police officers to focus on
precisely those sites—to see, in a given time block, who
shows up. Similarly, Location History—even two hours of
it—allows officers to target one-off events of potential interest: a gun show, say, or a political rally.
Still more fundamentally, we have never understood
Fourth Amendment protections as kicking in only once an
intrusion “goes too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) (adopting that approach for regulatory takings). Where the Fourth Amendment applies, it
applies—regardless of “the quality or quantity of information” the government obtains. Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 37.
So, for example, this Court held that thermal imaging qualified as a search even though it did not, and was not likely
to, detect “private activities” or “intimate details.” Ibid.
The Amendment, we analogized, makes “no exception” for
the officer “who barely cracks open the front door and sees
nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.”
Ibid. And likewise, the Amendment does not give agents a
pass if their wiretap is of limited duration and thus less
likely to intrude on private matters. Indeed, in our seminal
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wiretap case, the police obtained only 18 minutes of recordings. See Katz, 389 U. S., at 354, n. 14.
That approach makes all the more sense when, as with
Location History, officials can select the time-limited set of materials they want from an all-encompassing database.
Then, the durational bounds on the data actually acquired
do little to address the Fourth Amendment’s concern about
“a too permeating police surveillance.” Di Re, 332 U. S., at
595; see supra, at 12. What creates that concern is that the
government can access all of a cell-phone user’s movements,
in both public and private places—that it possesses a virtual panopticon with which to scrutinize its citizens’ activities. The sweep of the official invasion is not made less because the government, with the benefit of hindsight, can
pinpoint exactly which few hours of movements it wants to
review. That feature of accessing location data is, indeed,
more a practical benefit to the government than a limit on
its intrusive powers.9
And contra the Government, Knotts does not support the
view that accessing two hours of Location History is not a
search. There, police officers put a beeper in a car to help
them follow it from Minnesota to Wisconsin. The Court decided that the beeper did not turn the tail into a search, but was explicit in keeping its holding cabined to that rudimentary technology. The defendant had argued that a ruling
against him would enable officials to conduct “surveillance
9 The Government’s grace-period approach to Fourth Amendment protection would also create a host of line-drawing questions. At what point, exactly, would a non-search become a search? In two hours, or six hours, or one day, or six days? And how often would the clock reset? If, say, the limit was six hours, could an officer request location data from 6 a.m. to noon, and then again from 12:30 to 6:30 p.m.? And if there were concurrent federal and state investigations of a crime, as there could have been here, would law enforcement access to Location History data double? The approach the Government offers would “keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.” Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 401 (2014).
22 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
of any citizen of this country” free from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 460 U. S., at 283. The Court took the
concern seriously, stating that if technology progressed so
as to allow more sophisticated surveillance, “different constitutional principles” could well apply. Id., at 284. And
three decades later, five Justices in two opinions found that
they did. When faced in Jones with a GPS device—which
unlike the beeper allowed remote monitoring—they decided, notwithstanding Knotts, that privacy was implicated
and a search had occurred. See supra, at 14–15. Yet even
that was not all. When six years further on, the Carpenter
Court held that accessing CSLI was a search, it recounted
the Knotts-to-Jones progression to explain why Knotts did
not stand in its way. See 585 U. S., at 306–307 (Knotts “was
careful to distinguish between the rudimentary tracking facilitated by the beeper and more sweeping modes of surveillance”). For the third time, we reach the same conclusion
today.
And still another feature of Knotts makes it inapt here:
that the surveillance there was confined to public roads.
That fact was crucial to the Court’s decision: “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy,” Knotts explained, because
the car is always “in plain view.” 460 U. S., at 281. By contrast, the movements that Location History reveals are not
limited to public streets. Recall what Carpenter observed:
A “cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,
[and] political headquarters.” 585 U. S., at 311; see supra,
at 15.10 In one of those places—a private residence—this
10 The dissent replies that the “limited geofence procedure” authorized
by the warrant here distinguishes this case from Carpenter because “the geofence’s boundaries” centered on “a public place.” Post, at 16 (ALITO, J.). But as an initial matter, those boundaries were defined by a warrant. If accessing Location History does not count as a Fourth Amendment search, as the dissent generally suggests (see, e.g., post, at 12, 17), there
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Court has held even beeper technology to count as a search
because it could reveal “whether a particular article—or a
person, for that matter” was in the home “at a particular
time.” United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 716 (1984). If
that is so, accessing Location History must also be a
search—even if for only two hours—because that data can
far more reliably show someone within a home (indeed, on
a specific floor). The Government replies with an odd argument. It thinks that “tracking [someone] into a private residence”—yes, even for two hours—would “probably” be a
search, but tells us not to worry because Chatrie did not go
home. Tr. of Oral Arg. 98, 134. That approach, however, is
foreign to the way the Fourth Amendment works. Whether
something is a search does not depend on what it finds. See
Di Re, 332 U. S., at 595 (“[A] search is not to be made legal
by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts”). An officer, after all, cannot know the fruits of a given surveillance in advance. The surveillance must be either a
search or not regardless. The Government’s concession
thus gives away its argument that, for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, two hours of cell-phone location data
is not enough.
will not be a warrant (or any other means) to limit the scope of what law enforcement can demand. And even putting that aside, the dissent’s argument is wrong because it ignores how this geofence warrant actually worked. The geofence was not limited to the bank; it also included a nearby church. 590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 918 (ED Va. 2022); cf. Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae 12 (noting that, in Google’s experience, it is “common for a geofence to cover private homes, apartment buildings, . . . hotels, [and] places of worship”). And regardless, the Location History data the police obtained at the second stage of the search process was not constrained by the geofence. In fact, it showed individuals’ trips to private residences, a school, and a hospital. See 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 923–924. So the geofence’s boundaries do not somehow turn Location History into a public-movements-only technology or ensure a less “comprehensive” log than in Carpenter. Post, at 16.
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D
The Government has an additional argument, which in
Carpenter was its “primary” one—that the so-called thirdparty doctrine precludes Chatrie from invoking the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. 585 U. S., at 313. (Here too the
dissent reiterates the Government’s view. See post, at 11–
12, 17 (ALITO, J.).) The idea is that in “authoriz[ing] Google to collect, retain, and use” his location information, Chatrie lost his legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore his
right to complain of a search—regardless whether it was for
two hours, two weeks, or two years. Brief for United States
15. The problem for the Government—and presumably the
reason that its primary assertion in Carpenter has here become a secondary one—is that Carpenter refused to apply
the third-party doctrine to CSLI, and no good reason exists
to reach a different result for Location History.
The third-party doctrine traces to two cases involving information provided by customers to a bank and telephone
company, and then turned over to law enforcement officials.
In United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), this Court
held that a bank depositor had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in canceled checks and deposit slips in his bank’s
possession, because the records were “voluntarily conveyed
to the bank[ ] and exposed to [its] employees in the ordinary
course of business.” Id., at 442. The depositor, the Court
explained, had “take[n] the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another,” that the third party would in turn provide that
information to the government. Id., at 443. A few years
later, the Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979),
applied that principle to hold that a (landline) telephone
subscriber lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers he dialed. Once again, the Court reasoned
that the subscriber had “voluntarily conveyed [the dialed
numbers] to the telephone company,” and so relinquished
his Fourth Amendment right. Id., at 744.
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In Carpenter, however, the Court rejected the Government’s contention that the third-party doctrine likewise
governed the acquisition of CSLI. The Court acknowledged
that a cell-phone user “continuously reveals his location” to
a third-party wireless carrier. 585 U. S., at 309. But it held that cell-phone location information is “qualitatively different” from “telephone numbers and bank records.” Ibid.
Those differences fell along two axes. First, the Court explained, the “nature” of CSLI is incomparably “revealing.”
Id., at 314. There is “a world of difference” between the “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected
by wireless carriers” and “the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller.” Ibid. The former thus “implicates privacy concerns far beyond” the latter. Id., at 315. And second, the Court continued, “[c]ell
phone location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.” Ibid. Because “cell phones
and the services they provide” are “such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life”—“indispensable to participation
in modern society”—a person can hardly help but generate
a “trail of location data.” Ibid. “[I]n no meaningful sense,”
the Court thought, does that mean a person “voluntar[il]y
expos[es]” to any third party a “comprehensive dossier of
his physical movements.” Ibid.
Both differentiating features highlighted in Carpenter
apply equally or better to Location History. As noted above,
Location History is even more “revealing” than CSLI, because it provides a yet more precise record of an individual’s movements. See supra, at 16–17. Access to that record enables officials to undertake nearly perfect, retrospective
surveillance of countless persons and places. See supra, at
17–18. And for Location History, that surveillance is based
on information that a user reasonably understands as his
own, even though stored on Google’s servers—much like his
emails, photos, and calendar entries. See supra, at 18.
Likewise, the information is “not truly shared,” in the
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normal sense of wanting a third party to see or use it. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315. The exposure of that information
to Google is merely what happens when a user avails himself of one of the services on his cell phone. Or said a bit
differently, it is the automatic price of conventional cellphone usage—which, just as Carpenter noted, is a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life.” Ibid. So just as the
third-party doctrine did not apply in Carpenter, it does not
apply here.
The Government contests that conclusion on Carpenter’s
second axis alone: It claims that generating Location History, unlike producing CSLI, is a voluntary choice on the
user’s part. Although carrying a cell phone may be indispensable in modern society, the Government argues, using
Location History is not. Rather, Location History is an “optional add-on,” which a user must enable by an “affirmative
act” beyond “powering up” a phone. Brief for United States
13, 22 (quoting Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315). In support,
the Government emphasizes that only around one-third of
current Google accountholders have activated the service.
See Brief for United States 22; see 1 App. 45. That goes to
show, says the Government, that people can “live[ ] without”
Location History. Brief for United States 22; see Tr. of Oral
Arg. 92. And if that is true (the Government says), people
who do use the feature have indeed “voluntar[il]y expos[ed]”
all of their movements. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315.
But as an initial matter, that argument ignores some pertinent facts about how and why Google users turn on Location History. As described earlier, Google prompts a user,
and repeatedly, to turn on the service—when he sets up a
Google account, when he sets up an Android phone, and
when he sets up a Google app. See supra, at 3–4. The
prompt often informs him that his device will not “work correctly” unless he does so. 2 App. 140–141. By contrast, it
does not tell him quite what he is signing up for: “how frequently Google would record [his] location”; “how precise
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 27
Opinion of the Court
Location History can be”; or how Google might give all that
minute-by-minute location information to the government.
590 F. Supp. 3d, at 936; 136 F. 4th, at 128 (Wynn, J., concurring in judgment). In those circumstances, it is hard to
see how any user is, in the normal sense, “sharing” with
third parties a comprehensive catalog of his physical movements. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 314. And that is so regardless of how many others ignore Google’s entreaties. The
Government’s estimation of that number is almost surely
overstated: It appears to include, for example, the many
millions of Google accountholders in foreign countries like
China where collecting Location History is illegal. See 4
Joint App. in No. 22–4489 (CA4), pp. 845, 848. But in any
event, the raw user totals for Location History—one-third,
two-thirds, or someplace in between—are not the most apt
measure of whether that service’s enlistees have, as the
Government claims, self-consciously “assumed the risk of
sharing” all their movements with others. Brief for United
States 12.
More generally, the Government’s approach to Fourth
Amendment protection would raise a host of workability issues. At the top of the list: What percentage of users would
have to sign up for a service to make doing so non-voluntary? The Government posited at argument that if 80 percent of active Google accountholders had enabled Location
History, the case would be “much closer.” Tr. of Oral. Arg.
92. After all, the Government candidly noted, even possessing a cell phone is not truly “indispensable” (to use Carpenter’s word): “[S]omething like 90 percent of people have
[them].” Tr. of Oral. Arg. 92. So where to draw the line?
And after that, the questions only multiply. Would a user
lose Fourth Amendment protection if a highly popular cellphone feature became less so over time? What if the use of
a given feature is ubiquitous among (but only among) a subset of the population (say, an age cohort), and an individual
defendant is a member of that class? Would it be enough if
28 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the lion’s share of cell-phone users enabled a feature similar to the one at issue—so, for example, any location-tracking
service, whether Google’s or some other company’s? And
finally, a more basic inquiry: In such a world, how is anyone—whether a cell-phone user or a police officer—to know
in advance (which is when the knowledge is useful) whether
enrollees in a given service will be found to have Fourth
Amendment protection in the information that service collects? To ask all these questions about the Government’s
approach is to know that it is on the wrong track.
And there is yet a deeper problem: The Government’s
app-by-app, feature-by-feature method of granting Fourth
Amendment protection misapprehends the very nature of
modern cell-phone use. Pretty much everything a person
does on a smartphone requires some kind of opt-in—an “affirmative act” beyond “powering up” to utilize a given app
or service. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315. Consider sending
an email on Gmail, uploading a photo to Google Photos, or
adding a calendar entry to Google Calendar. None happens
solely by dint of the phone’s operation; each requires, as Location History does, an “optional add-on.” Brief for United
States 13. And each activity, like using Location History,
results in sharing information with a third-party tech company—turning over private materials to live on that company’s servers. The Government wishes to disconnect all
those uses from the mere act of carrying a turned-on cell
phone (the thing that generates CSLI), with only the latter
receiving assured Fourth Amendment protection. But that
is to imagine that all of us are living in dumb flip-phone
days. The point of carrying smartphones is to use what is
on them—as Carpenter said, to use the apps and “services
they provide.” 585 U. S., at 315. That is what has become
a “pervasive and insistent”—even “indispensable”—“part of
daily life.” Ibid.; Riley, 573 U. S., at 385. And so that is
what Carpenter insulated from the third-party doctrine. A
cell-phone user is not to be viewed as sharing private
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 29
Opinion of the Court
information with third parties—which then can be freely
passed on to the government—just by doing the ordinary
things cell-phone users do.
* * *
For all those reasons, we hold that police officers invade
a cell-phone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy when
they access his Location History. It does not matter if the
time period scrutinized was only two hours. Nor does it
matter that the materials obtained were handed over by a
third-party tech company. When the government “accesses
historical cell phone” location information—Location History as much as CSLI—it “conducts a search under the
Fourth Amendment.” Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 300.
III
That conclusion does not resolve this case, because the
Fourth Amendment prohibits only searches that are “unreasonable.” When law enforcement officials undertake a
search to discover evidence of a crime, the reasonableness
standard generally requires that they seek a warrant from
“a neutral and detached magistrate.” Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948); see Vernonia School Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 653 (1995).11 That requirement
subjects the officials’ assessment of a search’s propriety to
the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer.”
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U. S. 90, 99 (2006). The magistrate, in turn, may issue a warrant only when “probable
cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity.” Kentucky v. King,
563 U. S. 452, 459 (2011).
11 Our precedents recognize exceptions to that rule—most prominently,
“when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 319. Today’s decision does not call into doubt, in such circumstances, a warrantless geofence search. See id., at 320 (noting the same for “warrantless access to CSLI”).
30 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
When officers have obtained a warrant, as they did here,
a search’s legality will thus depend on whether a magistrate has properly found probable cause to support a particularly described search. “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462
U. S. 213, 232 (1983). But a magistrate must always determine that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the place searched. Id.,
at 238. That means determining, to the requisite “fair probability,” both that the place searched will have the materials sought and that those materials will contain evidence
“aid[ing]” in a criminal’s “apprehension or conviction.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U. S. 535, 551, 552, n. 7 (2012); see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 556 (1978)
(“The critical element” is whether there is the requisite
“cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located” in the targeted place). The particularity requirement, for its part, ensures that the search will be of an appropriate scope—that it is “carefully tailored to
its justifications, and will not take on the character of the
wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987).
That requirement typically looks to such matters as the geographic and durational expanse of the search. See id., at
84–85; Karo, 468 U. S., at 718. And it too must take account
of “particular factual contexts,” including in surveillance
cases the nature of the technology to be used. Gates, 462
U. S., at 232; see, e.g., Karo, 468 U. S., at 718; see generally Kerr Brief 17–20.
The warrant issued here, as described earlier, was an uncommon, multi-step one. See supra, at 7–8. The first step
it laid out authorized police officers to obtain location data for all cell phones inside the designated geofence within a
one-hour timeframe. The second step entitled the officers
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 31
Opinion of the Court
to obtain additional data (two hours, both inside and outside the geofence) for a subset of those phones—of the officers’ own choosing. And the third step enabled them to obtain personal identifying information (including names,
email addresses, and phone numbers) for a further subset—
again of their selection. As to how the officers would make
their choices at the second and third steps—how they would
pick the users subject to more intense scrutiny—the warrant said very little. In toto: They would “attempt to narrow
down the list by reviewing the time stamped location coordinates for each [device] and comparing that against the
known time and location information that is specific to this
crime.” 2 App. 136; see id., at 137; supra, at 7–8.
The parties have contested the legality of each stage of
that process. Chatrie analogizes the first step to an “unconstitutional general warrant,” and argues that in any event
the search at that step was both insufficiently described by
the warrant and lacking in probable cause. Brief for Chatrie 12; see id., at 13. As to steps two and three, Chatrie
contends that the warrant left too much authority to police
officers—and too little to the magistrate—to define the
search’s scope and determine whether cause for it existed.
See id., at 13–14. The Government, for its part, defends the
warrant at every step as seeking “particularized information from Google’s database” based on “probable cause to
believe that Google had information” that would help solve
a crime. Brief for United States 14. And the Government
urges that the discretion given to the officers at steps two
and three fell within the bounds of reasonableness. See id.,
at 46.
We leave all of those questions to the Court of Appeals to
decide in the first instance. Because the Fourth Circuit
panel concluded that no search had occurred, it did not address whether the geofence warrant issued here validly authorized each stage of the search process. Nor did the en
banc court’s one-sentence per curiam opinion speak to that
32 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
issue. We are, as we have said many times before, “a court
of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S.
709, 718, n. 7 (2005). It is therefore now up to the Court of
Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause.
IV
In his famed and vindicated dissent, Justice Brandeis explained why a wiretap was a search, subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements. See Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 471 (1928). Those who drafted the Amendment could not have imagined such a technology. But they
understood, Justice Brandeis wrote, a matter of more transcendent importance: that Americans had “as against the
Government, the right to be let alone” and that the Fourth
Amendment must protect against “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed.” Id., at 478.
Far more recently, this Court in Carpenter invoked Justice Brandeis’s opinion in explaining why law enforcement
officials could not have “unrestricted access to a wireless
carrier’s database of physical location information.” 585
U. S., at 320. Said Carpenter: “[T]he Court is obligated—as
‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the Government’—to ensure that
the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment
protections.” Ibid. (quoting 277 U. S., at 473–474 (dissenting opinion)). For new technological tools, the Court continued, may “risk[ ] Government encroachment of the sort
the Framers, after consulting the lessons of history, drafted
the Fourth Amendment to prevent.” 585 U. S., at 320.
Today’s decision follows from the same judicial obligation, to guard against the same risk of undue encroachment. The Fourth Amendment applies, too, when officials
tap into Google’s “database of physical location
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Opinion of the Court
information.” Ibid. That database is new, but the principle
covering it is not: That principle is instead the one our history has given. The Fourth Amendment must, as ever, protect against unjustified governmental intrusion on the privacy of the individual.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
JACKSON, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–112
OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that law enforcement officers conducted a search when they accessed petitioner Chatrie’s Location History. I write separately because I would have
gone further to explain that this search violated the Fourth
Amendment. As the Court observes, “[w]hen officers have
obtained a warrant,” the validity of a search turns on
“whether a magistrate has properly found probable cause to
support a particularly described search.” Ante, at 30. In
my view, it is clear that at a minimum the second and third
stages of the search process here did not satisfy this foundational requirement.
At step two, the warrant authorized officers to access an
additional hour’s worth of Location History, unbounded by
the geofence’s perimeter. Though the warrant stated that
officers would “attempt to narrow down the list” of devices
subject to this step, there was no explicit requirement that
they do so. 2 App. 136 (emphasis added). Nor did the warrant set forth any criteria that officers would use in their
narrowing efforts. Ibid.
The same infirmities carried over to step three. At this
step, the warrant authorized officers to access “identifying
account information,” including the username, date of
birth, account number, and any email addresses or
2 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
JACKSON, J., concurring
telephone numbers associated with the account. Id., at 137.
Once again, the warrant stated only that officers would “attempt to narrow down the list,” without setting forth any
criteria for doing so. Ibid. (emphasis added).
This “uncommon, multi-step” process, ante, at 30, meant
that officers conducted key portions of the search outside
the supervision of “a neutral and detached magistrate,”
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Put differently, officers could obtain additional, sensitive information at steps two and three without having to convince a
magistrate that there was probable cause to believe this
particular information would uncover evidence related to
the crime. In this way, the warrant left “too much to the
discretion of the officer[s] executing the order,” giving them a “roving commission” to collect more data absent any justification to a magistrate. Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41,
59 (1967).
The facts of this case illustrate why the lack of magisterial oversight is dangerous. When executing steps two and
three, law enforcement initially sought unbounded data
and account information from all 19 devices identified at
step one. See 590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 921 (ED Va. 2022).
Nothing in the warrant prevented officers from obtaining
this broad set of data; they narrowed the list only because
Google insisted on it. The officers eventually settled on requesting data from nine devices at step two, but even this
shorter list may have been overbroad. For three of the nine
devices, the location data showed the users’ movements to
and from sensitive spaces—namely, residences, a school,
and a hospital. See id., at 923. Given how it was written,
the warrant itself provided no “judicial check” on law enforcement’s determination that probable cause justified this
intrusion. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 220
(1981).
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
JACKSON, J., concurring
* * *
The Court correctly observes that allowing the Government to “access all of a cell-phone user’s movements” without limit essentially arms it with “a virtual panopticon with
which to scrutinize its citizens’ activities.” Ante, at 21. It is for this reason that law enforcement and courts must
carefully abide by the Fourth Amendment’s instruction that
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” The Fourth Circuit should keep this instruction in
mind on remand when evaluating the constitutionality of
the multi-step search that occurred here, especially at steps
two and three.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–112
OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s judgment that the government’s
examination of Okello Chatrie’s Location History data
amounted to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. But respectfully, I would reach that conclusion by a
different route.
I
To decide whether a Fourth Amendment search took
place in this case, the Court once again invokes a test first
advanced in a solo concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347 (1967). Under that test, a search occurs when the
government intrudes on an “expectation of privacy” that
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
If Katz has become a familiar feature of our law, it seems
to me no more persuasive for it. Consider just a few of its
problems, beginning with this: It has no basis in the Constitution’s text or history. The Fourth Amendment’s protections do not depend on “the breach of some abstract ‘expectation of privacy’ whose contours are left to the judicial
imagination.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296,
391 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). Instead, the Fourth
Amendment speaks in more concrete terms, protecting an
individual’s person, house, papers, and effects from
2 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
unreasonable searches and seizures. Ibid. No surprise,
then, that it’s hard to find anything like the Katz test in the law leading up to the Fourth Amendment’s adoption—or
anything much like it in this Court’s jurisprudence before
the 1960s. See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 391–392
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
Even if I could overlook that problem with Katz, I still
wouldn’t know how to apply it. As the Court has candidly
admitted, it has never been able to identify a “single rubric” that might “definitively resolv[e] which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection.” Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 304 (majority opinion). Maybe Katz poses an empirical question, tagging reasonable expectations of privacy to those
privacy expectations “people actually have.” Carpenter, 585
U. S., at 392 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). Or maybe the question is a normative one, asking what expectations reasonable people “should . . . have.” Ibid. In truth, nobody knows
and, either way, this Court is the wrong body for the task.
We aren’t equipped to make empirical assessments about
what most Americans think. Nor is it our job to enforce our
own normative judgments, as opposed to those embodied in
the Constitution and laws. Id., at 392–394.
If this weren’t trouble enough, we’ve also adorned Katz
with an equally indefensible qualification called the third
party doctrine. Under its terms, the Court has held, an individual maintains no “reasonable expectation of privacy”
in information he shares with others. Accordingly, the government may freely search a person’s papers and effects
without triggering any Fourth Amendment scrutiny so long
as they are entrusted to the care of someone else. See Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743–744 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 442–443 (1976).
Much as with Katz itself, this Court has never offered a
persuasive justification for its offshoot. Carpenter, 585
U. S., at 389–390 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). Nor do I see
how it might. Do we seriously mean to suggest that most
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
Americans think they have no “reasonable expectation of
privacy” in records held for them by their banks or pharmacists or doctors or technology companies? If not, on what
authority might we rule that the American people should
not reasonably expect privacy in materials like those? Really, the third party doctrine amounts to little more than a
“doubtful application of Katz that lets the government
search almost whatever it wants whenever it wants.” Id.,
at 391.
As it did eight years ago in Carpenter, the Court today
largely ignores these problems. It simply declares that Mr.
Chatrie enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
Location History because authorities could have used it to
create “a virtual panopticon.” Ante, at 21. And it tells us
that the third party doctrine does not apply to this case because Mr. Chatrie did “ ‘not truly shar[e]’ ” his Location History with Google. Ante, at 25–26 (quoting Carpenter, 585
U. S., at 315 (majority opinion)).
Count me unpersuaded. Why does tracking Mr. Chatrie’s
movements digitally over an hour or two invade his reasonable expectation of privacy when an officer tailing him for
the same length of time would not? See United States v.
Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281–283 (1983). Why is Location History data Mr. Chatrie voluntarily shared with Google not
“truly shared” when a person’s bank records are? See Miller, 425 U. S., at 440–443. Does the Court just mean to give
Katz’s third party doctrine a quiet burial by suggesting today that any information shared over “smartphones” using
“apps and services” falls outside its reach? Ante, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). And what does any of this
have to do with the Fourth Amendment’s terms anyway?
Even if Katz and its battered third party doctrine may
straggle on today, they leave our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence about where the Court’s obscenity doctrine stood
in the 1960s: We know a “reasonable expectation of
4 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
privacy” (and an exception to the third party doctrine) when
we see it.
II
Rather than employ Katz and its third party doctrine, I
would take a different approach. To decide whether the
Fourth Amendment is in play, I would consult its terms,
asking first whether Location History qualifies as one of
Mr. Chatrie’s papers or effects, and then asking whether
the government searched those papers or effects. This traditional approach remains very much part of our law. See
Byrd v. United States, 584 U. S. 395, 403 (2018). Indeed,
we have expressly recognized that Katz and its progeny
“supplemen[t] rather than displac[e]” traditional Fourth
Amendment principles. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 403 (majority opinion); see also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64–65 (1992); United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 406–
407 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 11 (2013).
Thanks to Katz’s prominence today, of course, litigants
sometimes fail to press more traditional Fourth Amendment arguments. See, e.g., Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 406
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting). But whatever his faults (possibly including bank robbery), Mr. Chatrie has not forfeited
that line of attack in this case. In fact, he begins his brief before us by contending that the Fourth Amendment is implicated here precisely because the government enlisted
Google to search his “papers and effects.” See Brief for Petitioner 15, 33.
I agree with that assessment. Set aside whether Location
History data qualifies as among Mr. Chatrie’s “papers,” and
consider whether it at least constitutes one of his “effects.” Based on the evidence the parties have put before us, it appears the word “effects” was understood at the time of the
Fourth Amendment’s adoption to embrace most any kind of
personal property. See, e.g., M. Brady, The Lost “Effects”
of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
Protection, 125 Yale L. J. 946, 985–987 (2016) (“[E]arly
sources indicate that the term ‘effects’ meant ‘personal
property’ in common and colloquial usage”); L. Donohue,
The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181,
1301 (2016) (effects meant “personal property or possessions,” including “commercial items and goods”); Brief for
United States 32 (suggesting that “effects” excludes certain
real property like so-called open fields (citing Oliver v.
United States, 466 U. S. 170 (1984))).
As I see it, Mr. Chatrie’s Location History data qualifies
as his personal property. To appreciate why, start with
this. As Google puts it, and no one seriously disputes, Location History serves as a “diary” or map “of a person’s travels.” Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae 3–4. At the
time of the events in question, Mr. Chatrie’s agreement
with Google referred to Location History as “your” (meaning, the user’s) “information.” 1 App. 72 (emphasis added).
Under the parties’ agreement, too, Mr. Chatrie was free to
“review” and “edit” his location data. Id., at 19. He was
even free to export or delete that data “from Google’s servers at will.” Ibid. Beyond all that, Google promised to protect his information against “unauthorized access, alteration, disclosure, or destruction.” Id., at 71. Put simply, Mr. Chatrie had the rights to enjoy, manage, alter, dispose, and
exclude others from what amounted to an electronic diary
or map of his travels. And as someone who held that many
“sticks in the bundle of rights . . . commonly characterized
as property”—including the “most treasured” and “essential” right to exclude—he has a strong claim that the Location History data was his personal property. Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U. S. 139, 149–150 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Next, notice what statutory and case law have to say on
the subject. The investigation of Mr. Chatrie unfolded in
Virginia. That State’s Computer Crimes Act expressly describes “computer data” as a form of “[p]roperty.” Va. Code
6 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
Ann. §18.2–152.2 (2021). Altering or making an unauthorized copy of computer data can constitute the crime of “computer trespass” (another property law concept). §§18.2–
152.4(A)(3), (6). And the State provides a right to sue for
anyone “whose property or person is injured” by violations
of the Act (again suggesting a right to exclude). §18.2–
152.12(A).
Nor is Virginia some outlier. In Texas, “computer . . .
data” can constitute “[p]roperty.” Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§33.01(16) (West Cum. Supp. 2025). State law likewise
criminalizes “knowingly access[ing] . . . a computer, computer network, or computer system . . . with the intent to
obtain or use a file, data, or proprietary information” for a
prohibited purpose. §33.02(b–1)(2)(C) (West 2016). Once
more, as well, those whose “property has been injured” by
certain computer crimes may bring a “civil cause of action.”
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §143.001 (West 2019).
Georgia has a similar regime. See Ga. Code Ann. §§16–9–
93(b), (g) (2018) (criminalizing “[c]omputer [t]respass” and
providing a private right of action for such violations). And, it appears, so do many other States. See Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 14–15, and n. 5 (“Today, more
than half of states . . . treat digital records and data as personal property,” and “[m]any” of them “make it illegal for
private actors to access or convert another person’s digital
data”); see also, e.g., People v. Seymour, 536 P. 3d 1260,
1273 (Colo. 2023) (finding that “law enforcement’s copying
of [the defendant’s] search history meaningfully interfered
with his possessory interest in that data”); Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC v. May, 2016 Ark. 281, p. 6, 495 S. W. 3d
73, 76 (“[U]nder Arkansas law, intangible property, such as
electronic data, . . . can be converted”); cf. Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N. Y. 3d 283, 292–293, 864 N. E. 2d
1272, 1278 (2007) (holding that “electronic records that
were stored on a computer and were indistinguishable from
printed documents” are “subject to a claim of conversion”).
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
To be sure, pursuant to its agreement with Mr. Chatrie,
Google stored his Location History data on its servers and
was free to use it for certain purposes. Brief for United
States 34–36. But an individual need not have “complete
ownership or exclusive control” before he can assert a
Fourth Amendment challenge against the search of real
property. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 401 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). Instead, we have long recognized, a “tenan[t] [or]
resident family membe[r]” who does not enjoy “fee simple
title” in a house has a sufficient interest in it to give rise to a Fourth Amendment right. Ibid. And I fail to see why the
law should differ markedly when it comes to personal property. If you “[t]oss your keys to a valet at a restaurant” or
“[a]sk your neighbor to look after your dog while you travel,” you may entrust your personal property to another and license him to do certain things with it, much as Mr. Chatrie
did with his Location History data. Id., at 399. But that
hardly means that property is no longer yours. Ibid.
Nor does it matter that those who wrote the Fourth
Amendment might not have imagined an electronic diary or
map of one’s travels. As with other laws, the terms found
in the Fourth Amendment carry their original public meaning and can bear more applications than its drafters might
have expected or intended. See id., at 400. So just as the
First Amendment protects speech over the internet today
no less than it did speech delivered in the town square in
1791, it should hardly come as a surprise that the Fourth
Amendment might protect as personal “effects” electronic
diaries of one’s travels as it always has more traditional
ones. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 40 (2001)
(observing that a “search” of a home can take place not just
by physical entry but also by the external use of thermalimaging devices).
Because Mr. Chatrie’s Location History data is his effect,
it is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions when
the government searches it. So, was there a search? The
8 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
government conducts a search when it “ ‘look[s] over or
through for the purpose of finding something.’ ” Id., at 32,
n. 1 (quoting N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989)). Under
our precedents, none of which the government asks us to
overrule, a search equally transpires when government officials enlist private parties in that task. See Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 614 (1989)
(Fourth Amendment “protects against” searches “effected”
by a private party “if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government”). And that’s exactly
what occurred here: The government conducted a search
both when it compelled Google to rummage through Mr.
Chatrie’s data at “step one,” and when it later examined
that data for itself and demanded more data yet from
Google at “step two.” See ante, at 7–8 (describing the stepwise process in which the searches were conducted in this
case).
*
I might have hoped that the Court would have pursued a
more traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment today.
But look carefully and you will see hints of it at work even
in the Court’s opinion. Why is the Court so protective of
Location History data, email, and electronically stored photos and calendars? See ante, at 25–26. Because, it turns
out, “a user reasonably understands” all those things “as
his own.” Ante, at 25. Put another way, they are his effects.
And why does the Court hold Mr. Chatrie’s effects protected
by the Fourth Amendment even though a third party stores
them? Because, the Court says, those effects remain his
“even though [they are] stored on Google’s servers.” Ibid.
Put another way, entrusting your effects to a third party for
certain agreed purposes doesn’t mean they are no longer
yours. While more work may lie ahead to bring coherence
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment
to our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps this is a
start.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–112
OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins as to
Part I and with whom JUSTICE BARRETT joins as to Parts
II–B, II–C–1, and II–C–2, dissenting.
Eight years ago, I warned that this Court’s decision in
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296 (2018), would produce one of two outcomes. Either the Court would need to
clarify Carpenter’s limits in a future decision, or Carpenter
would usher in “revolutionary developments” in our doctrine by giving criminal suspects a “protected Fourth
Amendment interest in any sensitive personal information
about them that is collected and owned by third parties.”
Id., at 385 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Today, the Court takes
the country down the latter path. In doing so, the Court
sheds Carpenter’s self-imposed boundaries and further destabilizes longstanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
To make matters worse, the majority does all this in an
advisory opinion. Although today’s decision will send seismic waves through our Fourth Amendment doctrine, not
one iota of the majority opinion will affect the outcome of
this case. The Court knows this and does not claim otherwise. Indeed, by refusing to review the one question that
could have at least theoretically given Chatrie some hope of
relief, the Court carefully set the stage for its planned performance: striking a pose as a great champion of privacy in
2 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
the digital age. I cannot support this irresponsible escapade.
I
The Court should not have granted certiorari in this case,
and under any faithful application of our precedents, it
should now either dismiss this petition or affirm the decision below based on the “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court issues an advisory opinion
concerning a now-obsolete “geofence” procedure. Last
Term, the Court worried out loud about rushing in to judge
“new technologies with transformative capabilities” that we
barely understand. TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. 56,
62 (2025) (per curiam). In cases involving such technology,
the Court proclaimed, we should take care not to “ ‘embarrass the future.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944)). Today, the Court exhibits no such modesty.
A
It has long been established that federal courts may not
issue “advisory opinions” that do not bear on the rights of
the litigants before them. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,
494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990). At the appellate stage, this principle means that courts should resolve only those questions
on which a favorable ruling would provide a litigant redress
from the judgment below. See Food Marketing Institute v.
Argus Leader Media, 588 U. S. 427, 432–433 (2019). The
question on which the Court granted certiorari in this case
cannot satisfy this requirement under any colorable view of
the law. The Court should therefore decline to answer it.
Okello Chatrie’s ongoing stake in this case stems from his
conviction for robbing a bank and brandishing a firearm.
On appeal, Chatrie challenged those convictions on only one
ground. He argued that the District Court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the fruits of the geofence procedure
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
ALITO, J., dissenting
that led to his identification as the bank robber.1 So, unless he can show that this evidence should be suppressed, he
cannot obtain any relief. And his chances of making the
showing needed to justify suppression are virtually zero.
The police obtained information about Chatrie’s location
at the time of the robbery pursuant to a warrant issued by
a neutral magistrate. And when evidence is obtained under
such a warrant, a defendant seeking suppression must
overcome the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 923 (1984). A majority
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, held that Chatrie could not do so. 136 F. 4th 100, 101
(2025) (Diaz, C. J., concurring); id., at 114 (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring); id., at 115 (King, J., concurring); id., at 115,
n. 1 (Winn, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 142 (Heytens, J., concurring). That holding suffices to affirm the
District Court’s admission of the geofence evidence and
thus independently supports the Fourth Circuit’s judgment. Accordingly, any review by this Court should concern
an issue that could at least plausibly disturb that good-faith holding. Cf. Stewart v. IHT Ins. Agcy. Group, LLC, 990
F. 3d 455, 457 (CA6 2021).
On this score, today’s decision fails. The majority does
not dispute the Fourth Circuit’s good-faith analysis, and
nothing in its opinion casts a shred of doubt on that holding. See ante, at 10, n. 4. To overcome the good-faith exception,
Chatrie would need to show that either (1) the affidavit supporting the geofence warrant was knowingly or recklessly
1 The majority characterizes the issue as whether the Government may
introduce the location information that the police obtained through the geofence procedure. But Chatrie also sought to suppress all the fruits of that location information, and these could potentially include a firearm matching one used in the crime, nearly $100,000 of currency in bands bearing the bank teller’s signature, and his confession to the crime. See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress in No. 3:19–cr–00130 (ED Va.), ECF Doc. 29; Statement of Facts, ECF Doc. 229, p. 3.
4 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
false, (2) the magistrate rubber-stamped the warrant application, (3) the affidavit was “ ‘bare bones,’ ” or (4) the warrant application was so facially deficient that no reasonable
officer would rely on it. Leon, 468 U. S., at 923, and n. 24.
Yet nothing in the majority opinion touches on any of these
matters. Thus, nothing in today’s decision bears on the
Fourth Circuit’s good-faith holding. And because that holding independently supports the judgment below, the Court’s
opinion is advisory.2
This outcome was guaranteed as soon as this Court
granted certiorari. When seeking review in this Court,
Chatrie recognized that dislodging the Fourth Circuit’s
judgment required that he prevail on the good-faith issue,
so his petition asked us to alter the good-faith exception.
See Pet. for Cert. i, 34–37 (asking the Court to create a
carve-out to the good-faith exception). Yet the Court excluded the good-faith issue from its grant of certiorari, 607
U. S. 1148 (2026), ensuring that any opinion would be advisory. Indeed, even if the Court were to decide that the
2 I do not contend that the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction over this
case as a formal matter. Chatrie’s conviction suffices to render this litigation a “case or controversy,” regardless of the question on which the Court granted certiorari. The majority opinion is nonetheless advisory— not because I think “the odds are strong” that Chatrie will lose on remand, contra, ante, at 10, n. 4., but because the majority opinion does not disturb the basis for the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and thus Chatrie’s conviction. This Court’s longstanding policy against issuing advisory opinions on constitutional issues is not limited to cases where we lack jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 568 (1947) (holding that the Court possessed jurisdiction over a case but nonetheless declining to exercise it because the Court’s policy against issuing gratuitous constitutional opinions “has not been limited to jurisdictional determinations”); Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885) (“In the exercise of [its] jurisdiction, [this Court] is bound . . . never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it”). An opinion composed exclusively of dicta is no less advisory simply because the Court has jurisdiction to pronounce such dicta.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
ALITO, J., dissenting
warrant in this case was deficient, there would be no colorable argument on remand that all reasonable officers would
have correctly predicted that outcome. See Leon, 468 U. S.,
at 923. After all, this Court has never provided guidance
on how to apply the Warrant Clause when the police request geolocation data from a third party. See Carpenter,
585 U. S., at 316–320 (noting only that such a warrant requires probable cause). Accordingly, it would be nearly impossible for Chatrie to prove that the police here (and, by
extension, every other officer who ever relied on this type of geofence warrant) acted in bad faith. See Davis v. United
States, 564 U. S. 229, 240 (2011) (Fourth Amendment violations “trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when
they are deliberate . . . and culpable”). In sum, no resolution of the question on which the Court granted certiorari
could have disturbed the Fourth Circuit’s good-faith holding and, thus, its judgment.
The Court therefore erred by granting certiorari, and we
should now dismiss this petition as improvidently granted.
See Conway v. California Adult Authority, 396 U. S. 107,
110 (1969) (per curiam) (dismissing when resolving the issue addressed in the petition would produce an advisory
opinion). Alternatively, this Court could affirm the decision
below on good-faith grounds. Although the Court did not
grant certiorari on this question, we may affirm a judgment
on any ground supported by the record, and we would not
be the court of “first view” on the good-faith issue. Upper
Skagit Tribe v. Lundgren, 584 U. S. 554, 560–561 (2018).
The Government properly presented this issue below, the
District Court admitted the contested evidence on goodfaith grounds, a majority of the en banc Fourth Circuit
voted to affirm on that basis, and the Government continued to press good faith at the petition and merits stages in
this Court. See Government’s Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Suppression, ECF Doc. 41, p. 21;
590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 937 (ED Va. 2022); Brief in Opposition
6 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
13; Brief for United States 47–48. This Court therefore has
every reason to affirm on that ground.
Instead, the Court charges forward to decide the question
presented, even though the majority cannot discern any impact that its decision has on the Fourth Circuit’s judgment.
See ante, at 10, n. 4. The majority thus issues a plainly advisory opinion, violating this Court’s “oldest and most consistent” justiciability rule. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
Advisory-opinion concerns aside, our prudential certiorari considerations further counseled against granting certiorari. Writs of certiorari are discretionary, and we reserve them for “compelling” cases in which the court below “has
decided an important question of federal law.” This Court’s
Rule 10. The question in this case does not qualify.
Chatrie’s petition asked whether the geofence procedure
that the police used here comports with the Fourth Amendment. The answer to this question has scarcely any ongoing
significance. Google, the Government, and the majority all
agree that Google has modified its Location History service
in a manner that forecloses future use of this geofence procedure. Ante, at 4, n. 2; Brief for Google LLC as Amicus
Curiae 2; Brief for United States 42, n. 3. Chatrie does not
offer any evidence to the contrary. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–
18; Brief for Petitioner 5; Pet. for Cert. 10–11. As a result, Fourth Amendment challenges to this geofence procedure
will likely pass into obscurity soon.
This Court has long been averse to granting certiorari on
questions “that time [will] soon bury.” Darr v. Burford, 339
U. S. 200, 227 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This
aversion applies with special force here given this case’s
subject matter. The Fourth Amendment’s application to
surveillance technology turns on the “unique nature” of the
technology involved and the way in which the police use it
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
ALITO, J., dissenting
to collect information. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 309. For
instance, when determining whether law enforcement’s use
of a technology requires a warrant or is otherwise “unreasonable,” this Court has considered the technology’s capabilities, prevalence, costliness, conspicuousness, intrusiveness, precision, accuracy, security, and comprehensiveness.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34–35 (2001); United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 429–431 (2012)
(ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); Maryland v. King, 569
U. S. 435, 446–465 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579
U. S. 438, 461–464 (2016); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 310–313.
Because these qualities vary from one technology to the
next, the specific application of the Fourth Amendment
does as well. Such variability renders this case all the less
suitable for our review. Whatever one’s jurisprudential
views about the Fourth Amendment in the digital age, a
case concerning a now-obsolete geofence procedure is an
odd vehicle for pronouncing them.
None of this is to say that today’s decision will be inconsequential. As the majority works its way through the
question in this case, it makes sweeping proclamations with
implications far beyond the specific procedure that the police used here. But this fact only underscores the advisory
nature of today’s decision. The majority has candidly little
to say about the relevance of its decision for Chatrie’s conviction. Ante, at 10, n. 4. Instead, the Court uses this case
as a vehicle to once again “make a statement about privacy
in the digital age.” See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 386 (ALITO,
J., dissenting). Because that function is not a proper use of
this Court’s certiorari docket, we should not have granted
this petition and should now dismiss it.
II
The Court’s resolution of the merits of this case is equally
flawed. Applying the Fourth Amendment to 21st-century
investigation methods is undoubtedly an important and
8 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
challenging task, and the Court ought to proceed cautiously. Yet the majority, faced with only countervailing
authority in the first two centuries of this Court’s case law, relies almost exclusively on our decision in Carpenter. And
rather than moderate Carpenter’s departures from long-established Fourth Amendment law, the majority propels
that decision’s disruption to new heights.
A
If the Court were to apply the Fourth Amendment as understood for the first century of this Nation’s history, we
would find no “search” of Chatrie’s papers or effects, much
less an “unreasonable” one. Until the last decades of the
19th century, the Search and Seizure Clause protected only
the physical security of one’s person and property, and document-production orders were not understood to be
“searches.” See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 367–
374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at
348–357 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); id., at 363–372 (ALITO,
J., dissenting). Under those principles, Chatrie’s arguments are meritless.
To illustrate this point, imagine that Chatrie spent his
free time taking road trips across the United States. And
suppose that he entered into a contract with a travel
agency, under which the agency would provide him valuable information about places to visit and activities to try as he traveled from place to place. Suppose that the contract,
in exchange for these services, authorized the travel agency
to maintain a detailed chronicle of Chatrie’s adventures and
to use that information to develop its business, expand its
offerings, and advertise to prospective customers. If a
grand jury had subpoenaed the travel agency for the records of Chatrie’s travels, he would have no basis to object
on search-and-seizure grounds. At least through the late
19th century, compelled document-production orders were
simply not “searches.”
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
ALITO, J., dissenting
Likewise, until Carpenter, this Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protected a person’s security in only his
own papers and effects, not those of a third party. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id., at 342; (THOMAS, J., dissenting); id., at 379–385 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Chatrie’s claim would therefore fail for a second reason: He possesses no property interest in the information
that Google conveyed to the police. To be sure, Chatrie
claims a property right in Google’s Location History files
under a bailor-bailee relationship, and he claims that the
execution of the geofence procedure transgressed those
rights. This argument radically reconceptualizes the traditional understanding of property rights. Cf. C. Reich, The
New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964). And even if Chatrie
possessed a property right in the Location History files on
Google’s servers, the conduct of the police in this case did
not infringe that right. The geofence procedure did not give
the police access to the Location History files themselves.
Rather, Google used the information contained in those files
to generate a spreadsheet that summarized objective, historical facts about Chatrie’s (and others’) location in the
hour before and hour after the robbery. See Decl. of S. Rodriguez, ECF. Doc. 96–2, pp. 2–3; 107 F. 4th 319, 324 (CA4
2024). The police sought and obtained those historical details, not the files on Google’s servers. And whatever property rights Chatrie might have in the Location History files,
he does not “own” historical facts about his movements in a
given hour. If Chatrie, instead of using Location History,
had written and copyrighted a private memoir about his
crimes, he would not have a Fourth Amendment claim if the
police asked a proofreader whether Chatrie was at the
credit union during the robbery. Cf. International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 234 (1918) (distinguishing between having a property interest in a newspaper article and having a property interest in the historical facts set forth in the article). Chatrie therefore cannot
10 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
show that the police here transgressed any rights in his papers or effects.
In short, under traditional search-and-seizure principles,
Chatrie could not challenge the geofence procedure here under the Fourth Amendment.
B
1
In the 20th century, this Court expanded its Fourth
Amendment doctrine to protect more than the physical security of one’s person and property. Beginning in Katz, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment also protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” from government
intrusions. 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also id., at 351–353 (majority opinion).
Whatever one thinks of Katz’s expansion of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, this Court at least had the prudence
to tread cautiously when implementing that expansion. Indeed, the Court spent much of the 20th century emphasizing the limits of Katz’s reach. For instance, the Court held
that Katz did not require the police to obtain a warrant for
visual or physical surveillance outside a house’s curtilage.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 178 (1984). Nor could
a defendant generally claim an “expectation of privacy” in
someone else’s home, his own public travels, his face-to-face
conversations with another person, or information that he
shared with a business. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83,
89–91 (1998); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281–
282 (1983); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 751–752
(1971) (plurality opinion); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S.
735, 744 (1979). If Katz ushered in a revolution in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, the Court was quick to cabin its impact. See also New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 693, 700
(1987) (holding that Katz does not require a warrant for inspections of “pervasively regulated industries”); California
v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that Katz
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
ALITO, J., dissenting
does not protect privacy interests in household garbage left
curbside); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213–215
(1986) (holding that Katz does not require a warrant for aerial surveillance).
Similarly, even after Katz, the Court recognized that legislatures still bore primary responsibility for regulating the use of new technologies and investigation methods. Thus,
when legislatures developed reasonable schemes to administer such activities, the Court was reluctant to constitutionalize additional rules. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal
Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523,
534–539 (1967) (upholding the constitutionality of a search
conducted pursuant to “reasonable legislative or administrative standards”); King, 569 U. S., at 465 (holding that a
DNA collection scheme was constitutional in part because
state statute regulated how records could be used); see also
Burger, 482 U. S., at 707–711 (allowing warrantless inspections pursuant to a regulatory scheme designed to combat
modern problems with car theft). As much as Katz reflected
a departure from traditional Fourth Amendment rules, this
Court’s decisions made clear that it was a measured one.3
2
The geofence procedure in this case did not violate Chatrie’s Fourth Amendment rights under these 20th-century
precedents. These precedents hold that a defendant does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records that
a company generates by virtue of the defendant’s use of its
services. This rule has come to be known as the third-party
doctrine. The Court articulated this rule in United States
v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), holding that the police did
not violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when
3 Contrary to the Court’s characterization of my argument, ante, at 11,
n. 5, my purpose in recounting the developments in this Court’s postKatz case law is to contrast the Court’s modesty during that period with its maximalist extension of Carpenter today.
12 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
they obtained transaction records from his bank. In reaching this conclusion, Miller emphasized that a bank is not
merely a neutral custodian of its customers’ financial information, but rather a party to an ongoing business relationship with them. Id., at 440–441. Thus, when the defendant
“voluntarily conveyed” his financial information to a bank
by depositing money or cashing checks, he assumed the risk
that the bank would create a paper trail of that information
for its own business purposes. Id., at 442. The defendant
likewise assumed the risk that the bank might share that
information with others, including the police. Ibid. The
Court therefore held that the defendant had no Fourth
Amendment rights in the bank’s records of his transactions.
What was true about the bank records in Miller is true
about Location History here. Chatrie voluntarily conveyed
his location information to Google, and Google created a
digital paper trail of that information. Like the bank in
Miller, Google was no neutral custodian in this arrangement. Id., at 440. In exchange for allowing Chatrie to use
its Location History service, Google could use his location
information for its own business purposes, such as sending
Chatrie location-targeted advertisements from third parties. 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 907–908. So, by giving Google his
location information for its own use, Chatrie assumed the
risk that Google might disclose location information to others, including the police. Miller, 425 U. S., at 443. Indeed,
Google advises its users that the company could use their
location information for its own advertising purposes and
could share that information with law enforcement. E.g., 1
App. 69–70. Thus, like the defendant in Miller, Chatrie
cannot now claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those data. The police therefore would not need a warrant
to perform the geofence procedure under our 20th-century
precedents.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
ALITO, J., dissenting
C
1
Without any support in 19th- or 20th-century understandings of the Fourth Amendment, Chatrie and the majority rely primarily on this Court’s decision in Carpenter.
Carpenter held that the police must obtain a warrant before
ordering a cellular carrier to provide more than six days of
cell-site records about a customer (i.e., information about
the specific cell towers to which a cell phone connected).
585 U. S., at 315–316. Like Katz, Carpenter extended the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to encompass a
category of government investigations that it had never
previously covered. Before Carpenter, a criminal defendant
who objected to police collection of cell-site records would
have faced at least two legal hurdles: the historical distinctions between searches and subpoenas duces tecum, and the
third-party doctrine. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 361–362
(ALITO, J., dissenting). Carpenter thus reflected a “stark
departure” from both traditional Fourth Amendment principles and this Court’s 20th-century doctrine. Id., at 321
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, Carpenter maintained that its departure
from these doctrines was “narrow.” Id., at 316 (majority
opinion). The question presented in Carpenter was whether
the Fourth Amendment allows “the warrantless seizure
and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course
of 127 days,” Pet. for. Cert. in Carpenter v. United States,
O. T. 2017, No. 16–402, p. i, and the Court purported to resolve no more than the question before it, 585 U. S., at 316,
and n. 4. Carpenter’s analysis likewise anchored itself in
the “unique nature” of the particular cell-site records that
the police had collected in that case. Id., at 315. In
“declin[ing] to extend” the third-party doctrine to weekslong cell-site records, Carpenter highlighted various aspects
of that dataset that, in the majority’s view, afforded the
14 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
defendant a stronger expectation of privacy than the defendants in our earlier third-party precedents. Ibid.
Three of those aspects—duration, comprehensiveness,
and voluntariness—deserve mention here. First, unlike
traditional police-surveillance techniques, the dataset in
Carpenter captured the “whole of [a person’s] physical
movements” over 127 days, violating Americans’ reasonable
expectation that they would not be “secretly monitor[ed]”
for a “very long period.” Id., at 310 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Second, the dataset gave the police an “allencompassing record” of the defendant’s whereabouts that
tracked him “beyond public thoroughfares and into private
residences . . . and other potentially revealing locales.” Id., at 311. Third, the Court determined that cell-phone users
do not “voluntarily” share their cell-site information with
cellular carriers in the same way that the defendant in Miller voluntarily conveyed his transaction information to a
bank. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315. The Court reasoned
that because cell phones are “indispensable to participation
in modern society” and “[v]irtually any activity on [a]
phone” generates cell-site records, a person has no practical
choice but to constantly convey this information to third
parties. Ibid. Based on these aspects of the dataset at issue, Carpenter concluded that the defendant had a strong
enough privacy expectation that the rationale undergirding
our third-party case law did not apply. Id., at 314–315.
Carpenter therefore held that the police needed a warrant
to obtain seven or more days of cell-site records from a cellular carrier. Id., at 310, n. 3, 316.
2
Carpenter did not require the police to obtain a warrant
for the geofence procedure here. By its own terms, Carpenter’s holding was keyed to the “unique nature” of the cellsite records in that case. Id., at 309, 315. Carpenter expressly left open the question whether the police would
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15
ALITO, J., dissenting
need a warrant for location data spanning less than a week,
as is the case with the data here. Id., at 310, n. 3. Carpenter likewise declined to address situations where the police
request information about all devices in a given area at the
time of a crime (e.g., a geofence procedure), as opposed to
continuous location information about one specific device.
Id., at 316. For this reason alone, Carpenter does not dictate an outcome here.
Nor does Carpenter’s reasoning justify extending its holding to this case. Here, the police requested two pieces of
information that could implicate Chatrie’s Fourth Amendment interests: (1) whether he was within 150 meters of the
credit union during the robbery, and (2) if he was, where he
traveled during the 1-hour periods immediately before and
afterward. Along three of the dimensions that Carpenter
found relevant, Chatrie has a far lesser privacy interest in
this information than the defendant did in the records at
issue in that case. The third-party doctrine therefore controls.
First, unlike the data collection in Carpenter, the
geofence procedure in this case did not risk uncovering the
“whole of [someone’s] physical movements.” 585 U. S., at
310. In contrast to the 127 days of cell-site records in Carpenter, the request made by the police here spanned just
two hours.4 Until today, this Court had recognized a Fourth
Amendment difference between tracking a person’s movements for a “brief stretch” and cataloging them for an “ ‘extended period of time.’ ” Ibid.; Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Although it might be difficult to “identify with precision” the dividing line between these two durations, a 2-hour stint of location tracking is “surely” too limited to constitute the “all-encompassing record” that
4 In accurately noting that the data at issue in Carpenter spanned 127
days, I do not dispute that Carpenter drew the constitutional line at seven days. It is the majority that eschews Carpenter’s 7-day line. Ante, at 18–23.
16 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
triggered heightened privacy concerns in Carpenter. Jones,
565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 311.
Second, the limited geofence procedure here was far less
likely to open “an intimate window” into Chatrie’s “ ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’ ” than was the chronicle that the police obtained in
Carpenter. Id., at 311. Whereas the procedure in Carpenter
gave the police a comprehensive log of the defendant’s
movement everywhere he went, the geofence’s boundaries
here centered on a credit union,5 a public place where individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy.6 Cf. Miller, 425 U. S., at 442–443 (holding that a person has no expectation of privacy in his dealings with a bank); Knotts,
460 U. S., at 281–282 (holding that a person has no expectation of privacy in his travels through public places). To
be sure, the geofence procedure also captured some people’s
movements outside the geofence in the hour before and after they visited the credit union, and it is feasible that some people might have traveled to a private location during that
window. But the incidental acquisition of such information
through otherwise-permissible surveillance does not violate
Chatrie’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id., at 282 (holding
that no search of the defendant occurred when a police
5 The geofence also encompassed a nearby church, but Chatrie has not
claimed an expectation of privacy in that church. The church therefore has no bearing on whether the geofence procedure in this case violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and Chatrie may not vicariously assert others’ rights in support of his suppression motion. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 148–150 (1978).
6 The majority correctly notes that under my interpretation of Carpenter, the police could use a geofence procedure without obtaining a warrant in many situations. Ante, at 22–23, n. 10. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, however, that fact does not mean that geofence procedures would lack any limits. Under Carpenter, if the police request and obtain sensitive, involuntarily collected location information that spans a week or more, they would still require a warrant.
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ALITO, J., dissenting
beeper monitored his travel from a public place to his private residence). Moreover, if the geofence procedure uncovered information about Chatrie’s movements within a private location, the proper solution would be to suppress that
information, rather than the fruits of the entire procedure.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 720–721 (1984)
(holding that location information from one leg of a defendant’s journey in private places was the fruit of an unconstitutional search but upholding the use of location information from a different leg of that journey in nonprivate
places).
Third, unlike the generation of cell-site records, the creation of Location History data is voluntary and not integral
to a cell phone’s functionality. Cell-site records are the byproduct of every phone interaction with a cell tower and
thus an unavoidable consequence of sending text messages,
making phone calls, or connecting to the internet. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315. A person can avoid creating those
records only by forgoing all use of a cell phone for these purposes, and doing so would render useless this “indispensable” component of modern life. Ibid. In contrast, users need
not enable Location History for their phones to function as
expected. That most Google accountholders carry on without using Location History is strong evidence that the service is not a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life” in
the way that creating cell-site records is. Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see ante, at 26.
Thus, on the criteria that Carpenter found relevant in determining whether to apply the third-party doctrine, Chatrie has a far lesser privacy interest in the data that the
police sought here. For that reason, I would not extend Carpenter here, and I would hold that the police did not need a
warrant.
18 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
3
The majority reaches the opposite outcome, and in doing
so, it announces a new rule of Fourth Amendment law: The
police must obtain a warrant every time they access any
cell-phone location information from a third party, however
brief the duration, however innocuous the request, and
however voluntarily that information was disclosed by the
user. Ante, at 29. This rule significantly extends Carpenter
and repudiates the boundary lines that Carpenter drew to
distinguish its novel holding from longstanding doctrine.
Whereas Carpenter rested its holding on the difference between obtaining a “brief stretch” of location information and
receiving a chronicle spanning a week or more, 585 U. S., at
310, 315, the majority holds that the police need a warrant
regardless of the duration of the data sought, ante, at 18–
23. Whereas Carpenter rested its holding on the concern
that an all-encompassing dataset would reveal a defendant’s presence in sensitive locations, 585 U. S., at 311, the
majority holds that the police need a warrant regardless of
whether a geofence captures any sensitive locations, ante,
at 22–24. Whereas Carpenter rested its holding on the
near-universal use of cellphones and the unavoidability of
generating cell-site records, 585 U. S., at 315, the majority
holds that the police need a warrant regardless of how widespread a technology is or how feasibly users may opt out,
ante, at 26–29. Now, we are told, all that matters is
whether a given investigative procedure enables the police
to obtain location information easily using a technology
that did not exist in “an earlier age.” Ante, at 16–18. If so, the police need a warrant.
This unshackling of Carpenter will unleash the very upheaval in Fourth Amendment law that Carpenter disclaimed. See 585 U. S., at 319 (stating that its holding
would apply “only . . . in the rare case”). Today’s decision
makes clear that the last two centuries of Fourth Amendment search doctrine simply do not apply to digital-age
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ALITO, J., dissenting
methods of tracking a suspect’s location. And although the
Court frames its holding as concerning only “location information,” ante, at 29, that qualification “might as well be
written on the dissolving paper sold in magic shops,” Fulton
v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 551 (2021) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). If past is prologue, the parchment
limits on today’s holding will fade away just as quickly as
Carpenter’s have.
4
In support of its sweeping conclusion, the majority argues
that a duration-based or procedure-by-procedure approach
to the Fourth Amendment would generate a “host of linedrawing questions.” Ante, at 21, n. 9; see also ante, at 27–
28. I do not disagree, but those questions are the inevitable
byproduct of the lines that Carpenter drew when it distinguished away longstanding doctrine. See 585 U. S., at 322,
339 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that Carpenter
drew an “unprincipled and unworkable line” and imposed
an “arbitrary 6-day cutoff ”). Indeed, the majority’s rejection of such line-drawing only betrays its expansion of Carpenter’s holding.
In any event, the majority’s approach creates its own
share of line-drawing problems. What dividing line can explain why a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information but not in his
bank records? See Miller, 425 U. S., at 442–443. Debit and
credit cards might be viewed as comparably “indispensable
to participation in modern society,” and their use creates a
detailed paper trail. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 315. As a result, modern bank records contain similarly comprehensive
accounts of Americans’ private lives, including “the political and religious organizations to which they donate; whether
they have visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion
clinic, or AIDS treatment center; [and] whether they go to
gay bars or straight ones.” Id., at 337 (Kennedy, J.,
20 CHATRIE v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., dissenting
dissenting). But as long as Miller remains good law, see
Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 316 (majority opinion), the Fourth
Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant
for these records.7
More broadly, where does the boundary between Carpenter and the third-party doctrine lie after today? Carpenter
gave “courts and law enforcement officers no indication how
to determine whether any particular category of information falls” on the Carpenter or Miller side of the line, and today’s decision does no better. Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 340
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Do the police need a warrant to
obtain a person’s Amazon purchase history? What about a
person’s Google search history or Venmo transaction log?
Those kinds of information fall squarely within the thirdparty doctrine, and today’s holding about “cell phone location information” does not ostensibly disturb that fact.
Ante, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same
time, those data can paint a similarly detailed picture of a
person’s private life, and law enforcement had no easy way
to obtain this information in “an earlier age.”8 Ante, at 17.
If the Court maintains its unwillingness to engage with
such “line-drawing questions,” ante, at 21, n. 9, Carpenter’s
warrant requirement might soon come for all forms of digital surveillance.
* * *
In Carpenter, I worried that we might be “picking up the
pieces” of our Fourth Amendment doctrine for a long time
to come. 585 U. S., at 362 (dissenting opinion). Today’s
7 One is left wondering on which side of the line location data from a
mobile-payment service like Apple Pay falls.
8 Moreover, it is common these days for a single company, such as
Google, to offer cellular plans, provide location services, maintain payment systems, host shopping platforms, and more. Companies have incentives to aggregate a user’s data across these services, and this tendency will further complicate any efforts to draw Fourth Amendment lines among different sorts of third-party records.
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ALITO, J., dissenting
decision all but guarantees that we will be cleaning up debris for the foreseeable future.
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BARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–112
OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE BARRETT, dissenting.
I have no quarrel with Carpenter v. United States, 585
U. S. 296 (2018), or with the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in this case. But I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that under our Fourth Amendment precedent, including Carpenter, Chatrie had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
data about his public movements that he voluntarily disclosed to Google. I therefore respectfully dissent.