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State v. Ragin
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHARDEL RAGIN
(SC 21044)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder and criminal possession of a pistol in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. After learning that the defendant may have been involved in the victim’s murder, the police served a search warrant on T Co., the defendant’s cell phone service provider, seeking information relating to the defendant’s cell phone, including call-identifying information and cell site location information for the two and one-half week period immediately following the murder. Because T Co. generated its records using Coordinated Universal Time, rather than Eastern Daylight Time, as its time standard, it produced data that corresponded not only to the two and one-half week period requested but also to the four hour period immediately preceding the approximate time of the murder. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the cell phone records, claiming that the search warrant lacked probable cause and particularity, was overbroad, and that the additional four hours of data that T Co. voluntarily produced was outside the scope of the warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and, at trial, the state relied on the defendant’s cell phone records, as well as witness testimony, to place the defendant in the area of the shooting. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress his cell phone records because the search warrant lacked the probable cause and sufficient particularity necessary to comport with the federal and state constitutions and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his call-identifying and cell site location information. Held:
The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his cell phone records.
The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the warrant lacked probable cause for cell phone records spanning the two and one-half week period following the murder, as the facts in the warrant affidavit, together with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, provided a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to conclude that probable cause existed to obtain the defendant’s call-identifying and cell site location information for the time period requested.
Specifically, the affidavit in support of the warrant established probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the murder, that he had used his cell phone shortly before the murder, that the police were still searching for his cell phone when they applied for the warrant, and that the data contained in the phone would assist in the police investigation of the victim’s murder and in any subsequent prosecution.
Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the warrant was sufficiently particular insofar as the time frame specified therein reasonably cabined the scope of the search, even though it was silent with respect to the applicable time zone.
State v. Ragin
The warrant identified a specific start date and end date and the relevant year, and there was no evidence to indicate that the police were aware that T Co. would rely on a time zone other than Eastern Daylight Time for purposes of generating the requested information.
There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the four hours of callidentifying and cell site location information corresponding to the time frame immediately preceding the time frame requested in the warrant should have been suppressed.
This court assumed without deciding that T Co. was not acting at the behest of the state when it turned over the additional four hours of data at issue and concluded that, when a third-party provider, such as T Co., voluntarily supplies the state with information exceeding the scope of a warrant and the information is of the type in which the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the state’s retention and subsequent use of that information, in the absence of an additional warrant, is properly subject to constitutional challenge.
Nevertheless, application of the exclusionary rule, which bars the state from introducing evidence that is obtained in violation of the federal or state constitution, was not warranted under the circumstances of the present case. It was far from certain under the federal constitution that the defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the four hours of call-identifying and cell site location information that was voluntarily produced, and the defendant failed to adequately brief his claim under the state constitution. Moreover, it was evident from the warrant that the police had probable cause to seize the additional four hours of call-identifying and cell site location information at issue, and suppression of that information would not meaningfully advance the deterrent purposes underlying the exclusionary rule, as there was no evidence that the police had engaged in deliberate, reckless, or otherwise improper conduct in obtaining the information that it sought. Furthermore, even if T Co.’s production of the additional four hours of data was attributable to the state, the production of that data reflected a reasonable response to a valid warrant.
Argued February 2—officially released June 30, 2026
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit,
illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, and
criminal possession of a pistol, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport, where the
court, Dayton, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to
the jury before Pavia, J.; subsequently, the court, Pavia,
State v. Ragin
J., granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal as to the charges of carrying a pistol without
a permit and illegal possession of a weapon in a motor
vehicle; verdict and judgment of guilty of the crimes of
murder and criminal possession of a pistol, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s
attorney, and Mary-Caitlin Harding, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
DANNEHY, J. The defendant, Shardel Ragin, appeals
directly to this court after a jury found him guilty of
murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a)
and criminal possession of a pistol in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-217c (a) (1). He claims
that the trial court improperly denied his motion to
suppress call-identifying information and cell site location information (CSLI) obtained pursuant to a search
warrant executed on his cell phone service provider. The
defendant argues that the search warrant lacked the
probable cause and sufficient particularity necessary to
comport with both the United States and Connecticut
constitutions and that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his call-identifying information and CSLI.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On the night of April 19, 2017, the defendant
and his wife visited Tiago’s Bar and Grill in downtown
Bridgeport. At the bar that evening was the defendant’s
acquaintance, Tyrelle Noblin, who was there celebrating
his friend’s birthday. Among those present with Noblin
was Lou Geneus, a friend of the defendant who was dating
the sister of Noblin’s fiancée. At around 10:24 p.m., the
defendant and his wife left the bar and headed to their
State v. Ragin
home in Bridgeport. At around 11:37 p.m., Geneus left
the bar and headed to his home. Also present at the bar
that evening, although not associated with the birthday celebration, were the victim, Max Antione, and his
friend, Michael Peters.
After the defendant and Geneus left, Noblin remained
at the bar for a while longer. At some point, Noblin called and texted the defendant to determine whether the defendant would return to the bar to meet him. When Noblin later exited the bar around 12:29 a.m., he observed
the defendant sitting in a black car parked on a side
street next to the bar. Noblin approached the car, briefly spoke with the defendant, and then got into the car. Once
inside, he noticed the defendant had a black semiautomatic firearm resting on his lap. When Noblin asked
the defendant why he had the weapon, the defendant
responded that “they gonna get what they got coming to
them.” Noblin testified that the defendant explained to
him that “they” had previously shot the defendant and
his wife in Stamford. Once the victim and Peters exited
the bar, and with Noblin still in the car, the defendant
reversed the car, drove toward them, and began firing
his weapon. Peters ducked and took cover beside a car
parked on the street. The victim attempted to flee, but,
as he was running away, he was shot by the defendant
and was pronounced dead at the scene shortly thereafter.
One week later, Noblin contacted the Bridgeport Police
Department and informed them that the defendant was
involved in the shooting. Based on the information that
Noblin provided, on May 3, 2017, the police sought a
search warrant for the defendant’s home and vehicle,
seeking, among other items, the defendant’s cell phone.
On May 6, 2017, the police executed the search warrant on
the defendant’s home and car but did not find the phone.
Thereafter, on May 8, 2017, the police sought a search
warrant for the defendant’s T-Mobile cell phone records.
The search warrant application sought telephone records,
subscriber information, call-identifying information,
text messaging data, and any information relating to cell
State v. Ragin
site activation or geographical positioning from April 20
to May 8, 2017.1 Attached to the search warrant application was an affidavit signed by Detective Robert G.
Winkler, which summarized Noblin’s statements to the
police. The affidavit stated that Noblin had been present
at the bar prior to the shooting and had communicated
with the defendant on his phone while he was there. It
further stated that Noblin left the bar alone around
12:30 a.m. on April 20, at which time he approached
the defendant’s vehicle parked outside, entered it, and
observed a firearm on the defendant’s lap. The affidavit
indicated that Noblin observed the defendant fire his
weapon from the vehicle and confirmed that the victim
was pronounced dead at 12:44 a.m. on April 20. It also
referenced the search of the defendant’s home and vehicle
on May 6 and the failure to locate his cell phone.
A judge issued a search warrant for the cell phone
records, and it was later served on T-Mobile. Pursuant
to the warrant, T-Mobile produced the defendant’s callidentifying information and CSLI for the period from
April 20 to May 8, 2017, Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC). Because T-Mobile produced its records using
UTC, rather than Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the
production included data that corresponded to the four
hour period immediately preceding midnight on April
20 in the local time zone—specifically, 8 p.m. to 12 a.m.
EDT on April 19, 2017.
The cell phone records revealed that the defendant was
present at his home in Bridgeport before receiving a call
from Geneus at 11:41 p.m. on April 19, 2017. After the
1
The search warrant application stated in relevant part: “The undersigned, being duly sworn, complains on oath that the undersigned has probable cause to believe that certain property, to wit: Phone records of T-Mobile cellular number 203-xxx-xxxx, to include telephone records, subscriber information and call-identifying information from April 20, 2017 [through] the current date [May 8, 2017]. Any information regarding cell site activation, geographical positioning (GPS) or any other information that would be able to pinpoint the cell phone's location during calls is also requested. Any text messaging data is also requested.” In the interest of privacy, we have redacted the defendant's cell phone number.
State v. Ragin
call, the cell phone records indicate that, from 11:43 to
11:52 p.m., the defendant was moving toward the location of the bar. The records further reveal that, after the defendant was in the vicinity of the bar, there was no user generated activity on the defendant’s phone between
11:52 p.m. and 1 a.m. on April 20, which indicated that
the phone was turned off at some point during this time
period. At 1 a.m., the phone was turned back on, and the
location data reveals that, at 1:30 a.m., the defendant
was in the vicinity of Geneus’ Bridgeport home before
returning to the area near his own home at 2:05 a.m.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his cell
phone records, and all corresponding evidence obtained,
on the basis that the search warrant lacked probable cause and particularity, and was overbroad. At the hearing on
the motion, defense counsel also asserted that, because
the defendant’s cell phone service provider maintained
and produced its records in UTC, it had provided an
additional four hours of information that should be
suppressed as outside the scope of the warrant. The trial
court denied his motion, finding that there was probable
cause, that the warrant was sufficiently particular, and
that it was not overbroad. Additionally, the trial court
found that T-Mobile was not acting as a state actor when
it provided additional material from the night of April
19, 2017, that was outside the scope of the warrant and
that there was no evidence to indicate that the police
knew the T-Mobile records would be provided in UTC and,
therefore, would provide the police with more information than they had requested in the warrant application.
At trial, the state introduced the defendant’s cell
phone records alongside Geneus’ cell phone records and
used the defendant’s call-identifying information and
CSLI in conjunction with Noblin’s testimony to place
the defendant in area of the shooting. The jury found the
defendant guilty of murder and criminal possession of a
pistol.2 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance
2
After the state presented its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court granted this motion only as to the
State v. Ragin
with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the defendant to
fifty years of imprisonment. This direct appeal followed.
See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
The defendant claims that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress his cell phone records
because the search warrant lacked the probable cause
and particularity necessary to comport with both the
United States and Connecticut constitutions,3 that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone’s call-identifying information, and that T-Mobile produced
documents beyond the scope of the warrant.
I
We begin with the defendant’s claim that the warrant
lacked probable cause for the period of April 20 to May
8, 2017. “Whether a warrant satisfies the constitutional
requirements of probable cause and particularity presents
a question of law over which our review is plenary.” State v. Johnson, 354 Conn. 96, 122, 349 A.3d 260 (2026).
charges of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a) and illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 (a).
3
The defendant argues that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution for call-identifying information and CSLI. He asks this court to conclude that, under our state constitution, the police must establish a nexus between the use of a suspect's phone and the crime under investigation to establish probable cause. At oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate counsel specifically argued that this higher probable cause under the state constitution would apply to both callidentifying information and CSLI, and require that the police show a nexus between the crime and the use of the cell phone. We rejected this claim under the federal constitution in State v. Evans, 352 Conn. 794, 818, 339 A.3d 1138 (2025), and, recently, in State v. Johnson, 354 Conn. 96, 121, 349 A.3d 260 (2026), reiterated that the federal and state probable cause standards are the same. Because the defendant does not articulate why the state constitution requires a different standard of probable cause that would provide greater protection for call-identifying information and CSLI, we decline to address the defendant's state constitutional claims as inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 804–805, 256 A.3d 655 (2021) (claim was inadequately briefed when appellant failed to provide any meaningful analysis).
State v. Ragin
“Both the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut
constitution prohibit the issuance of a search warrant
in the absence of probable cause. . . . Probable cause to
search [under both constitutions] is established if there
is probable cause to believe that (1) . . . the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal
activity or will assist in a particular . . . conviction . . . and (2) . . . the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched. . . . There is no uniform formula to determine probable cause—it is not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules—rather, it
turns on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts . . . . Probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . The task
of the issuing [judge] is simply to make a practical, [commonsense] decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Evans, 352 Conn. 794, 816–17, 339 A.3d 1138
(2025); see also State v. Johnson, supra, 354 Conn. 121.
“[A] search warrant satisfies the fourth amendment’s
particularity requirement if it identifies the place or
thing for which there is probable cause to search with sufficient definiteness to preclude indiscriminate searches.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Correa,
353 Conn. 338, 359–60, 341 A.3d 910 (2025). We have
recognized that “[t]he description of items to be seized
in a warrant need only be as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit,” and, “[i]n construing the terms of a warrant, the
circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation dictate a practical margin of flexibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254
Conn. 694, 704, 759 A.2d 995 (2000).
According to the defendant, the state offered no justification for obtaining his phone records for the two
and one-half week period following the victim’s murder.
We disagree. The affidavit established probable cause to
believe that the defendant had committed the murder,
State v. Ragin
that he had used his cell phone shortly before the crime,
and that the police were still searching for his cell phone to seize. In particular, the affidavit recounted Noblin’s
statements to the police, including that he observed the
defendant in possession of a firearm on April 20, 2017,
that the defendant fired the weapon from the driver’s
side window of his vehicle, and that the defendant drove
away immediately after the shooting. Noblin also confirmed the defendant’s cell phone number, which was
corroborated by probation records, and reported that
he had communicated with the defendant shortly before
the shooting.
The affidavit further indicated that, on May 6, 2017,
the police executed a search of the defendant’s residence
and vehicle and specifically sought his cell phone but did not locate it. In light of that unsuccessful search, there was probable cause to believe that the phone remained
outstanding and that its location data and call-identifying information would assist the police not only in
locating the device (which likely contained evidence of the crime) but also in the investigation and any subsequent
prosecution. Accordingly, these facts, together with
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, provided
a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to conclude that
probable cause existed to obtain the defendant’s callidentifying information and CSLI for the period from
April 20 through May 8, 2017. See State v. Evans, supra,
352 Conn. 820–21, 825.4
The defendant also contends that the warrant is not
sufficiently particular because it did not give the cell
4
The defendant initially challenged whether probable cause existed to issue the warrant for CSLI. Subsequent to the filing of his initial brief, we decided State v. Evans, supra, 352 Conn. 794, which set forth the probable cause standard for the search of cell phone CSLI. Id., 819. The defendant concedes that Evans largely resolves his federal constitutional challenge on this ground. The defendant nevertheless argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI under the federal constitution. Under the facts of the present case, we do not disagree. The warrant authorized the police to obtain eighteen days of CSLI. The United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018), made clear that
State v. Ragin
phone service provider specific time parameters for the
records. Specifically, the defendant argues that requesting cell phone records for a specific date range, without
an enumerated time zone, forces the cell phone service
provider to make inferences regarding when a day begins
and ends for purposes of document production.5 The
defendant contends that our decision in State v. Smith,
344 Conn. 229, 252, 278 A.3d 481 (2022), and several
federal cases require that search warrants for cell phone
records specify the applicable time zone. According to the defendant, because the cell phone service provider had
to interpret what it was required to produce, the warrant was ambiguous and therefore lacked the necessary
particularity under the fourth amendment. We disagree.
The defendant’s contention that our decision in State
v. Smith, supra, 344 Conn. 229, requires that a search
warrant include a specific time zone to be sufficiently
particular is not supported by that decision. There, we
explained that one of the warrants at issue “included
no time parameters to cabin the scope of the search but,
rather, allowed for the entire contents of the phone to
be searched for all time.” Id., 252. We concluded “that
the search warrant did not comply with the particularity requirement because it did not sufficiently limit the
the third-party doctrine does not apply to retrospective collection of CSLI for periods of at least seven days and that, therefore, a warrant is required. Id., 309–10, 317 and n.3; see State v. Tyus, 342 Conn. 784, 803–804 and n.12, 272 A.3d 132 (2022) (this court assumed without deciding that collection of CSLI for period of three days was nonetheless search because of sensitive nature of that information). The defendant also makes an ambiguous claim without any analysis that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI that is greater under our state constitution than under the federal constitution. We decline to address this constitutional claim as inadequately briefed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
5
The state argues that the defendant's claim that the warrant is not sufficiently particular because it lacked a specific starting time was not presented in the trial court and that the defendant failed to develop an evidentiary record to support his claim. Upon a review of the record, it is clear that the defendant raised the issue of the additional four hours the police received based on the difference in time zones when challenging the overbreadth of the search warrant. As such, we address his argument.
State v. Ragin
search of the contents of the cell phone by description
of the areas within the cell phone to be searched, or by
a time frame reasonably related to the crimes.” Id. The
decision, as with our other recent decisions upholding
search warrants for call-identifying information or CSLI
from a cell phone service provider for a limited period
of days, was silent with respect to time zones. See State
v. Johnson, supra, 354 Conn. 124–25; State v. Evans,
supra, 352 Conn. 813; see also State v. Smith, supra,
258. As long as the time frame in the warrant reasonably
cabined the scope of the search, we have concluded that
the warrant was sufficiently particular. See, e.g., State
v. Johnson, supra, 125.
As to the federal decisions that the defendant cites,
none is pertinent to the issue with which we are presented. For example, the defendant relies on United
States v. Fisher, 56 F.4th 673, 677 (9th Cir. 2022), and
United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961, 965 (11th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 296, 211 L. Ed.
2d 139 (2021), as examples of cases involving warrants
that include the relevant time zone. In those cases, the
search warrant affidavits referenced reports received
from a social media website or messaging application
in the course of investigations related to the exploitation of children and child pornography. United States
v. Fisher, supra, 677; United States v. Trader, supra,
965. Although the reports referenced in the affidavits
included a specific time zone, the search warrants themselves did not include a time zone in describing the items to be seized, and the courts were not presented with the
question of whether a specific time zone was necessary
to satisfy the particularity requirement of the fourth
amendment. See United States v. Fisher, supra, 676–78;
United States v. Trader, supra, 964–65.
On the basis of our review of the warrant in the present
case, we conclude that it was sufficiently particular. The warrant requests cell phone records from “April 20, 2017
[through May 8, 2017].” It identifies a specific start date, end date, and the relevant year. The search warrant was
State v. Ragin
executed by the Bridgeport police, who operate in EDT,
on T-Mobile’s custodian of records in New Jersey, who
also operates in that time zone. There is no evidence to
indicate that the Bridgeport police were aware that a
search warrant executed on a private entity located in the same time zone would result in their receipt of information pertaining to a time zone other than EDT.6 Given
these circumstances, the inclusion of specific starting
and ending numeric dates was sufficiently particular
to provide T-Mobile with a precise range of requested
information, and the trial court properly denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress.7
II
The defendant asserts that, even if the warrant was
sufficiently particular, the four hours of call-identifying information and CSLI from April 19, 2017, nevertheless
should have been suppressed. The defendant challenges
the trial court’s determination that T-Mobile was not
acting at the behest of the state and that it voluntarily
6
The defendant specifically limited his challenge to the four corners of the warrant and never sought a hearing to try to establish that the Bridgeport police intentionally omitted material information or were aware that T-Mobile maintained records in UTC.
7
The defendant also claims that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his call-identifying information contained in the cell phone records provided by T-Mobile. The defendant challenges the continued viability of the third-party doctrine under both the federal and state constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has explained that the third-party doctrine promulgated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979), remains applicable, as telephone call logs “reveal little in the way of ‘identifying information.’” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 314, 316, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018). Other courts have rejected both federal and state constitutional claims that the third-party doctrine is no longer applicable to call detail records, notwithstanding recent technological changes. See Commonwealth v. Lepage, 494 Mass. 67, 77, 232 N.E.3d 1196 (2024). We need not address these claims in the present case, however, because the police obtained a warrant authorizing the acquisition of the defendant's cell phone records, including call-identifying information. See State v. Lasaga, 269 Conn. 454, 470–71, 848 A.2d 1149 (2004) (declining to address whether reasonable expectation of privacy existed for files on workplace computer because police had obtained warrant supported by probable cause).
State v. Ragin
produced the additional four hours of records. According
to the defendant, the police effectively seized records
outside the scope of the warrant, and those records,
therefore, should be suppressed. In the alternative, the
defendant argues that, once law enforcement discovered
that T-Mobile had produced records corresponding to the
additional four hour period, the police were required to
segregate those records and to obtain a separate warrant
before retaining or using them. The state, on the other
hand, argues that the defendant’s claim challenges the
execution of the warrant, not its validity. The state
contends that the defendant’s claim fails because he
limited his motion to suppress to the four corners of the
warrant, did not seek an evidentiary hearing regarding
the manner in which the warrant was executed, and, in
any event, the exclusionary rule should not be applied
to evidence voluntarily produced by a private party.
For the reasons that follow, we need not decide whether
T-Mobile acted as an agent of the state when it produced
the four hours of call-identifying information and CSLI
at issue in this case because, regardless of its status when it did so, the result would be the same: the application
of the exclusionary rule is not warranted under these
circumstances.
The fourth amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures by the federal government;
see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454–55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); and is
made applicable to state action by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.
Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Accordingly, we have
applied the exclusionary rule to bar the government from
introducing at trial evidence that it obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 331
Conn. 258, 275, 202 A.3d 1003 (2019). The rule’s primary
purpose is “to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the [f]ourth [a]mendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boyd, 295
Conn. 707, 729, 992 A.2d 1071 (2010), cert. denied, 562
State v. Ragin
U.S. 1224, 131 S. Ct. 1474, 179 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2011). A
search or seizure conducted by a private party not acting
as an agent or instrumentality of the state, however, does not violate the fourth amendment and “does not deprive
the government of the right to use evidence that it has
acquired lawfully.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Betts, 286 Conn. 88, 96, 942 A.2d 364 (2008);
see id., 93–94 (fourth amendment was not violated when
defendant’s fiancée independently provided responding
police with incriminating evidence).
Certain searches under the fourth amendment may
require the assistance of private parties with the requisite technical ability to facilitate the execution of the search warrant. See, e.g., Bellville v. Northboro, 375
F.3d 25, 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding search when
private citizens assisted police in identifying technical
computer components); United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d
1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding search of Internet
accounts executed by Yahoo! employees outside presence
of police), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 993, 123 S. Ct. 1817,
155 L. Ed. 2d 693 (2003). In the context of cell phone
records, the state often relies on private cell phone service providers to provide the materials that are the subject
of the search warrant. See, e.g., State v. Smith, supra,
344 Conn. 252 (T-Mobile searched defendant’s records
and provided information subject to search warrant);
see also People v. Riche, 225 App. Div. 3d 30, 32, 34–35,
205 N.Y.S.3d 201 (upholding search when T-Mobile
custodian in New Jersey provided cell phone information to police in New York pursuant to valid warrant),
appeal denied, 42 N.Y.3d 940, 242 N.E.3d 680, 217
N.Y.S.3d 894 (2024). Although involvement of a private
party is often required to effectuate a search warrant of
cell phone records, that private party is not necessarily
acting as an agent of the state when it independently
provides information outside the scope of an otherwise
valid search warrant.
We have stated that “[t]here is no bright line test” for
determining when a private citizen or entity is acting
State v. Ragin
as an agent of the state; State v. Alexander, 197 Conn.
180, 183, 496 A.2d 486 (1985); and that “[t]he issue of
agency, even in a constitutional context, is primarily a
question of fact . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Id., 185. In the fourth amendment context, we have examined whether
the police placed the private party in a position to find
or receive the incriminating evidence, whether there
was a police initiated, preexisting plan, or whether the
private party was self-motivated or acting pursuant to a
reward. See, e.g., State v. Betts, supra, 286 Conn. 101.
In the present case, the trial court concluded that
T-Mobile was not acting at the behest of the state when
it produced the four hours of records at issue. The court
further noted that nothing in the record suggested the
police had engaged in conduct designed to exploit a
temporal ambiguity in the warrant to obtain additional
information. We need not resolve whether these conclusions were correct, however, because the outcome of the
present case is the same either way.
Even if we assume, as the trial court determined, that
T-Mobile was not acting at the behest of the state when it turned over the additional four hours of records at issue, this does not end the inquiry. Although the state lawfully came into possession of the additional records, a distinct question remains: whether the state may retain and
subsequently use that additional information in a later
criminal prosecution. We conclude that, when a thirdparty provider enlisted by the state to execute a technical search voluntarily provides information exceeding the
scope of the warrant and that information is of a type
in which the defendant retains a legitimate expectation
of privacy, the state’s retention and subsequent use of
that information, absent a second warrant, is properly
subject to constitutional challenge. Our conclusion that
law enforcement must generally secure a second warrant
before information of this nature may be retained and
used strikes the appropriate balance between legitimate
law enforcement interests and an individual’s rights,
particularly as the scope of cognizable privacy interests
State v. Ragin
under the fourth amendment continues to develop in the
digital age. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–86, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014); see
also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654–56, 100
S. Ct. 2395, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1980).
Although the state did not obtain a second warrant for
the additional four hours of data produced by T-Mobile in
the present case, we conclude that applying the exclusionary rule under these circumstances is not warranted. As
an initial matter, it is far from certain under the federal constitution that the defendant possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in only four hours of CSLI. See
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310 n.3, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018) (“[W]e need not
decide whether there is a limited period for which the
[g]overnment may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI
free from [f]ourth [a]mendment scrutiny, and if so, how
long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes . . . to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a [f]ourth [a]mendment search.”). And, as we previously
explained, the defendant failed to adequately brief such
claim under our state constitution. See footnote 4 of this opinion. It is evident from the warrant in the present
case that the police, who were in lawful possession of
the additional four hours of call-identifying information
and CSLI, had probable cause to seize those records from
April 19, 2017. See State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22, 69,
128 A.3d 431 (2015) (“when police have lawful access
to an item for which they have probable cause to believe
is evidence of a crime, it is not unreasonable for them
to seize that item without a warrant”). The supporting
affidavit set forth substantial facts establishing that the cell phone records would contain evidence linking the
defendant to the murder under investigation, including
evidence that Noblin and the defendant had spoken by
telephone while Noblin was at the bar shortly before the
victim exited, during a time period encompassing the
evening of April 19 through approximately 12:30 a.m.
on April 20. Suppression of the additional four hours of
call-identifying information and CSLI in the present case
State v. Ragin
would not meaningfully advance the deterrent purposes
underlying the exclusionary rule, as there is no evidence
that law enforcement engaged in deliberate, reckless, or
otherwise improper conduct in obtaining the records.
See, e.g., State v. Brown, supra, 331 Conn. 275. As a
result, we conclude that the trial court properly denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress his cell phone records.
Alternatively, even assuming that T-Mobile’s production of the four hours of call-identifying information and CSLI from April 19, 2017, was attributable to the state,
we conclude that the production reflected a reasonable
response to a valid warrant. As noted, the warrant did
not specify a time zone, and it was reasonably susceptible to an interpretation permitting production using UTC.
See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 141 F.4th 129, 137 (4th
Cir. 2025). On that assumption, suppression would not
meaningfully serve the deterrent purposes underlying
the exclusionary rule, as the record contains no evidence
suggesting that law enforcement acted deliberately, recklessly, or otherwise improperly in obtaining the records.
See State v. Correa, supra, 353 Conn. 359–60; State v.
Brown, supra, 331 Conn. 275.
As a result, and without deciding whether T-Mobile
was acting as an agent of the state when it voluntarily
produced the four hours of call-identifying information
and CSLI from April 19, 2017, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress
his cell phone records.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.