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Kaufman v. Synnott
ALAN KAUFMAN ET AL. v.
KATHLEEN E. SYNNOTT
(AC 48141)
Cradle, C. J., and Wilson and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a) and her motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the special motion to dismiss. Held: The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant’s special motion to dismiss, as the plaintiff’s argument was properly characterized as a challenge to the manner in which the court exercised its authority to act in regard to the anti-SLAPP proceedings brought by the defendant, rather than its power to hear and determine such matters. This court declined to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s assertions regarding the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP statute, as the plaintiff failed to raise such claims in a timely fashion.
The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and rejected the plaintiff’s interpretation of § 52-196a (f) (1), namely, that, because the defendant’s insurance company, C Co., assumed the financial responsibility for payment of the defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant did not “incur” attorney’s fees and costs as required by the statute, as this interpretation was not supported by the statute’s plain language or its overarching purpose, the defendant having unquestionably incurred costs in the course of responding to and defending against the plaintiff’s SLAPP lawsuit, and C Co., which ultimately assumed financial responsibility for payment, would not have had to pay attorney’s fees and costs had they not been incurred in the first instance by the defendant, and the goals of protecting defendants from the time and costs associated with the defense from meritless lawsuits were not benefited or advanced by the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute, which would delay resolution and increase the costs of such litigation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the attorney’s fees and costs awarded to the defendant and did not misapply the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. (488 F.2d 714), for guiding such a determination, as the court performed a comprehensive analysis of the attorney’s fees and costs requested by the defendant.
Argued February 17—officially released June 30, 2026
Procedural History
Acton to recover damages for, inter alia, defamation,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
Kaufman v. Synnott
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where Sallyann
Pelletier and Natalie Jarnstedt were cited in as party
defendants; thereafter, the court, Genuario, J., granted
the special motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Natalie Jarnstedt; subsequently, the court, Hon. Edward T.
Krumeich II, judge trial referee, granted the defendant
Natalie Jarnstedt’s motion for an award of attorney’s
fees and costs and denied the named plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, and the named plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Alan H. Kaufman, self-represented, the appellant
(named plaintiff).
Adam M. Teich, for the appellee (defendant Natalie
Jarnstedt).
Opinion
NORCOTT, J. In 2019, the self-represented plaintiff, Alan Kaufman,1 commenced an action against the
defendant Natalie Jarnstedt2 alleging defamation and
civil conspiracy. The defendant subsequently filed a
special motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-196a (b),3 which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs thereafter filed two appeals, both of which were
1
This action was commenced by the named plaintiff and his wife, Laura Kaufman, both acting as self-represented parties. Only the named plaintiff has pursued this appeal and filed a brief with this court. Additionally, we note that the named plaintiff has represented that he is an attorney. In this appeal, we refer to Alan Kaufman as the plaintiff. We refer to Alan Kaufman and Laura Kaufman, collectively, as the plaintiffs.
2
In their initial complaint, the plaintiffs named Kathleen E. Synnott as the defendant. In their first amended complaint, the plaintiffs added claims against Jarnstedt and Sallyann Pelletier. On October 15, 2019, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to cite in Jarnstedt and Pelletier as parties. In this appeal, we refer to Jarnstedt as the defendant and to Synnott, Jarnstedt and Pelletier, collectively, as the defendants.
3
General Statutes § 52-196a (b) provides: “In any civil action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against an opposing party that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.”
Kaufman v. Synnott
dismissed by this court. During this time period, the
defendant filed several motions for attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1). On October 3, 2024,
the court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s
fees in the amount of $91,698, and litigation costs in
the amount of $2807.27 for a total of $94,505.27. The
plaintiff then appealed from this award.
On appeal, the plaintiff challenges both the granting of
the special motion to dismiss and the award of attorney’s
fees and costs. With respect to the former, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the special motion to dismiss and
(2) the anti-SLAPP statute,4 § 52-196a, is unconstitutional for various reasons. As to the latter, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the
defendant incurred attorney’s fees and costs, because
they ultimately are to be paid by her insurance company,
and (2) applied the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
4
“SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation, the distinctive elements of [which] are (1) a civil complaint (2) filed against a nongovernment individual (3) because of their communications to government bodies (4) that involves a substantive issue of some public concern. . . . The purpose of a SLAPP suit is to punish and intimidate citizens who petition state agencies and have the ultimate effect of chilling any such action. . . . Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332, 337 n.4, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 665 n.1, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).
Section 52-196a, our anti-SLAPP statute, “constitutes a special statutory benefit . . . that provides a moving party with the opportunity to have [a] lawsuit dismissed early in the proceeding and stays all discovery, pending the trial court’s resolution of the special motion to dismiss. . . . As this court has observed, [a] special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a . . . is not a traditional motion to dismiss based on a jurisdictional ground. It is, instead, a truncated evidentiary procedure enacted by our legislature in order to achieve a legitimate policy objective, namely, to provide for a prompt remedy.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781, 782, 326 A.3d 251, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024). Thus, as we have recognized, § 52-196a provides statutory protection against SLAAP lawsuits. King v. Hubbard, 217 Conn. App. 191, 194 n.1, 288 A.3d 218 (2023).
Kaufman v. Synnott
1974) (Johnson factors), in determining the amount of
the attorney’s fees and costs awarded to the defendant.
We conclude that the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s special motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to
the court’s granting of the special motion to dismiss are
untimely and, therefore, not properly before this court
at this juncture. We further conclude that the court
properly determined that the defendant was entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1) and did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount
of such award. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history inform our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiffs commenced their
action on November 5, 2017, against only the named
defendant, Kathleen E. Synnott, alleging defamation and
harassment. In September, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint and a motion to cite in the defendant
and Sallyann Pelletier. The court granted the motion to
cite in as parties the additional defendants on October 15, 2019, and the defendant received service nine days later.
“One count alleging defamation and civil conspiracy was
directed at each of the defendants, and a fourth count
entitled punitive damages was directed against all three
defendants.” In their operative complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that they were defamed and slandered by the
defendants via complaints to the police and other local
and state officials, and by postings on websites and online newspapers. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they owned “two ‘field type’ English Springer Spaniel
dogs,” a specialized canine species bred for hunting. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants generally reported
that they had mistreated the dogs in that these animals
received little human attention, faced exposure to the
elements, and suffered from deprivation of water and
sufficient food.5
5
As to the defendant specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following in count three of the operative complaint: “Jarnstedt, who lives more than twelve miles from [the plaintiffs], complained to the Darien animal
Kaufman v. Synnott
On December 11, 2019, the defendant filed a special
motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a. The defendant
sought dismissal of the amended complaint directed
against her on the grounds that the allegations set forth
in the operative pleading centered on her right to petition the government on a matter of public concern and the
plaintiffs could not establish probable cause on the merits of their claims. The court permitted limited discovery.6
Consistent with the statutory language, the court scheduled an expedited hearing on the defendant’s special
motion to dismiss.7 The COVID-19 pandemic delayed
both the discovery and the hearing on the defendant’s
motion until May 10, 2021.
Following that hearing, the court, Genuario, J., issued
a memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s
special motion to dismiss. The court began its analysis
control officer that the [plaintiffs’] dogs are not provided with [proper shelter] in extreme weather conditions (hot or cold)—often without water or frozen water in the winter. . . . Jarnstedt said that she observed these conditions when she took a walk to the [plaintiffs’] house with friends who were extremely upset about [the plaintiffs’ dogs]. She asked . . . the animal control officer to launch a thorough investigation.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendant’s intention was to harm the reputation of the plaintiffs, to provoke the filing of criminal charges by town officials, and to have the dogs taken away from the plaintiffs. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant either posted or participated and facilitated in the posting of false statements to a website and collaborated and conspired with the other defendants to do so. The plaintiffs sought from the defendant $2,750,000 in special and presumptive exemplary damages and for emotional distress.
6
General Statutes § 52-196a (d) provides: “The court shall stay all discovery upon the filing of a special motion to dismiss. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until the court grants or denies the special motion to dismiss and any interlocutory appeal thereof. Notwithstanding the entry of an order to stay discovery, the court, upon motion of a party and a showing of good cause, or upon its own motion, may order specified and limited discovery relevant to the special motion to dismiss.”
In this matter, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for limited discovery and permitted the plaintiffs to take the deposition of Synnott and the defendant with each limited to no more than three hours. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to comply with certain limited requests for production prior to her deposition.
7
See General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (1).
Kaufman v. Synnott
by setting forth the applicable two part test: “The first
part requires the court to determine whether the moving
party (in this case [the defendant]) has made an initial
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
complaint is based on the moving party’s exercise of
free speech, right to petition the government or right
of association. Only if the moving party has made that
initial showing does the court consider the second prong
of analysis which is whether or not the opposing party
(in this case the plaintiffs) has demonstrated that there
is probable cause that they will prevail on the merits of
the complaint.” See General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3);8
see also Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781,
787–88, 326 A.3d 251, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326
A.3d 248 (2024).
With respect to the first prong, the court noted that
the defendant’s affidavit9 stated that she wrote a letter
to the Darien Police Department and requested that the
“Animal Control Unit” or “dog warden” investigate the
welfare of the plaintiffs’ dogs.10 The defendant wrote this letter at the behest of Synnott. The court determined
that, although “the deposition of [the defendant] did
8
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3) provides: “The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, unless the party that brought the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim and demonstrates to the court that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.”
9
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (2) provides: “When ruling on a special motion to dismiss, the court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits of the parties attesting to the facts upon which liability or a defense, as the case may be, is based.”
The parties filed respective affidavits in support of and in opposition to the defendant’s special motion to dismiss.
10
This letter, sent as an email and addressed to Darien Animal Control, stated as follows: “My husband and I visited friends in Darien who are extremely upset about two English Setters in their neighborhood; they
Kaufman v. Synnott
reveal that some of the statements in her letter . . . were knowingly not truthful, there is no evidence that she
participated in any other conduct other than writing
[this] letter . . . .” The court concluded, therefore, that this writing, despite containing certain falsehoods, constituted an exercise of the defendant’s right to petition
the government11 and involved a matter of public concern.12 Accordingly, the court found that the defendant
met the first prong necessary to prevail on her special
motion to dismiss.
The court then turned to the second prong, which
required the plaintiffs to demonstrate probable cause
that they would prevail on the merits of their amended
complaint. The court, after taking into account all valid
were so concerned, that we took a walk to 38 Delafield Island Road where the dogs are penned, seemingly the entire time.
“Don’t state statutes require dogs to be housed properly in extreme weather? These dogs are NOT provided with such, in extreme weather conditions (hot nor cold)—often without water or frozen water in the winter—the pen (although fairly large) is NOT cleaned regularly, which means that the dogs are also living in extremely unsanitary conditions!
“My husband and I lived with two English Setters years ago (we have smaller dogs now); we found them to be highly intelligent animals requiring rigorous/regular exercise, and proper stimulation—they do NOT thrive well without it.
“As we understood it, not much was done after a complaint was filed.
“[May] we suggest that Darien Animal Control launch a thorough investigation—this is not a proper way of treating animals, it borders on animal abuse/cruelty!
“Hoping to hear from you . . . .”
11
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) provides in relevant part: “‘(3) Right to petition the government’ means (A) communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body, (B) communication that is reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of a matter of public concern by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body, or (C) communication that is reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect consideration of an issue by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body . . . .”
12
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) provides in relevant part: “‘(1) Matter of public concern’ means an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .”
Kaufman v. Synnott
defenses available to the defendant, determined that,
contrary to the statement in her letter, the defendant
had never been to the plaintiffs’ property where the
dogs were kept and had never seen the dogs or the conditions in which they lived. Instead, the defendant relied
exclusively on Synnott’s statements regarding these
matters. The court further determined that the defendant indicated that she had no reason to believe that
Synnott’s communications regarding the plaintiffs’ dogs
and their living conditions were untrue. Ultimately, the
court determined that, when considering the import of
her entire letter, the defendant’s statements were made
with reckless disregard for the truth and, thus, probable
cause existed that she would not prevail on her defense
of qualified immunity applicable to statements made to
the police concerning alleged criminal activity.13
The court then considered the defendant’s potential
statute of limitations defenses. It determined that the
two year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-59714 would bar “any direct defamation claims”
made by the plaintiffs against the defendant. The plaintiffs argued, however, that the defendant conspired
with Synnott, Pelletier, and other unnamed parties to
defame the plaintiffs, and that tort was subject to the
13
“[S]tatements made to the police in connection with a criminal investigation . . . are entitled to protection by a qualified privilege. . . . Therefore, for the plaintiffs to prevail on their defamation claim, they must prove that the defendant made her statement with malice. Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35–36, 81 A. 1013 (1911) (‘[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice’). ‘[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.’ . . . ‘Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted.) Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn. App. 404, 409, 13 A.3d 1134 (2011).
14
General Statutes § 52-597 provides: “No action of libel or slander shall be brought but within two years from the date of the act complained of.”
In this matter, the defendant’s letter was forwarded by email to the Darien Animal Control officer on August 31, 2017. The plaintiffs did not make an effort to cite in the defendant as a party until September 30, 2019, beyond the two year statute of limitations.
Kaufman v. Synnott
three year statute of limitation set forth in General Statutes § 52-577.15 The court reasoned, however, that the
defendant’s involvement did not go beyond her August
31, 2017 letter to Darien Animal Control and, thus, the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that she participated
in a conspiracy to defame them.16 Ultimately, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their statutory burden, and, accordingly, granted the defendant’s
special motion to dismiss.
On November 10, 2021, the plaintiffs appealed from
the court’s granting of the defendant’s special motion
to dismiss. On December 21, 2021, this court dismissed
their appeal for failing to file various documents with
the Office of the Appellate Clerk. This court also denied
a motion for reconsideration of this dismissal on February 2, 2022. On May 24, 2022, our Supreme Court
denied the plaintiffs’ petition for certification to appeal. See Kaufman v. Synnott, 343 Conn. 923, 275 A.3d 212
(2022).
The plaintiffs filed a second appeal with this court on
May 31, 2022, in which they challenged the denial of a
motion to amend the complaint and the denial of a motion
to reargue. On September 22, 2023, this court dismissed
the second appeal as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure to timely file their brief and appendix.
15
General Statutes § 52-577 provides: “No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”
16
Specifically, the court reasoned: “In order to establish a civil conspiracy to defame, the plaintiffs must provide evidence that meets the standard of probable cause that [the defendant] combined with one or more persons to do a criminal or an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. The [plaintiffs have] failed to prove by the applicable standard that [the defendant] combined to do a criminal or unlawful act. [The defendant] wrote a letter to the Darien Animal Control officer making statements she believed to be true, though admittedly without any personal knowledge of their truth, concerning the treatment of certain dogs and seeking an investigation. Such activity is neither criminal nor unlawful. . . . There is no evidence before this court that would support a finding even to the level of probable cause that she participated in any of the Internet or website postings of which the plaintiffs complain.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Kaufman v. Synnott
Following the granting of the special motion to dismiss,
the defendant, on October 14, 2021, moved for an award
of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. On January 20,
2022, following the dismissal of the appeal filed by the
plaintiffs, the defendant filed a supplemental motion
for attorney’s fees and costs. Following the dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ second appeal, on October 12, 2023,
the defendant again filed a motion seeking attorney’s
fees and costs. This motion, filed pursuant to § 52-196a
(f) (1) and Practice Book § 11-21, requested $91,698 in
attorney’s fees and $2807.27 in costs for a total amount
of $94,505.27.
In response, on February 21, 2024, the plaintiffs moved
for summary judgment as to the defendant’s claim for
attorney’s fees and costs. Therein, the plaintiffs argued
that the defendant’s insurance company, Chubb Insurance, was the entity that incurred legal fees in this matter, but the defendant was the party that moved for the
payment of such fees. Attached to the plaintiffs’ motion
was a December 5, 2019 engagement letter from the
defendant’s counsel to the defendant indicating that
said counsel had been retained by Chubb Insurance. The
letter also stated: “I write to let you know that our firm will look to your insurance carrier for payment of all of
our attorneys’ fees and expenses in accordance with the
applicable insurance policy, and we will not look to you
for payment of any such fees.” Given these facts, the
plaintiffs asserted that the conditions of § 52-196a (f)
(1) were not satisfied and therefore the court should not
award attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant objected
to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on February 22, 2024.
The court held a hearing on July 15, 2024, to address
the defendant’s motions for attorney’s fees and litigation costs and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
Following that proceeding, the court, Hon. Edward T.
Krumeich II, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum
of decision on October 3, 2024. It rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that § 52-196a (f) (1) requires the moving party
Kaufman v. Synnott
to have actually paid or been personally liable for the
payment of the fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the
lawsuit under this statutory framework. Specifically, it
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ interpretation, which was
contrary to the plain language of the statute, “would blast quite a hole in the protections afforded [to] those who
were unfairly drawn into SLAPP suits for the exercise of
protected rights.” Furthermore, the court explained that
there was “no indication that the legislature intended to
shift the ultimate burden of incurred costs and fees from
the losing party to innocent third parties who actually
paid or are liable for payment of costs and fees included in defense of the SLAAP suit. [Finally] the word ‘incurred’
in § 52-196a (f) (1) refers to the work done, not the costs and fees to be awarded.”
Next, the court, after applying the Johnson factors,
concluded that the amount of the requested fees and
costs was reasonable, and that the downward adjustment
requested by the plaintiffs was not applicable under
these facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the court
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and
awarded the defendant costs and fees in the amount of
$94,505.27. In a footnote, the court observed that the
plaintiffs raised several constitutional challenges to
§ 52-196a in a posthearing brief. The court concluded
that, under these circumstances, the plaintiffs waived
the right to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statutory scheme at this point of the litigation.
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
as needed.
I
The plaintiff first challenges the granting of the special motion to dismiss filed by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, as a precondition to the application of the provisions of § 52-196a, there must be a valid exercise of a first amendment right.17 He further asserts
that given the court’s determination that portions of the
17
In using the term “first amendment right” we refer to “the exercise of . . . constitutional rights to free speech, to free association, or to
Kaufman v. Synnott
defendant’s letter were false, no first amendment right
had been exercised and, therefore, the court should not
have granted the special motion to dismiss. Additionally,
for the first time at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff claimed that due to the false statement in the
defendant’s letter and the resulting lack of valid first
amendment concerns, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed under § 52-196a. The plaintiff
also contends that the fee shifting provisions in the
statute are unconstitutional on an as applied basis by
improperly creating a hierarchy of first amendment
rights between the parties and by failing to distinguish
between cases brought in good faith and those brought
in bad faith. We disagree that the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court is implicated under these facts and circumstances. Furthermore, we conclude that, as
a result of the plaintiff’s untimely constitutional challenges to § 52-196a, he has waived such contentions, and
we decline to consider them.
A
We first consider the plaintiff’s claim, raised for the
first time at oral argument, that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to grant the special motion
to dismiss.18 Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, in
the August 27, 2021 memorandum of decision, Judge
Genuario determined that some of the statements contained in the defendant’s letter were false, and that false statements are not protected under the first amendment.
The plaintiff further contends that, as a result of this
determination, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed under § 52-196a, including awarding
petition the government.” Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 970, 293 A.3d 851 (2023) (D’Auria, J., dissenting).
18
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff argues that false statements are not entitled to constitutional protection and, therefore, the predicate for awarding attorney’s fees under our anti-SLAAP statute was absent. The plaintiff did not, however, assert that such a deficiency implicated the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court until oral argument before this court.
Kaufman v. Synnott
attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. We are not
persuaded.
We first consider the manner in which the plaintiff
has raised his claim that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. We iterate that the plaintiff did
not challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court until oral argument before this court. As a general
matter, we do not consider arguments raised for the first
time at oral argument. See L. K. v. K. K., 226 Conn. App.
279, 287, 318 A.3d 243 (2024). We recognize, however,
that a claim that the trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time and is subject to
plenary review by this court. Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry, 196 Conn. App. 80, 87–88, 228 A.3d 1042, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 919, 231 A.3d 1170 (2020); see also
Machado v. Taylor, 326 Conn. 396, 404, 163 A.3d 558
(2017). Indeed, “[o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction is raised, it must be disposed of no matter in what form
it is presented. . . . The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) L. K. v. K. K., supra, 287–88. For this
reason, we will consider the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed under
§ 52a-196a despite having been raised for the first time
at oral argument. Id.; see also O’Donnell v. Waterbury,
111 Conn. App. 1, 4–5, 958 A.2d 163, cert. denied, 289
Conn. 959, 961 A.2d 422 (2008); State v. Booker, 28
Conn. App. 34, 38–39, 611 A.2d 878, cert. denied, 223
Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 826 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
916, 113 S. Ct. 1271, 122 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1993). Because
we disagree with the plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument,
the defendant is not prejudiced by our consideration of
the issue notwithstanding it was not raised until the
time of oral argument in this appeal.
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles.
“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of
the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented
by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without
Kaufman v. Synnott
jurisdiction . . . . Furthermore, [j]urisdiction of the
[subject matter] is the power [of the court] to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. . . . A court has subject
matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate
a particular type of legal controversy. . . . Stated differently, [a] court does not truly lack subject matter
jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action
before it.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Karen v. Loftus, 228 Conn. App. 163, 175–76,
324 A.3d 793, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 924, 325 A.3d
1094 (2024); see also Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80,
104 n.18, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023); Parisi v. Niblett, 199
Conn. App. 761, 771–72, 238 A.3d 740 (2020). Indeed,
this court has recognized that “all civil matters . . . fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior
Court.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Shonna K., 77 Conn. App. 246, 253, 822
A.2d 1009 (2003); see also Kleinman v. Chapnick, 140
Conn. App. 500, 504 n.6, 59 A.3d 373 (2013).
The plaintiff has not presented us with any authority to
support his claim that the trial court lacked competency
to adjudicate the defendant’s special motion to dismiss
brought under our anti-SLAPP statute. Instead, he has
confused the court’s authority to act with its subject
matter jurisdiction. See O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn.
App. 51, 53, 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355,
813 A.2d 1001 (2003); see also Hepburn v. Brill, 348
Conn. 827, 838, 312 A.3d 1 (2024). As our Supreme Court
recently has explained, “[a]lthough related, the court’s
authority to act pursuant to a statute is different from
its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court
to hear and determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction,
is not to be confused with the way in which that power
must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of
the statute. . . . In other words, there is a distinction
between a trial court’s jurisdiction and . . . the correctness of a decision made by a tribunal in the course of its exercise of its jurisdiction.” (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Torrington
Kaufman v. Synnott
Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley, 354 Conn. 66, 78, 349 A.3d
551 (2026); see also Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn. App.
210, 217 n.7, 284 A.3d 702 (2022). This distinction is
important because a “judgment rendered by a trial court
that lacked jurisdiction is not merely voidable but void
ab initio and, therefore, subject to attack at any time.”
(Emphasis omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group, 335
Conn. 448, 463–64, 239 A.3d 272 (2020). The plaintiff’s
argument in the present matter, however, properly is
characterized as a challenge to the manner in which the
court exercised its authority to act in regard to the antiSLAPP proceedings brought by the defendant rather
than its power to hear and determine such matters. We
therefore reject the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.
At oral argument, the plaintiff referred to this court’s
recent decision in Black Rock Gardens, LLC v. Berry, 224
Conn. App. 379, 312 A.3d 588 (2024), as support for his
jurisdictional claim. In that case, the defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his special motion to
dismiss. Id., 380. We stated that the issue on appeal was
whether the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to § 52-196a (b) constituted an appealable final
judgment. Id., 383. This court relied on a trilogy of decisions19 from our Supreme Court that concluded (1) “our
anti-SLAAP statute affords a defendant a substantive
right to avoid litigation on the merits” and (2) “in cases in which a defendant can assert a colorable claim that a
trial court’s denial of a special motion to dismiss under
that statute has placed that particular right at risk, an
immediate appeal may be taken pursuant to the second
prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566
(1983).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Black Rock
Gardens, LLC v. Berry, supra, 384–85.
In Black Rock Gardens, LLC, we explained that the
defendant had failed to assert a colorable claim to the
19
See Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn. 1002, 293 A.3d 345 (2023); Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 293 A.3d 851 (2023); Pryor v. Brignole, 346 Conn. 534, 292 A.3d 701 (2023).
Kaufman v. Synnott
protections of our anti-SLAAP statute because his complaint was not based on the exercise of his first amendment rights. Id., 385; see also Smith v. Supple, 346
Conn. 928, 952, 293 A.3d 851 (2023) (dispositive inquiry
into whether denial of special motion to dismiss under
§ 52-196a is appealable final judgment under second
prong of Curcio is whether defendant can assert colorable claim of right to avoid litigation under anti-SLAAP
statute). Accordingly, we concluded that the defendant
was not entitled to an immediate review of the denial of
his special motion to dismiss and, therefore, this court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal. Black
Rock Gardens, LLC v. Berry, supra, 224 Conn. App.
384–87.
It is readily apparent that the present matter is distinguishable from the facts and analysis set forth in
Black Rock Gardens, LLC, and, therefore, the plaintiff’s
reliance on that case is misplaced. Specifically, the plaintiff in this appeal, which involves the granting of the
defendant’s special motion to dismiss, asserts that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed
under this statutory scheme. The issue in Black Rock
Gardens, LLC, which arose from the defendant’s appeal
from the denial of a special motion to dismiss, concerned
our appellate jurisdiction, which requires appeals to be
taken from a final judgment or an otherwise interlocutory order that satisfies Curcio. See id., 385 n.4. For
these reasons, we reject the plaintiff’s contention that
our decision in Black Rock Gardens, LLC, supports his
claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the present case to proceed under § 52-196a.20 We
further conclude that the plaintiff has challenged the
20
We emphasize that a “special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a . . . is not a traditional motion to dismiss based on a jurisdictional ground.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. V. D., 229 Conn. App. 316, 337, 328 A.3d 198 (2024); see also Aguilar v. Eick, 234 Conn. App. 281, 284, 344 A.3d 263, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 925, 345 A.3d 811 (2025); Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 788 n.12; Chapnick v. DiLauro, 212 Conn. App. 263, 269, 275 A.3d 746 (2022); Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 824, 254 A.3d 1001 (2021).
Kaufman v. Synnott
manner in which the trial court exercised its authority
pursuant to § 52-196a, rather than its power to hear such
matter. His claim that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, therefore, must fail.
B
Next, we turn to the plaintiff’s myriad of constitutional challenges to § 52-196a. We conclude that the
plaintiff, by failing to raise such claims in a timely fashion, has waived them. Accordingly, we decline to consider
the merits of the plaintiff’s assertions regarding the
constitutionality of our anti-SLAAP statutes.21
The following additional facts are necessary for
our discussion. In their August 22, 2024 posthearing
memorandum, the plaintiffs argued that § 52-196a is
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to them.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that (1) they improperly were deprived of their right to a jury trial and (2)
the statute’s fee shifting provisions violated their right to petition the court.
In its October 3, 2024 memorandum of decision
addressing the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees
and costs, the court noted that the plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of the anti-SLAAP statutory
scheme on its face and on an as applied basis22 for the first
21
We note, nonetheless, that, in Robinson v. V. D., 229 Conn. App. 316, 345, 328 A.3d 198 (2024), this court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that “§ 52-196a is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because it requires the court to make factual findings and, thus, deprives them of their federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial and to petition for grievances.” See also Gifford v. Taunton Press, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 11, 2019) (rejecting various challenges to constitutionality of § 52-196a).
22
“A facial challenge, as compared to an as applied challenge is not dependent on the facts of a particular case.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ardizzone, 230 Conn. App. 187, 217–18 n.14, 330 A.3d 231, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 920, 333 A.3d 104 (2025). In contrast, for an as applied challenge, a court determines the constitutionality of a statute in the context of the facts of that particular case. See State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 522 n.21, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).
Kaufman v. Synnott
time in a posthearing brief. It declined to consider the
plaintiff’s untimely constitutional challenges.
“Connecticut’s appellate courts often have recognized
that they are not obligated to consider claims not distinctly raised at trial and decided by the trial court. . . . This admonition is equally applicable to constitutional
claims.” (Citations omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC
v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 704, 915 A.2d 916, cert.
denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007). In 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC, the trial court held a hearing on the
plaintiff’s motion to discharge or reduce the defendant’s
mechanic’s lien. Id., 703. That proceeding focused on
the determination of the validity of the mechanic’s lien,
the bulk of which “was devoted to witness testimony and
other evidence pertaining to . . . the nature and timing
of the work performed by the defendant . . . .” Id. The
plaintiff did not raise a claim regarding the constitutionality of the mechanic’s lien statutes until the end of the brief argument it made following the conclusion of
evidence. Id., 703–704. On appeal, we declined to address
the plaintiff’s “casual and incomplete” constitutional
challenge. Id., 704–705. We further noted that, given
the interlocutory nature of that appeal, the plaintiff
retained the ability to pursue the claim in a different
proceeding. Id., 705.
Likewise, in the present case, the plaintiff belatedly
challenged the constitutionality of § 52-196a. He did not
raise these matters during the proceedings before the
trial court when it determined the merits of the special
motion to dismiss or properly pursue such claims in the
two appeals filed following the granting of the special
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff also failed to present
his constitutional claims to the trial court at the time of the hearing on the defendant’s § 52-196a (f) (1) motion.
We agree with the trial court that, as a result of the
untimely manner in which the plaintiff has asserted his
constitutional claims, he has waived the right to do so.23 23
To the extent that the plaintiff has raised constitutional claims on appeal that were not made in any fashion before the trial court, we
Kaufman v. Synnott
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and
costs. Specifically, he argues that the court (1) improperly concluded that the defendant was entitled to such
an award despite the ultimate payment of her legal fees
by her insurance company, and (2) misapplied the Johnson factors in determining the amount of the attorney’s
fees and costs awarded to the defendant. We are not
persuaded.
The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this claim. Following the granting of her
special motion to dismiss, the defendant filed several
motions for attorney’s fees pursuant to § 52a-196 (f) (1). The defendant filed a postappeal supplemental motion for
attorney’s fees and litigation costs on October 12, 2023.
Therein, she argued that, as a result of the granting of
her special motion to dismiss, she statutorily was entitled to all costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. As detailed in the attached affidavit of counsel, the defendant claimed
accrued attorney’s fees of $91,698 and litigation costs
of $2807.28 for a total of $94,505.27.24
In response, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Therein, he argued, inter alia, that the two requirements of § 52-196 (f) (1) had not been met. First, the
plaintiff asserted that the defendant had not incurred
fees and costs with respect to the special motion to dismiss because her insurance company, Chubb Insurance,
was obligated to pay these items. Second, the plaintiff
conclude that such extraordinary review is not warranted due to his failure to adequately brief a request for review, in name or substance, pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). State v. Nathaniel T., 230 Conn. App. 45, 52, 329 A.3d 285 (2024); see also State v. Abramovich, 229 Conn. App. 213, 217–19, 326 A.3d 593 (2024).
24
See Bruno v. Whipple, 215 Conn. App. 478, 497–99, 283 A.3d 26 (2022) (party seeking attorney’s fees by contract or under statute must demonstrate reasonableness of such request with appropriate evidentiary showing).
Kaufman v. Synnott
argued that the defendant improperly was the moving
party seeking attorney’s fees and litigation costs on
behalf of Chubb Insurance.
Following a hearing,25 the court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and denied
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its October 3, 2024 memorandum of decision. In rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that the conditions of § 52-196a
(f) (1) had not been satisfied, the court observed that
the statutory term “moving party” referred to a person
or entity that made the special motion to dismiss and
that the defendant, not Chubb Insurance, had filed the
motion for attorney’s fees and costs. It then explained:
“[The plaintiff] would have the court read into the statute a requirement that the moving party must have actually paid or be personally liable for payment of the fees, costs and expenses incurred in the lawsuit for them to
be recoverable . . . . If so, that would eliminate recovery of ‘incurred’ fees and expenses paid by others including
insurers, parents, spouses, trusts, estates, employers,
associations etc. That would blast quite a hole in the
protections afforded [to] those who were unfairly drawn
into SLAPP suits for the exercise of protected rights.” It further stated that the plaintiff’s interpretation would
benefit parties whose lawsuit had been dismissed pursuant to § 52-196a (e) (3) by relieving them from the associated costs and fees simply because they had been paid
by a third party. The court further explained: “There is
no indication that the legislature intended to shift the
ultimate burden of incurred costs and fees from the losing party to innocent third parties who actually paid or are
liable for payment of costs and fees incurred in defense
of the SLAPP suit.” The court then reasoned that the
phrase “incurred” in § 52-196a (f) (1) referred not to the costs and fees awarded but rather to the “work done.”
Finally, the court, after considering the applicable Johnson factors, determined that the amount of attorney’s
fees and costs sought by the defendant was reasonable.
25
The plaintiff has not provided this court with a transcript from the July 15, 2024 hearing held by the court on the parties’ motion regarding the issue of attorney’s fees and costs.
Kaufman v. Synnott
A
On appeal, the plaintiff claims the court misapplied
§ 52-196a (f) (1). Specifically, he argues that “the plain meaning of the statute narrowly confines fee reimbursement to (1) a moving party that (2) has actually incurred
fees.” He contends that Chubb Insurance, and not the
defendant, incurred the attorney’s fees and costs and that Chubb Insurance was not the moving party. For these
reasons, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and
costs. The defendant counters that the plaintiff’s interpretation imposes requirements that are not present in
the statutory language and is contrary to the purpose and
plain meaning of § 52-196a. We agree with the defendant.
This claim requires us to interpret the language of
§ 52-196a (f) (1), which presents a question of law subject to plenary review. Aguilar v. Eick, 234 Conn. App. 281,
293, 344 A.3d 263, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 925, 345
A.3d 811 (2025); Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App.
818, 823, 254 A.3d 1001 (2021). “When construing a
statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to
the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us
first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .
When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also
look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history
and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the
legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to
its relationship to existing legislation and common law
principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena v. American
Kaufman v. Synnott
Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30,
45–46, 213 A.3d 1110 (2019); see also Hope v. Willimantic Partners, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 200, 215–16,
351 A.3d 837 (2026).
We begin with the relevant statutory text. Section
52-196a (f) (1) provides: “If the court grants a special
motion to dismiss under this section, the court shall
award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees, including such costs and fees incurred in connection with the filing of the special motion to dismiss.” By its
plain language, the statute directs that, following the
granting of a special motion to dismiss, attorney’s fees
and costs, including those incurred in connection with
the filing of a special motion to dismiss, shall be awarded to the moving party by the trial court.26 See King v. Hubbard, 217 Conn. App. 191, 210, 288 A.3d 218 (2023).
The term “incurred” is not defined in this statutory
scheme. “In the absence of a definition of terms in the
statute itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legislature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the
English language, as gleaned from the context of its use.
. . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to look
to the common understanding of the term as expressed
in a dictionary. . . . Dictionaries in print at the time
of the statute’s enactment are the most instructive.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
26
See, e.g., Grayson v. Spears, Manning & Martini, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-23-6063705-S (September 25, 2024) (defendants entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs following granting of special motion to dismiss); Rezendes v. Wooley, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2023 WL 2986691, *1 (Conn. Super. April 10, 2023) (if court grants special motion to dismiss, moving party is awarded attorney’s fees and costs); Primrose Cos. v. McGee, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 26, 2022) (award provision of § 52-196a (f) (1) encompasses all work performed by defendant’s counsel arising from case and not merely work done in conjunction with special motion to dismiss); Cronin v. Pelletier, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 30, 2019) (statute mandates award of attorney’s fees and costs following grant of special motion to dismiss).
Kaufman v. Synnott
Stanford v. Nogiec, 233 Conn. App. 862, 871, 342 A.3d
268, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 346 A.3d 511 (2025);
see generally General Statutes § 1-1 (a); State v. Panek,
328 Conn. 219, 229–30, 177 A.3d 1113 (2018).
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff puts forth the following dictionary definitions of the word “incur.” “To
incur an expense means to become liable or subject to
the expense. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th Ed. [2014]) [p. 632]. To incur a cost is to sustain
it or be liable or subject to it. The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. [2011]) [p.
891].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In a similar
vein, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incur” as follows:
“To have liabilities cast upon one by act or operation of
law, as distinguished from contract, where the party
acts affirmatively. To become liable or subject to, to
bring down upon oneself, as to incur debt, danger, displeasure and penalty, and to become through one’s own
action liable or subject to.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
Ed. 1990) p. 768.
In the present case, the defendant unquestionably
incurred costs in the course of responding to and defending against the plaintiff’s SLAPP lawsuit. Additionally,
the defendant used the special motion to dismiss as a
means to end this litigation in an expeditious fashion.
Pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1), the defendant was entitled
to an award of attorney’s fees and costs. To be sure,
Chubb Insurance, her insurance company, ultimately
assumed the financial responsibility for payment of these
items. Chubb Insurance, however, would not have had
to pay these attorney’s fees and costs had they not been
incurred in the first instance by the defendant. In other
words, we disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that
the defendant did not incur attorney’s fees and costs in
the present matter.27
Additionally, the plaintiff’s interpretation of § 52-196a
(f) (1) imposes a condition or requirement—that the party
27
We note that the defendant was the proper party to move for attorney’s fees and costs under § 52-196a (f) (1), particularly in light of our
Kaufman v. Synnott
that successfully had filed a special motion to dismiss
must personally be responsible for the attorney’s fees
and litigation costs—that simply is not found in the text
of the statute. This court will not read conditions into
a statute that do not exist. Stanford v. Nogiec, supra,
233 Conn. App. 877; see also PJM & Associates, LC v.
Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 138, 971 A.2d 24 (2009)
(courts cannot change inherent meaning of words or
supply additional terms to change meaning of provision
at issue when interpreting statutory language); State v.
Fetscher, 162 Conn. App. 145, 152, 130 A.3d 892 (2015)
(legislature is aware of how to express its intent to qualify or limit operation of statute), cert. denied, 321 Conn.
904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016). As our Supreme Court recently
has explained, courts must construe statutes as they are
written and only the legislature may rewrite them to
accomplish a particular result. Del Rio v. Amazon.com
Services, Inc., 354 Conn. 151, 172, 349 A.3d 570 (2026);
see also Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527,
541, 344 A.3d 527 (2025) (same).
Although we conclude that the plain meaning of the
text of the statute adequately guides us as to its meaning, we nonetheless conclude that an examination of the
statute’s legislative policy supports our interpretation,
and the purpose of our anti-SLAPP statutory scheme is
not advanced by the plaintiff’s construction of § 52-196a
(f) (1). Previous decisions of our appellate courts guide
this aspect of the proper construction of § 52-196a. See
Aguilar v. Eick, supra, 234 Conn. App. 294. “[O]ur analysis begins with the plain meaning of the statute, although we remain mindful that we do not write on a clean slate,
but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of
[the statutory] language and the purpose of [the relevant] statute[s].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Airey
v. Feliciano, 352 Conn. 639, 646, 338 A.3d 344 (2025);
see also State v. Joseph V., 345 Conn. 516, 546, 285 A.3d
1018 (2022) (in construing statutory language, courts
are bound by prior judicial interpretations and purpose
of statute).
conclusion that the defendant incurred the attorney’s fees and costs for the purpose of this statute.
Kaufman v. Synnott
In discussing the purpose of § 52-196a, our Supreme
Court has noted, based on its citation to the legislative
history, that this statute “was intended to address situations in which people have spoken out on matters of
public concern including the press and we’ve seen situations where people file litigation. There appears to be
no basis to that litigation but it’s designed to chill free speech and the expression of constitutional rights, and so this provides for a special motion to dismiss so that early in the process somebody who’s speaking and exercised
their constitutional rights can try to dismiss a frivolous or abusive claim that has no merit and short circuit a
litigation where it might otherwise cost a great deal of
money to continue to prosecute.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332, 382
n.36, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141
S. Ct. 2467, 209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021). This court additionally has observed that § 52-196a “affords a defendant
a substantive right to avoid litigation on the merits that can be costly and burdensome . . . through the dismissal
of a SLAPP suit . . . [which] are by definition frivolous
lawsuits . . . [and] the procedural mechanism established
by [this statute] is intended to weed out meritless claims at an early stage of litigation . . . .” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Aguilar v. Eick, supra, 234 Conn. App. 294; see also
Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 946 (same); Sicignano
v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 694, 325 A.3d 1127
(2024) (§ 52-196a sets forth procedural mechanism to
achieve important substantive goal of protecting parties
from expensive and time-consuming lawsuits by providing expedited off-ramp to avoid further litigation), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025); Chapnick v.
DiLauro, 212 Conn. App. 263, 269, 275 A.3d 746 (2022)
(purpose of § 52-196a is to provide mechanism for early
dismissal of SLAPP suits).
It is clear, therefore, that § 52-196a serves to protect
defendants from the time and costs associated with the
defense from meritless lawsuits. These goals are not
benefited or advanced by the plaintiff’s interpretation of
Kaufman v. Synnott
§ 52a-196 (f) (1). Litigating whether some third party, be it an insurance company, trust, spouse, friend, etc., may
bear the ultimate financial responsibility for attorney’s
fees and costs in the context of § 52-196a will delay the
resolution and increase the costs of such litigation, both of which are contrary to this statutory framework. Finally,
we fail to see why the defendant’s arrangement with her
insurance company should serve as a financial windfall
benefiting the plaintiff, who was found to have filed a
SLAPP lawsuit, which is by definition frivolous. See
Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 801. For
these reasons, we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff’s interpretation of § 52-196a
(f) (1) is not supported by the statute’s plain language
or the overarching purpose of § 52-196a. Accordingly,
we agree with the trial court that the defendant was
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under § 52a-196 (f)
(1) in this matter.
B
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court abused
its discretion in determining the amount of attorney’s
fees and costs awarded to the defendant. Specifically,
he argues that the court misapplied the Johnson factors
in awarding the “exorbitant sum of $94,505.27.” The
defendant counters that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion and that the “thorough and well reasoned” memorandum of decision
should be affirmed. We conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in applying the Johnson factors28 in
28
“The [twelve] Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client and (12) awards in similar cases.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conservation Commission v. Red 11, LLC, 135 Conn. App.
Kaufman v. Synnott
awarding the defendant $94,505.27 in attorney’s fees
and costs.
In its October 3, 2024 memorandum of decision, the
court determined that the defendant presented credible
evidence regarding the amount of her attorney’s fees and
litigation costs.29 It observed that this matter was “very actively litigated.” It specifically stated that it considered “various Johnson factors in rendering its fee award to
[the defendant], including the complexity and novelty
of pursuing a special motion to dismiss at a time when
the anti-SLAAP statute was new, the time and labor
required, the background and experience of the attorneys
who represented [the defendant], the reasonable rates
charged as compared to rates charged by similar defense
counsel in this judicial district, the magnitude of the
case and the results obtained.” Furthermore, the court
explained that “[t]he lodestar adjustments requested by
the plaintiff are not warranted. The hourly rates reflected the relative experience of the billing attorneys. Staffing where an experienced partner oversaw a less experienced
associate is not uncommon. [Further] all defense costs
may be recovered not just those on the special motion
to dismiss. . . . That certain Johnson factors were not
applicable is not a rationale for downward adjustment
as the plaintiff urged.”
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles.
“The general rule of law known as the American rule is
that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and burdens
of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception. . . . This rule is
generally followed throughout the country. . . . Connecticut adheres to the American rule. . . . There are few exceptions. For example, a specific contractual term may
provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs . . . or a statute may confer such rights.” (Internal quotation
765, 786, 43 A.3d 244 (2012); see also Carrillo v. Goldberg, 141 Conn. App. 299, 317 n.10, 61 A.3d 1164 (2013).
29
On appeal, this court will not disturb the credibility determinations made by the trial court. Glastonbury v. Sakon, 184 Conn. App. 385, 394–95, 194 A.3d 1277 (2018).
Kaufman v. Synnott
marks omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple, 215 Conn. App. 478,
492–93, 283 A.3d 26 (2022); see also Glastonbury v.
Sakon, 184 Conn. App. 385, 392–93, 194 A.3d 1277
(2018). In the present case, § 52-196a (f) (1) constitutes the applicable statutory exception to the American rule.
See, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687,
696, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021).
Next, we identify our standard of review. “It is well
established that we review the trial court’s decision to
award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. . . . This
standard applies to the amount of fees awarded . . . and
also to the trial court’s determination of the factual
predicate justifying the award. . . . Under the abuse
of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every
reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial
court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse
of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached
the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple, supra, 215 Conn. App. 497;
see also Francini v. Riggione, 193 Conn. App. 321, 329–
30, 219 A.3d 452 (2019) (trial court is in best position
to evaluate circumstances of each case and, therefore,
Appellate Court may not alter award of attorney’s fees
unless there has been abuse of discretion); see generally
Laudano v. New Haven, 58 Conn. App. 819, 822, 755
A.2d 907 (2000) (“No one can state the reasonable value
of legal services as a fact. He can only express his opinion. The value is based upon many considerations.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
This court has explained that “[t]he initial estimate
of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. . . . The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other
factors [outlined in Johnson]. . . . The Johnson factors
may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount, but
no one factor is a substitute for multiplying reasonable
Kaufman v. Synnott
billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number of
hours expended on the litigation.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Whitney v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc.,
164 Conn. App. 420, 435, 137 A.3d 866 (2016); see also
R.I. Pools, Inc. v. Paramount Concrete, Inc., 149 Conn.
App. 839, 877 n.20, 89 A.3d 993, cert. denied, 312 Conn.
920, 94 A.3d 1200 (2014).
In determining the amount of attorney’s fees and litigation costs, the court began with the lodestar amount
and then considered the various Johnson factors. See,
e.g., Ernst v. Deere & Co., 92 Conn. App. 572, 577, 886
A.2d 845 (2005); Laudano v. New Haven, supra, 58
Conn. App. 822–24. It considered and ultimately declined
to apply the adjustments sought by the plaintiff. After
reviewing the record and the arguments raised on appeal,
we conclude that the court performed a comprehensive analysis of the attorney’s fees and litigation costs
requested by the defendant. We further conclude that the
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the court’s award constituted an abuse of its discretion. See, e.g., Thames
River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 801,
720 A.2d 242 (1998). We iterate that our review is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly applied
the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion
that it did. We answer those questions in the affirmative
and thus reject the plaintiff’s challenge to the attorney’s fees and litigation costs awarded in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.